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UNITED NATIONS  NATIONS UNIES
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
---
MESSAGE TO SYMPOSIUM ON THE MEDIA
AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE
Carleton University School of Journalism and Communication
Ottawa, 13 March 2004
When, on 7 April, people around the world commemorate the 10th 
anniversary of the Rwanda genocide, that observance should be fi lled not only 
with remorse, but with resolve.
We must remember the victims – the hundreds of thousands of men, women 
and children abandoned to systematic slaughter while the world, which 
had the capacity to save most of them, failed to save more than a handful, 
forever sullying the collective conscience. We must also help the survivors still 
struggling with the physical and psychological scars. But most of all, we must 
pledge – to ourselves as moral beings and to each other as a human community 
– to act boldly, including through military action when no other course will 
work, to ensure that such a denial of our common humanity is never allowed 
to happen again.
The United Nations has now had ten years to refl ect on the bitter knowledge 
that genocide happened while UN peacekeepers were on the ground in Rwanda, 
and to learn lessons that all humankind should have learned from previous 
genocides. We are determined to sound the alarm about emerging crises and 
to help countries tackle the root causes of their problems. I expect soon to 
appoint a United Nations special adviser on the prevention of genocide, and 
to make other proposals for strengthening our action in this area.
It is encouraging to know that the news media are also undertaking a process 
of self-examination as we collectively remember this tragedy. Media were used 
in Rwanda to spread hatred, to dehumanize people, and even to guide the 
genocidaires toward their victims. Three journalists have even been found 
guilty of genocide, incitement to genocide, conspiracy and crimes against 
humanity by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. We must fi nd 
a way to respond to such abuses of power without violating the principles of 
freedom, which are an indispensable cornerstone of democracy.
I am glad that you are confronting these and other questions, including the 
role of the international media, especially at a school where future journalists 
are being trained. Such training must include refl ection on the responsibilities 
of their chosen profession.
There can be no more important issue, and no more binding obligation, 
than the prevention of genocide. The world has made some progress in 
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understanding the responsibility to protect. Yet it is still not clear, were the 
signs of impending genocide to be seen somewhere today, that the world 
would mount an effective response. I hope that all of us, as diplomats, 
journalists, government offi cials or just concerned citizens, will act promptly 
and effectively, each within our sphere of infl uence, to halt genocide wherever 
it occurs – or better still, to make sure there is no ‘next time’.
x MESSAGE FROM KOFI ANNAN
Preface
It was the French philosopher, Voltaire, who wrote: ‘We owe respect to the 
living; to the dead we owe only truth.’
In the case of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the news media accomplished 
neither of Voltaire’s admonitions. Confronted by Rwanda’s horrors, Western 
news media for the most part turned away, then muddled the story when 
they did pay attention. And hate media organs in Rwanda – through their 
journalists, broadcasters and media executives – played an instrumental 
role in laying the groundwork for genocide, then actively participated in the 
extermination campaign.
On the eve of the tenth anniversary of the Rwanda genocide, the School 
of Journalism and Communication at Carleton University in Ottawa hosted 
a one-day symposium on 13 March 2004, entitled ‘The Media and the 
Rwanda Genocide.’ The symposium examined in tandem the role of both 
the international media and Rwanda’s domestic news organizations in the 
cataclysmic events of 1994. The Carleton symposium brought together for the 
fi rst time an international collection of experts as well as some of the actors 
from the Rwandan drama; it also inspired this collection of papers. Many of 
the contributions found here are based on papers delivered at the Carleton 
event, but others were commissioned or have been reprinted here because of 
their valuable contribution to the debate.
The symposium was made possible by generous contributions from the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Government of 
Canada, through the Global Issues Bureau of the Foreign Affairs department 
and the Canadian International Development Agency. The IDRC has 
also played a key role in the publication of this collection; it continues to 
support Carleton’s efforts to build a Media and Genocide Archive and to 
establish a partnership with the School of Journalism and Communication 
at the National University of Rwanda in Butare through a project called The 
Rwanda Initiative.
I would like to thank all those who contributed to the symposium and to 
this collection, most notably the authors of the papers you are about to read. 
Special thanks are due to Chris Dornan, who was director of the School of 
Journalism and Communication when this project began, Pamela Scholey and 
Bill Carman from the IDRC, Roméo Dallaire, who lent considerable moral 
support to this project, and Sandra Garland, who did wonderful work as a 
copy-editor. Finally, I would like to thank my wife Roula El-Rifai and our 
son, Laith Rifai-Thompson. My passion for Rwanda has often consumed 
time and energy that should have been devoted to my family.
For my part, I came to Rwanda late. Before joining the faculty at Carleton 
in 2003, I was a career journalist with the Toronto Star. I was not in Rwanda 
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in 1994. I fi rst visited in 1996 to report on the repatriation of Hutu refugees 
from the Goma region of what was then eastern Zaire. But Rwanda does get 
inside you and, since then, I think I have been trying to some degree to make 
amends for not having been there in 1994. Reviewing the Toronto Star archives, 
I found an article of mine published on 9 April 1994. I had forgotten ever 
having written it; perhaps it left my memory because it was such a dreadful 
piece of journalism. Written three days into the genocide, the article focused 
entirely on the evacuation of Canadian expatriates from Kigali and invoked 
every cliché of tribal confl ict, chaos and anarchy.
Two months later, in early June, while Roméo Dallaire and his beleaguered 
contingent watched helplessly as the slaughter continued in Rwanda, I 
reported for the Star from Normandy, France, where then Canadian Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien was participating in ceremonies to mark the fi ftieth 
anniversary of D-Day. In my experience, major events taking place elsewhere 
in the world often become a preoccupation for the journalists reporting on 
such international gatherings. But as I recall, during that weekend of speeches 
and press conferences in Normandy commemorating a war that ended half  
a century earlier, there was nary a mention of what was going on at that 
moment in Rwanda. None of the leaders mentioned the Rwanda genocide. 
Nor did any in the media throng covering the D-Day commemorations ask 
about Rwanda. 
The collection you are about to read explores the role of hate media in the 
Rwanda genocide and examines international media coverage of the genocide. 
Then it turns to an assessment of the guilty verdict in the international criminal 
tribunal for Rwanda’s ‘Media Trial’ and fi nally concludes with a section on the 
aftermath, examining the current media climate in Rwanda, media intervention 
strategies and the place of the Rwanda genocide in popular culture.
The purpose of looking back at the media’s role in the Rwanda events is 
not just to remember. We still have some learning to do on this subject and 
examining the way journalists and news organizations conducted themselves 
in 1994 is not just a historical exercise. Sadly, we don’t yet seem to have fully 
discerned or absorbed the lessons from Rwanda.
Ultimately, this collection is dedicated to those who perished in 1994. To 
underline the point, I would like to borrow a comparison used by British 
journalist, Scott Peterson. To understand the number of dead, imagine that 
every word in this book is the name of a victim. This entire volume would 
list only 200,000 of the dead, a fraction of the estimated toll of nearly one 
million people. As you read this collection, look at every word. Then think of 
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The images are so disturbing they are diffi cult to watch. Two women kneel 
amid the bodies of those who have already been slain. They are at the side of 
a dirt road in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. Their fi nal moments are captured 
on video by a British journalist, one of only a few foreign reporters left in the 
country, who is recording clandestinely from the top of  a building nearby.1
Remarkably, during a genocide that claimed as many as a million lives, this is 
one of the only times a killing is recorded by the media. In the footage, one of 
the women is pleading, fi rst clasping her hands in front of her, as if  in prayer, 
then throwing open her arms, appealing to the throng of men who are milling 
about nearby, holding machetes and sticks. Further along the road are the 
bodies of  others who have been dragged out of their homes and killed. The 
woman continues to beg, but the men seem to be oblivious to her. A young 
boy dressed in a T-shirt strolls past, giving the women only a backward glance. 
At one point, you can see a man in the crowd clutching something in his left 
hand. It appears to be a radio.
Minutes go by and the woman continues to plead for her life. The other 
fi gure crouched beside her barely fl inches. Men wielding sticks in one hand and 
machetes in the other move forward and begin to pound the bodies that are 
strewn around the two women, striking the corpses again and again. One man 
gives the bodies a fi nal crack, as if  driving a stake into the ground, then slings 
his stick over his shoulder and ambles off. All the while, the woman continues to 
wave her arms and plead. A white pickup truck approaches and drives through 
the scene. The windshield wipers are fl opping back and forth. One of the men 
huddled in the back of the vehicle waves a hand at the woman who is kneeling 
on the ground. He taunts her with a greeting.
Finally, two other men approach. One, dressed in dark trousers and a white 
shirt, winds up to strike the pleading woman. He has the posture of someone 
who is about to whip an animal. She recoils. Then he strikes her on the head 
with the stick he is clutching in his right hand. She crumples to the ground, 
then suffers more blows from her murderer. Almost at the same moment, the 
other woman is struck down as well by another assailant, her head very nearly 
lopped off  by the initial blow. Finally, the two men walk away casually, leaving 
the bodies to squirm. In the distance, there is the sound of birdsong.
The date is 18 April 1994, nearly two weeks after the 6 April plane crash 
that claimed the life of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and plunged 
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Rwanda into the abyss. The tiny central African country, a mere dot on the 
world map, garnered virtually no international media attention before the killing 
spree that followed the president’s death. No one had paid much attention to 
a fl edgling peace accord signed in Arusha, Tanzania in 1993, setting out the 
details for a power-sharing arrangement between the majority Hutu population 
and the minority Tutsi, represented in the talks by the rebels from the Tutsi-
dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). An international peacekeeping 
force, commanded by a Canadian general, Roméo Dallaire, was dispatched 
to oversee implementation of the accord. Dallaire and his peacekeepers were 
only vaguely aware of the mounting tensions in the autumn of 1993, but heard 
rumblings about a ‘third force’ – Hutu extremists who opposed the power-
sharing arrangement.
The voice of Hutu Power was the private radio station RTLM, established 
by extremists who surrounded the president. And RTLM was an echo of other 
extremist media, notably the newspaper Kangura. Once the president’s plane was 
shot down by unknown assailants, the message from RTLM was unmistakable: 
the Tutsi were to blame; they were the enemy and Rwanda would be better 
off  without them. The killings began almost immediately in Kigali through 
the night of  6–7 April. Hutu moderates, who were willing to share power, 
were among the fi rst targeted, along with Tutsi marked for extermination in a 
campaign that eventually fanned out across the country. Many of the hundreds 
of thousands of Rwandans who were slaughtered had huddled in churches for 
sanctuary. Death squads lobbed in grenades. In their frenzy, killers severed the 
Achilles tendons on the heels of their victims, so they could return and fi nish 
the job later. Teachers killed students, neighbours slaughtered neighbours as 
local offi cials helped organize the killing.
In its 2003 verdict in the ‘Media Trial’ of  executives from RTLM and 
Kangura, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) confi rmed 
the undoubted role of Rwandan hate media in the killing:
The newspaper and the radio explicitly and repeatedly, in fact relentlessly, 
targeted the Tutsi population for destruction. Demonizing the Tutsi as having 
inherently evil qualities, equating the ethnic group with ‘the enemy’ and 
portraying its women as seductive enemy agents, the media called for the 
extermination of the Tutsi ethnic group as a response to the political threat 
that they associated with Tutsi ethnicity. (ICTR 2003: para. 72)
(The full text of the judgement summary can be found in Part Three of this 
collection.)
Most international news organizations initially misunderstood the nature 
of the killing in Rwanda, portraying it as the result of  tribal warfare, rather 
than genocide. Much of the international coverage focused on the scramble to 
evacuate expatriates from the country. In mid-April, when the killing intensifi ed, 
the volume of news reports actually declined. Most journalists had left along 
with the other foreigners. 
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The grainy video captured on 18 April by Nick Hughes, who was positioned 
on the top fl oor of the French School, is truly the exception that proves the 
rule. Hughes looked fi rst through the scope of  a rocket launcher, borrowed 
from a Belgian soldier stationed in the school. Then he trained his camera on 
what he saw taking place in the road below. Hughes would recount later that he 
had to stop shooting at several points for fear that his lone remaining battery 
pack would expire and, as a result, there are ‘jump cuts’ in the video at points 
when he briefl y turned off  his camera. Because he was shooting from such a 
distance, the sound on the audio track is the background noise in the school 
and, occasionally, the voice of  Hughes and an associate. ‘She’s praying over 
the person that has just been killed,’ he comments at one point. ‘They’re going 
to kill her, you can see that,’ he says later.
Eventually, the international media reports on Rwanda were replete with 
images of bloated corpses, strewn at the roadside or choking Rwanda’s rivers. 
But because there were so few foreign journalists on the ground at the height 
of the killing and because the domestic media had either been cowed or co-
opted into the massacres, there are no other known images of the crime itself, 
the crime of genocide. Would the world have reacted differently if  confronted 
daily by images of people being slaughtered rather than the static, disembodied 
pictures of disfi gured corpses? More informed and comprehensive coverage of 
the Rwanda genocide, particularly in those early days, might well have mitigated 
or even halted the killing by sparking an international outcry. The news media 
could have made a difference. But within Rwanda, the only news media making 
a difference were hate media, such as RTLM, which proved instrumental in 
fanning the fl ames and implicating tens of  thousands of  ordinary people in 
the genocide. 
Journalists could have had an impact in Rwanda – a sort of Heisenberg effect 
– had there been a signifi cant enough media presence to infl uence events. The 
Heisenberg effect, named for German physicist Werner Heisenberg, describes 
how the act of  observing a particle actually changes the behaviour of  that 
particle, its velocity or direction. Arguably, more comprehensive and accurate 
reporting about the Rwanda genocide could have changed the behaviour of the 
perpetrators, mitigating the slaughter. Instead, the lack of international media 
attention contributed to what I would call a sort of inverse Heisenberg effect. 
Through their absence and a failure to adequately observe and record events, 
journalists contributed to the behaviour of the perpetrators of  the genocide 
– who were encouraged by the world’s apathy and acted with impunity.
At every turn, it seems, we return to this troubling equation, implicating 
news media – both within Rwanda and internationally – in the genocide. In 
looking back on this period, it is important to examine the role of domestic 
hate media and the international media in tandem in one collection of papers. 
As uncomfortable as this connection may seem, we cannot separate the two. We 
are looking at the role of the media, the power of its message and the impact 
of an information vacuum.
There is a considerable and growing body of  literature on the Rwanda 
genocide in general and the role of the media in particular. Indeed, a number 
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of authors have focused intently on the role of  hate media in fostering and 
fomenting the genocide and that important work is refl ected and elaborated 
upon in the collection of papers you are about to read. This collection takes 
the crucial step of juxtaposing analysis of the Rwandan media with analysis 
of coverage by the international media, thus encouraging a broader refl ection 
on the role of the media as a whole. No other publication brings together both 
sides of the topic in this way. The role of hate media in the Rwanda genocide 
is in some ways self-evident. But it is not so clear, or at least not as universally 
accepted, that international media played a role in the genocide as well.
In the autumn of 1994, French journalist Edgar Roskis, wrote in Le Monde 
Diplomatique of  ‘un genocide sans images’, a genocide without images. His 
article, translated and reprinted in this collection, underlines the point that 
because most foreign journalists fl ed the country, the indisputable crime of 
genocide very nearly went unrecorded. Roskis cites French photographer, 
Patrick Robert, who was working in Rwanda at the time for the Paris-based 
Sygma photo agency. ‘There were six American correspondents,’ Robert 
recounted. ‘They had scarcely arrived when their editors gave them all orders 
to come home. At the Hôtel des Mille Collines, I picked up snatches of their 
conversations: “Too dangerous, not enough interest ... deep Africa, you know 
... middle of nowhere.”’
From 6 April until the middle of May, when the bulk of the genocide took 
place, Rwanda was still relegated to the inside pages of most newspapers, Roskis 
notes. The photos that were published were small and often old, the accounts 
second-hand, with little if  any news appearing for days at a time.
The international media really only began to pay attention once Hutu refugees 
began to pour out of Rwanda into neighbouring countries. As Roskis contends, 
it was the ‘humanitarian melodrama’ of Goma that fi nally garnered the full 
attention of the international media. The Rwanda genocide was a media event, 
without question. And yet, it never quite graduated to the rank of  ‘mega-
event’, the kind of sensation that frequently attracts hundreds of international 
reporters, camera crews and satellite uplinks. 
There is irony here. Dallaire continues to insist that with an intervention force 
of  5,000 troops, he could have put a halt to the killing. But the world’s power 
brokers – chief  among them the United States, Great Britain and France – used 
their positions on the United Nations Security Council to argue against 
intervention. The lack of focused, persistent media coverage of events in Rwanda 
only served to help the cause of  those foot-draggers who did not want to get 
involved. Many blame American unwillingness to be drawn into Rwanda on 
‘Somalia fatigue’, a reference to its humiliating withdrawal from Mogadishu in 
1993 after 18 US rangers died in an abortive mission. The bodies of some of the 
helicopter pilots were later mutilated and dragged through the streets of  the 
Somali capital by a jeering crowd. Canadian journalist, Paul Watson, then working 
for the Toronto Star, captured a Pulitzer-prize-winning photograph of the body 
of one of the American pilots as it was being hauled through the streets. That 
searing media image was published by many US newspapers and is widely credited 
with prompting the Clinton administration to withdraw from Somalia.
INTRODUCTION 5
A media image contributed to US withdrawal from one African mission. 
A year later, at the height of the Rwanda genocide, the lack of media images 
probably helped the cause of those in Washington, London, Paris and other 
major capitals who wanted to avoid mounting an international intervention 
in another African country. As Dallaire puts it in his overview chapter in this 
collection, the world turned its back on Rwanda, not least because international 
news organizations initially downplayed the story. The Rwanda genocide, as a 
news event, simply did not break through.
By most accounts, there were only two foreign journalists in Rwanda on 6 
April 1994, when Habyarimana’s plane was shot down: Katrin van der Schoot, 
a freelance Flemish reporter for Belgian radio, and Lindsey Hilsum (the author 
of ‘Reporting Rwanda: the Media and the Aid Agencies’, in Part Two of this 
collection). Hilsum was in Rwanda on a temporary contract for UNICEF, 
although she also worked as a freelance reporter for the BBC, the Guardian and 
the Observer. As Hilsum recounts in her paper, some Nairobi-based journalists 
managed to move southward from Uganda with the RPF. Others – among them 
the BBC’s Mark Doyle, who recounts his experiences in this volume – persuaded 
a World Food Programme offi cial in Entebbe to fl y them into Kigali on a plane 
being used to evacuate foreigners. A few others drove up from Burundi, but 
for most of April, there were no more than 10 to 15 reporters in the country 
at any time.
As Hilsum describes, most of  the journalists were Africa specialists, but 
even they did not understand what was happening at fi rst. ‘With a shooting 
war in the east and the north and massacres in much of the country, for most 
of April it was genuinely confusing,’ Hilsum writes. The journalists who did 
remain were mainly British, French and Belgian. Most US reporters had been 
ordered to leave by their employers because it was too dangerous. Although 
a signifi cant number of reporters arrived on the scene shortly after the killing 
began, most were there with instructions to cover the attempts to rescue foreign 
nationals. And all but a handful left along with the evacuees in mid-April. There 
was virtually no ‘real time’ TV news out of Rwanda for the fi rst weeks of the 
genocide because it was too risky to send an expensive satellite uplink into the 
country. The fi rst satellite uplink was erected in Kigali only in late May, after 
the RPF had secured the airport.
As French journalist, Anne Chaon, notes in her contribution to this collection, 
the media muddled the story from June onward, when the French military began 
‘Operation Turquoise’ in southwest Rwanda. ‘Dozens of reporters returned to 
Rwanda. And while they were able at that time to discover the enormity of the 
killing campaign in this area ... they reported also on the humanitarian and 
military intervention from abroad. The result was that the reality of genocide 
was, once again, submerged in too much information.’ 
* * *
This collection of papers grew out of the 13 March 2004 symposium at Carleton 
University, organized by Canada’s best-known and oldest journalism school. 
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The purpose of the event was to make a direct and explicit connection between 
the conduct of  Rwandan media in the genocide and the role played by the 
international media. Like the symposium, the collection of papers follows the 
same structure, with an added focus in the fi nal section on events since 1994 
and the current state of the media in post-genocide Rwanda.
A substantial introductory section includes a historical overview by Gerry 
Caplan, author of  the Organization of  African Unity report, Rwanda: the 
Preventable Genocide (IPEP 2000). Retired Canadian General Roméo Dallaire 
speaks from the unique vantage point of a key player during the period, with 
fi rst-hand knowledge of the role of the media, his failed attempts to shut down 
or jam RTLM hate radio and his efforts to attract international media attention 
to the genocide in Rwanda. Dallaire argues that hate media were essentially the 
soundtrack of the genocide and were deployed as a weapon. He also recounts 
how, in his view, the international media infl uenced events by their absence, at 
a time when so much attention was focused on the war in the Balkans, where 
white Europeans were the victims. 
This central contention – that local hate media fomented the genocide and 
international media essentially facilitated the process by turning their backs – is 
the crux of this collection of papers. This collection is, in essence, a journey 
through the media role in the events in Rwanda, a journey that has not yet 
reached its destination.
HATE MEDIA IN RWANDA
It is logical to begin with an examination of  the evolution of  hate media in 
Rwanda and the particular role played by radio station RTLM and the newspaper 
Kangura. Alison Des Forges, senior advisor to Human Rights Watch’s Africa 
Division and the author of the defi nitive work Leave None to Tell the Story: 
Genocide in Rwanda (Des Forges 1999), sets the scene with a broad historical 
overview of the development of hate media in Rwanda and the world’s failure 
to deal effectively with the phenomena. French historian Jean-Pierre Chrétien,
co-author of Rwanda: les Médias du Génocide (Chrétien et al. 1995), traces the 
evolution of RTLM in Rwandan society. He describes how the organizers of 
the genocide plotted to use the airwaves to instill the notion of ‘the democratic 
alibi’, justifying the extermination of the Tutsi on the grounds that they posed 
a threat to the majority Hutu. Marcel Kabanda, a Rwandan historian and also 
co-author of Rwanda: les Médias du Génocide (Chrétien et al. 1995), focuses on 
the role of print media in the lead-up to the genocide, specifi cally the bimonthly 
newspaper Kangura. Jean-Marie Higiro, now an associate professor in the 
Department of Communication at Western New England College in Springfi eld, 
Massachusetts, was director of the Rwandan Information Offi ce in Kigali from 
31 July 1993 to 6 April 1994. He examines the impact of the private print press 
on Rwandan politics before the genocide. Darryl Li, explores more fully the 
impact of  RTLM on its listeners by interviewing dozens of  Rwandans who 
were part of the RTLM audience and admitted to taking part in the genocide. 
Charles Mironko uses data from interviews with nearly 100 confessed genocide 
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perpetrators to analyze critically the relationship between the rhetoric of ethnic 
hatred so prevalent among Rwandan political elites and the forces that propelled 
ordinary Rwandan Hutu to participate in killing Tutsi. Kenyan journalist Mary 
Kimani, who worked for a number of  years with Internews Rwanda, uses a
detailed content analysis of recordings of RTLM broadcasts to make the case 
that individual broadcasters – not their guests or government offi cials – were 
most likely to use the airwaves to disseminate hate.
And fi nally we hear from Thomas Kamilindi, a former Radio Rwanda 
journalist based in Kigali, who later worked as a freelance correspondent in 
Rwanda for the BBC and other media outlets. In a personal reporter’s memoir, 
he recounts how he resigned from state-run radio in Rwanda a few months 
before the 1994 genocide started because he had sometimes been asked to 
broadcast news repugnant to him. 
INTERNATIONAL MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE GENOCIDE
Part Two turns to the other side of  the equation to examine the role of 
international media coverage of  the genocide. The contention is that while 
hate media in Rwanda contributed to the genocide by playing a proactive role, 
the international media also played a role by, in essence, acquiescing to the 
killing campaign by downplaying it. But that is the critique writ large. Through 
a combination of  journalistic memoirs from reporters who were in the fi eld 
and academic studies by observers of  the international media coverage, this 
section canvasses such issues as the responsibility of individual journalists and 
the constraints faced by journalists reporting from war zones.
The fi rst contributor is Mark Doyle, the BBC journalist who spent more 
time on the ground in Rwanda during the genocide than any other foreign 
reporter. His paper navigates the fi rst days of the genocide through the eyes of 
a reporter and, notably, includes numerous extracts from the transcripts of his 
crucial broadcasts from Rwanda in the midst of the killing. He discusses his 
own deliberations over when and how to use the word genocide to describe what 
was going on around him. Anne Chaon is a journalist with Agence France-
Presse, who worked on AFP’s Africa desk in Paris during the fi rst weeks of 
the genocide, then reported from Rwanda in June before heading to eastern 
Zaire in July. Chaon takes issue with the conventional wisdom that individual 
journalists missed the story in Rwanda and, instead, argues that journalists 
did the best they could under the circumstances and that the problem was that 
readers and decision-makers didn’t care about a tiny country in Africa. As one 
of only two foreign reporters on the ground when the genocide began, Lindsey 
Hilsum is in a unique position to describe media coverage of  the genocide 
and the disproportionate attention paid in July and August to the plight of 
Hutu refugees who had fl ed to Goma, in eastern Zaire. She contends that the 
complex political causes of the exodus to Goma were not understood by the 
public nor by many of the journalists who covered Goma as a humanitarian 
story. Steven Livingston, associate professor of political communication and 
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international affairs at The George Washington University in Washington, 
DC, analyzes American television coverage of  the genocide and concludes 
that the US stood at arm’s length from events in Rwanda in the spring of 1994 
because policymakers believed their predecessors in the George H.W. Bush 
administration were lured into Somalia by television pictures. Linda Melvern,
investigative journalist and author of A People Betrayed: The Role of the West 
in Rwanda’s Genocide (Melvern 2000) and Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan 
Genocide (Melvern 2004), argues that international media contributed directly 
to the genocide by misconstruing the killing in the fi rst weeks as spontaneous, 
tribal warfare rather than a systematic campaign to exterminate a minority. 
Nigerian-born researcher Emmanuel Alozie is one of  the few to seriously 
examine African media coverage of the genocide. Alozie, professor of media 
communications at Governors State University in Illinois, analyzes coverage of 
the Rwanda genocide in The Nation newspaper in Kenya and Nigeria’s Guardian
and makes some comparisons with African media coverage of Darfur a decade 
later. Nick Hughes, the British cameraman and later fi lm producer, describes 
the important footage he captured in Rwanda, one of the only known instances 
of a killing during the genocide recorded by the media. Mike Dottridge, who 
was a desk offi cer with Amnesty International at the time of the genocide, takes 
a step back from the issue of media coverage to explore the fact that so little 
attention was paid to events in Rwanda before the genocide, particularly in the 
late 1980s and between 1990 and 1994, despite abundant evidence of unrest. 
His paper situates the three and a half  years of inaction, as RTLM broadcast 
its messages of hate, in a broader context in which journalists and others based 
outside Rwanda share responsibility for this inaction.
Part Two also reprints accounts by several journalists who reported from 
Rwanda during the genocide, including Tom Giles, who was a BBC producer 
in Rwanda in 1994, and Richard Dowden, who was Africa editor for the British 
newspaper the Independent at the time. It also includes the piece by French 
journalist Edgar Roskis, who wrote in Le Monde Diplomatique in the autumn of 
1994 about the impact of the lack of images from the Rwanda genocide. We also 
reprint a paper by Alan J. Kuperman, now assistant professor at the University 
of Texas. Kuperman argues that international media were guilty of several key 
lapses: they mistook the killing for a resumption of the civil war, grossly under-
estimated the death counts, left en masse at a critical moment and those who 
remained focused almost exclusively on Kigali. The exploration of international 
media coverage of  the genocide is rounded out with an analysis by Melissa 
Wall, a journalism professor of  news magazine coverage at California State 
University, Northridge. Wall, whose paper was fi rst published in Gazette: The 
International Journal for Communication Studies, discovered several disturbing 
themes in coverage: Rwandan violence was the result of irrational tribalism, 
Rwandan people were little better than animals, the violence was incompre-
hensible, neighbouring countries were just as violent and only the West was 
capable of solving Rwanda’s problems. 
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JOURNALISM AS GENOCIDE – THE MEDIA TRIAL
Part Three explores the 3 December 2003 guilty verdict in the so-called ‘Media 
Trial’ before the ICTR. The tribunal convicted Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze of genocide, direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide and crimes against humanity 
(persecution and extermination). Nahimana and Barayagwiza were the directors 
of RTLM, which was found to have fanned the fl ames of hate and genocide in 
Rwanda. Ngeze was the editor of the extremist newspaper Kangura. The full 
text of the summary of the verdict, issued by judges Navanethem Pillay, Erik 
Møse and Asoka de Zoysa Gunawardana, is included in this section as a key 
reference document.
The rest of the section explores the Media Trial from four key vantage points. 
Simone Monasebian, who was one of the trial attorneys with the ICTR and a 
prosecutor in the Media Trial, focuses specifi cally on RTLM broadcasts before 6 
April 1994. She argues that the world community had grounds to intervene well 
before RTLM used its broadcasts to goad the killers and that RTLM broadcasts 
after 6 April could not have had the impact they did without the several months 
of conditioning of the population. In a direct retort to Monasebian, Jean-Marie 
Biju-Duval, a Paris-based lawyer who served as defence counsel for Ferdinand 
Nahimana, takes issue with the legal arguments that were central to the guilty 
verdict in the Media Trial. Biju-Duval attacks the tribunal’s ruling on the 
question of the criminality of the propaganda that was broadcast and published 
before 6 April 1994, when the attack on the president’s plane precipitated the 
massacres and genocide of April to July 1994, during which he concedes the 
media did make direct calls for extermination. Charity Kagwi–Ndungu, who 
was also a prosecutor in the trial, examines the diffi culty of  prosecuting the 
crime of incitement to genocide in print media. She argues, ‘The challenge is 
how to counter war propaganda and speeches in the future that jeopardize the 
lives of minority groups.’ Finally, Binaifer Nowrojee, author of Shattered Lives: 
Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath (Nowrojee 
1996) focuses on the direct link between the sexually graphic and offensive 
depiction of  Tutsi women in the pages of  Kangura before the genocide and 
the brutal sexual violence and rape that became a stock in trade of the killers 
during the genocide. Nowrojee takes issue with the Rwanda tribunal’s failure 
to prosecute journalists specifi cally for inciting sexual violence. 
AFTER THE GENOCIDE AND THE WAY FORWARD
Part Four of  this collection explores issues that emerged after the Rwanda 
genocide – such questions as appropriate strategies for media intervention in 
such a situation, the role of the media in peace-building and in cases where the 
media in vulnerable societies are being abused. This concluding section also 
looks at the media climate in Rwanda and, fi nally, the portrayal of the Rwanda 
genocide in popular culture.
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Frank Chalk, co-director of the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human 
Rights Studies and co-author of History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and 
Case Studies (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990), makes blunt recommendations for 
aggressive intervention in situations where media are being manipulated. Chalk 
recommends three possible forms of intervention: early-stage interventions in 
confl ict situations where mass killing has not begun; medium-stage interventions 
in societies just beginning to suffer genocidal massacres; and late-stage 
interventions launched when genocide is underway, which could require actually 
destroying the transmitters and printing presses of the hate media outlets. 
Philippe Dahinden, a Swiss journalist, focuses on his experience founding and 
managing the independent station Radio Agatashya, which covered Rwanda, 
Burundi and the Kivu after July 1994 in an attempt to counter the destructive 
messages of hate radio. This led to the creation of the Hirondelle Foundation, 
an international organization of journalists that establishes media operations 
in crisis areas. 
Mark Frohardt, Africa regional director for Internews and former deputy 
chief  of  mission for the United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in 
Rwanda (May 1995 to June 1997), describes a groundbreaking analysis on the 
role of  media in vulnerable societies. According to Frohardt and co-author 
Jonathan Temin, vulnerable societies are highly susceptible to movement toward 
civil confl ict or repressive rule or both. They advocate structural interventions, 
such as strengthening domestic and international journalist networks; content-
specifi c interventions, such as issue-oriented training; and aggressive interventions, 
such as radio and television jamming. 
The current media climate in Rwanda is the subject of  a paper by Lars 
Waldorf, a former Human Rights Watch staffer in Rwanda. He describes 
how an authoritarian regime in Rwanda continues to justify censorship and 
propaganda as a necessary safeguard against the recrudescence of genocide. 
Waldorf contends that after the RPF stopped the genocide and took control in 
July 1994, it retooled the previous regime’s information agency and the offi cial 
media to disseminate its own propaganda. 
Carleton University professor Michael Dorland writes about the place of 
the Rwanda genocide in popular culture, with particular reference to the fi lm 
‘Hotel Rwanda’. Dorland, an expert on the Holocaust fi lm genre, refl ects on 
what happens to this genre when the subjects are not Jewish.
Finally, in an epilogue written in 2006 – some twelve years after the genocide 
– I refl ect on what, if  anything, has changed in the meantime. If  we can’t fi gure 
out the structural fl aws in the news media that resulted in the failure to provide 
adequate coverage of the Rwanda genocide or the more recent crisis in Darfur, 
surely that diffi culty should not prevent us from trying to change the structure one 
small piece at a time, through the work of individual journalists. The collection 
ends with a rallying cry to journalists, to assume their responsibilities.
It is our hope that this collection of papers will foster a more critical and 
comprehensive examination of  the role of  the news media in the Rwanda 
genocide. The stark reality is that all these years later, we have barely begun to 
learn the lessons of Rwanda.
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NOTES
1. A copy of the raw footage shot by journalist Nick Hughes has been deposited in the Media and 
Genocide Archive at Carleton University. The footage was also entered as Exhibit 467 at the 
trial of Georges Rutaganda before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, 
Tanzania.
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The news media – both domestic and international – played a crucial role 
in the 1994 Rwanda genocide. From my vantage point as commander of the 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), I was able to 
watch the strange dichotomy of local media, on one side, fuelling the killing 
while international media, on the other side, virtually ignored or misunderstood 
what was happening.
The local media, particularly the extremist radio station Radio-Télévision 
Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM), were literally part of  the genocide. The 
genocidaires used the media like a weapon. The haunting image of killers with 
a machete in one hand and a radio in the other never leaves you.
The international media initially affected events by their absence. A tree was 
falling in the forest and no one was there to hear it. Only those of us in Rwanda, 
it seemed, could hear the sound, because the international media were not there 
in any appreciable numbers at the outset.
And my mission, especially in those early days, was ill equipped to monitor 
what was being broadcast in the local media or to counteract it with strong 
messages of our own about the UN and its role in Rwanda.
To step back for a moment, it is important to set the scene in Rwanda in 
1993–94, then to look at the ways in which the media were involved, both locally 
and internationally. This was a time when Rwanda had, in theory, fi nished a civil 
war. Enemies had signed a peace agreement, some of them under duress. In the 
course of a year, the country moved from a peace agreement through political 
stagnation to assassinations, massacres, civil war and, ultimately, genocide. In 
the end, the Tutsi minority actually won the war, gained control of the whole 
country and is now on a different path. 
In my view, 1993–94 was an era in the ‘new world disorder’, not the ‘new 
world order’, as George Bush, Sr, called it. No new military thinking, no new 
diplomatic thinking was coming to the fore.
We were entering an era of confl ict into which many diplomats, politicians, 
soldiers and humanitarian relief  workers stumbled. They did a lot of on-the-
job training, a lot of crisis management. In some cases they applied too many 
resources, at a terrible cost of life. In Rwanda, they didn’t want to get involved 
at all, creating an orphan nation, where the people simply didn’t count. 
The American experience in Mogadishu in October 1993 signifi cantly changed 
the will of the Western world to commit itself to the betterment of the developing 
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world. Eighteen American soldiers were killed. They were professional soldiers 
who knew that every day when they woke up, they risked their lives. It was part 
of their way of life, their professional commitment. But after 18 military deaths 
in Somalia, the imperial power turned tail and ran. 
The Americans had entered Somalia, along with Canadians and soldiers 
from many other countries, because hundreds of thousands of Somalis were 
dying of thirst and lack of food and medical supplies. When the Americans 
eventually pulled out – and pulled the heart out of the mission leaving it in the 
hands of Pakistanis, Italians, Canadians and the UN – there were still hundreds 
of thousands of Somalis dying. But for the United States, the price had become 
too high. The price of 18 soldiers was too high for the American government 
to continue with its stated aim of helping Somalia.
In Rwanda, in the fi rst 24 hours of the genocide, the death of ten Belgian 
soldiers was too much for Belgium, the ex-colonial power, to sustain. It was 
a massive shock, I agree, and the Belgians pulled out and tried to convince 
everybody else that we should leave. They said we would all be massacred and 
nobody wanted to get involved in another African escapade where the risk of 
soldiers’ lives was too high. 
A representative of one major power came to me within the fi rst weeks of 
the genocide and said quite clearly that, after doing an assessment, they had 
decided that they were not going to come and stop the carnage. There were 
bodies all over. We were already burning bodies with diesel fuel, because of the 
fear of disease, the smell and the wild dogs. This representative said, ‘You know, 
this country is of no strategic value. Geographically, it provides us nothing. It’s 
not even worth putting a radar station here. Economically it’s nothing, because 
there’s no strategic resources, only tea and coffee, and the bottom is falling out 
of those markets.’
This person said, ‘In fact what there’s too much of here is people. Well, we’re 
not going to come because of people.’ In quantifying that, he went on to say 
that his government could only reconsider its decision not to intervene if  for 
every one if  its soldiers either killed or injured, there would be an equivalent 
of 85,000 dead Rwandans. 
Are all humans human or are some more human than others? Do some count 
more than others? Millions of dollars were pouring into Yugoslavia in 1994 
along with tens of thousands of troops. Everybody was looking at Yugoslavia. 
Nobody came to Rwanda. They pulled everything out and abandoned us in the 
fi eld. There were more people killed, injured, internally displaced and turned 
into refugees in 100 days in Rwanda than during the six years of the Yugoslav 
campaign. And yet, the powers that be ripped the heart out of the possibility 
of stopping, or at least curtailing, the killing or saving of black Africans. It was 
as if  those people didn’t count.
In Yugoslavia, the problems were portrayed as long-standing divisions that 
educated people had debated. It was religious and ethnic confl ict, something 
studied and analyzed. As such, we brought in new terms, like ‘ethnic cleansing’ to 
describe Yugoslavia. In Rwanda, it was just a bunch of tribes going at each other, 
like they always do. Rwanda was black. Yugoslavia was white European. 
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And where were the media? Where were the media in that debate? How many 
were taken in or set up? In terms of humanity, the real crisis at that time was 
in a small country in black Africa that nobody was interested in. The media 
for the most part travelled down the road of the mainstream thinking of the 
world powers – it was Yugoslavia that mattered, not Rwanda.
While the killing raged on in Rwanda, the O.J. Simpson case dominated the 
airwaves. Tonya Harding’s kneecapping of her fi gure skating competitor was 
there as well. You had Nelson Mandela’s election in South Africa. You had 
Yugoslavia. And, oh yes, somewhere in there, a bunch of black tribesmen in 
Africa were killing each other. During the 100 days of the Rwanda genocide, 
there was more coverage of Tonya Harding by ABC, CBS and NBC than of 
the genocide itself. Was that because of a love of pathos? Was it because of the 
excitement? Was it because the Harding story was on CNN’s radar screen? Or 
was it the hand of someone above, guiding the media and getting across the 
subtle message, ‘Listen, we have absolutely no interest in going into another 
hellhole in Africa. We do not want to get involved in Rwanda. So don’t get us 
involved.’
The media, like so many others in Rwanda, failed. The world powers failed. 
Individually we failed. 
Major news agencies devote fewer resources to Africa to begin with and 
virtually ignore small countries like Rwanda, which are deemed to be of little 
strategic value. There is no context, no general understanding of situations like 
the one that evolved in Rwanda. As I say in my book, when I was asked to go 
and serve as commander of  the mission in Rwanda, I had to ask, ‘Rwanda, 
that’s in Africa isn’t it?’ 
Before the genocide, the media scene in Rwanda was essentially internal 
with some local stringers, who were responding more often than not to the 
international journalists based in Nairobi. Until the start of the war, international 
media involvement amounted to: ‘Is there an event? Do we go or do we just 
get the stringer?’ 
Months before the genocide, when we opened our mission headquarters 
with President Habyarimana in attendance, a number of  journalists from 
international agencies were there. When the president was sworn in as part of 
the new government, there was international media coverage. When there was 
a massacre in the northwest of the country, there was international coverage. 
But in essence, the international press were neophytes when it came to Rwanda. 
In fact, one international media organization was using a Rwandan stringer in 
Kigali who was part of the extremist movement. I had a call from a London 
journalist, who asked questions that were clearly based on false information. 
Thank God a person like Mark Doyle of the BBC spent considerable time on 
the ground and worked to set the record straight. 
In my view, most of  the journalists who came into Rwanda after the war 
started knew little or nothing of the country. Those who did know a lot were 
not necessarily listened to. Many stories were simply gruesome accounts of 
killings. There was little analysis of why we let a potential peace process fall 
into disarray.
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After years of ignoring the place, after 6 April, all of a sudden every journalist 
wanted to jump on whatever aircraft or truck was available to get to Kigali. 
They didn’t know what they were looking for, but there was excitement and it 
had reached the CNN radar screen. So, in the fi rst days, a number of journalists 
did appear; within the fi rst week, more than 200 were sitting in Nairobi. 
They came to report that people were being slaughtered. Platoons of 
journalists would come in for three or four days, then leave so I could bring 
more in. We guaranteed their safety and provided them with transport, food 
and lodging. To me it was absolutely essential that they get their story. I put 
the lives of my troops on the line to guarantee that people got their daily story. 
Not only to get to the places where the catastrophe was evolving, but also to 
get their stories out. I had offi cers and soldiers run the gauntlet to get television 
tapes to my headquarters in Uganda, then to Kampala and then Nairobi where 
the technology existed to transmit images.
It took some time before the big media outfi ts arrived and set up their 
international capabilities. Within the third week of  the genocide, when the 
UN had buckled under and decided that it was not only not going to reinforce 
the mission, but that it was also going to abandon Rwanda, the only voice, the 
only weapon that I had, was the media. If, through the media, I could shame 
the international community into acting, then I would have achieved my aim. 
But despite the courageous work done by reporters in the fi eld, the stories often 
didn’t get past the editor’s desk. The story never really got told and that’s why 
O.J. Simpson and Tonya Harding got a lot more press than 800,000 human 
beings being slaughtered. 
The media can be a two-way street. I tried to give journalists what they 
required and some of them were instrumental in providing me with information. 
Many journalists were courageous enough to go between the lines. I opened 
my headquarters to them. The only time I didn’t want them there was when we 
were planning operations. At other times, I would see journalists standing at 
the big map boards with my operations duty offi cers. They would be marking 
the map and saying, ‘Yes, I’ve been through there and, yeah, there is a massacre 
site there and, yes, there are about 50,000 people on the side of that hill over 
there.’ The exchange was transparent.
But after the initial fl urry of attention in the fi rst few days of April, most 
international media representatives were evacuated with the other expatriates 
and it seemed like there was no one left, like no one cared. 
When news reaches the general population, it shapes public opinion. When 
there is a lack of  statesmanship, public opinion can force a government to 
make decisions. Getting information out to the general population and holding 
decision-makers accountable – by continuously berating them about what is 
going on and what they are doing or not doing – is more crucial than a few 
talk shows and a couple of newscasts. In the case of Rwanda, that’s where the 
process broke down. The events in Rwanda simply did not break through to 
such an extent as to create momentum. 
From mid-April into the beginning of May, only a handful of international 
reporters were on the ground to witness the genocide. I went to great lengths 
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during that period to attract international media attention. I wanted journalists 
to get their stories and, as I said, I used UNAMIR resources to get tapes up to 
the Ugandan border, so that they could eventually reach Europe. The BBC’s 
Mark Doyle used my satellite phone from time to time. I felt that one good 
journalist on the ground was worth a battalion of troops, because I realized 
they could bring pressure to bear. 
I had a policy of taking all media calls in the evening and gave instructions 
to my staff  to facilitate those interviews. I had frequent conversations with 
Michael Enright on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s radio programme 
‘As it Happens’. But the media coverage wasn’t enough to create an outcry in 
the international community. The ambivalence of  the great powers toward 
Rwanda was too imbedded; they had reason to be disinterested, to turn away, 
because of ‘Somalia fatigue’.
Ironically, the news media fi nally descended in hordes once the genocide 
was over and the ‘refugee crisis’ occurred in Goma. A clouded picture of the 
suffering appeared, as genocidaires were among those who fl ed and were now 
getting ten times the media attention given to the genocide itself. 
I have been asked why I didn’t leak the famous 11 January cable, with its 
warning about Interahamwe militia training to kill thousands, making lists and 
hiding weapons. There has been much debate about my message to the UN in 
New York, about an informant who provided information about arms caches 
and the preparation of  lists of  people to be exterminated. I informed New 
York of my intention to raid some of the arms caches, but was ordered not 
to intervene. Once it was clear the UN system was not going to act on those 
warnings, should I have leaked the information to The New York Times or the 
Washington Post?
If  the media had come and asked me what was going on, if  they had come 
and queried me about the stagnation and the political and security process and 
asked me what we were doing, they would have got the answer. And they could 
have reported what was happening. But I was not going to leak that document. 
You cannot be ethical and fi ddle with the media.
Within the country, Rwandan media played an exceptionally important role 
in the genocide. The country is known as a radio country. In some villages, 
radio was like the voice of God. At the height of the killing, in the camps for 
the displaced and refugees, you could still fi nd people with portable radios. I 
wondered where they got the batteries. We couldn’t even get batteries for our 
fl ashlights. 
RTLM was created specifi cally as a tool of the genocidaires to demonize the 
Tutsi, lay the groundwork, then literally drive on the killing once the genocide 
started.
A great handicap for UNAMIR (in effect the representative on the ground of 
the world community) was our initial ignorance of what was really happening and 
of the mixed media messages. We had so little capacity to monitor broadcasts, 
particularly those in the local language, Kinyarwanda. For a long time, we 
didn’t notice the difference in tone between RTLM broadcasts in French and 
those in Kinyarwanda. We missed this vital early-warning sign of what was to 
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come because, in effect, we weren’t listening properly to local media and what 
it was telling people in January, February and March 1994.
I still believe it would have made a signifi cant difference if  we had had 
the capacity to monitor local media comprehensively from the outset. This 
was one of  the lessons learned from Rwanda – that part of  the role of  an 
international force is to get the whole picture, to realize the importance of 
media messaging. 
In the fi rst few days after 6 April, it was Rwanda’s prime minister designate, 
Faustin Twagiramungu, who was in hiding in my headquarters, who acted as 
my media monitor, listening to RTLM and translating from Kinyarwanda. 
Later, we hired a young man who could speak English and French and trained 
him to perform the same task.
Missions such as ours need people with media and linguistic skills. You 
ignore the local media at your peril. And there was another lesson in this 
volatile situation: UNAMIR desperately needed its own media outlet, its own 
radio station. We were unarmed in the media war that was going on and had 
virtually no capacity to explain ourselves to the local community to whom radio 
was so important. People were turning to the extremist RTLM, the state-run 
Radio Rwanda and the rebel-controlled Radio Muhaburu. In Cambodia, for 
example, the UN’s use of radio was essential. But in our case, the equipment 
was unavailable, so it was dropped from the budget for our mission. In January 
and February, when it became apparent that we needed a media outlet to explain 
ourselves, we begged the UN for that facility. We knew that equipment from 
the UN station in Cambodia was in storage in Italy, but although we pleaded 
for it, we didn’t receive the gear until well after the genocide.
We did not have a radio station to take part in the debate or to sell our 
‘product’. It became clear to me that none of  the radio stations in Rwanda 
actually told people why we were there. No information from us was being 
passed on. People saw a white vehicle with a blue fl ag going by at 70 kilometres 
an hour, but many Rwandans had no idea why we were there. Those who 
did know were led to believe that we could do much more than our mandate 
actually permitted. 
In fairness, before 6 April, at the behest of  Jean-Marie Higiro, then the 
director of Radio Rwanda, we were allowed 30 minutes a week on the air. But 
we discovered that no one in our small mission had the skill to do 30 minutes 
of  programming. In fact, some weeks we didn’t even go on the air. Without 
interpreters or media analysts, we didn’t even have the ability to present a lucid 
programme.
Once the killing started, I would meet displaced people and Rwandans 
would always have this sort of look of astonishment with regard to the Blue 
Berets. They believed that the UNAMIR mandate was to protect and defend 
the Rwandans, whereas, in fact, the Security Council limited it to assisting in 
establishing an atmosphere of security. The limitations of our mandate were 
never really explained to the whole of the nation, and that is one of the great 
tragedies of the mission. 
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Another tragedy was our failure to intervene early to shut down RTLM, 
which had become the voice of the devil in Rwanda. Through January, February 
and March 1994, before the genocide began, the radio station stepped up its 
campaign, delivering the message that there were people who should not live in 
Rwanda. It even described ways to eliminate them. Failing all else, we should 
have shut down RTLM. I repeatedly asked for the capability to jam RTLM, 
but the request was denied. The argument was that this would amount to a 
violation of state sovereignty and that there was also a very high cost attached 
to maintaining jamming equipment. 
In my view, it was time to question the absolute of state sovereignty and to 
ask whether it was becoming an impediment to humanity. When RTLM started 
to attack not only the mission, but also myself, when RTLM was launching 
its descriptions of  how to kill, it was obvious to everyone that RTLM was 
operating without any rules. It was beyond rules. It was beyond limits. And it 
was an overt instrument of genocide. I went to the UN and the big powers, and 
said, ‘I need two things. One is a radio station and, second, I need somebody to 
fi nd that RTLM emitter and close her down, either by jamming it or ultimately 
destroying it.’ At the height of the genocide, the response was that Rwanda is 
a sovereign state, the airwaves belong to that sovereign state and we cannot 
intervene. Sovereignty became an instrument for not doing something.
In fact, on 25 May 1994 in a convocation speech at the US Naval Academy in 
Annapolis, Maryland, President Clinton said the US could not be the policeman 
of the world and would only participate in and fully support UN peacekeeping 
operations that were deemed to be in the vital interests of the US. ‘We cannot 
solve every such outburst of civil strife or militant nationalism simply by sending 
in our forces,’ Clinton said. ‘We cannot turn away from them. But our interests 
are not suffi ciently at stake in so many of  them to justify a commitment of 
our folks.’ 
This doctrine was spelled out in Presidential Decision Directive 25, unveiled 
that same month, even as the killing went on unabated across Rwanda. That 
directive codifi ed and complicated US participation in peacekeeping operations. 
Indeed, it is my understanding that weeks earlier, on 7 April, in the working 
room of  the Security Council, Madeleine Albright and her colleagues said 
bluntly about Rwanda, ‘The Americans are not going to intervene, and they’re 
not going to help anybody who wants to.’
The world failed utterly to deal with one of  the century’s most clear-cut 
examples of abuse of the media. Sadly, we dealt with it only in hindsight through 
the ‘Media Trial’, the important prosecution at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda.
As for the international media, I think we need to ask ourselves, did the lack 
of attention and understanding by the international media actually contribute 
to the genocide? Did the decision to ignore Rwanda border on complicity by 
letting this atrocity go unreported? 
The media can be both a weapon and a conscience to humanity. Journalists 
can be powerful, individually and collectively. But they can also be manipulated 
very easily if  the depth of the subject is not there. For future journalists, my 
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advice is get yourselves a lot more cultured, learn some geography, some 
anthropology, some sociology and maybe even some philosophy. Bring more 
depth to your questions and to your analysis. And stay dynamic in the search 
for the truth, for you are an instrument of the absolute called ‘justice’. If  you 
abdicate or if  you are perfunctory, then we will all be weakened.
3
Rwanda: Walking the Road to Genocide
Gerald Caplan
BEFORE INDEPENDENCE
It is not diffi cult to isolate the key steps that led from the late pre-colonial period 
in Rwanda to the genocide a full century later. There was nothing inexorable 
about this process. At its heart was the deliberate choice of  successive elites 
to deepen the cleavages between the country’s two main ethnic groups, to 
dehumanize the group that was out of  power and to legitimate the use of 
violence against that group. In hindsight, two almost competing historical 
evolutions can be seen: the series of building blocks that paved the way to the 
point where genocide became conceivable; and the numerous occasions when 
it was not yet too late to reverse this destructive pattern. 
It was under Mwami (King) Rwabugiri, a Tutsi who ruled during the late 
1800s, that the chief characteristics of modern Rwanda were fi xed for the next 
100 years. A powerful head of a centralized state, he provided fi rm direction to 
an elaborate series of subordinate structures. In the colonial era, under German 
and then Belgian rule, Roman Catholic missionaries, inspired by the overtly 
racist theories of nineteenth-century Europe, concocted a bizarre ideology of 
ethnic cleavage and racial rankings that attributed superior qualities to the 
country’s Tutsi minority. This 15 per cent of the population, it was announced, 
were approaching, however gradually, the exalted level of  white people, in 
contrast with the declared brutishness and innate inferiority of  the ‘Bantu’ 
(Hutu) majority. Because the missionaries ran the colonial-era schools, these 
pernicious values were systematically transmitted to several generations of 
Rwandans along with more conventional Catholic teachings. 
The alleged differences between ethnic groups were arbitrary and baseless, 
yet they soon took on a life of  their own. The Belgians made the Mwami’s 
complex structures more rigid and ethnically infl exible. They institutionalized 
the split between the two groups, culminating in the issuance to every Rwandan 
of an ethnic identity card. This card system was maintained for over 60 years 
until, with tragic irony, during the genocide it became the instrument that 
enabled Hutu killers in urban areas to identify the Tutsi who were its original 
benefi ciaries.
While it served them, the Tutsi elite were only too pleased to believe in their 
own natural superiority and to run the country for their Belgian patrons. The 
majority Hutu were treated with harshness appropriate to a lower caste. Soon 
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many Hutu came to agree that the two ethnic groups, distinguished mostly by 
vocation in prior centuries, were indeed fundamentally dissimilar in nature and 
irreconcilable in practice. The Tutsi came to be demonized as a foreign invading 
power with no entitlements in Rwanda. 
As the colonial era drew to a close, democracy in the colonies became 
synonymous with majority rule. The tragedy of Rwanda is that the majority 
came to be defi ned by ethnicity alone. A national independence movement, 
an umbrella under which all citizens united to oppose colonial rule, failed to 
thrive in Rwanda. Voices of moderation and inclusiveness were drowned out 
by extremists advocating ethnic exclusivity. 
Yet, there had been little open violence before independence. Hutu were 
unquestionably considered the ‘serfs’, but only some Tutsi benefi ted from 
colonialism; many led lives no better than the Hutu peasantry. Then, as always, 
the notion of  ethnic homogeneity was contradicted by the actual divisions 
within both Hutu and Tutsi communities.
Although Hutu surely resented their status and treatment, considerable 
intermarriage took place between the two groups, which after all shared a 
common language, religion, geography and, often as not, appearance. Tutsi 
cattle herders and Hutu farmers complemented each other. Hatred between the 
two groups needed careful nurturing. Until political parties formed on the basis 
of ethnic origins, there were no massacres of either ethnic group by the other. 
Instead of an independence struggle directed against their colonial masters, 
the Hutu party targeted their masters’ Tutsi surrogates. Surprisingly enough, 
Hutu politicians now found themselves actively supported by the Belgians and 
the Catholic Church, both reversing their original stance once they realized that 
Hutu rule was inevitable. This support continued even when anti-Tutsi violence 
broke out. Between 1959 and 1967, 20,000 Tutsi were killed and 300,000 fl ed in 
terror to neighbouring countries. In the eyes of some Tutsi today, these attacks 
constitute either a prelude to genocide or genocide itself.
THE FIRST AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS
The newly independent government of Grégoire Kayibanda made its colours 
apparent from the start. As early as 1961, the United Nations reported that ‘the 
developments of these last 18 months have brought about the racial dictatorship 
of one party … An oppressive system has been replaced by another one.’ The 
Hutu government pleased no one, not even the large majority of its fellow Hutu. 
Life for the peasantry remained precarious, while a small Hutu elite from the 
north and northwest grew increasingly dissatisfi ed with their marginal role in 
Kayibanda’s southern-dominated government. 
As pressure on Kayibanda grew, he unleashed ethnic terror once again, hoping 
to save his regime by uniting the Hutu against the common Tutsi enemy. At the 
same time, ethnic cleavages were reinforced, neither for the fi rst nor last time, by 
events south of the border in Burundi. In 1972, after an appalling massacre of 
the Hutu majority by the Tutsi government there, terrorized Burundian Hutu 
fl ooded into Rwanda to infl ame ethnic tensions and to join in anti-Tutsi attacks. 
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Although relatively few Tutsi were killed, many thousands were driven out to 
join their ethnic kin in exile.
But Kayibanda’s exploitation of ethnic fears failed to save his regime and, in 
1973, he was replaced by Juvénal Habyarimana, head of the Rwandan army. 
For the next 15 years, Rwanda enjoyed relatively good times and little ethnic 
violence. Habyarimana opened the country to the world and effi cient, stable 
little Rwanda soon became the darling of the West’s burgeoning development 
industry. As for the Tutsi, they were now safe for the fi rst time in almost 15 
years. It is true they suffered signifi cant institutional discrimination. They were 
allowed to play only a marginal role in politics, were shut out of the military 
and were limited by quota to 10 per cent of education placements. But they 
thrived in the private sector and were successful in the liberal professions as 
well as some public service institutions. 
More than 60 per cent of Rwandans were Catholic, and the church remained a 
trusted ally and reliable bulwark of the regime, giving it legitimacy and comfort 
literally until the end. In common with the foreign governments and aid agencies 
that were involved with Rwanda, church leaders rarely challenged the ethnic 
basis of public life or Habyarimana’s one-party military dictatorship; indeed, 
they embraced without reservation the notion of demographic democracy based 
on the Hutu’s overwhelming majority. 
By the late 1980s, however, economic progress stalled. Government revenues 
declined as coffee and tea prices dropped. International fi nancial institutions, 
indifferent to the social and political consequences of their demands, imposed 
programmes that exacerbated infl ation, land scarcity and unemployment. Young 
men were hit particularly hard. The mood of the country was raw.
It was at this vulnerable moment, on 1 October 1990, that the children of the 
Tutsi refugees who had earlier fl ed into English-speaking Uganda re-emerged 
as a rebel army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Often made scapegoats 
and persecuted in exile, Rwandan Tutsi also remained unwelcome back in 
Rwanda. According to Habyarimana, the country was too poor, too crowded 
and had too little land to accommodate the exiled community – all plausible 
propositions. 
The RPF invasion and the government’s response constituted a giant step 
on the road to genocide. The RPF was not constrained by the knowledge that 
incursions by Tutsi exiles in the 1960s had led to great brutality against other 
Tutsi. As for Habyarimana, he had a choice in October 1990. Contrary to RPF 
expectations, few Rwandans of  any background welcomed these unknown 
‘Ugandan’ soldiers. A united front among all Rwandans against outside invaders 
was perfectly plausible. But an opportunistic and threatened government chose 
the opposite course; with great deliberation, to further their own self-interest, 
they reawakened the sleeping dogs of ethnic division. All Tutsi, both citizens 
and RPF soldiers, were portrayed as alien invaders, while divisions among 
Hutu had to be submerged in a common front against the intruders. All Tutsi 
were denounced as fi fth columnists, secret supporters of the RPF. Anti-Tutsi 
propaganda, largely muted for the previous 17 years, was unleashed anew. 
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At the same time, Habyarimana called on his foreign friends for military 
help. The French responded most positively. Their forces prevented a swift 
RPF victory over the hapless Rwandan army, and French soldiers and advisors 
remained in the country counselling Habyarimana’s people politically and 
militarily on keeping these ‘anglo-saxon’ interlopers at bay. The government 
learned that, whatever it did, it could always count on the unconditional public 
and private support of the French government. 
Immediately after the RPF raid, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
threw itself into peacemaking and attempts to resolve the confl ict. For the OAU 
in Rwanda and then the Great Lakes region, the 1990s were a time of well-meant 
initiatives, incessant meetings, commitments made and commitments broken. 
In the end, the OAU had only enough resources and power to bring adversaries 
together, hope they agreed and pray they did not violate their agreements. 
The impact of  the RPF raid was devastating in every way. Its advances, 
together with the government’s anti-Tutsi propaganda, drove terrifi ed Hutu into 
internal settlement camps. In a short time, close to 300,000 Rwandans had been 
driven from or fl ed their land to become ‘internally displaced persons’ (IDPs). 
In early 1993, another large-scale RPF attack led to a further million, mostly 
Hutu, IDPs. The country was in turmoil. The ailing economy had little chance 
to recover. Anti-Tutsi violence, organized by the government or its allies, spread 
like wildfi re, while the RPF insurgents similarly showed little restraint in dealing 
brutally with Hutu civilians in the areas they ‘liberated’. 
Within the Habyarimana government, real power increasingly resided with 
a small faction of  insiders from the northwest called the Akazu, ‘the little 
house’; it was also widely known as ‘le Clan de Madame’, as its core was the 
president’s wife, family and close associates, who were the chief benefi ciaries 
of  the corruption that characterized the regime. As the economic collapse 
signifi cantly reduced the available spoils of power and called into question the 
very legitimacy of the regime, the Akazu began playing the ethnic card to divert 
attention away from serious divisions among the Hutu.
This should not be taken to mean that planning of the genocide was initiated 
at a precise moment. Both physical and rhetorical violence against the Tutsi 
continued to escalate from the RPF incursion until the genocide actually started 
in April 1994. There is no question that this campaign was organized and 
promoted and that at some point it turned into a strategy for genocide. But 
that exact point remains unknown. For Rwanda, the ‘smoking gun’ that nails 
the perpetrators and their fanatical plot is not a single meeting or a particular 
letter, but rather a cumulative series of events.
Rwanda endured three and a half  years of  violent anti-Tutsi incidents. In 
retrospect, most of these can be interpreted as deliberate steps in a vast conspiracy 
culminating in the shooting down of the president’s plane on the evening of 6 
April 1994 and the unleashing of the genocide. But this interpretation remains 
somewhat speculative. No one yet knows who shot down the plane, nor can it 
be demonstrated that every one of the countless manifestations of anti-Tutsi 
sentiment in these years was part of a diabolical master plan. The evidence most 
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plausibly suggests that the idea of genocide emerged only gradually through 
1991 and 1992, accelerating in determination through 1993 and into 1994.
Later, when it was fi nally over, a great international argument broke out over 
who knew what about the events unfolding in Rwanda. There can be no debate 
here; the facts speak for themselves. The world that mattered to Rwanda – its 
Great Lakes neighbours, the United Nations, all the major Western powers 
– knew exactly what was happening and that it was being masterminded at the 
highest levels of the state. They knew that this was no senseless case of ‘Hutu 
killing Tutsi and Tutsi killing Hutu’, as it was sometimes dismissively described. 
They knew that a terrible fate had befallen Rwanda. They even knew that some 
Hutu Power extremists were talking openly of eliminating all Tutsi, although 
few could then conceive that an actual genocide was being plotted.
Anti-Tutsi violence, it was widely known, was revived immediately after the 
RPF invasion when organized anti-Tutsi massacres began – and ended only 
when the genocide itself  ended. Massacres of Tutsi were carried out in October 
1990, January 1991, February 1991, March 1992, August 1992, January 1993, 
March 1993 and February 1994. On each occasion, scores of Tutsi were killed 
by mobs and militiamen associated with various political parties, sometimes 
with the involvement of the police and army, incited by the media, directed by 
local government offi cials and encouraged by some national politicians.
As the terror heightened, the organizers learned that they could not only 
massacre large numbers of people quickly and effi ciently, they could get away 
with it. Wholehearted backing of the regime by the French government and 
general indifference to the escalating racism by the churches reinforced this 
feeling. A culture of  impunity developed as the conspirators grew bolder. 
Extremist army offi cers colluded with the circles surrounding Habyarimana 
and the Akazu to form secret societies and Latin American-style death squads 
known as ‘Amasasu’ (bullets) and the ‘Zero Network’. They did not long remain 
secret; in 1992, their existence and connections were publicly exposed.
But contrary forces were at work at the same time. Pressure for democratization 
from both within and outside the country forced Habyarimana to accept 
multiparty politics. The apparent advance toward democracy, however, had 
several unanticipated consequences, all of them unwelcome. A host of new parties 
emerged, most of them Hutu, wanting to participate in the process. One of these 
new parties, the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic, represented Hutu 
radicals and had links to the death squads. What was worse, parties organized 
their own youth militias, the most notorious being the Interahamwe formed by 
Habyarimana’s own Mouvement Républicain National pour la Democratie et le 
Développement (MRND). At the same time, new hate-propagating media sprang 
up, most infamously a private radio station calling itself Radio-Télévision Libre 
des Milles Collines (RTLM), which was fi nanced and controlled by the Akazu
faction. While his militia terrorized opponents and beat up Tutsi and his radio 
station incited ethnic hatred and violence, Habyarimana, with great reluctance, 
agreed to accept a coalition government. 
Immediately, the new ministers joined with the OAU and Western powers 
to pressure Habyarimana to agree to negotiations with the RPF in Arusha, 
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Tanzania. In August 1993, after long, drawn-out sessions, agreement was reached 
on a series of key issues. But these were never implemented. Ultimately, Arusha 
backfi red. The more it appeared that power and the limited spoils of offi ce would 
have to be shared not only with other Hutu parties but also with the RPF, the 
more determined the Akazu insiders grew to share nothing with anyone.
At the same moment, a deadly new weapon was unexpectedly delivered into 
the hands of the Rwandan Hutu. The assassination in October 1993 by Tutsi 
offi cers of Burundi’s democratically elected Hutu president and the appalling 
massacres that followed were taken by many Hutu as fi nal proof that power-
sharing between Tutsi and Hutu was forever doomed; the Tutsi could never be 
trusted. The emergence of Hutu Power, an explicit and public organizing concept, 
was the immediate consequence of the Burundi upheaval. Large Hutu Power 
rallies attracted members of all parties, attesting to the new reality that ethnic 
solidarity trumped party allegiances. Political life, in these last turbulent months 
before the genocide, was reorganized strictly around the two ethnic poles. 
As the conspiracy widened and deepened, so did knowledge of the conspirators’ 
intentions. Virtually everyone in Rwanda associated with the United Nations, 
the diplomatic community or human rights groups knew about death lists, 
accelerating massacres, arms proliferation and threats to opposition politicians. 
The UN military mission uncovered a high-level Interahamwe informant, whose 
revelations led its commander, Major General Roméo Dallaire, to send his 
famous 11 January 1994 message – the so-called ‘genocide fax’ – to New York 
headquarters: ‘Jean-Pierre,’ Dallaire reported, ‘has been ordered to register 
all Tutsi in Kigali. He suspects it is for their extermination. Example he gave 
was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1,000 Tutsi.’ Dallaire’s 
superiors at the Department of  Peacekeeping Operations replied with the 
perverse instruction to inform the president and take no further action. Another 
opportunity to expose the conspiracy was lost. 
When it was fi nally unleashed only three months later, hours after Habyarimana 
went down with his plane, the violence was organized and coordinated. Its 
goal was explicit: genocide. A clique of Rwandan Hutu planned to mobilize 
the Hutu people with the explicit intention of exterminating all Tutsi in the 
country, including women and children. The rest of the world knew that a great 
disaster loomed for Rwanda, but few envisaged the possibility that the radicals 
would resort to outright genocide. It was a prospect simply too appalling to 
contemplate. But for the extremist Hutu leadership, no other response to their 
situation any longer seemed adequate. 
THE EXTERNAL ACTORS BEFORE THE GENOCIDE
Several outside actors carried a heavy responsibility for the events that were 
now unfolding. Some were guilty of crimes of commission, others crimes of 
omission. But one way or another, as they had for the entire century, outsiders 
had great infl uence on Rwanda’s fate, much of it malevolent.
Within Rwanda itself, the chief  culprits were the Catholic and Anglican 
hierarchies and the French government, all active supporters of the Habyarimana 
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government. Church leaders failed to use their unique moral position among 
the overwhelmingly Christian population to denounce ethnic hatred and human 
rights abuse. The French government was guilty of the same failure at the elite 
level. Its public backing constituted a major disincentive for the radicals to 
make concessions or to think in terms of compromise. Although some French 
offi cials knew that many of their clients at the highest echelons of the Rwandan 
regime were guilty of human rights violations, they failed to use their infl uence 
to demand that such violations stop. At the same time, they continued to act 
as senior political and military advisors to the government. The radicals drew 
the obvious lesson: they could get away with anything. 
At the United Nations, the Security Council, led unremittingly by the United 
States, simply did not care enough about Rwanda to intervene appropriately. 
There were no economic or strategic interests at play. What makes this betrayal 
of  their responsibility even more intolerable is that the genocide was in no 
way inevitable. It could have been prevented entirely. Even once it was allowed 
to begin, the destruction could have been signifi cantly mitigated. All that 
was required was a relatively modest international military force, perhaps 
5000 properly trained troops, with a strong mandate to enforce the Arusha 
agreements. Nothing of the kind was authorized by the Security Council before 
the genocide, and the force that was approved during the genocide was not 
permitted to intervene until the slaughter was over. 
The United States has formally apologized for its failure to prevent the 
genocide. President Clinton insisted that it was a function of  ignorance. 
The evidence shows that the American government knew precisely what was 
happening, not least during the months of the genocide. Domestic politics took 
priority over the lives of helpless Africans. After losing 18 soldiers in Somalia 
in October 1993, the US was unwilling to participate in further peacekeeping 
missions and was largely opposed to the Security Council authorizing any new 
serious missions at all, with or without American participation. 
In October 1993, the fi rst UN mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) was set up; it 
was notable mostly for its weak mandate and minimal capacity. No amount of 
credible early warnings could persuade the members of the Security Council to 
treat the mission seriously or the UN Secretariat to interpret its mandate fl exibly. 
In fact, the single occasion on which UNAMIR was authorized to go beyond 
its passive observer mandate was at the very outbreak of the genocide. Several 
European nations fl ew planes in to evacuate their nationals, and UNAMIR was 
authorized not only to assist the evacuation, but also to go beyond its mandate, 
if  required, to assure the safety of foreign nationals. Never was such permission 
granted for the protection of Rwandans. And none of the 2,500 European and 
American troops used in the evacuation or on standby in the region offered to 
work with UNAMIR to stop the genocide.
The signifi cance of the Security Council’s action should not be underestimated: 
its refusal to sanction a serious mission made the genocide more likely. The 
feeble UN effort helped persuade the Hutu radicals that they had nothing to 
fear from the outside world, regardless of their deeds. This assessment proved 
only too accurate. Once the genocide began, the US, backed most forcefully 
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by Britain, repeatedly and deliberately undermined all attempts to strengthen 
the UN military presence in Rwanda. 
Belgium became an unexpected ally in this goal. On day two of the crisis, 
ten Belgian soldiers were murdered by Rwandan soldiers. As the radicals had 
anticipated, Belgium swiftly decided to pull out all its troops, leaving the 2,500 
Tutsi they were protecting at a school site to be slaughtered within hours. The 
Belgian government decided that its shameful retreat would be at least tempered 
if  it were shared by others, and strenuously lobbied to disband UNAMIR 
entirely. Although the US supported the idea, it was too outrageous to pursue. 
Instead, with the genocide costing tens of thousands of lives daily, and ignoring 
the vigorous opposition of the OAU and African governments, the Security 
Council chose to cut the UN force by 90 per cent at the exact moment it needed 
massive reinforcement. For most of  the 100 days of  the genocide, General 
Dallaire commanded a force of only 400, many of them inadequately trained 
or equipped. As horror stories accelerated, the council authorized a stronger 
mission, UNAMIR II, but once again the US did all in its power to undermine 
its effectiveness. In the end, not a single new soldier or piece of military hardware 
reached the country before the genocide ended.
THE GENOCIDE
The two rockets that brought down President Habyarimana’s plane became the 
catalysts for one of the great calamities of our age: a genocide and a civil war, 
separate but simultaneous. To this day, controversy reigns over the responsibility 
for this attack. Most students of the genocide believe the fi nger most plausibly 
points to Habyarimana’s extremist allies, fed up with his attempts to placate 
outsiders. Deniers of the genocide – still active to this day – insist it was the RPF 
leadership. There has been no investigation and no one can say with certainty.
A certain chaos reigned for the few days following the crash, although the 
conspirators had control enough to begin systematic search-and-murder missions 
against their leading opponents, both Hutu and Tutsi. But soon enough, all 
sense of uncertainty ended. The government’s military structure that had been 
built since 1990 was now swiftly mobilized to execute the genocide as well as 
to fi ght a civil war. It could now be seen clearly that its creators had an overall 
strategy that it implemented with scrupulous planning and organization, control 
of the levers of government, highly motivated soldiers and militia, the means 
to kill vast numbers of people, the capacity to identify and kill the victims and 
tight control of the media (specifi cally RTLM) to disseminate the right messages 
both inside and outside the country.
When the genocide ended little more than 100 days later, perhaps as many as 
a million women, children and men, the vast majority of them Tutsi, lay dead. 
Thousands more were raped, tortured and maimed for life. Victims were treated 
with sadistic cruelty and suffered unimaginable agony. 
The attacks had many targets. A clear priority list for elimination included 
anti-Habyarimana government and opposition members; Hutu who opposed 
the extremists, thousands of  whom were slaughtered without mercy in the 
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fi rst days; critics such as journalists and human rights activists; any Tutsi 
seen as community leaders, including professionals, political activists, lawyers 
and teachers; as well as priests, nuns and other clergy who were Tutsi or who 
sheltered intended victims. 
Together, military leaders and the new interim government of Hutu Power 
supporters that was sworn in after the plane crash made the overall decisions, 
while Rwanda’s elaborate governing structure implemented the genocide with 
remarkable effi ciency. The Hutu leadership of  the Catholic and Anglican 
churches, with a few notably courageous exceptions, played a conspicuously 
scandalous role in these months, often directly complicit in aiding the 
genocidaires, at best remaining silent or explicitly neutral. This stance was easily 
interpreted by ordinary Christians as an implicit endorsement of the killings, 
as was the close association of church leaders with the leaders of the genocide. 
Perhaps this helps explain the greatest mystery about the genocide: the terrible 
success of Hutu Power in turning so many ordinary people into accomplices in 
genocide. In no other way could so many have been killed so swiftly.
It has always been diffi cult to establish the numbers killed in the genocide. 
The highest persuasive fi gure for Tutsi killed seems to be near one million, 
the very lowest, 500,000. Government spokespeople have often used a fi gure 
of  ‘more than a million’, while a new offi cial fi gure is 937,000 dead. More 
research is needed to be certain. Even if  the most conservative fi gure is used, it 
still means that over three-quarters of the entire population registered as Tutsi 
were systematically killed in just over 100 days. As well, millions of Rwandan 
Hutu became internally displaced within the country or fl ed to become refugees 
in neighbouring countries. 
THE WORLD DURING THE GENOCIDE
Until the day it ended with the RPF’s military victory, the UN, the governments 
of the US, France and Belgium, most African governments and the OAU all 
failed to defi ne the events in Rwanda as full-blown genocide and all continued 
to recognize members of  the genocidaire government as legitimate offi cial 
representatives of their country. All except the French government remained 
publicly neutral between a government that was executing the genocide and 
their RPF adversaries, the only force fi ghting that government.
Throughout the genocide, France remained openly hostile to the RPF. After 
two months of confl ict, the French government, in a so-called humanitarian 
mission known as Operation Turquoise, sent a force to create a safe zone in 
the southwest of the country. It probably saved the lives of 10–15,000 Tutsi, 
although it jeopardized other Tutsi by giving them a false sense of  security. 
Far more consequentially, as the RPF advanced, many government and 
military leaders responsible for the genocide and many government soldiers 
and militia escaped to the safety and protection of this zone. They were then 
permitted by the French force to cross the border into eastern Zaire, joining 
fellow genocidaires who had escaped through other routes, all of them ready to 
resume their war against the new Kigali government. When the French troops 
pulled out in August 1994, not a single genocidaire had been arrested in their 
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safe zone. The consequences for later confl ict in the Great Lakes Region can 
hardly be exaggerated.
The facts are not in question: a small number of major actors could have 
prevented, halted or reduced the slaughter. They include France in Rwanda 
itself; the United States at the Security Council, loyally supported by Britain; 
Belgium, whose soldiers knew they could save countless lives if they were allowed 
to remain in the country; and Rwanda’s church leaders. In the bitter words of 
the commander of the UN’s military mission, the ‘international community 
has blood on its hands’.
In the years since, the leaders of the UN, the United States, Belgium and the 
Anglican Church have all apologized for their failure to stop the genocide. Yet 
none has suggested that Rwanda is owed restitution for these failures, and in 
no single case has any responsible individual resigned in protest or been held to 
account for his or her actions. Neither the French government nor the Roman 
Catholic hierarchy (including the late Pope John Paul II) has apologized or 
accepted responsibility for its role. 
RWANDA SINCE THE GENOCIDE
When the war and the genocide ended on 18 July 1994, the situation in Rwanda 
was almost indescribably grim. Rarely had a people anywhere had to face so 
many seemingly insuperable obstacles with so few resources. Their physical and 
psychological scars were likely to linger for decades.
The country was wrecked – a wasteland. Of seven million inhabitants before 
the genocide, as many as 15 per cent were dead, two million were internally 
displaced and another two million had become refugees. Many of those who 
remained had suffered horribly. Large numbers had been tortured and wounded. 
Many women had been raped, tortured and humiliated, some becoming infected 
with AIDS. Of the children who survived, 90 per cent had witnessed bloodshed 
or worse. An entire nation was brutalized and traumatized. They were, in their 
own phrase, ‘the walking dead’. Yet killers and survivors had no alternative but 
to resume living side-by-side on Rwanda’s hills.
This was the situation a new inexperienced government had to face. Its 
challenges were monumental and its strategies not always convincing. Although 
it has always called itself a government of national unity and included prominent 
Hutu in high-profi le offi ces, most observers believe that real power in the land 
– political and military – has been exercised by a small group of the original 
‘RPF Tutsi’, the English-speakers from Uganda. Paul Kagame, leader of the 
RFP forces during the civil war and genocide, and vice-president and minister 
of defence until he became president in 2000, has universally been seen as the 
government’s indispensable man. 
Some saw it as a government that was not trusted by its people and a people 
not trusted by its government. Under the circumstances, neither was surprising. 
A major insurgency by genocidaires based in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) into northwestern Rwanda caused havoc through the late 1990s. 
The government, suspicious of all Hutu, responded with brute force, frequently 
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failing to distinguish between genocidaires and ordinary peasants. The latter, in 
turn, were reinforced in their belief  that the RPF government was not theirs.
Nor, for very compelling reasons, did the new government trust the international 
community, although it immediately found itself overwhelmingly dependent on 
Western nations and international agencies and fi nancial institutions to begin 
reconstruction. Given its past record, the world’s response to Rwanda’s needs 
ranged from modest to disappointing to downright scandalous. Although the 
government eventually began to fi nd favour among various Western countries, 
notably the US and United Kingdom, which led to somewhat more generous 
aid packages, nothing like restitution or the cancellation of the odious debts 
incurred by the Habyarimana regime has ever been contemplated.
To make matters worse, only months after the genocide ended, many of the 
foreigners who had come to ‘help’ the country began to argue that Rwandans 
ought to get on with the task of rebuilding their society. ‘Quit dwelling on the 
past and concentrate on rebuilding for the future,’ they were advised. Within 
six months of  the end of  the genocide, relief  workers were already telling a 
traumatized people, ‘Yes, the genocide happened, but it’s time to get over it and 
move on.’ Rwandans believed, not without reason, that such insensitivity and 
lack of empathy could only be directed at Africans. In fact, as research from the 
Holocaust and Armenian genocides has shown, the traumas from a disaster of 
this order are multi-generational in their impact. Certainly today, for survivors 
and perpetrators alike, Rwanda remains very much a traumatized nation. 
‘Getting over it’ is an enormously diffi cult task. As with all societies in 
transition from tyranny and terror, among an endless host of  problems that 
continue to bedevil Rwanda are highly complex questions and dilemmas of 
justice, guilt and reconciliation. In the insightful words of scholar Mahmood 
Mamdani (2002),
The Tutsi want justice above all else and the Hutu want democracy above all 
else. The minority fears democracy. The majority fears justice. The minority 
fears that the demand for democracy is a mask for fi nishing an unfi nished 
genocide. The majority fears the demand for justice is a minority ploy to 
usurp power forever.
As hundreds of thousands of ordinary Rwandans had picked up their machetes 
and actively participated in the genocide, Rwanda faced an unprecedented 
situation. The UN set up an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania, aimed at trying ‘the big fi sh’, while Rwanda is 
now experimenting with two parallel judicial systems. In all of these, the process 
of trying accused genocidaires is long, laborious and frustrating. But if  there are 
more effective ways to deal with this issue, they are not readily apparent. 
The ICTR has been a source of controversy from its inception. Foes, not least 
the Rwandan government, must acknowledge its groundbreaking jurisprudence, 
while supporters have diffi culty justifying its huge budget and enormous staff  
– in 2004–05, US$ 231 million and 1,042 authorized posts. Although 60 people 
have been detained, as of mid-2005, after almost a decade of work, the court 
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has convicted only 22 people and acquitted 3 others. Nevertheless, even within 
this almost derisory number, the ICTR’s achievements must be recorded:
• The court interpreted the defi nition of genocide as presented in the 1948 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.
• It defi ned the crime of rape as a crime against humanity.
• It convicted, for the fi rst time, a leader of a government for the crime of 
genocide.
• It ruled that the media can be a tool of genocide for which those in charge 
are responsible.
In Rwanda, a decimated judicial system had the responsibility for dealing with 
some 120,000 Hutu rotting in prisons in appalling circumstances, often without 
proper charges. The task defi ed capacity. As of 2004, some 6,500 had been tried. 
At this rate, it was estimated, it would take two to four centuries to clear the 
backlog. The government resorted to two dramatic steps. To the chagrin of 
the voluble survivors’ umbrella organization, Ibuka, it released some 20,000 of 
those charged with lesser crimes or for whom no credible documentation existed. 
Beyond that, it embarked on one of the most remarkable social experiments 
of  our time: local courts called gacaca, an attempt to blend traditional and 
contemporary mechanisms to expedite the justice process in a manner that is 
meant to promote reconciliation. To clear the enormous backlog of cases, 12,000 
gacaca courts have been appointed, each made up of 19 locally elected judges. 
A staggering 250,000 Rwandans have been trained for their roles.
Some human rights advocates are concerned that these grass-roots courts will 
operate as a kind of mob justice, with no properly trained professionals and no 
capacity to adhere to international standards. However, most observers feel there 
was little practical alternative and are watching the gacaca panels with much 
interest. Already unexpected consequences are emerging. Ordinary Rwandans 
are accusing their neighbours of participating in the genocide, adding thousands 
of  new names to the lists of  those to be tried. Equally dramatic, Rwandans 
prominent in public life today have been accused of genocidal activities, most 
notably the minister of defence, and they too will be obligated to make their 
case before a gacaca panel. It will be some time before a balanced judgement 
about the effectiveness and fairness of this bold innovation can be made. 
In the meantime, questions of justice and reconciliation, perplexing in any 
post-confl ict situation let alone a genocide, will remain to bedevil offi cial actions 
and popular expectations. The government has created a series of structures 
and institutions designed to foster reconciliation and unity, but on its own 
terms. Ethnicity can no longer be recognized except as a destructive aberration 
of the past – a radical proposition given the past century. There can be only 
one identity – Rwandan – and any attempt to resurrect old ethnic issues is 
pounced on as unacceptable ‘divisionism’. Government argues this is the only 
way to forge a united people. To the government’s opponents, it is merely a 
convenient excuse to suppress legitimate democratic opposition. What the vast 
majority of Rwandans in the hills think, what young Rwandans think, whether 
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traditional stereotypes have evaporated because they are no longer legal is not 
easy to say. 
THE REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES
While these questions absorbed Rwandans internally, beyond its borders the 
genocide had created another monumental crisis. By the end of the 100 days, 
two million citizens had fl ed the confl ict in every direction – more than half  a 
million east to Tanzania, more than a quarter million south to Burundi and, 
most dramatically, at least 1.2 million west to the eastern Kivu region of Zaire. 
As the fi ghting and genocide drew to a close, thanks to France’s Operation 
Turquoise much of the leadership and many of the troops and militia of the 
genocide had escaped from Rwanda into eastern Zaire, where they had unlimited 
access to weapons. This was a sure-fi re formula for disaster.
The international media had fi rst ignored, then largely misinterpreted the 
genocide as nothing more than another example of  African savagery; now 
they made the Kivu refugee camps a universal cause célèbre. Foreign aid 
and foreign aid workers fl ooded in, vastly more than went to Rwanda itself. 
Unfortunately, the genocidaire army (former Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR)) 
and the Interahamwe militia had almost completely taken over the camps and 
were benefi ting enormously from the work of the humanitarian community; 
genuine refugee needs could be met only when the NGOs fi nished meeting the 
demands of the military controlling the camps. 
The goals of  Hutu Power were transparent and well known to everyone 
involved in dealing with the Kivu crisis: to overthrow the new government in 
Kigali and return to power. Almost immediately they began raids back into 
the country, providing yet another major emergency for the new Rwandan 
rulers to deal with. Widespread demands for the ‘international community’ 
to disarm the killers went nowhere. Once again, the leaders of  the Security 
Council badly failed Rwanda. In some ways, they actually added to Rwanda’s 
woes. The French government, with tacit American approval, supported Zaire’s 
President Mobutu as the only person who could help with the refugee crisis 
in his country. In fact, Zairian groups associated with Mobutu’s notoriously 
corrupt government became the primary suppliers of arms to the ex-FAR and 
militia in the Kivu camps, although many other countries and groups were 
involved in weapons trading as well.
The consequences of  these international decisions for Africa were largely 
foreseeable and wholly disastrous. The post-genocide Rwandan government had 
long made it abundantly clear that it would not continue to tolerate the use of 
the camps in Zaire as launching pads for the genocidaires’ return. By late 1996, 
they had had enough. Hostility toward the many former Rwandan Tutsi who 
lived in the Kivu region had increased ominously, and the Rwanda government 
had secretly begun training them. Under the fl ag of an alliance of anti-Mobutu 
Zairians headed by the dissolute Laurent Kabila, and with the active support of 
Uganda, the Rwandan army launched a vicious attack on the entire complex of 
Kivu camps in October and November. The cost in human life was enormous 
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and a fl ood of refugees swarmed back into Rwanda. But substantial numbers 
of camp dwellers fl ed deeper into Zaire. Some of these were genuine refugees, 
some ex-FAR and Interahamwe. Led by the Rwandan army, the anti-Mobutu 
alliance pursued them ruthlessly, killing large numbers including women and 
children. In the process, they perpetrated atrocious human rights abuses whose 
actual magnitude is still not known. 
But the military action soon spread far beyond eastern Zaire. The emboldened 
anti-Mobutu alliance, still led by the Rwandan army and bolstered by the forces 
of Uganda, Angola and Burundi, now set its sights on Mobutu himself. Within 
nine months, Mobutu fl ed and Kinshasa fell to the rebels. But there was to be 
no happy ending to the saga. The new head of the rechristened Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Laurent Kabila, soon clashed with his Rwandan 
advisors, and in July 1998, little more than a year after they had helped him 
become president, Kabila threw the Rwandan and Ugandan military out of 
the DRC. 
Within days they returned as an enemy force. The second Congo war in two 
years now began, but almost immediately escalated to continental dimensions. 
It became Africa’s fi rst great war. Directly or indirectly, more than a fi fth of all 
African governments or armies from across the continent have been involved, as 
well as perhaps a dozen or more armed groups; the alliances between and among 
these groups, with their varied and confl icting interests, have been bewildering. 
Kabila’s major military allies were Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia; facing 
them were the Rwandans, Ugandans and Burundians. The situation is further 
endlessly complicated by the DRC’s enormous mineral resources, an irresistible 
lure for governments, rogue gangs, warlords and powerful foreign corporations 
alike, and by the continuing problem of  arms proliferation sponsored by 
governments throughout the world as well as a multitude of  unscrupulous 
private hustlers.
One year after the new war began, the Lusaka agreement on a ceasefi re 
and peace process was signed. Although the ceasefi re was repeatedly violated, 
attempts to implement a genuine peace continued and in 2000 the Security 
Council sent a small peacekeeping mission (MONUC) to the Congo. 
Violence continued, however. Although most of the DRC remained beyond 
the control of government, in eastern Congo full-scale anarchy and terror was 
unleashed. Rwanda and Uganda found the pursuit of mineral wealth at least 
as compelling as the destruction of the remaining Interahamwe fi ghters, and 
fought the DRC army and various armed gangs over these riches. Coltan, a 
metal ore used in cell phones and computers, previously unknown except to 
experts, became everyone’s favourite plunder. Soon open warfare broke out 
between erstwhile allies – Ugandan and Rwandan troops – over control of 
territory and resources. While a truce was eventually reached, the bitterness 
between the rulers of the two countries has not entirely dissipated and remains 
a source of potentially serious instability. 
Through these years ordinary Congolese died in huge numbers. Including 
those killed in confl ict and those who died of the famine and disease spread by 
the confl ict, they may now number close to four million (although all statistics 
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are very rough approximations). Gang rape of girls and women on a mass level, 
often followed by further torture and violent death, has become commonplace. 
By all accounts, this constitutes the greatest human-infl icted disaster since World 
War II. Those directly responsible include the governments of the DRC, Rwanda 
and Uganda and an assortment of  proxy gangs and warlords all competing 
for mineral resources. Those indirectly responsible are the Western countries 
backing the various belligerent governments and the Western mining companies 
who have moved into the middle of the action. Many have been named in UN 
investigative reports. What all have in common is a refusal to acknowledge the 
slightest responsibility. 
Laurent Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and replaced by his son, Joseph. 
The following year, peace negotiations led Uganda and Rwanda to promise 
to withdraw their armies and the DRC promised the demobilization and 
disarmament of Rwandan Hutu rebels in eastern Congo. By the end of 2002, 
Rwanda and Uganda claimed they had fully withdrawn from the DRC, although 
their proxies remained. At times it was diffi cult to tell which proxies were which. 
At all times, innocent Congolese paid the cost in suffering and death. 
In Kinshasa, a power-sharing unity government was set up under Joseph 
Kabila in 2003, but it is now stalled and is at risk of  failure. Meanwhile, a 
long-simmering confl ict over land and mineral wealth in the northeastern Ituri 
region broke into widespread interethnic violence and massacres in 2002–03. 
Once again Rwandan and Ugandan proxies were said to be involved, although 
the two countries vehemently denied the charges. But recent history shows 
that today’s denial has often enough become tomorrow’s acknowledgement. 
Although a strengthened UN mission (MONUC II) has now been deployed in 
the Congo, various armed groups continue to threaten its stability. 
The Congo’s neighbours continue to perceive the situation as a threat to 
their interests and have taken interventionist actions that further destabilize the 
fragile process of transition. Some 8,000 to 10,000 anti-RPF Rwandan rebels, 
including the remaining Interahamwe, still operate in eastern DRC under the 
umbrella of  the Forces Démocratique pour la Liberation du Rwanda. The 
Kigali government will never let its guard down as long as their threat continues. 
The events in Kivu in 2004, when Rwandan troops crossed into the DRC (an 
action formally denied and universally believed in Kigali), the current violence 
in Ituri, ongoing tensions in Kinshasa and other parts of the DRC are stark 
warnings that the confl ict in the Congo could quickly spiral into another large-
scale war.
Burundi too remains unpredictable. The civil war that effectively began 
in 1993 with the murder by Tutsi offi cers of  the fi rst democratically elected 
president, a Hutu, has now largely ended, although some rebels refuse to give 
up their arms. A great international effort has been invested in ending this 
murderous confl ict and getting all factions to agree to multiparty elections 
with both Hutu and Tutsi guaranteed representation and infl uence. The late 
President Nyerere of Tanzania and Nelson Mandela were both immersed in the 
process for some time, and the government of South Africa continues to play 
a central role. Efforts at reconciliation and nation-building have been extensive 
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and there is real reason for optimism. But given its bloody and violent history, 
the future of Burundi, ranked 173rd of 177 countries on the United Nations 
Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) human development index, remains very 
much an open question. 
Although each of these Great Lakes nations has its own multiple challenges 
to meet, their interconnectedness can hardly be overestimated. Tensions between 
Rwanda and Uganda, which has its own intractable confl ict in the north of the 
country, merely aggravate the situation. It hardly needs saying, but without peace 
the futures of  Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and the DRC are all jeopardized, 
with incalculable consequences not only for their own citizens, but also for the 
entire continent.
RWANDA TODAY AND TOMORROW
Predicting the future of  Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region is not easy. 
Looking at Rwanda itself, it is possible to be either mildly optimistic or quite 
pessimistic.
In many ways, the progress the country has made since 1994 is remarkable. 
The ubiquitous devastation has completely vanished, manifested now only in 
the damaged walls of the National Assembly and the genocide memorial sites 
with their eerie skeletons throughout the country. Yet both the assembly and 
the sites have been left deliberately as memories of the genocide. Kigali now 
boasts a new expensive luxury hotel, high-rise offi ce buildings, a large new 
estate of mansions and an elite that crowds the clubs and hotels on Saturday 
night. Economic growth has been relatively strong. To the superfi cial observer, 
Rwanda has returned to normality, even to a certain prosperity. 
At best, however, that means it has returned to the status of  being a 
desperately poor underdeveloped country, now ranked 159thof 177 countries on 
the UNDP’s human development index. The gap between the small privileged 
elite and the vast majority is great and growing. Life expectancy at birth is 39 
years and 60 per cent of the population lives on less than US$ 1 a day. Of the 
eight million population, close to 90 per cent live in rural areas, most of them 
very poor. 
Yet Rwanda’s challenges go well beyond the usual litany of  deep-rooted 
social and economic problems faced by any poor country with scarce land and 
a swelling population. There is the onerous and ‘odious’ debt, meaning that it 
was incurred largely by the previous government for weapons that were used in 
the genocide. (Some debt relief  has just been announced.) Then there are the 
enormous funding needs that spring directly from the genocide: for assistance 
to survivors, for orphans, traumatized children, street children, children-headed 
households, for widows, for violated women, for women with HIV/AIDS, 
for the great burdens of  the two parallel justice systems, for programmes to 
inculcate national reconciliation and human rights, for resettling the millions 
of refugees and IDPs, for demobilizing and re-educating ex-FAR troops, for 
ex-child soldiers, for the army, for the battered education and health systems, 
for continuing research on the genocide – the list is limitless. This burden is 
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the consequence of a tragedy that could have been prevented or mitigated. Yet 
Rwanda today is dependent on foreign sources for much of its meagre budget, 
while most initiatives crucial to rehabilitation, reconciliation and a culture of 
rights depend for their viability on outside funding sources.
Views on Rwanda today remain remarkably diverse. Hutu Power advocates, 
still thriving outside the country, continue perversely to deny the genocide 
with a series of self-contradictory propositions. It never happened. Or, Hutu 
were enraged that the RPF murdered Habyarimana and spontaneously lashed 
out. Or, people were killed in a civil war. Or, if  there was a genocide at all, it 
was perpetrated by the RPF both in Rwanda and in the DRC. Or, there was a 
‘double genocide’. The ugly phenomenon of denial is particularly widespread 
in the French-speaking countries of Europe and Africa and in Quebec. It would 
be useful to expose the network of European politicians, priests and academics 
who continue to fund and support this malignant force and who actively foment 
hatred against the present government of Rwanda. 
Hostility to Rwanda for its human rights abuses is also widespread. Some 
prominent former foreign friends of  Rwanda have emerged as bitter critics, 
sometimes describing the country as virtually a totalitarian dictatorship. 
Instances of  intimidated human rights activists, jailed reporters, threatened 
media and opponents of  the government forced to fl ee the country are not 
hard to come by. The presidential election of 2003, the fi rst since 1994, was 
won by Paul Kagame with an almost unbelievable 95 per cent of  the vote. 
But there was criticism of  the way the ‘divisionist’ card was played against 
Kagame’s main opponent, and his opponents accused the RPF of beating up 
their campaign workers. 
Yet, typical of Rwanda, others insist that such attacks are excessive. Some 
see an unfair double standard imposed on the RPF government. Corruption 
is a great deal less widespread than among its neighbours. Security obtains 
in most of  the country. The election process appeared to be mostly fair. In 
the subsequent elections for the National Assembly, opposition parties won 
a credible 25 per cent of the vote. Beyond that, almost half  the legislators are 
women, the largest proportion of any parliament in the world. This should 
have positive repercussions for all Rwandan women. Within certain boundaries, 
mostly understood, the media are cut a good deal of slack; in any event, the 
BBC and Voice of  America are now easily available in the three national 
languages. Although some accuse Kagame and his government of exploiting 
the genocide for their own self-interest, others argue the opposite: considering 
that it has been only twelve years since the genocide, the number of Interahamwe
still active in eastern Congo and the uncertain loyalty of the country’s 85 per 
cent Hutu majority, it can just as convincingly be argued that the government 
allows a substantial amount of freedom and openness. But no one, on any side, 
doubts Kagame’s steely determination and his readiness to take whatever steps 
are necessary, barring none, to keep his country secure and his government 
in power.
Eleven years after the genocide, Rwanda remains impenetrable, opaque, 
mysterious, a source of  puzzlement and controversy to all who know it – a 
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country that found itself  making history that it never sought and is now 
attempting to forge a new path in the face of spectacular odds. Terribly poor, 
badly traumatized, deeply divided, a precarious entity in a fragile and explosive 
region, Rwanda is a country that is now bound to make history once again. 
It has only two paths to choose. It can once again succumb to its history and 
regress to yet another unspeakable confl ict. Or it can transcend its past and 
attempt to defeat poverty and underdevelopment as a united, secure and stable 
country. As has been true for more than a century, both Rwandans and outsiders 
will play central roles in determining the future.
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Call to Genocide: 
Radio in Rwanda, 1994
Alison Des Forges
Eleven years after the end of the Rwandan genocide, two fi lms were released 
for popular audiences, greatly increasing widespread realization of the horror 
that had taken the lives of  more than half  a million Tutsi. In both cases, the 
fi lm-makers highlighted the importance of radio in mobilizing people to kill. 
Audiences leave the theatre wondering how it was possible for genocide to occur 
in full public view at the end of the twentieth century and why no action had 
been taken to halt the broadcasts that were promoting the worst of all crimes. 
LEAD-UP TO GENOCIDE
At the end of  the 1980s, Juvénal Habyarimana saw his power slipping after 
nearly 20 years. Even though he was a member of the Hutu ethnic group, who 
formed some 90 per cent of the population, he had lost much of his popular 
base. For years he had favoured his own region and, even more, his own family 
circle, as the rest of  the country experienced an economic crisis due to the 
falling prices of  coffee and tea, the country’s major exports. The voices of 
dissent grew, taking the form of a demand to end the monopoly of power held 
by the president’s political party, the Mouvement Républicain National pour la 
Démocratie et le Développement (MRND).
In 1990, Rwanda was attacked by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a 
movement consisting mostly of refugees and children of refugees of the Tutsi 
ethnic group. Once the ruling elite of Rwanda, the Tutsi had been overthrown 
in a revolution beginning in 1959 and many had fl ed the country. In the early 
1960s these Tutsi refugees had led a series of incursions into Rwanda, each of 
which provoked reprisals against the Tutsi who still lived in the country. After 
Habyarimana came to power in 1973, there was a period of calm with neither 
attacks from the outside, nor killings of the Tutsi minority in Rwanda. 
With the 1990 attack by the RPF, Habyarimana and some around him saw 
the chance to stop the erosion of their popularity and to try to craft a new Hutu 
solidarity by turning against the Tutsi minority inside the country, labelling 
them traitors and accusing them of supporting the RPF attackers. Within days 
of  the fi rst attack, the government had rounded up thousands of  Tutsi and 
Hutu opposed to the regime; it would hold some for months without trial in 
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inhumane conditions. Many were tortured and scores died. Two weeks after the 
RPF attack, government offi cials carried out the fi rst of a series of massacres 
of Tutsi civilians, killing hundreds at the commune of Kibilira. Over the next 
three years, there would be another 15 such massacres before the genocide of 
1994 began (Des Forges 1994: 87; International Commission 1993: 11–29).
From the opening days of  the war, the government understood the 
importance of  using media to rally Rwandans around the regime. Believing 
that the government-controlled media were not up to the task of  carrying 
forward a vigorous propaganda campaign, Habyarimana named a promising 
young intellectual and university professor, Ferdinand Nahimana, to take over 
the offi cial information offi ce, a post that included authority over the national 
radio station (Chrétien et al. 1995: 51–2).
THE ROLE OF RADIO
A large number of Rwandans could not read or write and, as a result, radio was 
an important way for the government to deliver messages to the population. 
In addition to the usual news, the radio broadcast offi cial notifi cation of 
appointments to and dismissals from government posts, announcements of 
government meetings and lists of candidates admitted to secondary schools. 
It also broadcast daily reminders from the president, exhorting Rwandans to 
work hard and live clean, moral lives. So long as Rwanda was a single-party 
state – that is until June 1991 – the radio also disseminated propaganda for 
the president’s party, the MRND. Not just an offi cial voice of the state and a 
propaganda channel for the single party, the national radio also helped link 
families whose relatives were distant, broadcasting news of  deaths so that 
relatives could return home for funerals. 
In March 1992, Radio Rwanda was fi rst used in directly promoting the killing 
of Tutsi in a place called Bugesera, south of the national capital. On 3 March, 
the radio repeatedly broadcast a communiqué supposedly sent by a human 
rights group based in Nairobi warning that Hutu in Bugesera would be attacked 
by Tutsi. Local offi cials built on the radio announcement to convince Hutu 
that they needed to protect themselves by attacking fi rst. Led by soldiers from 
a nearby military base, Hutu civilians, members of the Interahamwe, a militia 
attached to the MRND party, and local Hutu civilians attacked and killed 
hundreds of Tutsi (International Commission 1993: 13–14). 
The role of  the radio in inciting killing demonstrated the importance of 
controlling the media. Opposition parties, having proved their strength in 
massive street demonstrations, were able to push Habyarimana into conceding 
to them the right to participate in government and one of the ministries they 
wanted to control was a newly created ministry of  information. In the new 
coalition government formed just after the Bugesera massacre, a member of 
one of the opposition parties was named to head this ministry. He gradually 
instituted policies meant to end the MRND monopoly on the media and to 
guarantee equal access to members of other political parties. Nahimana was 
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removed as head of the information offi ce and so lost control of the radio as 
well (Chrétien 1995: 61).
Other voices were also beginning to be heard. The RPF broadcast through a 
station called Radio Muhabura, although its signal did not reach all of Rwanda. 
Some civil society groups also drew up proposals for independent radio stations, 
such as one to serve the rural poor.
RADIO AS PART OF THE ‘SELF-DEFENCE’
The war dragged on through 1991 and 1992, punctuated by occasional ceasefi res 
and sporadic negotiations, but without any real settlement. In January 1993, 
the RPF was able to force some major concessions on the government during 
a negotiating session, a diplomatic success they followed by a stunning military 
advance in early February – in violation of an existing ceasefi re agreement. Until 
this time, Habyarimana had been able to count on France as a reliable supplier 
of arms and political support. French troops, supposedly in Rwanda to protect 
French citizens, were decisive in stopping the RPF advance on several occasions, 
including in early 1993. But some French authorities were becoming convinced 
that the Rwandan government would need substantial additional support if  it 
were to continue to resist the RPF and the French were increasingly unwilling 
to supply this. 
In that atmosphere of growing RPF strength and weakening French support, 
some Habyarimana supporters – and perhaps Habyarimana himself  – turned 
to the idea of mobilizing large numbers of civilians as a ‘self-defence’ force to 
back up the national army. Military correspondence, as well as propaganda, had 
made clear in the preceding months that the ‘enemy’ included Tutsi civilians as 
well as RPF combatants. Thus the self-defence force was apparently meant as 
much to attack these civilians as to confront the soldiers of the RPF force. 
The general outlines of the self-defence force were sketched out by Colonel 
Théoneste Bagosora in the fi rst pages of his 1993 engagement book. Bagosora, 
who would take the lead in national affairs after President Habyarimana was 
killed on 6 April 1994, was known for his hostile attitude toward Tutsi. Many 
of the details jotted down in his 1993 engagement book were later replicated in 
a secret national self-defence plan drawn up in the early months of 1994, then 
implemented in April 1994 when the civilian population was mobilized to kill 
Tutsi civilians. Even in his preliminary notes, Bagosora suggested that the radio 
should be used in the self-defence effort. He even noted the name of Simon 
Bikindi, one of the most popular musicians in Rwanda, who would become 
famous for his songs extolling Hutu solidarity and denouncing supposed Tutsi 
crimes (Bagosora 1993).
AN END TO WAR: THE ARUSHA ACCORDS
Nearly four years of  war between the Rwandan government and the RPF 
ended with the signing of the Arusha accords in August 1993. At that time the 
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signatories already recognized the importance of propaganda in contributing 
to tensions between parties and agreed to end such propaganda.
But despite the carefully detailed accords, some elements in both the 
Rwandan government and the RPF were not ready to make peace and continued 
preparations for further war. 
As part of the accords, a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force was created 
to help implement the agreement. Known as the United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), it arrived later than expected – most of the 
peacekeepers came only in December – and was smaller than thought necessary 
by its commanding offi cer, Canadian General Roméo Dallaire. UNAMIR was 
poorly equipped and poorly supplied throughout its time in Rwanda. Taking 
into consideration its weaknesses, the UN Security Council gave the force a 
mandate that was far less robust than originally envisioned in the accords. 
RTLM MAKES ITSELF HEARD
Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) began its broadcasts just 
after the accords were signed. In the context of multiplying voices, adamant 
supporters of the MRND and of a new, related party called the Coalition for the 
Defence of the Republic (CDR) decided to launch a radio station to broadcast 
the message that used to be the only one heard on Radio Rwanda. Nahimana, 
well acquainted with the power of radio, did much of the work organizing the 
new station. Habyarimana himself was the most important of its backers, which 
comprised many of the ruling elite, including ministers and other government 
offi cials, bankers and high-ranking military offi cers. But the station was meant 
to be the voice of the people and the price for a single share was kept low to 
attract ordinary citizens to support the effort (ICTR 2003: para. 4.2). 
RTLM was also meant to reach out to the ordinary citizen in its programming. 
It aired the latest music, especially popular Congolese songs, while Radio 
Rwanda was still broadcasting old standard tunes. Unlike the offi cial Radio 
Rwanda, which spoke in the ponderous tones of  state offi cials, RTLM was 
informal and lively. Several of  its announcers were known for their quick 
wit, which was appreciated even by those who were the butt of their humour. 
According to one Rwandan well-acquainted with the media in his country, 
RTLM offered comments that sounded like ‘a conversation among Rwandans 
who knew each other well and were relaxing over some banana beer or a bottle 
of Primus in a bar’ (Higiro 1996).
RTLM brought the voice of ordinary people to the airwaves. Listeners could 
call in to request their favourite tunes or to exchange gossip with announcers 
and a wider audience. RTLM journalists went out into the streets and invited 
passers-by to comment on topics of the day. This populist approach allowed 
RTLM to claim a legitimacy different from that of  Radio Rwanda; it still 
broadcast offi cial voices often enough to continue to enjoy the authoritative-
ness of national radio, but to that it added the appeal of being the station to 
speak for the people.
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But in late October 1993, the president of neighbouring Burundi and the fi rst 
Hutu to hold that post, was assassinated by military offi cers who had seemed 
to accept his popular election by majority vote several months before. As soon 
as the news of the assassination became known, Burundian Hutu – in some 
cases led by local government offi cials or political leaders – began attacking 
Tutsi. The Tutsi-led army then carried out extensive reprisal killings of Hutu 
civilians, sometimes in areas where Tutsi had not actually been killed. The fi nal 
death toll was tens of thousands of dead in both groups. 
These events in Burundi further polarized Rwandans, many of  whom 
were quick to draw lessons from the neighbouring state, whose Hutu–Tutsi 
population mirrored their own. For many Tutsi, the attacks on other Tutsi in 
Burundi demonstrated the vulnerability of a minority in situations of ethnic 
confl ict and made them even more afraid to put their trust in a Hutu-led 
government. Meanwhile, some Hutu speculated that the RPF had assisted 
Burundian Tutsi soldiers in the assassination and claimed that the crime proved 
that Rwandan Tutsi could not be trusted to implement the Arusha accords as 
they had agreed to do. 
Two important opposition parties split over the question of the desirability 
of continuing with efforts to implement the accords, while their anti-Arusha 
accord members formed a new coalition with Habyarimana’s MRND and the 
CDR. The coalition became known by its rallying cry ‘Hutu Power’ and its 
voice became the RTLM.
RTLM reported the assassination of the Burundi president in a highly sen-
sationalized way to underline supposed Tutsi brutality and heighten Hutu fears 
of Tutsi (RTLM transcripts: 25 October; 20, 29, 30 November; 12 December 
1993). The president was actually killed by a bayonet blow to the chest, but 
RTLM reported details of supposed torture, including castration of the victim. 
In pre-colonial times, some Tutsi kings castrated defeated enemy rulers and 
decorated their royal drums with the genitalia. The false report of the castration 
of the Burundi president was intended to remind Hutu listeners of this practice 
and to elicit their fear and repulsion; it did so with great success.
From late October on, RTLM repeatedly and forcefully underlined many 
of  the themes developed for years by the extremist written press, including 
the inherent differences between Hutu and Tutsi, the foreign origin of  Tutsi 
and, hence, their lack of rights to claim to be Rwandan, the disproportionate 
share of wealth and power held by Tutsi and the horrors of past Tutsi rule. It 
continually stressed the need to be alert to Tutsi plots and possible attacks and 
demanded that Hutu prepare to ‘defend’ themselves against the Tutsi threat 
(RTLM transcripts: 25 October; 12, 20, 24 November 1993; 29 March; 1, 3 
June 1994).
In addition to the increasingly virulent propaganda against Tutsi, the radio 
spewed forth attacks on Hutu who were willing to continue cooperating with 
them. In some cases, the radio moved from general denunciations to naming 
specifi c people, including the Hutu prime minister, as enemies of  the nation 
who should be eliminated one way or another from the public scene. It used 
increasingly violent language, saying, for example, that the Interahamwe militia 
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might rip into little pieces those thought to support the RPF (Article 19 1996: 
92–3, 96–7, Sénat de Belgique 1997: 70).
In February 1994, RTLM showed that it could be used just as Radio Rwanda 
was used at the time of  the 1992 Bugesera massacre, to pinpoint targets for 
attack. An opposition politician was assassinated and, in reprisal, the head 
of  the CDR party was lynched by militia members of  the opposition party 
(Sénat de Belgique 1997: 38–9, 71–2). RTLM warned that the RPF were going 
to attack the capital, a report that was false. It demanded that listeners protect 
themselves against RPF supporters in certain parts of the city. Hutu in those 
neighbourhoods, led by militia, killed about 70 people, thus foreshadowing the 
bloody events to come two months later (Article 19 1996: 97).
FEAR AND FOREBODING
In December 1993, some 600 RPF soldiers moved into Kigali, implementing a 
provision of the accords that allowed the RPF to station troops in the capital to 
protect their political leaders during the period of transition to a new government. 
At the same time, preparations for renewed war increased. Political leaders of 
Hutu Power parties recruited thousands of militia members and arranged for 
their training. Offi cials and military offi cers distributed thousands of weapons 
to civilians, an effort so widespread and public that it drew condemnation 
from a Catholic bishop who asked authorities to explain why the fi rearms 
were being handed out (Kalibushi et al. 1993). In December and throughout 
the early months of  1994, RTLM stepped up the pace and bitterness of  its 
attack on Tutsi, Hutu opposition fi gures, leaders of civil society and even the 
UN peacekeepers, all of  whom it accused of  favouring the RPF. In several 
cases, the peacekeepers did behave badly toward Habyarimana supporters, 
thus providing a kernel of truth on which RTLM expanded very successfully 
(Belgium 1994).
Rwandan and international human rights organizations and other members 
of Rwandan civil society denounced these preparations publicly while diplomats 
cabled their capitals more discretely, warning of the growing risk of renewed 
war and violence (Sénat de Belgique 1997: 41, 85–6). Dallaire notifi ed UN 
headquarters in New York about caches of arms hidden in the capital and he 
reported that militia were highly organized and prepared to kill 1,000 Tutsi in 
the fi rst 20 minutes after the signal for attack was given. His warnings, like his 
efforts to win permission to confi scate arms and his pleas for more supplies 
and equipment, went unheeded. 
Those who tried to raise the alarm about the preparations for violence 
frequently drew attention specifi cally to the radio. Dallaire, who had once 
hoped for radio equipment to permit the UN force to inform the public in a 
responsible fashion, notifi ed New York about the broadcasts against his force, 
but to no avail. One RTLM announcer warned that the UN peacekeepers from 
Belgium – particularly disliked because Belgium, the former colonial power, 
had refused to provide arms to the Rwandan government – would face ‘a fi ght 
without pity’ and ‘hatred without mercy’ unless they gave up and returned 
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home (Sénat de Belgique 1997: 49). The Belgian ambassador told authorities 
at the Belgian Foreign Ministry that RTLM was disseminating ‘infl ammatory 
statements calling for the hatred – indeed for the extermination’ of Tutsi. Days 
before the start of the genocide, the German ambassador, then serving as head 
of the European community in Rwanda, called attention to the ‘unacceptable 
role of some media’ (Adelman and Suhrke 1996: 32, Prunier 1995: 209). When 
diplomats protested to Habyarimana and other offi cials about the broadcasts, 
they claimed that the radio station was a private enterprise, merely exercising 
its right to free speech.
The minister of  information, under whose authority the radio station 
operated, tried to call the directors of RTLM to account for the content of its 
broadcasts. In correspondence and in meetings, he insisted that the incitement 
to fear and hatred must stop. On at least one occasion, RTLM leadership 
promised to moderate the tone of the broadcasts, but did not do so. The attorney 
general registered civil complaints against RTLM but, under pressure from 
the president, had not yet taken action on them by early April (ICTR 2003: 
para. 4.3).
Critics of RTLM all asked for changes in the content of the broadcasts; none 
went so far as to ask for the station to be closed down completely. 
RADIO IN THE GENOCIDE
President Habyarimana, the president of  Burundi and leading military and 
civilian offi cials of the Rwandan government were killed on the evening of 6 
April 1994 when their plane was shot down on its approach to Kigali airport. 
Within hours, military, administrative and political authorities ordered the 
killing of leading members of  parties opposed to Hutu Power and of Tutsi. 
Under the guidance of Colonel Bagosora and other Hutu Power offi cers and 
offi cials, a new interim government was installed. It included political leaders 
ready to implement a ‘self-defence’ plan that included widespread killing of 
Tutsi civilians. 
The killings began fi rst in the capital and some outlying areas where Hutu 
Power leaders were strongest; authorities in other regions, particularly the south 
and centre of  the country, resisted the killing for the fi rst two weeks. On 7 
April, the RPF attacked the Rwandan government army, thus beginning full-
scale war once again. From this time forward, the war and the genocide were 
intertwined, making it easier to direct the killing of Tutsi civilians as if  it were 
part of the war effort.
Assailants searched out Tutsi, moving from house to house in a neighbourhood; 
they massacred them by the thousands in churches and other public buildings 
where Tutsi sought refuge; and they picked them out at barriers set up to impede 
their fl ight on roads and paths throughout the country. 
Authorities used RTLM and Radio Rwanda to spur and direct killings 
both in those areas most eager to attack Tutsi and members of  the Hutu 
opposition and in areas where the killings initially were resisted. They relied 
on both radio stations to incite and mobilize, then to give specifi c directions 
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for carrying out the killings (RTLM transcripts: 13, 29 April; 15, 20 May; 1, 
5, 9, 19 June 1994).
Incitement
As RTLM had forewarned, it turned its full force against the Belgian 
peacekeepers, accusing them of having shot down – or helping to shoot down 
– the president’s plane. Under the stimulus of these broadcasts, some soldiers of 
the Rwandan army brutally murdered ten UN troops of the Belgian contingent. 
Some Hutu Power leaders had foreseen that the Belgian government would 
withdraw its troops from the peacekeeping force should some of its soldiers 
be killed, and it did just that soon after the murders. This withdrawal so badly 
weakened the force that the Security Council initially favoured the withdrawal 
of the whole force, although it fi nally permitted a token force to remain in the 
country with orders to keep a low profi le, concentrating on protecting itself  
and taking no risks to save Rwandans (UN 1996: 37–44).
After 6 April, RTLM called on all Hutu to ‘rise up as a single man’ to defend 
their country in what was said to be the ‘fi nal’ war. One announcer predicted that 
the war ‘would exterminate the Tutsi from the globe … make them disappear 
once and for all’ (Chrétien et al. 1995: 205). RTLM staff carried forward all the 
themes so vigorously developed in previous months, emphasizing the cruelty and 
ruthlessness of the Tutsi (RTLM transcripts: 15 May; 9, 14, 19, 20 June 1994). 
As one announcer said, using the term inyenzi or cockroach to refer to the RPF 
and its supporters, ‘the cruelty of the inyenzi can be cured only by their total 
extermination’ (Chrétien et al. 1995: 204; RTLM transcript: 3 June 1994). 
RTLM used terms like inyenzi and Tutsi interchangeably with others referring 
to RPF combatants, leading listeners to believe that all Tutsi were necessarily 
supporters of the RPF force fi ghting against the government. RTLM announcers 
warned specifi cally that combatants dressed in civilian clothes were mingling 
among displaced people fl eeing combat zones, and they encouraged people 
along their route to be vigilant in searching out any refugees who looked like 
they might be RPF in disguise, that is, who looked like they might be Tutsi 
(RTLM transcripts: 1, 2 February; 29 April; 4–6, 20 June 1994). 
After 6 April, the director of Radio Rwanda, himself a member of the political 
opposition, fl ed and the national radio station took up the anti-Tutsi messages 
of RTLM. One RTLM announcer commented that Radio Rwanda had changed 
from ‘rival’ to ‘sister’ (Chrétien et al. 1995: 79). On 21 April, Radio Rwanda 
broadcast a debate by political leaders, during which one politician insisted 
that Tutsi returning from exile abroad intended to ‘exterminate, exterminate, 
exterminate, exterminate’. Tutsi, he said, were going to ‘exterminate you until 
they are the only ones left in the country so that they can keep for a thousand 
years the power that their fathers had kept for four hundred years ... You must 
not let up in your efforts,’ he told his listeners (Chrétien et al. 1995: 300). 
On some occasions, national authorities were heard on Radio Rwanda, 
delivering a similar message but one that carried additional weight because 
of the respect attached to their offi ces. In an effort to force the people of the 
southern prefecture of  Butare to begin killing, the government removed the 
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prefect (governor) in a humiliating way that left no doubt about why he had 
lost his post. At the ceremony installing his successor, broadcast by Radio 
Rwanda, the interim president of Rwanda, who had been set up by the Hutu 
Power faction, exhorted all citizens to see killing Tutsi as their responsibility. 
He said that any not ready to do so should step aside for those ready to ‘work’, 
a common euphemism for killing. He warned further that those not willing to 
‘work’ should be eliminated by others, by the good ‘workers who want to work’ 
for their country (Sindikubwabo 1994).
Directives
Authorities used both radio stations to give instructions and orders to listeners. 
RTLM announcers identifi ed specifi c targets to attack, sending assailants on 8 
April to the home of Tutsi businessman Antoine Sebera and later to the home of 
Joseph Kahabaye. One identifi ed a hill in the capital where Tutsi were said to be 
hiding in the woods and another provided a list of 13 people and their locations. 
On one occasion, an announcer urged people guarding a barrier in Kigali city 
to eliminate Tutsi in a vehicle just nearing that checkpoint. Notifi ed soon after 
that the Tutsi had been caught and killed, the announcer congratulated the 
killers on the air. In yet another case, the station directed assailants to attack a 
mosque in Kigali where Tutsi were seeking shelter and on another day, urged an 
attack on a convoy that was attempting to evacuate Tutsi and Hutu opponents 
of Hutu Power from the Hotel Mille Collines, a gathering point for people at 
risk (RTLM transcripts: 13, 29 April; 15, 20 May; 1, 5, 9, 19 June 1994). Later 
in May, RTLM said that General Dallaire should be killed, identifying him as 
a white man with a moustache (Dallaire 2004: 379–80). Leaders of the militia 
used RTLM to call their men to meetings in the capital or to send them off to 
other parts of the country (Kamanzi n.d.: 146). 
Radio Rwanda conveyed orders from the authorities, including a message 
from the prefect of Kigali telling residents to ‘close ranks, remember how to 
use the usual tools [weapons] to defend themselves’ (Kayishema 1994). He went 
on to specify that citizens should clear the brush in which Tutsi might hide. He 
directed them to ‘search houses, beginning with those that are abandoned, to 
search the marshes of the area to be sure no inyenzi have slipped in to hide there 
... and to search the drains and ditches.’ He said that ‘reliable’ people should 
be chosen for these tasks, meaning those who supported the Hutu Power line, 
and that they should be given what they need for the work, meaning weapons. 
Radio Rwanda served to summon drivers of  bulldozers needed to dig mass 
graves for the thousands of bodies (Chrétien et al. 1995: 298).
Authorities relied on the radio stations to congratulate those who were 
‘vigilant’ and performed well and to castigate those who hesitated to join in 
the killing. On occasion, when they wanted to limit the violence, authorities used 
radio to deliver this message as well. In early May, when the UN commissioner 
for human rights was about to arrive, RTLM told listeners to abstain from 
attacks on Tutsi. In another incident a short time later, the interim government 
was seeking to win renewed French support and found the French unwilling 
to commit much assistance to a government then beginning to come under 
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criticism for its genocidal policy. To help persuade the French that the genocide 
would not pose a problem to the delivery of aid, RTLM told listeners to please 
behave in a more dignifi ed fashion. Listeners were told to make sure that bodies 
were not left on the roads to be seen by foreigners and to please not stand around 
barriers laughing when someone’s throat was cut (Chrétien et al. 1995: 316–17; 
Human Rights Watch 1994).
The impact of the radio
Authorities supporting the genocide urged citizens to listen to the radio. One 
offi cial even told the residents of his area that they should regard what the radio 
told them as having the same importance as direct orders from him. In some 
cases, authorities picked up radio messages and used them to mobilize local 
people more effectively. Thus when the radio claimed that supporters of the 
RPF had hidden weapons in or near churches, local authorities staged incidents 
in which they ‘discovered’ planted weapons to give credence to the reports of 
secret preparations for attacks against Hutu. 
Conversely, authorities who tried to resist or limit the killings asked national 
offi cials to halt the broadcasts or moderate their content; in one case, two 
prefects advised the people in their prefectures to listen to the radio with a 
very critical ear.
In addition to this indication of  the importance that authorities attached 
to the radio, there is considerable evidence from the perpetrators themselves 
about the impact of radio and RTLM, in particular. One foreign religious sister 
crossed dozens of barriers as she moved across Rwanda during the genocide; at 
each one, she found the guards listening to the radio. Others have testifi ed that 
bands of killers set off  to ‘work’, singing the anti-Tutsi songs they had learned 
from RTLM. One witness said that it was RTLM who said that the Tutsi were 
to be killed and another said the radio had taught people that they must ‘kill 
them before they kill you’ (Human Rights Watch/International Federation of 
Human Rights Leagues interviews: Kigali, 16 July 1995; Musebeya, 7 June and 
28 August 1995; Butare, 19 October 1995).
Throughout the genocide, RTLM continued the interactive broadcasting 
that it had begun in the months before. Its journalists went out around the 
city of  Kigali, interviewing ordinary people at the barriers, giving them an 
opportunity to explain on air what they were doing and why they were doing 
it. This confi rmation by ordinary people of the ‘rightness’ of what they were 
doing contributed to the legitimacy of the genocide for radio listeners.
When foreign observers began to criticize the genocide, RTLM sought to 
bolster the legitimacy of the authorities by discounting all negative comments 
and by reminding its listeners that all they had to do was to win the war and 
then foreign critics would forget any crimes they had committed (Chrétien et 
al. 1995). 
Demands for action
As the death toll mounted, human rights and humanitarian organizations sought 
without success to persuade leading UN members to increase the number of 
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peacekeeping troops in Rwanda. On 30 April, the Security Council did direct 
the Secretary General to examine ways to expand the force, but it was another 
two and a half  weeks before the resolution calling for an enlarged force was 
approved. Because of the diffi culties securing, equipping and transporting the 
new peacekeepers, the reinforcements did not arrive in Rwanda until the interim 
government had been defeated by the RPF and had fl ed the country.
Unable at first to obtain assurance of  reinforcements, activists sought 
help from the United States (US), France and the UN with the more limited 
objective of closing down the radio stations that were inciting and directing 
the violence. 
The argument developed by Human Rights Watch and followed by some 
other international nongovernmental organizations was that international 
silence on the genocide and failure to interrupt the broadcasts made it possible 
for the interim authorities to continue to claim that they constituted a legitimate 
government, recognized by other governments. The fact that Rwanda continued 
to sit as a non-permanent member of  the Security Council throughout the 
genocide reinforced its claim to international legitimacy. Human Rights Watch 
argued that jamming radio broadcasts would disrupt incitements to genocidal 
violence and would limit the delivery of genocidal directives. And, argued the 
human rights group, jamming the broadcasts would deliver a broader message 
as well: it would make clear international condemnation of the genocide, thus 
weakening the claim of the authorities to legitimacy and perhaps encouraging 
resistance against the killings.
In early May, US State Department staff who shared concern over the role of 
the radio stations in the genocide had their legal staff  consider the implications 
of  jamming the radio. In accordance with the usual strong US support for 
freedom of speech as guaranteed by international conventions and telecom-
munications law, the State Department lawyers concluded that the US should 
not interrupt RTLM broadcasts. At a congressional hearing on 4 May, George 
Moose, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, said that the issue was 
moot because a military attack by the RPF had silenced RTLM, an assertion 
contradicted immediately by a Human Rights Watch representative who said 
that the station had resumed broadcasting from a mobile transmitter (Des 
Forges 1994). On the same day, national security advisor Anthony Lake, who 
had been pressed by human rights activists to interrupt the radio broadcasts, 
raised the issue with the secretary of defence. Within 24 hours, the Department 
of Defence replied that the radio could be jammed from a specially equipped 
aircraft, but that it would be ‘ineffective and expensive’, costing about US$ 8,500 
for each hour (Wisner 1994). 
On 1 June, Ted Kennedy, an infl uential senator, made a new effort to get 
action and asked the US Secretary of State to cooperate with the UN in ending 
‘the unconscionable incitement to genocide’ being carried out by radio stations 
in Rwanda. Once again the offi cial response described jamming as ‘legally 
contentious’, an assertion to which offi cials again added arguments concerning 
the cost and supposed ineffectiveness of jamming the radios (Acting Under-
secretary of Defence for Policy 1994).
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In fact, the legal arguments against jamming could have been countered by 
another set of arguments in its favour – arguments used previously by the US 
when it silenced radio broadcasting in Haiti and during the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War. Had the US lawyers been willing to recognize the killings in Rwanda as 
genocide – an action delayed until June – lawyers could also have justifi ed halting 
the broadcasts by referring to that part of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UN 1951) that prohibited ‘direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide’ (Metzl 1997). 
Arguments concerning cost and effectiveness could also have been debunked 
had offi cials with suffi cient clout wished to do so. In the end, the ultimate 
consideration was simply to avoid getting involved in what US offi cials saw as 
becoming a complicated confl ict and especially to avoid becoming enmeshed in a 
confl ict that might require the deployment of US forces. From that perspective, 
jamming the radio carried a signifi cant risk: if  the US judged that the situation 
was serious enough to merit this fi rst step, it would fi nd it diffi cult not to move 
to a further stage of involvement if the jamming itself proved insuffi cient to stop 
the killings. It was probably this consideration that moved a defence department 
offi cial to advise that jamming could be a very ‘dangerous and open-ended 
prospect’ (Acting Undersecretary of Defence for Policy 1994). Having suffered 
the loss of  18 soldiers in a peacekeeping operation in Somalia the previous 
year, US offi cials were determined to avoid any ‘dangerous and open-ended’ 
commitments, especially on the African continent. 
The UN Security Council was fi nally moved to action by RTLM threats 
against General Dallaire and the peacekeeping troops under his command. In 
late June, the president of the council asked the interim government to close 
down RTLM. At fi rst the Rwandan representative, still sitting as a nonpermanent 
member of the council, put forward arguments about the private nature of the 
enterprise and guarantees of  freedom of  speech. After further pressure, he 
agreed to end the broadcasts, but they continued, his commitment notwith-
standing (Haq 1994).
In late June, the French government sent a military force to Rwanda, 
purportedly to protect civilians. At fi rst, interim government offi cials expected 
that the deployment, known as Operation Turquoise, would support its troops 
in opposing further RPF advance. RTLM and Radio Rwanda hailed the arrival 
of  the French soldiers and gave instruction on how to welcome the troops 
warmly. By the fi rst week of July it was clear that the French did not intend to 
support the interim government and its army – at least not openly – and French 
soldiers began protecting Tutsi and dismantling some of the barriers. The tone 
of RTLM commentary changed abruptly and the radio began criticizing the 
French presence. The French, with experienced, highly qualifi ed troops on 
the ground, lost little time in destroying at least one and possibly more radio 
transmitters used by RTLM and the national radio. When RTLM continued 
to broadcast, although apparently to a more limited area, French offi cials were 
able to oblige the stations to halt verbal attacks on French troops. They also 
brought in equipment to jam the radio, although they did not use it.
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NEW ATTITUDES TOWARD JAMMING RADIO
In mid-July the RPF defeated the Rwandan army and both army and interim 
government offi cials led a massive exodus of nearly two million Rwandan Hutus 
into neighbouring countries. This caused an enormous humanitarian crisis and 
the loss of even more human lives, this time mostly Hutu. Recognizing that the 
outfl ow threatened to destabilize the entire region and cause far larger problems, 
the UN and the US hoped to limit the crisis by persuading the refugees to 
return home rapidly; but RTLM, still broadcasting from a mobile transmitter, 
encouraged the refugees to remain outside Rwanda. In late August, the US asked 
the French to jam the radio and offered to help them do it; however, the French 
had sent their equipment home (Quiles et al. 1998: 329–30). In October, the 
US and the UN discussed cooperating in jamming the broadcasts, but before 
they could act, the radio vanished from the airwaves.
Having seen the power of hate radio in Rwanda, US offi cials were ready to 
act in 1995 when a Burundian station called Radio Rutomorangingo began 
broadcasting anti-Tutsi messages. A policymaking group decided that the US 
could ‘technically and legally contribute to silencing the radio’ (Young 1994). In 
the end, the station moderated its broadcasts and the US took no action against 
it, although the Burundian government jammed its broadcasts a year later, using 
equipment from Israel. As a result of the Rwandan experience, President Bill 
Clinton issued a policy directive in 1999 permitting US interventions in any 
future cases in which radio stations called for violence (Clinton 1999).
The importance of the radio, which was recognized by policymakers in the 
United States in the years after the Rwanda genocide, was spread to wider 
audiences with the showing of the popular fi lms in 2005. Perhaps this recognition 
of the role of the radio by a broader audience will help ensure that policymakers 
actually act to stop the voices of hate in similar tragedies in the future. 
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Among the testimonials of participants in the Rwanda genocide gathered by 
journalist Jean Hatzfeld is this passage:
Killing is very discouraging if  you must decide to do so yourself  ... but if  you 
are obeying orders from the authorities, if  you are adequately conditioned, 
if  you feel pushed and pulled, if  you see that the carnage will have absolutely 
no adverse effects in future, you feel comforted and revitalized. You do it 
without shame ... We envisaged this relief  with no reluctance whatsoever ... 
we were effi ciently conditioned by radio broadcasts and advice we heard. 
(Hatzfeld 2003: 85)
This psychology of killers perpetrating mass slaughter makes the most sense 
not when it is seen as some kind of exotic, ethnocultural way of thinking, but 
rather when situated among the methods of an eminently modern propaganda. 
The psychology is explained in a handbook written by French psychosociolo-
gist Roger Mucchielli (1972), Psychologie de la Publicité et de la Propagande: 
Connaissance du Problème, Applications Pratiques. A training handbook in the 
fi eld of humanities designed for psychologists, facilitators and leaders, it can be 
found along with the rest of Mucchielli’s works in the library of the National 
University of  Rwanda, Butare. The handbook inspired a note ‘regarding 
expansion and recruitment propaganda’, written by a Butare intellectual and 
later found by the team headed by human rights researcher Alison Des Forges 
(1999: 65–6). The Mucchielli manual explains – without moral or ideological 
expectation – the mechanisms of mass conditioning and mobilization required 
to create a mass movement. It describes methods for moulding a good conscience 
based on indignation toward an enemy perceived as a scapegoat. It describes 
such tactics as ‘mirror propaganda’ or ‘accusations in a mirror’, the notion of 
ascribing to others what we ourselves are preparing to do. The good conscience 
would legitimize collective action based on widespread certainty of being on the 
side of the strongest and the just. In other words, the collective action would 
be the embodiment of the ‘people’.
The fascination that some genocide organizers displayed for Mucchielli’s 
work is quite understandable. All the ingredients for such conditioning existed 
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in Rwanda: a low literacy rate, a proclivity for a unanimous partisan approach 
surrounding moralistic assertions, a well-established potential scapegoat in 
the Tutsi minority and enduring references to the ‘majority people’ (rubanda
nyamwinshi).
From an ideologic point of view, this socioethnic populism entailed the pre-
eminence of the ‘Hutu people’, whose absolute right was based on the fact that 
this community constituted the majority (perceived as homogeneous). The right 
was also based on the assertion of the community’s indigenous character, in 
contrast with the so-called foreign nature of the Tutsi community (also seen 
as naturally homogeneous). 
From the early 1960s, this ideology had infi ltrated all spheres of public life 
in Rwanda, evolving from a distinctive pre-colonial and colonial history and 
the subsequent process of decolonization. It is impossible here to review the 
details of  twentieth century Rwandan history; however, it seems important 
to recognize that the roots of  the extremist propaganda that prepared and 
accompanied the genocide are twofold. First, the propaganda is set within a 
traditional socioracial policy that had been refi ned for a generation. Second, 
changes within Rwanda’s political and social conditions in the generation since 
independence meant that, after 1990, the sense of belonging among the Hutu 
was no longer the sole factor leading to political mobilization. As a result, this 
propaganda was grounded in the sheer effi ciency of its arguments (combined 
with suffi cient provocation and violence) and became a tool for disqualifying all 
opponents and for uniting the Hutu masses around the so-called Hutu Power 
movement, thus facilitating ‘recruitment and expansion’. From then on, the 
use of  democratic language became a ‘technology’ designed for totalitarian 
mobilization, under the guise of freedom of speech – the democratic alibi.
A review of the propaganda themes exploited by Radio-Télévision Libre des 
Milles Collines (RTLM) highlights its obvious inclination to play on two fronts. 
The fi rst is associated with racist ardour against the Tutsi ‘cockroaches’ and the 
second pertains to the legitimacy of the elimination of these ‘cockroaches’ by the 
‘majority people’. The fi rst front, which is ethnoracial, surfaces when journalists 
use epithets such as ‘dogs’ or ‘snakes’ when referring to Tutsi, accusing them of 
cannibalism and mercilessly welcoming their disappearance. It is also apparent 
when journalists start theorizing about the primacy of ethnic considerations, 
about the fi nal battle of  the Bantu and Hima–Tutsi and about the need to 
eliminate people who do not have an identity card at checkpoints. In fact, the 
‘interethnic’ aspect of the confl ict was emphasized near the end of the massacres 
and in the aftermath of  the genocide as growing awareness of  international 
disapproval set in. When he was questioned in Goma in July 1994, Gaspard 
Gahigi, editor-in-chief of RTLM, invoked his right to speak about the ‘ethnic 
problem’ as this problem led to the ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ that was then 
unfolding in the refugee camps in eastern Zaire. On 3 July 1994, Kantano 
Habimana, the most popular journalist host on RTLM, was still advising his 
audience to ‘keep this small thing in your heart’, meaning the intent to eradicate 
the arrogant and ferocious ‘hyenas’ (Chrétien et al. 1995: 317).1
RTLM PROPAGANDA: THE DEMOCRATIC ALIBI 57
When the French Operation Turquoise reached Rwanda in June, RTLM 
dispensed advice from ‘our intellectuals’ on the need to legitimize, for the 
benefi t of these foreign friends, the role of barriers during ‘a war’. The station 
also advised of the necessity to approach foreign journalists with great caution. 
‘Today, everyone knows that it was an ethnic war,’ Gahigi explained on 15 May 
1994 (Chrétien 1995: 137). In other words, racism is either coded or benignly 
portrayed as natural, in accordance with ethnographic beliefs prevailing 
among Europeans. According to this way of thinking, hatred was quite natural 
between these ethnic groups, public anger was spontaneous and authorities did 
everything in their power to prevent the worst from happening. This would 
become the central theme of  information campaigns led by those who had 
close ties to the genocidal regime and oversaw the refugee camps of  Kivu 
between 1994 and 1996.
In the months preceding the genocide – from October 1993 to April 1994 
– and during the slaughter in April and May 1994, the essential reference is 
that of the majority people and the legitimacy of self-defence against a ‘feudal 
clique’. The reference normalized the massacre perpetrated by the majority, 
which becomes an expression of democratic anger. ‘If  the Hutu who represent 
90 per cent in our country ... if  we can be defeated by a clique of 10 per cent, 
the Tutsi population, it means that we have not demonstrated our full strength,’ 
said the leader of MRND, Joseph Nzirorera, on 28 May 1994 (Chrétien 1995: 
118–19). Just two weeks earlier, on 14 May, Kantano Habimana talked about 
the fact that ‘the small-size family in Rwanda’ is that of  the Inkotanyi [the 
RPF guerrillas symbolizing all the Tutsi] ... ‘It is a minuscule group descending 
from those we call Tutsi. The Tutsi are few, estimated at 10 per cent,’ he added. 
Already, on 23 March 1994, Kantano Habimana was defending the logic of 
Hutu Power to fi ght the logic underlying the Arusha accords. ‘This Rwanda 
is mine. I am of the majority. It is I, fi rst and foremost who will decide, it is 
not you.’
The aim of this thesis regarding Hutu majority is very clear: to achieve, through 
propaganda methods identifi ed earlier, a massive and violent mobilization of 
the Rwandan Hutu in support of extremist factions, such as the Coalition pour 
la Défense de la République (CDR), which was the soul of RTLM. On 3 April 
1994, Noël Hitimana spelled it out very clearly: 
The people are the actual shield. They are the truly powerful army ... On the 
day when people rise up and don’t want you [Tutsi] anymore, when they hate 
you as one and from the bottom of their hearts, when you’ll make them feel 
sick, I wonder how you will escape. 
Hence, it was freely recognized that the systematic slaughter of  Tutsi was 
legitimate: ‘The proof that we will exterminate them is that they represent only 
one ethnic group. Look at one person, at his height and physical features, look 
closely at his cute little nose and then break it,’ Kantano Habimana proclaimed 
on 4 June 1994 (Chrétien 1995: 193). As early as 13 May, he observed:
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The Tutsi are very few. They were estimated at 10 per cent. The war must 
have brought them down to 8 per cent. Will these people really continue 
to kill themselves? Do they not risk extermination if  they persist in this 
suicidal behaviour of throwing themselves against far more numerous people? 
(Chrétien 1995: 205)
Three days later, Habimana proclaimed the expected victory of the ‘Sons of 
the Cultivators’ (Benesabahinzi, meaning the Hutu) who ‘slowly exterminate’ 
their enemies. These types of declarations of war, labelling the disappearance 
of the Tutsi a ‘mass suicide’, were widespread. They weave together the notions 
of demographic strength, the certainty of victory and the good conscience of a 
citizen’s struggle. As it had claimed since October 1993, RTLM aimed to ‘tell the 
truth’ – the truth of numbers and the truth of right. Georges Ruggiu, Belgian 
announcer for French-language broadcasts on RTLM, calmly explained at the 
end of June that, as reported by Radio France International, 50 people killed 
in a commune merely represent 9 per cent of the population of the commune, 
which is ‘approximately the proportion of individuals who might have helped 
the RPF’. In other words, their eradication was normal. Hence, we should be 
talking about the ‘media of genocide’ rather than the ‘hate media’ because they 
were conveying and justifying cold and deliberate propaganda. 
The democratic alibi that this propaganda so busily sustains is also discernible 
in historical references. For example, on 23 May 1994, RTLM, via Ananie 
Nkurunziza (closely associated with the police and acting as an intellectual 
analyst), linked the prevailing circumstances with all that happened in Rwanda 
between 1959 and 1967, that is, the way in which a so-called ‘social’ revolution 
had been accompanied by populist movements against the Tutsi (including the 
acts of genocide of December 1963 to January 1964, perpetrated in Gikongoro). 
In his view, these acts arose from ‘a realization’ or ‘an awakening’. That is 
precisely what RTLM, pursuing the work of the periodical Kangura, was trying 
to do: to restore the logic of socioracial mobilization, which had been so effi cient 
30 years earlier.
As Parmehutu did in the 1960s, the extremists in 1993–94 likened their actions 
to those that took place during the great European revolutionary and liberation 
movements, such as the French Revolution. For example, on 17 June 2004, 
just as the French government had announced its plan to intervene, Kantano 
Habimana compared ‘the fi nal war in progress’ to the French Revolution 
(Chrétien 1995: 331). On 30 June, Georges Ruggiu, referring to the ‘furious 
population’, stated: ‘Has Robespierre not done exactly the same in France?’ 
(Chrétien 1995: 204). On 3 June, RTLM editor-in-chief Gaspard Gahigi awaited 
international assistance, which he equated to the Normandy landings of 1944 
(Chrétien 1995: 331). It would also be appropriate to consider the divine jus-
tifi cations that were invoked, whereby God, the Holy Family and the Virgin 
Mary were all mobilized for the sacred cause of  the Hutu people (Chrétien 
and Rafi ki 2004: 283).
This calculated populism was designed to ‘awaken’ the Hutu masses. It also 
served to comfort the usual biases that prevailed in France and in Belgium, 
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notably within democratic-Christian circles and also among leftists, about 
the nature of  the Rwandan regime. In Western media there is an apparent 
intertwining of  ethnographic analysis (atavistic antagonisms, etc.) and a 
‘democratic’ interpretation of ‘majority power’, to the extent that during the 
1980s, President Habyarimana was often portrayed as a democratic state leader, 
a representative of the Hutu majority. Other factors defi ning democratic culture 
(human rights, respect for minorities, refusal to recognize the exclusion of 
communities, rule of law, social justice) were considered to be ancillary under 
the tropical sky.
Georges Ruggiu’s biography is mainly the account of a young Third World 
activist who, when he fi rst landed in Kigali, compared the suburbs of the capital 
to the Brazilian favelas he had visited.2 In Belgium, he had had the opportunity 
through the social-Christian movement to mingle with Rwandan militant 
students who were members of the sole party (MRND). As if  spontaneously, 
without possessing an extensive knowledge of Rwandan history, he adhered to 
the dogmas of the majority people and of a democracy that in his view would 
be set back by the Arusha compromise. His populist beliefs almost naturally 
connected with the racial ideology of the extremists with whom he associated. 
From a broader standpoint, we know that this belief was also brought forth by 
President Mitterrand to vindicate France’s steadfast support for Habyarimana 
and later for the Kambanda government, including the Operation Turquoise 
endeavour. When surveying the French written press in May and June 1994, 
one notices that various articles printed in Le Monde, Libération or Le Nouvel 
Observateur combine ethnographic factors (under the ‘old demon’ of Hutu–
Tutsi antagonism) with suggestions of ‘popular defence’. One Belgian media 
report plainly condemned the ‘sanctioned racism’ prevalent in Rwanda and 
within a number of the country’s Western partners (Cros 1994). On 26 June, 
reporter Jean Hélène from Le Monde, who was on site in Cyangugu with the 
French army, alludes to ‘popular exultation’, ‘the relief  of  villagers’ and the 
concern of  ‘Rwandan authorities’ to ‘track down the enemies of  the nation 
who threaten the population’ (Hélène 1994). On 4 July, French missionary 
Father Maindron, even though he had witnessed events in the Kibuye region, 
declared to a French journalist that the killing was ‘a spontaneous popular rage’ 
(Luizet 1994). He was echoed by the prefect of Cyangugu, when he talked to 
French soldiers about ‘legitimate self-defence … against an enemy from within’ 
(Smith 1994).
What is manifest today is the obvious continuum from the propaganda 
devised by RTLM through to current theses denying the genocide. In fact, these 
viewpoints do not attempt to deny the massacres, but rather to justify them 
in terms of ‘ethnic hatred’, ‘spontaneous rage’, ‘legitimate popular uprising’ 
or ‘international disinformation’. An editorial by Jacques Amalric (1994) was 
prescient:
Are we next going to lend credence to Capitaine Baril’s utterances, who would 
have Tutsi being responsible for their own extermination ... We can fear the 
worst, after hearing the content of some private conversations, supposedly 
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held confi dentially: ‘Things are not as simple as you believe. It is not a 
question of all innocents on one side and culprits on the other.’
In fact, racist propaganda wearing the mask of democracy – the common 
thread of extremist media – was also voiced by offi cial channels and managed 
to fi nd assent, whether through distraction or genuine conversion, among 
Western partners. This would largely explain why it took two months to clearly 
identify, in Western media, the nature of the events taking place in Rwanda. 
The president of Médecins Sans Frontières very adequately summarized the 
situation: ‘Neither France, nor the international community gave themselves 
the means to characterize the genocide and to promptly assume its implications’ 
(Biberson 1994).
Alfred Grosser (1989) wrote: ‘No, it is not true that the slaughter of Africans 
is felt in the same way as is the slaughter of  Europeans.’ This rings terribly 
true in the case of  Rwanda. Although this could be blamed on a level of 
indifference toward far away tragedies, more likely it is due to signifi cant exotic 
ethnographic factors that still hinder a more sensible perception of  African 
societies. But fi rst and foremost in this case, it is because of the effectiveness 
of modern propaganda – propaganda that was well thought out, constructed, 
refi ned and of unyielding effi ciency, both within and outside the country. This 
propaganda succeeded in camoufl aging genocide and making it appear to be a 
vast democratic mobilization, consequently trapping an entire population.
NOTES
1. The RTLM broadcasts cited in this article were transcribed from tape recordings used during 
preparation of expert testimony for the Media Trial in 2002 by J.F. Dupaquier, M. Kabanda, 
J. Ngarambe and J.P. Chrétien. The tapes that remain are part of  the documentation of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. We have noted variations in the numbering of 
the tapes between 2000 and 2002. Thus citations are based on the date of broadcast and the 
name of the journalist. When the transcripts were also mentioned in our book les médias du 
génocide (Chrétien et al. 1995), we indicated the appropriate page number.
2. Ruggiu, G. Dans la tourmente rwandaise. Unpublished journal. 127 pp. This journal was 
presented as evidence to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on 16 June 2003 as 
exhibit no. K0269165–K0269292.
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Kangura:
the Triumph of Propaganda Refi ned 
Marcel Kabanda
In Rwanda’s print media of the 1990s, the publication that had the most impact 
on the country was the bimonthly newspaper Kangura. It was well known for 
its hysterical hatred of Tutsi and any Hutu who expressed a desire for change, 
freedom and democratic openness. Established in May 1990, and headed from 
beginning to end by Mr Hassan Ngeze, Kangura soon became famous for its 
publication of what was commonly referred to as the ‘Ten Commandments’ of 
the Bahutu (Anon. 1990: 6). Through these commandments, the paper strongly 
exhorted the Bahutu to understand that the Tutsi were fi rst and foremost an 
enemy and that they should break all ties with them, whether those links derived 
from marriage, business or professional relations. 
Kangura also called for the dissolution of the historical, political and cultural 
community of Rwanda and for the building of a new community, one that would 
supposedly be authentic and pure. Alongside this new community could subsist a 
nonindigenous category that would be tolerated, but closely monitored, because 
its ambition was to dominate. To convince its readers, Kangura proceeded to 
display fl agrant exhibitions of a mummifi ed, pre-revolutionary Rwanda – albeit 
wearing its best modern attire – so that it would have some appeal to readers. 
Deliberately overlooking all changes that had taken place in the previous 30 
years with regard to distribution of power and national wealth, Hassan Ngeze 
delved into history’s attic and revealed a picture that was initially put to use 
by the Parmehutu Party. Essentially, this representation was one of a country 
dominated, indeed ‘colonized’, by Tutsi. Kangura brought the Rwanda of the 
1990s back to its 1957 version, when Hutu leaders wrote the Bahutu Manifesto
denouncing their exclusion. 
In 1990, Rwanda was at a crossroads. Refugees who had lived outside the 
country for 20 or 30 years were asking to come back. They insisted on the 
abolition of  ethnic quotas – between groups and between regions. Within 
the country, more and more people were demanding a multiparty system. 
Opposition to refugee repatriation, and the stronghold on state governance 
and markets exercised by a few people close to the president’s family, were in 
clear contradiction to the principles that legitimized the revolution of 1959, 
namely democracy. Thus, a sense of asphyxia within the country and a feeling of 
abandonment by those who were exiled converged to condemn the hypocrisy of 
 62 
KANGURA: THE TRIUMPH OF PROPAGANDA REFINED 63
a system that, while claiming to be republican and democratic, overtly practiced 
discrimination and tyranny. 
Faced with war and requests for political openness, the regime reacted by 
alluding to the 1959 revolution, which had brought a dual benefi t. It allowed 
the branding of armed opponents as nostalgic feudal groups and called on the 
majority to mobilize and fi ght to keep the advantages it had gained. On the 
other hand, it served to remind people of  the populist resistance movement 
and the fi rst aggression by refugees in December 1963, an event used to justify 
the most extreme violence. From 1990 to 1994 – but particularly during 1991 
– Kangura contained a number of  articles that repeatedly agitated against 
the Tutsi scapegoat. The Tutsi became those ‘who took everything’, ‘who are 
everywhere’, who control the business sector, who govern despite appearances, 
who constitute the majority in the school system, both in terms of teachers and 
students, in the church and within all spheres that symbolize progress.
Kangura aimed to awaken the Hutu, not from a sleep, but from what Kangura
saw as a state of  unconsciousness that made them unaware of  the fact that 
the Tutsi had secretly led a contra-revolution. Hassan Ngeze attempted to 
demonstrate that through relentless erosion, the Tutsi had managed to reverse 
the former position of the Hutu on the social, cultural and political fronts. But 
the Ten Commandments were not enough to draw in followers. Kangura worked 
to provide its readers with reasons to believe in its credo, to convince them of 
imminent danger and to persuade them that they needed messiahs. 
Kangura was active in a context wrought with undeniable diffi culties, where 
increasing poverty hindered access to education, health care and employment 
and within a society that lived by agriculture, while land became less and 
less available and fertile. Within this setting, accusing Tutsi of  grabbing all 
privileges and identifying them as scapegoats was a sure-fi re mobilization 
tactic. It successfully mustered the support of a majority of young people who 
were non-schooled, unemployed and without hope for a better future. It also 
appealed to a great number of graduates who could no longer be hired by a 
government that was complying with structural adjustment programmes set up 
by the International Monetary Fund. Kangura revived the Bahutu Manifesto
of 1957. This document, considered to be the soul of the Hutu emancipation 
movement, described the Muhutu–Mututsi social problem:
First and foremost, the problem is one of political monopoly enjoyed by one 
particular race, the Mututsi: political monopoly that under existing structures, 
develops into social and economic monopoly, which in turn, because of 
de facto selection in education, becomes a monopoly that pigeonholes the 
Bahutu as perpetual unskilled subordinates.
Attempting to superimpose 1957 values on 1990 Rwandan society, Kangura
denounced the so-called Tutsi hegemony and the perceived injustice toward the 
Hutu, the majority people. First, it insisted that the Hutu remember the revolution 
of 1959 and the conditions under which democracy could continue.
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The fact that the Batutsi are fi ghting to restore monarchy should incite a 
number of  Bahutu to fi ght for democracy, to remember the roots of  the 
1959 revolution. If  they do not fully appreciate this fact, then the revolution 
loses its purpose. And, as the majority people well know, the revolution was 
justifi ed. They will have to live with the consequences. (Anon. 1990: 6)
The paper pointed out that the contra-revolutionary war conducted by the 
Tutsi had never stopped.
Remember also, at the beginning of November 1959, the Batutsi provoked 
inter-ethnic massacres in trying to eliminate the Hutu elite who were calling 
for democracy and social justice for the benefi t of the Bahutu masses, until 
then crushed under the feudal and minority power of the Batutsi ... Since 
the revolution of 1959, the Batutsi have not for one moment relinquished 
the notion of reconquering power in Rwanda, of exterminating intellectuals 
and of  dominating Bahutu farmers ... The war declared against Rwanda 
in October 1990 is undoubtedly aimed at achieving what the Batutsi had 
attempted to accomplish through guerrilla warfare and terrorism, from 1962 
to 1967, harassing the Hutu population through nocturnal Inyenzi attacks. 
(Anon. 1990: 6–7)
The paper suggested that, on this path to conquest and power, the Tutsi had 
made considerable progress, and that they were monopolizing areas such as 
the workplace, trade and fi nance.
The Batutsi comprise 50 per cent of  government offi cials, 70 per cent of 
private business employees, 90 per cent of staff in embassies and international 
organizations, and they hold prominent positions everywhere. However, this 
ethnic group constitutes 10 per cent of the population. National wealth, trade 
and industry are in the hands of the Batutsi, who often use civil and military 
authorities as a cover-up. It is to the Batutsi that banks award substantial 
loans, it is them who benefi t from considerable tax exemptions, import and 
export licences, etc. (Anon. 1991a: 3)
Immediately before the 1959 revolution, one of  the central factors that 
polarized the debate around social relations between Tutsi and Hutu was 
schools. At the time, research was being conducted to ascertain the proportion 
of Hutu and Tutsi youth who were educated. According to the Rwandan Comité 
d’étude du Conseil supérieur du pays (1958):
Twenty-nine elementary establishments of 114 responded, which is 24 per cent 
of the total: total numbers in these schools: 29,953 Bahutu, which represents 
67.81 per cent; 14,211 Batutsi, or 31.70 per cent; 32 Batwa, or 0.01 per cent. 
Secondary institutions: 29 of 47 establishments responded: 1,116 Bahutu, 
39.20 per cent; 1,740 Batutsi, that is 60.80 per cent; 0 Batwa.
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In the 1990s, extremist propaganda spoke as if  these circumstances still 
prevailed and education had remained a Tutsi monopoly: 
Regarding completed education, the minority remains in the lead ... They 
have fought incessantly and with courage for their people to massively pursue 
their education, in such high proportion, when compared to the percentage of 
the population they represent, which is 10 per cent. Through their cold and 
calculated expansion, the Tutsi managed to so condition the Second Republic 
that policies now privatized foreign student scholarships. It is obvious that 
it was not privatization of scholarships per se, but rather the unprecedented 
and offi cial award of  scholarships to the minority ... Since the 1960s, the 
Hutu have clumsily directed the conquest of administration, while the Tutsi 
concentrated on teaching so as to retain a positive image of their people. They 
have advised their little Tutsi brothers to seek higher education, which is so 
important in the workplace, particularly in English and computer sciences, 
among other fi elds. As soon as they left their classrooms and auditoriums, 
the Tutsi laureates overwhelmed the Hutu within international projects 
and organizations, not to mention the administrative sphere. As for trade! 
Nothing more to say. It is their preserve. Whose preserve is it? The Tutsi’s, of 
course. Their secret lies in that their refugee brothers facilitate imports and 
they don’t have to leave the country. They also benefi t more than the Hutu 
from loans awarded by Rwandan banks ... With this overall intellectual and 
economic might, the Tutsi progresses without obstacles on the road to his 
moral revolution. Vague and nebulous are the means chosen by the 1959 
revolution to force him to back off, because at the time when the majority 
was liberating itself, the minority was aiming at the mortal target that is the 
human psyche. And it is precisely there that we must look for the causes of 
the October war. (Anon. 1992a: 11) 
In another article published in the international issue: 
Supposing that statistics relative to teaching at all levels of  secondary 
and superior education were carefully recorded, one would unfortunately 
be surprised to recognize that the Tutsi is omnipresent. Those who are in 
establishments of higher education well know the actual situation. Ethnic 
proportions are unequal and crystal-clear. In public and private affairs, 
power is undoubtedly secured. The minority managed to seduce Rwandan 
society and it is now clustered around its core. Some areas have become Tutsi 
strongholds, namely the Rwandan clergy, etc ... Everywhere, members of 
the Tutsi ethnic group are united and are forever faithful travellers forming 
networks, aiming to conquer power. (Anon. 1992b: 3)
Kangura blamed the ‘negligent manner with which ethnic classifi cation was 
carried out’ for the increasingly prominent positions held by Tutsi within the realm 
of Rwandan social and economic spheres. It criticized the country’s authorities 
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for a lack of vigilance and for providing Tutsi with identity cards attesting that 
they were Hutu, which made control and discrimination impossible.
Due to the practice of  identity falsifi cation, the policy aiming for ethnic 
balance has failed. This explains why the Tutsi – those who kept their identity 
and those who modifi ed it – now make up 80 per cent of staff  in our schools. 
But who would be surprised by this? Those who should implement this policy 
are themselves Tutsi, pretending they are Hutu. (Anon. 1991b: 13)
The impact of this lack of control on Tutsi movements is considered to be 
equivalent to the ‘programmed disappearance’ of the Hutu from all sectors that 
symbolize modernity – including cities – and setting the Hutu back to rural 
life, which in turn leads to unequal distribution of the fruits of progress. If  the 
programmed disappearance succeeded, the Hutus would lose everything they 
had gained during the revolution:
Did you know that Tutsi represent 85 per cent of the population living in the 
city of Kigali? When all those who had no job were sent away, only the Hutu 
left. As for the Tutsi, they managed to obtain work certifi cates through their 
brothers who attested that they used them as maids and servants. Furthermore, 
after their liberation, their accomplices piled into Kigali in order to be better 
protected by the international community. What is missing that would unite 
the Bahutu in such a way? If  the Hutu are not careful, they will soon be sent 
back to the countryside, leaving only the Tutsi to reside in cities. Just look at 
Kigali, Bujumbura, Kinshasa and Kampala. (Anon. 1991c: 10)
The reference to 1959 is also used against opposition parties but, in this 
case, the receding timeline is supplemented by role inversion. Some facts might 
improve understanding of  the scope of  a campaign that is more akin to a 
political swindle than to a normal public debate. Historically, the leader of the 
social revolution is considered to have been President Grégoire Kayibanda. 
Co-signer of  the Bahutu Manifesto, in 1959 he established the Mouvement 
Démocratique Républicain (MDR) Parmehutu party that would spearhead 
the revolution. In 1960, elected representatives from the Parmehutu proclaimed 
the advent of the republic. 
In July 1973, President Kayibanda was deposed by a military coup led by 
Major Juvénal Habyarimana, who later became a major general. Kayibanda 
and a number of his collaborators were arrested and tried for treason. Some 
were executed. The death sentence proclaimed against Kayibanda was later 
commuted to life imprisonment. Held in residence in Kavumu, in his native 
prefecture of Gitarama, Kayibanda died in 1975 under suspicious circumstances. 
In the 1980s, Kayibanda’s name was revived and the international airport in 
Kigali was named after him. But his political party remained prohibited. In 
1991, during overtures to a multiparty system, a number of political leaders 
from the centre and south of  the country attempted to reinstate the party. 
Kangura accused them of treason.
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These cowardly traitors have succumbed to the temptation of  using the 
people against themselves, in collusion with the unfortunate aggressor who 
has already lost the battle in the ground. In doing this, they usurped the glory 
of the MDR-Parmehutu party and lured the people who spearheaded the 
1959 Revolution to free the Rwandan people from the yoke of feudalism, 
into the trap set by the Inyenzi. That is how they hurriedly adopted the name 
MDR, making sure they removed ‘Parmehutu,’ in order to appease the Tutsi 
extremist who had in the past preferred exile to being led by a Hutu elected 
by the majority, in accordance with the principles of democracy. Through 
this trickery, they managed to lure to their side some of  the citizens who 
fondly remember … At a time when the Bantu people of our sub-region are 
fi ghting a legitimate battle to free themselves from the tutsi hegemony; at a 
time when the blood is fi lling the Akanyaru and its tributaries in the South; 
it is not the time to fool anyone. The war is between the Tutsis and the Hutus 
and the only solution is public awakening. (Anon. 1991d: 4)
In so clearly usurping heritage and patrimony, Hassan Ngeze strove to depict 
President Habyarimana as the legitimate representative of  Kayibanda. In a 
politically skewed message, published in January 1991, the international issue 
of  Kangura stated that the leader of  the 1973 coup and gravedigger of  the 
Parmehutu was the best person to incarnate the ideals of the man he had left 
to die 15 years earlier in devastating isolation and destitution. 
Kangura informs you that the RDP (Republican Democratic Party) is born
After witnessing the need for the majority people to have its own party, 
able to lead it towards authentic democracy, a party through which it can 
express itself  and speak in the name of those who cannot, we ask that all 
Rwandans, whatever their religious beliefs, adhere to the RDP. This party 
already has a large number of  members in Rwanda, notably those who 
support the beliefs of Dr. Grégoire Kayibanda – to protect the interests of 
the majority – and those of Habyarimana, who promotes a policy based on 
peace and development. It is not customary for Rwandans to denigrate. You 
are well aware of the fact that some say successive governments, whether led 
by Habyarimana or by Kayibanda, have brought us nothing. In our opinion, 
the most important issue is to appreciate the good that was accomplished 
by those who have presided over Rwanda since the end of monarchy and to 
examine together the means for us to do better. (Anon. 1991e: 7) 
At a time when the country faced war and others discussed the possibility 
of moving toward a multiparty system, Kangura ignored current affairs and 
problems. It was mainly preoccupied with convincing Rwandans that they 
were still living under the circumstances prevailing in 1957. Consequently, it 
forced those who wanted change to position themselves with respect to the only 
worthwhile battle, that is, the battle fought by their ancestors. So as to highlight 
how clearly this debate was rooted in the past, Kangura not only repainted the 
present with archaic colours, but it also strove to revive the feelings and emotions 
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that inspired revolutionary action, by giving a voice to those who, from 1957 to 
1960, acted as charismatic and uncontested leaders of the Hutu cause. 
These men were called on because of their knowledge of Rwanda and their 
expertise on the issues at hand. In the December 1990 issue of Kangura, Hassan 
Ngeze, as though wanting to support the decalogue of Tutsi hatred by drawing 
on the perspective of a wise man, well-versed in Hutu–Tutsi relations, published 
a text supposedly written in 1976 that he attributed to Joseph Gitera. In response 
to President Habyarimana who, at the time, had allegedly interrogated him on 
ways to facilitate reconciliation among Rwandans, this early leader of  Hutu 
emancipation apparently depicted the Tutsi as a Mugome:
It is the pretentious Tutsi, with his Muhutu slave and his Mutwa clown and 
hunting dog, who chose exile from Rwanda because of  his misdeeds and 
is now scheming against Rwanda and Rwandans. Again, it is this grudge-
holding Mututsi who, with his courtesan Muhutu and his subservient Mutwa, 
is nesting like a snake ready to devour Rwanda and oblivious Rwandans. 
This one and the other are constantly communicating and co-operating, 
to eventually take revenge on the Rwandan Republic, its authors and its 
perpetrators of  insult and lese majesty: ‘Banze Umwami.’ This is the two-
headed dragon, one head outside Rwanda and the other inside. Here then is 
the ‘Umugome.’ Is he merely a fantasy? Absolutely not. (Gitera 1990: 12)
Kangura’s diagnosis of the Hutu situation in Rwanda was catastrophic. The 
solution it put forward was radical and unyielding. In November 1991, Hassan 
Ngeze asks one question: ‘What tools will we use to defeat the Inyenzi once 
and for all?’ The answer is in the adjacent illustration where Kayibanda and a 
‘beautiful’ machete appear alongside each other (Anon. 1991f). This allegory 
intends to demonstrate the rationale for the elimination of Tutsi by means of 
murder, implying that this is inscribed in the republic’s history and that it is 
based on the need to protect the Hutu from the permanent threat of  feudal 
bondage. Kangura refers to past violence as examples to follow. The bloodbath 
of December 1963 is prominently highlighted. In Hassan Ngeze’s opinion, this 
event holds information that would offer a fi nal resolution to the Tutsi problem 
within the republic.
In fact, there are similarities between the 1963 episode and the 1990 crisis. 
On the night of 20 December 1963, a few hundred Tutsi refugees armed with 
bows and makeshift guns arrived from Burundi, entering southeast Rwanda 
(in Bugesera). They proceeded to attack the military camp of  Gako where 
they killed four soldiers, then took the road to Kigali after stealing weapons, 
ammunition and two jeeps. Along the way, they recruited displaced Tutsi at 
camp Nyamata and their ranks grew to approximately 1,000 men. They were 
arrested on the Nyabarongo bridge, south of the capital city, by the army aided 
by Belgian advisors (Segal 1964). This raid, led by ‘cockroaches’ (inyenzi) – to 
borrow a term they were given to characterize their nocturnal activities – was 
followed by similar fruitless ventures. But this time, retaliation tactics were such 
that the crisis renewed the atmosphere of 1959. 
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It seems that Ngeze was fascinated by the way in which the Kayibanda 
government handled that crisis. Reprisal tactics were of  unprecedented 
magnitude. All infl uential Tutsi were arrested. Some were released after being 
mistreated, while others were executed without trial in Ruhengeri (in the north 
of the country). This was the case for senior offi cials and leaders of both the 
UNAR party (Union Nationale Rwandaise) and the moderate Rassemblement 
Démocratique Rwandais, well known for their opposition to Mwami Mutara 
Rudahigwa and for their struggle for a political system that would be more 
respectful of human dignity and personal freedom. 
Tutsi who remained in the country were considered, as a whole, to be suspect 
and accomplices of  enemies from the outside – justifi cation for taking them 
hostage and legitimizing retaliation against them. Members of Parliament and 
government were sent back to their prefectures to plan the people’s ‘self-defence’, 
with prefects and burgomasters. These events were truly foreboding of the 1994 
genocide. Particularly in Gikongoro, in the south of the country, more than 
10,000 people were atrociously massacred between 24 and 29 December that 
year, their bodies thrown in rivers. According to witnesses, the man orchestrating 
these massacres, who was frequently seen on site and whose statements were 
more favourable to the killers than to the victims and escapees of the murders, 
was then minister of agriculture Nkezabera Damien, an early militant within 
the Parmehutu. 
At the time, Bertrand Russell spoke of  the ‘most horrible and systematic 
massacre since the extermination of Jews by the Nazis’ (Le Monde, 6 Feb. 1964). 
On 6 February 1964, the French periodical Témoignage Chrétien published 
an account of  the mass murders that occurred in Gikongoro. Following are 
two excerpts attesting to the fact that in Rwanda, even after a generation had 
passed, we could not ignore what would eventually emerge from the propaganda 
devised by the media:
In the afternoon of December 25th [1963] would begin a ‘plan of repression’ 
that, simply put, consisted of  exterminating all Tutsi residents from the 
prefecture of Ginkogoro.
The entire population – Christians and Pagans alike, catechisers and 
catechumens – in groups of roughly one hundred, led by propagandists of 
the Party and with the authorities’ blessings, attacked the Tutsi. This time, 
the goal was not to loot but to kill, to exterminate all that bore the Tutsi 
name. In order to prevent potential humanitarian reactions, organizers of 
the massacre had avoided targeting the killers’ immediate neighbours; hillside 
residents killed people from a faraway hill, and vice versa.
Giles-Denis Vuillemin, a Swiss professor who was in Rwanda through 
UNESCO, witnessed the events and recorded entries in his journal:
January 3rd, I travel to Kigeme where I meet Dr. Hendersen. At the hospital, 
there are only a few refugees and authorities are attempting to chase them 
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off. Dr. Hendersen tells me that the hill of Kigeme was spared because of the 
infl uence of the director of schools, a respected member of Parmehutu. On 
the other hand, trucks are preventing access to the hospital. Dr. Hendersen 
estimates a total of 5,000 dead in the region. From Kigeme, I go to Cyanaka. 
The mission is full of refugees (1,500 to 2,000). The Fathers there are clearly 
talking about genocide; in their opinion, only international pressure could 
prompt authorities to change their policy. In the long term, they say, Rwandan 
Batutsi are doomed. They would have to be provided with another country, 
under international control and assistance. (Vuillemin 1964)
In December 1990 (Kangura issue 7: 5) and December 1991 (Kangura issue 28: 
3), Hassan Ngeze republished a declaration made in April 1964. In it, Grégoire 
Kayibanda, president of the First Republic warned Rwandan Tutsi:
You have witnessed the unrest from which we are only now emerging, that 
was caused by the provocative and irresponsible meanness of the refugees 
– inyenzi. Residents of  Nyamata know, those from Burundi witnessed it: 
blame it on the secular (and incurable) meanness of what is the true essence 
of the Buhake. Gashaka-Buhake and the footmen who followed him in his 
fl ight are still digging the trenches they had started in 1959 …
We have told you what we expect from you in our 1963 speech: awaken to 
democracy, follow the new custom in Rwanda. What we want is brotherhood 
amongst citizens … Goodness and wisdom will be our weapons. But if  you 
resist the wisdom of democracy, you can blame no one. (Kayibanda 1964)
In February 1991, Kangura republished a speech given in Paris, on 3 April 
1964, by Anasthase Makuza, at the time president of the National Assembly 
of Rwanda, in which this great militant of Parmehutu attempted to justify the 
aforementioned massacres:
The population did not succumb to panic. It did not extend its neck so that 
the Inyenzi could cut its throat, according to plan. As soon as the Hutu 
became aware of the atrocities perpetrated in Bugesera, they understood the 
great danger of returning to prior circumstances. They remembered the abuse 
they endured under feudal rule. They glanced at the scars the Tutsi regime 
had left on their bodies. They remembered hard labour, the contempt they 
withstood and the practice by which a Tutsi could ask another to lend him 
a Hutu to murder. They then felt a great anger and vowed not to fall victim 
to the fate of losers. This anger was intensifi ed by the fact that the former 
servant had, for four years, experienced the fl avourful treats of democracy 
and that it is those he had called upon – invited to do so by his leaders 
– to share in the delights, that threatened to deprive him of his satisfaction. 
(Makuza 1991: 4)
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Reference to the anger of parents is meant to inspire that of their children. 
Thus, Kangura is highlighting what it is normal to expect from sons who are 
worthy of their fathers.
It is incredible and intolerable, but here all limits have been transgressed. We 
have to show these accomplices that it is not they who govern us. It is troubling 
and it is a genuine problem to consider that the national army has just spent 
more than a year in the maquis, fi ghting against the Inkotanyi opponent. 
In the meantime, the brothers of this enemy come and go freely inside the 
country, spreading false information, thus demoralizing the national army 
and the majority people. Obviously, if  this is allowed to go on, the people 
will engage in a battle using alternative means. All is fair in war. How is it 
that newspapers published by the Inkotanyi draw false lists of their alleged 
dead and that the Hutu keep silent even though they were killed in greater 
numbers since the beginning of this war? (Ngeze 1991: 2) 
In revisiting these articles, one is particularly struck by the publisher’s interest 
in history. Why did Kangura need to refer to the speeches made in 1964 by 
Kayibanda and Makuza, or by Joseph Gitera in 1976? In a society where age 
and experience bestow authority, the voices of  elders constitute an excellent 
argument. The past provided evidence that violence against the Tutsi was normal 
and legitimate. However, it is clear that those historical references favoured a 
particular trend, that of the Parmehutu. 
In reading these documents, one is amazed by the precision with which the 
logic of genocide is exposed: identifi cation of the Tutsi from within, as being 
obvious accomplices in any action undertaken by refugees; a whole component 
of  the population whose members are taken hostage and accused of  being, 
through heredity, enemies of the republic; the justifi cation of massacres if  these 
people would not ‘obey’. 
They are, in fact, a call to kill, sanctioned by arguments drawn from past 
experience. In the end, reference to the revolutionary period, both in the print 
media and in RTLM propaganda (see Chrétien, Chapter 5), demonstrates 
that the genocide bloomed on the soil planted by the ‘Barwanashyaka’ of the 
Parmehutu and abundantly irrigated by MRND militants. 
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Rwandan Private Print Media 
on the Eve of the Genocide
Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro
In April 1994, I was director of the Offi ce Rwandais d’Information (ORINFOR), 
a government agency that managed public media: Radio Rwanda, Rwandan 
Television, Agence Rwandaise de Presse and the government-published 
newspapers, Imvaho and La Relève. I had been appointed by the coalition 
government led by Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana on 31 July 1993 and, 
in this role, I collected a signifi cant volume of information about the media. 
Early in the morning of  7 April, when I realized that the Forces Armées 
Rwandaises (FAR) had taken over Radio Rwanda and that my assassination 
and that of my family was likely and potentially imminent, my family and I left 
our residence to hide at a friend’s house; we took only the clothes on our backs. 
A group of presidential guards sent to kill us arrived about 30 minutes later. 
On 9 April, I called the United States embassy, in Kigali, to evacuate my 
daughter, who was born in Austin, Texas, when I was in graduate school there. 
We rushed into the car the embassy sent and drove to Bujumbura, Burundi, 
where we boarded a plane to Nairobi, Kenya, accompanied by US marines. 
My exhaustive documentation on the Rwandan media was totally lost. For 
this paper, I have to rely on my memory and the messages I exchanged with some 
Rwandan newspaper editors after the genocide. (For their security, I cannot 
disclose their names.) [Editor’s note: The author also referred to the material 
listed in the bibliography at the end of this paper to refresh his memory.] 
TYPES OF PUBLICATIONS
The privately owned print media in pre-1994 Rwanda can be divided into four 
categories based on their political bias: 
• Newspapers aligned with the Mouvement Républicain National pour 
la Démocratie et le Développement (MRND) and the Coalition pour la 
Défense de la République (CDR);
• Political opposition newspapers;
• Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) newspapers;
• The print media of the Rwandan Tutsi diaspora.
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Pro-MRND and CDR newspapers
Newspapers in this group were: Akanyange, Umurwanashyaka, Écho des Mille 
Collines/Impanda, Intera, Interahamwe, Kamarampaka, Kangura, La Médaille 
Nyiramacibili, Umurava, Le Courrier du Peuple and Shishoza. Most of  their 
editors were Hutus from northern Rwanda. 
They praised the MRND and President Juvénal Habyarimana’s leadership 
and offered space to MRND leaders to respond to criticism levelled at them by 
the editors of other newspapers and leaders of opposition parties. They depicted 
Habyarimana as the guarantor of peace and the MRND as the political party 
of true patriots.
Opposition leaders were portrayed as RPF puppets, traitors and embezzlers 
of public funds, demagogues, opportunists and idiots motivated by the desire 
to settle scores with President Habyarimana. The papers saw the RPF as Tutsi 
supremacists whose goal was to restore the Tutsi monarchy and enslave Hutus. 
To them, the invasion by the RPF from Uganda was an attempt to roll back 
the social and economic progress made by Hutus since the social revolution 
of 1959. In these pro-MRND media, Tutsi leaders were portrayed as cunning, 
bloodthirsty, untrustworthy and natural power mongers. 
These negative representations tap into Rwandan history and old stereotypes 
exemplifi ed in such sayings as ‘Umututsi umucumbikira mu kirambi akagukura 
ku buliri’ (You give shelter to a Tutsi in your living room, he chases you out of 
your bedroom) and ‘Umututsi umuvura imisuha akakwendera umugore’ (You 
cure a Tutsi of infl ammation of the genitals, he makes love to your wife).
Kangura stands out among these newspapers. From its inception, its mission 
was the defence of Hutu interests and it published many articles dehumanizing 
Tutsis and depicting them as the enemy. Kangura articulated pan-Hutuism 
and strived to raise the awareness of the Hutus of Rwanda, Burundi and the 
eastern part of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) about the 
perceived threat presented by the Tutsis of Rwanda and Burundi and the Himas 
of Uganda.
These newspapers were funded by northern Hutus who viewed the birth 
of a private press as an assault on the social and economic accomplishments 
of the Habyarimana regime. For example, Seraphin Rwabukumba, President 
Habyarimana’s brother-in-law, and Pasteur Musabe, the director general of 
the Banque Continentale Africaine, launched Intera after Kinyamateka (the 
newspaper owned by the Catholic Church) and Umuranga (a newspaper founded 
by Félicien Semusambi) published articles criticizing the Habyarimana regime. 
The Service Central de Renseignements launched Kangura with Hassan Ngeze 
as the cover to counter the articles published by Kanguka, a newspaper funded 
by Valens Kajeguhakwa, a Tutsi businessman and a member of the RPF. High-
ranking northern Hutus believed that some southern Hutus, along with some 
Tutsis, were attempting to destroy the Habyarimana regime and that it was 
important to counter their attacks. As the name suggests, Intera’s objective was 
to convince the public of  the economic progress made by the Habyarimana 
regime since it came to power in 1973.
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Opposition newspapers
Opposition political parties, particularly the Mouvement Démocratique 
Républicain (MDR) and the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD), were associated 
with Agatashya, Ibyikigihe, Ikindi, Ijambo, Intwali-Ijwi rya J.D.R., Intumwa/Le 
Méssager, Isibo, Izuba/Le Soleil, La Griffe, L’Ère de Liberté, Umuranga, Nouvelle 
Génération, Nyabarongo, Republika, Rukokoma, Soma, Verités d’Afrique,
Umuturage w’U Rwanda, Urumuli rwa Demokarasi and Umurangi. Their editors 
came from southern Rwanda. After the split of the MDR into two factions in 
1993, Umurangi and Umuranga went along with the MDR power faction, a 
group who felt that the Arusha agreement between the RPF and the Rwandan 
government gave too much power to the RPF.
Pro-opposition newspapers presented MRND leaders as evil and corrupt: 
liars, idiots, animals, bloodthirsty murderers and warmongers. Some published 
drawings of President Habyarimana covered with blood. Intumwa/Le Méssager
(no. 10, 30 December 1991) published a cartoon featuring Prime Minister 
Sylvestre Nsanzimana carrying a hyena on his shoulders; the hyena stood for 
the MRND. In its 25 July 1992 issue, the newspaper depicted the secretary 
general of the MRND as a bird with a snake around its wing and neck, biting 
his head; the MRND is the snake in this cartoon. Ijambo (no. 54, 31 May 1993) 
published a cartoon featuring a gorilla wearing the hat of the CDR. In other 
words, these newspapers dehumanized the MRND and the CDR, and the 
newspapers associated with the MRND and CDR responded in kind. 
Umurangi frequently published cartoons portraying Prime Minister 
Agathe Uwilingiyimana as a prostitute or sexual object and other opposition 
political leaders as dogs. In Rwandan culture a person considered dishonest, 
untrustworthy, cowardly and corrupt is usually labelled ‘imbwa’ or dog.
These newspapers portrayed opposition leaders as peace-loving people 
capable of ending the war. They disseminated the view that expansion of the 
war was something that President Habyarimana and the MRND wanted to 
keep them in power. According to these newspapers, opposition leaders had a 
solution to the war: peace with the RPF. Some represented opposition leaders 
as medical doctors administering medicine to a confused patient, President 
Habyarimana. Intumwa/Le Méssager (no. 20, 15 August 1992) ran a cartoon of 
Habyarimana lying on a hospital bed and being forced to drink a medication 
administered by the leaders of the MDR, PSD and Parti Libéral.
Pro-RPF newspapers
Buracyeye, Kanyarwanda, Kanguka, Kiberinka, Le Flambeau, Rwanda Rushya
and Le Tribun du Peuple (also known as Umuvugizi wa Rubanda et Le Partisan)
strived to be the voice of the Tutsi. Their founders and editors were all Tutsi 
and members of the RPF living in Rwanda.
These newspapers denounced the MRND regime and its human rights 
records. They too contended that President Habyarimana and his party, the 
MRND, did not want peace. Examples of  dehumanization of  ideological 
opponents were also found in these papers. For instance, Kanyarwanda (no. 1, 
23 September 1992) and Rwanda Rushya (no. 18, 22 February 1992) published 
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cartoons depicting the MRND and the CDR as monsters that thrive on human 
fl esh. Kanguka (no. 58, May 1992) published a cartoon showing the members 
of the CDR as monkeys. A cartoon published by Kiberinka (no. 8, April 1992) 
warns Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye not to carry the hyena (meaning the 
MRND) on his shoulders. In these newspapers MRND and CDR leaders and 
supporters were depicted as killers. 
These papers hailed the RPF armed struggle. They published interviews 
with RPF leaders, and provided information about its political agenda and 
the territory the RPF had conquered. They never published stories about 
the assassinations, the abductions or the destruction for which the RPF was 
responsible as it advanced from southern Uganda in its quest for power. If  they 
printed stories about violence in the demilitarized zone or buffer zone separating 
Rwandan government forces and RPF forces, they attributed it to ‘the army of 
Habyarimana’, a derogatory label for the FAR. 
The front page of Le Flambeau, Rwanda Rushya, Kanguka and Le Tribun 
du Peuple quite often carried a photograph of RPF soldiers. Furthermore, the 
editors of  this group of  newspapers were the only ones allowed to visit the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army. Jean Pierre Mugabe, the chief editor of Le Tribune 
du Peuple, frequently visited the zone occupied by the RPF in Rwanda. He even 
produced a video documentary depicting the RPF military living in the areas 
under its occupation at a time when the Rwandan government was telling the 
world that there were no RPF soldiers on Rwandan territory, that they were in 
Uganda. The government strategy was to refuse to negotiate with the RPF, but 
rather to deal with the government of Uganda. This video omits any discussion 
of the destruction of villages and displacement of populations resulting from 
the war, and instead glamourizes the RPF and its leaders.
In 1993, Jean Pierre Mugabe fl ed Rwanda and joined Radio Muhabura, the 
radio station of the RPF. Charles Kanamugire, the chief editor of Le Flambeau,
always wore around his neck a photograph of  General Fred Rwigema, a 
founder and commander of  the RPF. Vincent Rwabukwisi, the chief  editor 
and owner of Kanguka, wrote in every issue of his paper that he could not get 
along with a person who did not call him an RPF militant or inkotanyi. His 
paper even organized a contest to promote the political platform of the RPF. 
André Kameya, the editor-in-chief of Rwanda Rushya, published many articles 
supporting the RPF and, as one of the leaders of the Parti Libéral, he repeated 
RPF messages at press conferences. 
The media of the Rwandan Tutsi diaspora
Rwandan Tutsi refugees had their own publications: for example, Alliance edited 
by Alliance National Unity (RANU), an organization that later changed its 
name to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF); Congo Nil, edited by Francois 
Rutanga in Belgium; Impuruza, edited by Alexander Kimenyi in the United 
States; Inkotanyi, edited by the RPF; Intego, edited by Jose Kagabo in France; 
Munyarwanda, edited by the Association of  Concerned Banyarwanda in 
Canada; Avant Garde; Le Patriote; Huguka; and Umulinzi. These publications 
were circulated clandestinely in Rwanda.
RWANDAN PRIVATE PRINT MEDIA; EVE OF THE GENOCIDE 77
The best known paper in this group is Impuruza, published in the United 
States from 1984 to 1994. Tutsi refugees and Roger Winter, the director of the 
United States Committee for Refugees, provided fi nancial assistance to the 
publication. Impuruza is the name of a drum, which in pre-colonial Rwanda 
was beaten to call able men to war. In the fi rst issue of  Impuruza, its editor, 
Alexander Kimenyi, a Rwandan national and a professor at California State 
University, explained, ‘The reason why we chose this name is to remind us that 
we too are at war and that we have to continue to show heroism.’ 
Impuruza published articles on the condition of the Rwandan Tutsi diaspora 
and on the authoritarian nature of Habyarimana’s regime. It accused Belgium 
and the Catholic Church of being responsible for ethnic confl ict in Rwanda 
because of  their colonial policies and called for a round table between the 
Rwandan government and the representatives of the Tutsi refugees.
Although this paper was not sold in Rwanda, it circulated among Hutu 
and Tutsi elite in the country. Some Hutu elite saw it as the true refl ection of 
an agenda for Tutsi hegemony in the Great Lakes of Africa even though the 
publication purported to defend the rights of Rwandan refugees to a homeland. 
Examples of statements suggesting Tutsi hegemony may be found in the name 
Impuruza and in the article written by Festo Habimana, the president of the 
Association of Banyarwanda in Diaspora USA in the fi rst issue:
A nation in exile, a people without leadership, ‘the Jews of Africa,’ a stateless 
nation, all these could very well make wonderful titles to depict the ‘saga’ 
of our people. A nation in exile because we are a group of people who are 
of  the same origin, speak the same language distinct from the rest of  the 
surroundings; a people who have been victimized for a long period of time 
yet survived and excelled under oppression … It is no secret, as it is not our 
fault that we happen to be scattered in fi ve or six different countries in which 
we are outnumbered, and the consequent problems are not of our making 
that the partition of Africa left us in such dilemma we fi nd ourselves in.
He calls for the unity of Tutsi refugees saying:
But our success will depend entirely upon our own effort and unity, not 
through world community as some perceive – in 25 years, what have they 
achieved for us in terms of concrete settlements for those who were displaced 
in [the] late 50s and early 60s? It will be only when they see us in charge of 
ourselves, and in control, that they will respond and listen. As long as we are 
scattered, with no leadership, business as usual on their part shall always be 
their policy. We are a very able and capable people with abundant blessings. 
What are we waiting for? Genocide?
It should be noted that the Association of Banyarwanda in Diaspora USA 
– assisted by Roger Winter – organized the International Conference on the 
Status of Banyarwanda Refugees held in Washington, DC, in 1988. It was at 
this conference that Tutsi refugees presumably chose armed struggle as the 
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solution to the refugee problem. Winter, two US State Department offi cials 
and a Ugandan diplomat participated in the conference. At the invitation of 
the president of the association, I attended the opening session. I was then a 
graduate student in the United States.
After the RPF launched the war in October 1990, pro-MRND and CDR 
newspapers frequently reminded their readers that the ultimate goal of the RPF 
was the creation of a Tutsi–Hima empire in the Great Lakes of Africa. 
To Hutu elite, Impuruza articulated a racist ideology that predated colonial 
rule. They particularly singled out a poem Alexandre Kimenyi wrote to honour 
General Fred Rwigema, the commander-in-chief of the RPF who died in the 
early days of the invasion of Rwanda in 1990. The poem, called ‘Nsingize Gisa 
umusore utagira uko asa’ (A tribute to Gisa, a young man with an indescribable 
beauty), appeared in Impuruza (no. 17) in December 1990. Here is an excerpt 
translated into English by Dr Froduald Harelimana:
You are a bullfi ghter who launched a war to free the Nobles [Tutsi]
Since you decided to use the entire arsenal
The termites [Hutu] will run out of the country
Just a few days before the fi rst shell has landed
Those wild rats, corrupted crooks [Hutu] are already panic-stricken
They are looters, hooligans, and killers [Hutu]
I see those traitors with bloated cheeks [Hutu] running in panic and 
disarray
Those thieves [Hutu] are troublemakers.
The ugly creatures [the Tutsi mythology preaches that people of Hamitic 
origin are generally handsome, whereas people of Bantu origin are ugly] 
are insane and furious
They are the enemies of Rwanda; they are nothing but a bunch of 
dishonorable dirt.
The Hutu elite regarded Impuruza as the voice of the Tutsi refugees and its 
editor as the ideologue of the RPF. Kimenyi, the editor, served as the director of 
research of the RPF: Rwandan offi cials took this publication very seriously.
JOURNALISM AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM
Except for the government journalists, most journalists in Rwanda did not 
have college degrees or professional training. Many editors and journalists 
were militants in the political parties they worked for and were well respected 
in those political parties. The journalists who were on the side of  the ruling 
party, the MRND, behaved as intelligence agents of the state: ordinary citizens 
were afraid of them.
Some journalists held positions in political parties. Gaspard Gahigi, editor-
in-chief of Umurwanashyaka and Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines 
(RTLM), was a member of the central committee of MRND; Ngeze, owner and 
director of Kangura, was an advisor to the CDR; Sylvestre Nkubili, a journalist 
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at Kinyamateka, was vice-president of the Union Démocratique Populaire de 
Rwanda (UDPR); Andre Kameya, owner and director of Rwanda Rushya, was 
the director of the commission of information of the Parti Libéral; Vincent 
Rwabukwisi, owner and director of Kanguka, was president of the UDPR.
Rwandan newspapers looked very similar in format and presentation. Most 
of them were tabloids; they published articles in Kinyarwanda (the language 
spoken in Rwanda) and used cartoons to portray political leaders. They watched 
each other closely and tried to emulate or outsmart each other. 
Some cartoons looked alike. For example, Izuba/Le Soleil (no. 12) of 1 April 
1992 published a cartoon that had already appeared in Le Tribun du Peuple
(Umuvugizi wa Rubanda). It showed the minister of  public works, Joseph 
Nzirorera, hanged by dogs for corruption and embezzlement. Kanguka (no. 
51) of  13 January 1992 published a cartoon showing Félicien Ngango and 
Félicien Gatabazi, respectively fi rst vice-president and executive secretary of 
the PSD, hanged by dogs for corruption and embezzlement. Finally, La Griffe
(no. 6) of 11 April 1992 printed a cartoon showing Ferdinand Nahimana, then 
director of ORINFOR, caught by dogs for his use of public media to spread 
hatred against Tutsi. 
Examples of  dehumanization could be found in many of  these papers, 
including those associated with political opposition and the RPF.
To improve the quality of  the Rwandan press, the Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation, a German organization, included independent journalists in its 
international training programmes. In the mid-1980s, this foundation initiated 
a training programme for journalists of the Economic Community of the Great 
Lakes, of which Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
are members. After the legalization of political parties, the American and Belgian 
embassies also organized seminars for Rwandan journalists. These seminars 
attracted many editors very eager to learn. After the signing of the Arusha peace 
agreement, organizers of these seminars even invited journalists from Radio 
Muhabura, the clandestine radio station of the RPF. I was an instructor at these 
seminars. Instructors always insisted that the media not be used to promote 
war, hatred or racist ideology. Such messages went unheeded.
PROFIT AND THE NEWSPAPER BUSINESS
According to some editors, the fi nancial viability of a newspaper depended on 
its readers. The number of readers a newspaper had depended on its political 
leanings. The buyers of  the newspaper and the fi nancial supporters were 
members of  the political party the newspaper had chosen to support. The 
newspapers that sided with political parties that had money were the ones that 
were viable and published regularly. Those supporting the MRND and the 
RPF fall into this category. 
Newspapers supporting the MRND included Kangura, Umurwanashyaka,
Interahamwe, Kamarampaka, Écho des Mille Collines and La Médaille 
Nyiramacibili.
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Among those supporting the RPF were Kanguka, Rwanda Rushya and Le
Flambeau. These newspapers and their editors had fi nancial resources that came 
from wealthy Tutsis, such as Valence Kajeguhakwa, the director of planning 
of the RPF. The three newspapers had an offi ce, a telephone and other offi ce 
equipment.
Other editors frequently published articles supporting RPF views, usually 
from RPF supporters living inside Rwanda. To have these articles published, 
RPF supporters had to pay substantial sums of  money. Some editors who 
received such funding were Elie Mpayimana of L’Ère de Liberté, Theoneste 
Muberantwali of  Nyabarongo, Édouard Mutsinzi of  Le Méssager, Édouard 
Mpongebuke of Umuturage and Augustin Hangimana of Ijambo.
A former Rwandan editor who now lives in exile wrote to me:
When we launched independent news organizations in 1990 (I launched mine 
in June 1990) we had many contacts with RPF milieus. However, at that time, 
these milieus were called Rwanda National Unity. There were individuals 
who gave us articles to publish using Tutsi channels (business people) and 
there were individuals who gave us money for subscriptions of support (for 
instance a person would say I have read your articles and I liked them, here is 
a contribution to publish in the next issue of your newspaper). I later found 
out that there was also some confusion since there were powerful Tutsi who 
knew there was something in preparation but did not have necessary contacts 
and thought we had them, and they asked us for them. Some would ask to 
meet with me and whenever they saw me and realized I did not look like them, 
they were disappointed. After the war broke out, some people accused me 
of supporting the enemy; there were powerful Tutsis who were convinced I 
was a member of the RPF, and they asked me for contacts ... However later 
they found the proper channels of establishing links with the RPF.
Some newspapers received fi nancial assistance from people who were only 
motivated to bring about democratic change in the country. Among them are 
Isibo and Ikindi, which received fi nancial assistance from the United States 
embassy and wealthy supporters of the opposition MDR. Some received a budget 
from their founders. Among these were state-run newspapers; Kinyamateka,
a Catholic-owned newspaper; Imbaga, a newspaper owned by Centre Iwacu, 
a private nongovernmental organization (NGO); and the newspapers owned 
by political parties. Other newspapers and their editorial staff  did not make a 
profi t and journalists who worked for them were poor.
Selling newspapers was a major problem. Every editor had to fi nd a market 
and organize a distribution system. In Kigali, newspapers were sold at the 
central bus station and children sold newspapers on the street. Usually the 
editors did not receive the money collected by these street children. Quite often 
I visited kiosks where newspapers were sold to observe reading behaviours and 
talk to newspaper boys. I could see many unsold issues. 
When the private press was fi rst established, a newspaper sold for 50 Rwandan 
francs (about US$ 0.30). After devaluation of the Rwandan franc by 67 per cent 
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in November 1990, under an International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural 
adjustment programme, the cost of  a copy doubled. Reading a newspaper 
became very expensive even for me, the director of a state agency. It was too 
costly to buy all the newspapers that were published in Kigali. I observed that a 
reader could give 50 Rwandan francs to a newspaper boy, read a copy standing 
at the kiosk and return it.
Based on discussions with many of the editors of these newspapers, whom I 
met at seminars and other events in Kigali, the circulation of a newspaper was 
2,000–3,000 copies. When an issue sold well, the editor would order another 
printing. Hassan Ngeze of  Kangura told me on several occasions that the 
circulation of his newspaper was 10,000 copies and sometimes 30,000. I always 
doubted these fi gures; visiting the kiosks in Kigali, I found many unsold issues 
of Kangura.
DISTRIBUTION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE
There were many obstacles to the distribution of  these newspapers outside 
Kigali. The fi rst was the high illiteracy rate. To emphasize the impact of 
Rwandan media on the genocide, Professor Alison Des Forges, a Human Rights 
Watch researcher and an expert on Rwandan history, wrote:
Some 66 per cent of Rwandans are literate and those who knew how to read 
were accustomed to reading for others. In many cases, the written word was 
underscored by cartoons, most of which were so graphic that they could not 
be misinterpreted. (Des Forges 1999)
However, the general census of the population conducted on 15 August 1991 
indicates that: ‘The population that cannot read nor write represents 44 per 
cent of people who are more than six years.’
In other words, only 56 per cent of the population could read and write in 
1991. The same general census adds: ‘In comparison to 1978, this represents a 
decrease of 13.4 per cent, since the illiteracy rate was 57.4 per cent for the entire 
country.’ Des Forges’ literacy fi gure suggests that there had been a dramatic 
change of 10 per cent between August 1991 and 6 April 1994. However, during 
that time there was no documented campaign to increase the literacy level of 
the population. 
Buying a paper was expensive: the cost of a newspaper was 100 Rwandan 
francs before 6 April 1994 (US$ 0.75) or the average day’s salary of a migrant 
worker in rural areas of Rwanda. The drop in coffee prices on the world market 
and the IMF’s structural adjustment programme worsened the situation. 
Potential consumers, such as elementary school teachers, did not have money 
to spend on print media. In fact, the Rwandan government was not even paying 
the salaries of teachers on time because it was almost bankrupt.
The newspapers of the government, the Catholic Church and the political 
parties reached rural areas. The political parties sent their papers to their 
supporters in the prefectures and communes. Others reached rural areas through 
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people who travelled to Kigali. People living outside the capital did not realize 
that many newspapers existed. 
Editors could put advertisements on Radio Rwanda to announce that a new 
issue of their newspaper was available, but they could not hint at the content. 
For publicity, they had to count on the weekly review of the print press, a Radio 
Rwanda programme produced by Tharcisse Rubwiliza. Those who did not like 
this weekly review regarded this journalist as an accomplice of the RPF; in April 
1994 Interahamwe killed Rubwiliza at his house in Gikondo.
There were no places in the provinces or communes where newspapers could 
be sold. The administrative structure of  Rwanda was still dominated by the 
MRND and did not allow easy dissemination of  any information opposed 
to it. However, political parties that had organizational structures in the 
countryside used them to distribute newspapers to local leaders and supporters 
free of charge.
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
With the sudden emergence of an aggressive press early in 1990, the government 
reacted by issuing statements broadcast by Radio Rwanda asking journalists 
not to abuse the freedom of the press. When those statements went unheeded, 
the chief  of  the Service Central de Renseignements (SCR), an agency based 
in the president’s offi ce, called a meeting with journalists in early 1990 and 
dictated issues that were off  limits for discussion. Such issues included the 
head of  state and his family, regionalism or relations between southerners 
(abanyenduga) and northerners (abakiga), religion and government offi cials. 
The SCR chief even designated an intelligence offi cer to serve as an advisor to 
the press. His restrictions would have left little freedom and no one accepted 
these injunctions. 
The regime engaged in persecution of the private press, particularly newspapers 
that were critical of the MRND and its leaders. Editors were frequently jailed, 
interrogated by the SCR or beaten by its agents. Among those who were 
jailed were Thaddée Nsengiyaremye of  Ikindi, Théoneste Muberantwali of 
Nyabarongo, Janvier Afrika of  Umurava, Julien Uwimana of Ibyikigihe and
Urumuli rwa Demokarasi and Sixbert Musangamfura of Isibo.
Many issues of some newspapers were not allowed to leave the print shop 
because they contained articles critical of the Habyarimana regime. Politicians 
took editors to court. Joseph Nzirorera, a minister of public works sued Sixbert 
Musangamfura because he had published an article on mismanagement in 
the ministry. Other editors were targeted by car ‘accidents’, that is, attempted 
assassinations. Félicien Semusambi survived a car accident, while Father Silvio 
Sindambiwe did not.
To silence dissent in the private print press, Nahimana Ferdinand, then 
director of ORINFOR, convened a meeting of all Rwandan journalists. His 
idea was to create an association of  journalists supposedly to defend their 
interests, but in fact he wanted to use it to infl uence the content of newspapers. 
The journalists affi liated with opposition papers and the representatives of 
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Kinyamateka, a Catholic newspaper, and Imbaga, a newspaper funded by Centre 
Iwacu, walked out of the meeting and created the Association des Journalistes 
du Rwanda (AJR). Those who remained formed a pro-regime government 
association, the Union des Journalistes du Rwanda (UJR). 
In June 1991, a new constitution legalized multiparty democracy, and political 
parties began to publish their own newspapers. Some politicians and parties 
provided funds to newspapers and used them to defend themselves against 
political attacks or to disseminate their views. Thus, these newspapers were 
published regularly. For example, the pro-MRND and pro-CDR newspapers 
Kangura, Umurwanashyaka, Interahamwe, Kamarampaka, Écho des Mille 
Collines/Impanda and La Médaille/Nyiramacibili came out at least twice a 
month; pro-RPF newspapers Kanguka, Rwanda Rushya and Le Flambeau,
and pro-MDR newspapers, Isibo and Umurangi, were also published at least 
twice a month. Their resources came from political parties or their supporters, 
who were very often wealthy businessmen. Some newspapers had two or three 
people working for them, an offi ce and a telephone; others were a one-person 
operation without a known address.
Finally, a law of  the press was promulgated in 1992. While claiming to 
recognize the freedom of the press, its emphasis was on how to restrict that 
freedom. The Rwandan law on the press recognized the right of any Rwandan to 
publish a newspaper. It stated that a person who wanted to launch a newspaper 
had to write a letter to the minister of information and the local prosecutor 
informing them of his intentions and providing the name of the newspaper, 
its goals and the identity of  the editorial team. Once the person received 
authorization from both offi cials, he could begin publishing. If  after 30 days 
the minister of  information and the local prosecutor had not responded to 
the letter, the person could start a newspaper anyway. The law also provided 
that the owner of the newspaper had to send three copies of each issue to the 
minister of information and the local prosecutor.
IMPACT OF THE PRIVATE PRINT PRESS ON RWANDAN POLITICS
Erosion of power
The private print media represented the first political opposition to the 
Habyarimana regime. Until 1989, only Kinyamateka – under the leadership of 
Father Silvio Sindambiwe and André Sibomana – could publish articles critical 
of  the regime. Under government pressure, Silvio Sindambiwe was replaced 
by André Sibomana, who used the newspaper as a platform to defend human 
rights. The regime used all sorts of intimidation tactics, including taking him 
to court. The birth of independent newspapers followed his example. 
The resistance of  these editors to the authoritarian regime of  Juvénal 
Habyarimana convinced the Rwandan elite that if  they needed political change 
they had to fi ght for it. The negative representation of Habyarimana and his 
associates as warmongers, murderers, monsters, liars and embezzlers lifted all 
the taboos that had surrounded the regime. The regime lost its essential attribute 
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of instilling terror in the population. When multiparty democracy became 
legal, opposition supporters in Kigali chanted ‘navaho impundu zizavuga’
(when he [Habyarimana] is removed from offi ce cries of  joy will resonate 
throughout Rwanda). In Rwandan political culture, this type of discourse was 
previously unthinkable.
Infl uence on the political process
I believe the private print media infl uenced the Rwandan political elite. For 
instance, in 1991 pro-opposition media called for the abolition of the annual 
compulsory contribution each public- and private-sector employee was obligated 
to pay as a member of the MRND. (According to the country’s constitution 
of 1978, all Rwandans were members of the MRND.) The contribution was 
deducted from the pay cheque at the beginning of a new year. Although the 
constitution was not changed until June 1992, the secretary general of  the 
MRND abolished the annual compulsory contribution.
During the coalition government led by Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye, 
pro-MRND and pro-CDR newspapers monitored and denounced many abuses 
committed by some members of his cabinet who belonged to opposition parties. 
At the time, the media accused the members of the PSD of diverting public 
resources toward their political party. The accusation of mismanagement put 
these ministers on the defensive.
The dehumanization practices mentioned earlier made the political discourse 
vitriolic. For example, when a newspaper published a cartoon depicting a 
political leader as a dog, a murderer or a monster, a newspaper favourable 
to this political leader would retaliate by publishing a cartoon depicting an 
opponent as a dog or a monster, or he would dehumanize the other or the 
other’s political party during a speech at a political rally. These dehumaniza-
tion practices found in the media led to the escalation of confl icts between the 
MRND and the CDR and opposition parties, and it caused the escalation of 
confl icts among opposition parties themselves. It was common to see politicians 
depicted in newspapers as a cow, goat, dog, hyena, lion, monkey, gorilla, pig, 
snake, shark, eagle or mouse. In other words, the media were used as proxies 
in the struggle for power and refl ected the anger and even hatred the political 
parties harboured toward each other. 
To illustrate the impact of  dehumanization on the escalation of  violence, 
I have selected three examples mentioned earlier to relate them to Rwandan 
political culture.
Inyenzi: Inyenzi means cockroach, which is of course demeaning. Originally 
the word inyenzi had a positive connotation, to do with the Tutsi rebel movement 
that devastated Rwanda throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In a BBC interview 
broadcast on 8 November 2003, Aloys Ngurumbe explained that Inyenzi is the 
acronym of ‘Ingangurarugo yemeye kuba ingenzi.’ Ingangurarugo was an army 
division under Kigeli Rwabugili, a Tutsi king who ruled Rwanda at the end 
of the nineteenth century. Hence, Inyenzi means ‘a member of Ingangurarugo
who has committed himself  to bravery.’ Rwabugili, the son of King Rwogera 
belonged to this division. The word ingangurarugo comes from ‘kugangura urugo 
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rw’ibwami’ or to provoke trouble at the king’s court. When Rwabugili was a 
child, he and his friends attacked Rwogera’s court and took away his cattle. 
More broadly, ingangurarugo then means troublemakers. During his reign, 
Rwabugili waged war throughout the Great Lakes of Africa until his death in 
1895. Ngurumbe stated that his supporters chose the label, not extremist Hutus, 
to whom it is attributed in many writings on the 1994 Rwanda genocide. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Inyenzi would attack at night and kill innocent 
civilians. Then they would rapidly vanish in the countryside or retreat into 
Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda or Zaire. Due to this ability to terrorize the country 
and to disappear, the population associated the attackers with cockroaches 
instead of  bravery. Cockroaches are annoying insects that disappear when 
somebody turns on the light. The only way to get rid of them is to kill all of 
them. Inyenzi became a generic term for Tutsis. By extension, the supporters 
of the Habyarimana regime and other Hutus opposed to the RPF applied the 
label inyenzi to their political opponents. 
By virtue of this exclusionary practice, during a political rally held in October 
1993 to remember the assassination of  Melchior Ndadaye, the fi rst demo-
cratically elected Hutu president of Burundi, Froduald Karamira, the second 
vice-president of MDR declared that Radio Rwanda had fallen into the hands 
of inyenzi and that inyenzi Higiro should be fi red. Karamira was referring to 
me. Given the volatile political climate of  the time, labelling a person or a 
group of  people cockroaches was similar to sentencing somebody to death. 
The Radio Rwanda reporter informed me of this hate language and I ordered 
him to omit that part of  the speech from his report. In compliance with the 
Arusha accord between the Rwandan government and the RPF, I had ordered 
state-run media not to use the word inyenzi when referring to the RPF and 
to avoid all language that incited violence. This policy applied to the news 
coverage of  political rallies, the broadcast time allocated to political parties 
and all press releases sent to ORINFOR, including those of MDR, the party 
to which I belonged. Whenever a news release of a political party came across 
my desk and contained language inciting violence or dehumanizing a group of 
people, I would cross out that language and initial the crossed out paragraphs 
or sentences before sending it to the news desk of Radio Rwanda. My family 
and I almost lost our lives because of this policy.
Hyena: In Rwandan culture a hyena is the worst animal. Rwandans use the 
name to label a dirty person or a person who has a bad look. Saying that a 
person is a hyena is to wish him death. It is a very bad insult. In Rwanda it 
is common to carry a baby or a person one likes or who needs care on one’s 
back or shoulders. Showing someone carrying a hyena like that is the worst 
possible insult.
The editor who published the cartoon portraying Prime Minister Nsanzimana 
carrying a hyena on his shoulders wanted to express empathy with him. I think 
he meant that Nsanzimana was sentenced to death because he was given the 
tough responsibility of leading Rwanda during a political and economic crisis. I 
doubt that in the volatile situation Rwanda was undergoing, MRND members 
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decoded this intended meaning. I rather think that they saw the cartoon as 
very offensive.
Monkey or gorilla: Likening the rally of the CDR to a bunch of monkeys or 
gorillas is to draw on deep stereotypes or even the hatred that Tutsi supremacists 
felt for Hutus. There is a Rwandan tradition known as ‘kwishongora’ – an 
oratory skill consisting of either putting down a speaker or a group of speakers, 
or defl ecting an attack from a speaker or group of speakers. Tutsi aristocrats 
had to master this skill to be able to socialize with their peers. Tutsi supremacists 
compared Hutus to monkeys or gorillas as part of this oratory practice because 
they were confi dent that they were superior to Hutus and the indigenous 
Twas. Since the CDR was made up of Hutus, a rally of gorillas was a rally of 
Hutus. Again the editor’s intended message was to ridicule the emphasis on 
Hutu identity, but it rekindled deeply seated racism. In a politically charged 
atmosphere, such as the one prevailing in Rwanda at the time of publication, 
the cartoon was very provocative. 
Role in the genocide
Many newspapers welcomed the signing of the Arusha peace agreement between 
the Rwandan government and the RPF. Interahamwe, a pro-MRND newspaper 
devoted a special issue to the Arusha talks, with many photos of  the repre-
sentatives of the RPF. The political atmosphere was one of relief  and hope. 
However, the positive news coverage did not last long, for opposition parties 
split into pro-MRND and pro-RPF factions, and newspaper editors aligned 
themselves accordingly.
During the genocide these newspapers stopped publication. Most of  the 
journalists were killed. 
Did the content of these newspapers serve as the catalyst of the genocide? 
The media have the potential to shape the views of their readers. As said earlier, 
Rwandan newspapers reached a small proportion of the population because of 
their high cost and the high illiteracy rate. They certainly shaped the world view 
of the political elite, as evidenced by the example regarding the abolition of the 
compulsory annual contribution to the MRND, and they probably contributed 
to the escalation of violence.
Having said that, the Rwanda genocide cannot be solely attributed to 
Rwandan media. The media tapped into a context of social discontent, war, 
high population growth rate, economic crisis, regionalism, historical ethnic 
confl ict opposing Hutus to Tutsis, bad leadership and such external forces as 
the structural adjustment programme and the rivalries between foreign powers. 
It is the combination of these factors that led to the genocide. 
CONCLUSION
Basic human rights – such as freedom of  speech and freedom of  the press 
– should be guaranteed to Rwandan citizens, otherwise underground networks 
will channel social discontent and an explosion of  violence will likely occur 
again. These basic human rights should be sustained by economic development. 
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Economic development that favours one group over others will inevitably create 
social inequalities and discontent and, in the long run, likely lead to violence. 
The MRND regime favoured northern Hutu elite; today the RPF regime favours 
Tutsi refugees who returned from Uganda.
Journalism is an established academic discipline. It is important that Rwandan 
journalists learn the professional values of  this field and understand the 
requirements and responsibilities of the profession. 
Foreign donors should support the development of a free press by funding 
the training of professional communicators in Rwanda and by encouraging the 
Rwandan government to open up the political arena and the state-run media 
to pluralistic ideas.
Alternative media, such as Internet newspapers or magazines, may reach 
only those Rwandan elite with access to this technology. It is these elite who 
are involved in the struggle for power. Cultural centres and libraries may play 
a major role by making the Internet accessible at a low cost.
For the majority of the population, radio remains the medium through which 
news and ideas are disseminated most widely. As long as Rwanda is ruled by 
authoritarian regimes, broadcasting will remain under government control. 
That is why international radio stations that broadcast in Kinyarwanda and 
Kirundi – such as the BBC and the Voice of America – are essential to provide 
information on topics that are off  limits in Rwanda. I realize that these radio 
stations have their own political agenda; however, it is my conviction that so far 
they have offered space to political diversity in their programming. Providing 
space in which differences are articulated is one way to prevent confl icts.
To prevent abuses perpetrated in the name of freedom of speech and freedom 
of the press, there is a need for local independent NGOs to defend these basic 
freedoms. These organizations may monitor violations of these freedoms by 
both the government and journalists and remind them of their obligation to 
maintain a free society.
Some ‘experts’ on Rwanda relay the RPF propaganda according to which 
a racist ideology originated from the teaching of  Catholic missionaries, the 
policies of Belgian colonizers and the social revolution of 1959 that overthrew 
the Tutsi monarchy. These ‘experts’ then emphasize the role of Kangura and 
the RTLM in the mobilization of Hutus around a racist ideology that instilled 
hatred in Rwanda before 1994. These experts create only two social categories 
among Hutus: Hutu ‘extremists’ and Hutu ‘moderates’. 
In 1992, my parents fl ed our village near the Rwanda–Uganda border as 
a result of the RPF ‘scorched earth’ policy. They moved from one internally 
displaced camp to another until they reached Zaire, then Kenya. They returned 
to Rwanda in 1998 only to fi nd the ruins of their home. In which category do 
they fi t? During this entire period they were always on the run. Many other 
people like them just ran to save their lives. The narrow social categories of 
‘extremist’ and ‘moderate’ are, therefore, meaningless.
When it comes to the media as well, some experts adopt a binary analysis: the 
media of hate and the media of democracy. Such a representation of events is, 
of course, valuable in Western movies or other artistic creations. Rarely do these 
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experts realize that practices of racism and exclusion in Rwanda have indigenous 
seeds in Rwandan proverbs that stereotype ethnic groups, myths that legitimize 
the superiority of Tutsis over Hutus and Twas and other social practices. 
When I was growing up, no Hutu or Tutsi drank at the same jar of ikigage
(beer of sorghum) or urwagwa (banana wine) with a Twa or partook of the same 
meal in a basket with a Twa. This exclusionary practice was still alive in 1994. 
Likewise, before the social revolution of 1959, Tutsi aristocrats never socialized 
with Hutus. Only impoverished Tutsis mixed with Hutus – impoverished Tutsis 
and Hutus made up of what the Hutu leaders of the social revolution of 1959 
called ‘rubanda rugufi’ or the low or oppressed people. Racism and exclusionary 
practices are not confi ned to one ethnic group or one group of media as the 
Hollywood approach suggests.
Before the social revolution of 1959, Tutsi supremacists called Hutus ‘ibimonyo’
or ants. Ibimonyo are a type of ant that lives in colonies of thousands. They are 
big and work very hard tilling the soil, but they are considered worthless. If  a 
person steps on them and kills them, it does not matter. The Rwandan name 
‘Sekimonyo’ means the son of an ant or the son of a Hutu. To my knowledge 
only Hutu parents gave this name to a child. This suggests that Hutus had 
internalized their oppressor.
As discussed earlier, after Tutsi rebels launched the Inyenzi movement in the 
1960s and 1970s to retake power, Hutu elite turned the acronym on its head 
and labelled all Tutsis inyenzi or cockroaches. Under the RPF regime, Tutsi 
elite labelled Hutus ‘genocidaires’ or genocide perpetrators. Unlike Hutu elite, 
Tutsi elite are careful not to use such a label in writings and speeches at public 
events. Since the victory of the RPF, Tutsi elite have added a new label to the 
Rwandan dictionary of exclusionary practices, the word ‘ibipinga’ from a Swahili 
word ‘kupinga’, which means to reject what another person says. Thus ibipinga
means those who reject RPF policies, and the word has become a generic term 
used by the RPF to mean Hutus. By extension, the label also applies to Tutsis 
who oppose the RPF. As a consequence of this exclusionary discourse, ibipinga
have to be eliminated in the elite pro-Tutsi regime by assassinating them or 
forcing them into exile.
Rwandans who are committed to building a democratic society in Rwanda 
and to understanding the racism and exclusionary practices that have both 
historically and contemporarily pervaded Rwandan society, should beware 
of  the limited narratives of  experts and the discourse of  the RPF. An open 
discussion on this issue may result in the adoption of policies and behaviours 
that will lead to peaceful coexistence among the three Rwandan ethnic groups: 
the Hutus, the Tutsis and the Twas. Shifting the blame on to foreigners and 
ignoring deep-seated racism will only lead to cyclical violence as each ethnic 
group strives to achieve a zero-sum solution to oppression.
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Echoes of Violence: Considerations 
on Radio and Genocide in Rwanda
Darryl Li
For 100 days in the spring and summer of  1994, millions of  Rwandans 
witnessed, participated in or otherwise lived through a nationwide campaign 
of extermination – a collective effort whose rhythm was in many ways regulated 
by the broadcasts of Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM). ‘The 
graves are only half  empty; who will help us fi ll them?’ an RTLM announcer is 
reputed to have wondered out loud in one of the station’s less subtle moments. 
The semi-private radio station, reportedly linked to a circle of  high-ranking 
Hutu extremists, has achieved an infamous, if  not legendary, reputation for 
allegedly inciting Rwandan Hutu to participate in massacring the country’s 
Tutsi minority on a scale and scope without precedent in the country’s history.1
Aside from acting as a surrogate information network for the Interahamwe
militia and other organized groups dedicated to the killing, RTLM was also 
the most popular station in the country during the genocide;2 it was perceived 
as a reliable political barometer, a source of entertainment and a provider of 
breaking news. Yet in many ways, despite a burgeoning literature on the Rwanda 
genocide (notably African Rights 1995; Des Forges 1999; Gourevitch 1998; 
Mamdani 2001; Prunier 1995) and even specifi c studies on radio’s role (Chalk 
1999; Chrétien et al. 1995; Kellow and Steeves 1998; Kirschke 1996; Nkusi et al. 
1998), its impact on listeners remains relatively unexplored and its overall place 
in encouraging mass participation in the killings largely under theorized.
This enquiry, based in part on three months of fi eldwork conducted in Rwanda 
in the summer of 2000,3 seeks to integrate the perspectives and experiences of 
radio listeners with broader considerations about the study of  the Rwanda 
genocide and mass atrocity more generally. Specifi cally, I will argue that the 
question of  RTLM’s role in the genocide can be elucidated through three 
aspects: ideologically, it played on existing dominant discourses in Rwandan 
public life for the purposes of encouraging listeners to participate in the killings; 
performatively, the station’s animateurs4 skilfully exploited the possibilities of 
the medium to create a dynamic relationship with and among listeners; and, 
fi nally, RTLM helped the Rwandan state appropriate one of the most innocuous 
 90 
This paper originally appeared in the Journal of Genocide Research, 6(1), March 2004.
ECHOES OF VIOLENCE: RADIO AND GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 91
aspects of  everyday life in the service of  the genocide. Taken together, these 
three aspects make radio a useful prism through which one can approach the 
question of mass participation in a genocide that was diffuse, routinized and 
intimate in nature.
OPENING QUESTIONS
An enquiry into the Rwanda genocide and RTLM’s role in it reveals parallel 
questions and gaps in the existing literature on collective violence and media 
studies, both essentially revolving around the question of  subjectivity and 
action. Commentators have frequently remarked on the highly centralized 
and labour-intensive nature of  the killing campaign, involving the direct or 
indirect efforts of hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens working under 
the direction of  a strong state using a dense network of  local administra-
tion and parastatal entities. Although it was spearheaded and guided at the 
local level by bureaucrats, party cadres and armed elements (military, police, 
militia), what sets the Rwanda genocide apart from many other contemporary 
mass atrocities was the participation of  such a sizeable and heterogeneous 
portion of the population (farmers, businessmen, journalists, nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) workers, clergy, teachers) as killers, lookouts, informants, 
looters, logisticians and cheerleaders.
The fact of mass participation in the genocide, however, needs to be further 
understood through three particular aspects that frequently elude systematic 
enquiry. First, the killing was highly diffuse. Although it did not unfold evenly 
or simultaneously across the country, it left no region untouched, and the killing 
itself  was carried out in spaces both public and private, including churches, 
roadblocks, homes, schools, fi elds and government offi ce buildings, obviating 
the need to relocate and concentrate large numbers of  victims to distant, 
secluded institutions such as camps or prisons. Second, in the vacuum left by 
the absence of much cultivation, business and study, the genocide established 
its own rhythm; participation (construed broadly, not necessarily killing) was 
routinized. Although orgiastic massacres did occur, many of the day-to-day 
activities of  the genocide (primarily roadblock duty, patrols and searches) 
were carried out by work crews rotating according to set schedules, sometimes 
electing their own leaders. Third, the genocide was a project in which mass 
violence relied on social intimacy. Systematic identifi cation and pursuit of Tutsi 
depended on the compilation of  comprehensive lists at the local level; such 
surveillance, coupled with movement restrictions, made escape and anonymity 
extremely diffi cult. Moreover, the killing involved widespread denunciation and 
betrayal of friends, neighbours and loved ones.5
Scholars have drawn from many of the existing theories of collective violence 
to explain the Rwanda genocide. So-called ‘primordialist’ approaches, based 
on the idea of reifi ed ‘ancient ethnic [or tribal] hatreds’ (teleologically drawing 
on earlier episodes of anti-Tutsi violence in the late 1950s and 1960s), initially 
dominated much of  the media coverage of  and some of  the scholarship on 
the genocide. However, these have been widely criticized to the extent that 
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they now serve as little more than an academic pinata, although their political 
potency cannot be underestimated (and their potential analytical value, if  
properly revised, is perhaps under-appreciated at this time). Primordialist 
approaches have been largely displaced by explanations that emphasize the 
historicity/contingency of ethnic identities, the role of manipulative and self -
serving political elites, crushing economic and demographic pressures, the 
importance of racist anti-Tutsi ideologies or often some combination thereof. 
Although these diverse theories (at times grouped together as ‘instrumentalist’) 
have provided a useful critique of primordialism and have made a number of 
positive contributions to the study of the genocide, the question of how mass 
participation was secured and sustained is often effaced (notable exceptions 
include Mamdani 2001 and Uvin 1998).6 Indeed, in the face of such widespread 
participation in diffused, routinized and intimate killing, it seems diffi cult to rely 
on existing explanations – ideas such as cultural norms of obedience, elite-driven 
manipulation and socio-economic pressures – without somehow speaking of 
Rwandans as easily open to manipulation and control. Yet at the same time, one 
cannot lose sight of the fact that the genocide came immediately after the period 
of multipartyism, which was marked by unprecedented political openness and 
opposition to the state, including intra-Hutu violence.
Interestingly, the holes in the extant literature on RTLM and the genocide are 
similarly shaped. Pictures of Interahamwe militia with their ears glued to radios 
and stories of RTLM’s more gory announcements were easily incorporated into 
atavistic explanations of the genocide. The fi rst in-depth studies (Chrétien et 
al. 1995; Kirschke 1996) reviewed the kinds of racist stereotyping used in the 
station’s broadcasts or unearthed the overlapping networks of power, money, 
patronage and ideology that brought RTLM and other extremist media to 
life. Others have analyzed the question from the perspective of sociolinguistics 
(Nkusi et al. 1998) and media studies (Kellow and Steeves 1998). In exten sively 
cataloguing and analyzing the broadcasts of RTLM, these works highlight the 
station’s role in disseminating racist stereotypes and inciting specifi c killings. 
However, they say little about how media messages were received by their 
intended audiences and how such broadcasts interacted with other factors at 
the local level (especially state coercion and mobilization). This empirical gap 
often allows analyses to fall back on older ‘magic-bullet’ theories of  media 
studies in which, as Jean-Marie Higiro, a Hutu opposition journalist, put it, 
‘human beings are considered as automatons’ (Higiro 1996: 170). Chrétien’s 
thorough catalogue of ideological themes and tropes in newspapers and radio, 
considered the authoritative work on media in the genocide, essentially relies 
on this theory: ‘Two tools, one very modern, the other less so, were particularly 
used during the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda: the radio and the machete, 
the fi rst to give and receive orders, the second to carry them out!’ (Chrétien et 
al. 1995: 191). He says little of the perspective of listeners or their immediate 
contexts. In a similar vein, Kellow and Steeves write: ‘some African countries 
have strong traditions of hierarchy and authoritarianism, which increase the 
likelihood of blind obedience to the orders of offi cials on the radio. Norms of 
rote obedience were and continue to be, exceptionally strong in Rwanda’ (Kellow 
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and Steeves 1998: 116). Yet such an argument is undermined by the fact that 
RTLM, started just months before the genocide, was younger than both the 
familiar state-controlled Radio Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front’s 
(RPF) Radio Muhabura. Moreover, many of  the Rwandans I interviewed 
recalled actively debating, comparing and doubting broadcasts from different 
radio stations, including RTLM, and still do. At the same time, however, it is 
clear that media audiences do not exist in a cultural vacuum that allows them 
to ‘objectively’ evaluate different radio stations; although RTLM was popular 
and many Rwandans did indeed obey orders to kill, the connection between 
these two facts must be analyzed rather than taken for granted.
Accounts of  the genocide and of  radio’s role in it share a problematic 
approach to the role of the human as subject; both tend to assume uncritically 
the existence of an ordinary farmer/citizen/radio listener, open to manipulation, 
mobilization and stimulation. These perspectives can fi nd their parallels in the 
rich and long-running tradition of scholarship that seeks to explain collective 
action, especially in relation to violence. It is of little surprise, then, that the 
old dyads of structure versus agency and materialism versus idealism that have 
long dogged social science research should re-emerge here.
RADIO AND THE IDEOLOGY OF GENOCIDE
There is little disagreement that RTLM propagated a racist anti-Tutsi ideology, 
drawing on historical myths, stereotypes of the Tutsi and appeals to Hutu unity 
and that it often did so in a thinly veiled code referring to ‘work’ instead of 
killing and ‘cockroaches’ (inyenzi) instead of Tutsi. Furthermore, the station 
described gruesome acts of violence attributed to Tutsi as a means of implying 
what should be done to them (the so-called ‘accusation in a mirror’ technique: 
see Des Forges 1999: 65–6). Yet accounts of RTLM’s ideological role that focus 
solely on racist aspects do not explain why the station’s particular ideological 
world views caught on more than those of other stations; moreover, they fail to 
show how RTLM transcended ordinary propaganda, from simply propagating 
certain beliefs or feelings about Tutsi as an ethnic category, to encouraging and 
facilitating participation in the murder of friends, neighbours and relatives.
To address these two points, the analysis of the ideology of the genocide as 
propagated through RTLM needs to be widened beyond its amply documented 
anti-Tutsi imagery. In light of the near-absence of anti-Tutsi propaganda or 
policy in Rwanda from the early 1970s to the 1990s, I would like to draw attention 
to how RTLM appropriated and transformed elements of three dominant public 
discourses of post-colonial Rwandan modernity: history (as a particular way 
of  thinking of  the past); democracy (as a particular way of  thinking about 
gover nance); and development (as a particular way of thinking about economy 
and work). RTLM built on these discourses while responding to the particular 
contingencies of the post-1990 political situation in a way that neither Radio 
Rwanda nor Radio Muhabura appeared to match. Moreover, RTLM helped 
Rwandans make sense of  their active participation in the genocide in terms 
that were broader than simple hatred or fear of Tutsi by creating a context in 
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which euphemisms such as ‘work’ and ‘cockroaches’ could be easily understood 
through an indirectness that left nothing unsaid.
The discourse of history in Rwanda was a product of late colonial modernity, 
a particular way of looking at the past based on a unifi ed national narrative 
incorporating the lives of all its people past and present and cast in the mould of 
linear progress, whose dominant theme was Hutu victimization (in the colonial 
era) and emancipation (1959 onward). In this formulation, the ‘Hutu revolution’ 
of 1959 that precipitated the end of elite Tutsi hegemony (many Tutsi were as 
poor as their Hutu neighbours) and Belgian rule represented a radical and 
emancipatory leap forward, the raison d’être of the post-colonial Rwandan state 
that had always implicitly legitimized itself  in opposition to the past.
During the genocide, however, RTLM portrayed the progress achieved 
since the revolution as under threat from the RPF, collapsing past into present 
and calling on Rwandans to re-enact the do-or-die moment of 1959. Georges 
Ruggiu, RTLM’s Belgian animateur, recalled that the station’s management 
issued explicit instructions to make such historical comparisons and that he 
said on the air that ‘the 1959 revolution ought to be completed in order to 
preserve its achievements’ (ICTR-97–32-DP2000., paras 110, 186). Kantano 
Habimana, arguably RTLM’s most popular animateur, once told listeners: 
‘Masses, be vigilant … Your property is being taken away. What you fought 
for in ’59 is being taken away’ (RTLM, 21 January 1994). Venant, a 69-year-
old Tutsi, told me that RTLM ‘made [people’s] heads hot [ashyushe imitkwe]’ 
when speaking of how the RPF intended to restore the monarchy and reinstate 
dreaded colonial-era clientship institutions, while another farmer said he feared 
a repetition of the events of 1959 (interviews, 8 and 11 August 2000).
I do not wish to imply, however, that the simple invocation of  specific 
historical memories had a predetermined effect. What is important about 
the examples above is not simply that they alluded to the past (after all, one 
could easily mention a past characterized by Hutu–Tutsi cooperation or 
even indistinction, as offi cial RPF rhetoric does), but that they built on the 
discourse of history while undermining its structure as a discourse, specifi cally 
by removing the element of  progress.7 The linear shape of  history, implying 
inevitable teleological progress, had long been used to legitimize the regime 
through implicit comparison with the colonial era. By disrupting linearity and 
folding 1959 into 1994, not only did RTLM evoke negative historical memories 
of colonial rule but it also contributed to a deep sense of crisis, in which the 
nation was suddenly and violently derailed from the path it had been on. While 
the state had earlier evoked a fear of the past based on comparison to produce 
assent, RTLM brought the past into the present, producing a more profound 
horror intended to prompt action.
The discourse of  democracy was built around a congruence between 
ethnicity and nation (specifi cally the Hutu as the Rwandan nation, with the 
Tutsi transformed from exotic aristocrats to parasitic outsiders) and a notion of 
ethnic majoritarianism, in which the president rules by virtue of his membership 
in and representation of an ethnic majority that will always be entitled to rule 
by virtue of its numerical preponderance. Not only did this allow the state to 
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demonize the Tutsi as a hostile minority bent on restoring its old dominance 
(especially early years of  the post-colonial state, when monarchist Tutsi 
guerrillas continued to launch raids from neighbouring countries, prompting 
bloody reprisals against the Tutsi who stayed behind), but more importantly, 
it squelched economic, regional and ideological differences between Hutu in 
the name of ethnic solidarity.
During the genocide, RTLM, the self-styled voice of the rubanda nyamwinshi 
(‘numerous people’, that is, majority or masses), drew on this discourse of 
democracy in its frequent appeals to ethnic majoritarianism, while at the 
same time attempting to channel the participatory potential of  opposition 
politics rather than simply suppress it. Because the genocide was preceded by a 
period of multipartyism that witnessed intense and at times violent opposition 
by various Hutu parties, a priority of  the regime was to co-opt or split the 
opposition as a means of promoting ethnic solidarity (or vice versa). The many 
such ‘conversions’ I was told about included a Hutu opposition activist called 
Ngerageze who, according to an acquaintance, ‘heard on RTLM that you had 
to forget about parties and think only of ethnicity’ and became a local militia 
leader during the genocide (interview, 9 August 2000). Although it may be 
impossible to say how much Ngerageze’s decision was infl uenced by RTLM, 
it is clear that re-establishing ethnicity as the supreme principle of democracy 
was a priority of the genocidal regime. It is in this context that one can make 
sense of the following remark by RTLM animateur Valérie Bemeriki, a sample 
typical of the station’s broadcasts:
Now, we seem to have forgotten political parties and it is understandable since 
the enemy who harasses us is unique ... In the meantime, we have put aside 
matters of political partie s even if  the international community is shouting: 
‘lnterahamwe! Interahamwe!’… But for  us, we apply that word to all of us, 
to all Rwandans who stood up together, at the same time, who got united in 
order to beat the Inyenzi Inkotanyi. (RTLM, 22 June 1994)
The station also played on the idea of democracy by reminding people of 
the numerical weakness of the country’s Tutsi minority, which would not only 
guarantee their defeat but absolve Hutu of any blame, since an enemy resisting 
in the face of  such odds could be nothing but suicidal. ‘These are Inkotanyi
[nickname for RPF fi ghters or Tutsi generally], they come from a very tiny 
minority called the Tutsi,’ Kantano once explained. ‘Will those people truly 
continue to commit suicide against the majority? Will they not be exterminated?’ 
(RTLM, 12 May 1994).
The discourse of development in post-colonial Rwanda defi ned the relationship 
between state and economy after the abolition of colonial-era forms of often 
coercive ‘customary’ clientship. It was especially important in legitimizing 
President Juvénal Habyarimana’s regime from the early 1970s onward (Uvin 
1998: 23–4).8 The consequences were both symbolic (Habyarimana’s party called 
itself  Mouvement Républicain National pour la Democratie et le Développement
(MRND); the rubber-stamp parliament of the regime was the Conseil National 
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pour le Développement) and material (foreign aid infl ows comprised 22 per 
cent of  the country’s GNP by 1991 (Prunier 1995: 79). The centrepiece of 
development was umuganda, obligatory communal labour mandated on nearly 
the entire population on a weekly basis, enforced through dense administrative 
networks of both state functionaries and party cadres (umuganda was offi cially 
an MRND activity) at the local level.
RTLM’s notorious use of ‘work’ as a euphemism (with machetes as ‘tools’) 
needs to be understood in the context of  development, with participation 
(manning roadblocks, taking part in night patrols, conducting house searches, 
clearing fi elds) being likened to umuganda on a number of occasions. RTLM’s 
invocation of work drew upon the existing discourses of  development while 
simultaneously recasting communal labour as an exercise in national survival 
(sometimes described as ‘civil defence’) at a moment of  crisis. ‘Mobilize 
yourselves,’ animateur Georges Ruggiu told listeners during the killings. ‘Work 
you the youth, everywhere in the country, come to work with your army. Come 
to work with your government to defend your country’ (RTLM, 5 June 1994). 
A Western missionary who spoke fl uent Kinyarwanda recalled: ‘Every morning, 
RTLM was in the habit of asking listeners, “Hello, good day, have you started 
to work yet?”’ (interview, 29 April 1997, supplied by an anonymous source). It 
is important to emphasize that work had a value beyond umuganda, which was 
so burdensome that it more or less fell into disuse during the era of post-1990 
multipartyism. The value of work was also tied to the virtues espoused by the 
Catholic Church (Prunier 1995: 77; Verwimp 2000: 338) and to the dignity of 
being associated with the activities of the state (Taylor 1999: 141).
It is also important to note that state-controlled Radio Rwanda, which had 
been broadcasting since the eve of independence in 1962, played a pivotal role 
in propagating each of these discourses (history, democracy, development) in 
post-colonial Rwanda; the majority of those I spoke to learned much of their 
country’s past through the radio. Radio was a key site for the articulation of 
democracy, and Radio Rwanda regularly exhorted listeners to work harder and 
advised them on agricultural techniques.9
Yet in the context of instability caused by the RPF invasion in 1990, Radio 
Rwanda’s reticence about the progress of  the war began to raise listeners’ 
suspicions that it was withholding the full extent of the truth; this stiltedness 
was amplifi ed in the opening weeks of  the genocide, when the station was 
largely paralyzed by internal power struggles between MRND supporters and 
opposition sympathizers. Radio Rwanda’s inability to adjust to the fl uid political 
situation in the early 1990s is best captured by the memory of many Rwandans 
of Habyarimana’s death; Domitille, 57, an accused génocidaire, recalled listening 
to the radio the morning after the crash in which Habyarimana was killed: 
‘While Radio Rwanda played classical music, RTLM gave news about the 
situation’ (interview, 11 July 2000). 
On the other hand, the RPF’s Radio Muhabura remained limited (although 
it sought to tap into anti-regime sentiment and many of the people I spoke to 
listened clandestinely out of curiosity, despite potential repercussions). Aside 
from its dull and propagandistic style (even RPF soldiers were said to prefer 
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RTLM), its ideological vision was perhaps too radical for much of the Rwandan 
population; not only did it espouse a view of  politics that entirely ignored 
ethnicity (or reduced it to an imperialist plot), but it also raised fears of  a 
radical change in the country’s demographic, economic and political makeup 
by billing itself  as the ‘voice that repatriates’ (Kirschke 1996: 50) – a reference 
to the diaspora of predominantly Tutsi refugees in neighbouring states who 
fl ed Rwanda in 1959.
While Radio Rwanda appeared mired in the past and Radio Muhabura 
seemed to foreshadow a frightening future, RTLM somehow struck a balance 
between continuity and change, positioning itself  in relation to dominant 
discourses while departing from them in specifi cally compelling ways. At the 
same time, it appropriated ideologies that had previously produced acquiescence 
and depoliticization and gave them a participatory, mobilizational edge, which 
resonated with the dynamism of political plurality that marked the period of 
the early 1990s.
RADIO AND PERFORMANCE IN THE GENOCIDE
RTLM did more than merely articulate the ideological world view of genocide; 
after all, there were dozens of  Hutu newspapers that did so as well. Also 
important was its use of radio’s specifi c properties as a medium of broadcast 
performance, where oral texts are perfectly reproduced but uniquely received 
in thousands of different locales as specifi c events in time.10 With a virtuosic 
fl are, RTLM’s animateurs played off  and around the ideological agenda they 
sought to promote, developed distinctive on-air personalities and sought to 
implicate listeners in the project of the genocide.
Although the extant literature on the genocide has cited RTLM’s informal 
atmosphere, lively style, good music, off-colour jokes and the introduction of 
‘western-style interactive broadcasting’ to explain its appeal (Chrétien et al.
1995: 73–4; Des Forges 1999: 70; Higiro 1996: 1; Kirschke 1996: 84–5; Prunier 
1995: 189), it has often been understood simply as a means by which the station 
could easily ‘manipulate’ audiences, a kind of Rwandan breads and circuses.11
Instead, it is also necessary to grasp how  listeners interacted with RTLM’s 
broadcasts, and how animateurs consciously or unconsciously exploited the 
possibilities and limits of the medium.
One key performative aspect was the skill with which RTLM’s animateurs 
played off  the ideologies of the genocide, giving an impression of frankness 
and trustworthiness that also gave the ideology resilience in dealing with 
contingency. In doing so, RTLM did what any good propaganda must do: 
provide specifi c responses to opposing arguments (‘balance’), even if  they are 
based on non-falsifi able assumptions. On 6 January 1994, RTLM broadcast 
an interview with Tito Rutaremara, a high offi cial in the RPF, in which he 
was allowed to voice harsh criticism of the MRND. Yet Kantano prefaced the 
interview with a long monologue peppered with numerous jokes and attempts 
to discredit Rutaremara, referring to him as ‘that tall Tutsi’ and reporting that 
he was surrounded by other Tutsi drinking milk (milk, metonymous with cattle, 
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is often considered a symbol of Tutsi refi nement or snobbery); after playing 
back the recording, Kantano noted that Rutaremara ‘was of course answering 
[the questions] in the Inkotanyi way’. RTLM also corrected itself, especially in 
cases where it retracted denunciations (which were effectively death warrants), 
para doxically bolstering its claims to tell ‘only the truth’. The performative 
contin gency of the moment allowed RTLM’s animateurs to depart from the 
ideological script of the genocide to strengthen it.12
RTLM animateurs themselves became personalities, known and invested 
with certain meanings by many of  their listeners, often fi tting into typecast 
roles: for example, Ananie Nkurunziza, a former intelligence offi cer, as the 
serious political analyst; and editor-in-chief Gaspard Gahigi as political pundit. 
How ever, Kantano Habimana was by far the most popular animateur (‘Kantano 
talked as if  people were right in front of him, which was good for getting their 
attention,’ recalled James, a 41-year-old farmer (interview, 6 August 2000)), a 
sentiment echoed by many others I spoke to, both Hutu and Tutsi. 
Perhaps the most interesting example of the personal authority of animateurs 
is the strange case of  Georges Ruggiu, a Belgian citizen newly arrived in 
Rwanda, hired at Habyarimana’s behest despite having barely any journalism 
experience and no knowledge of Kinyarwanda (ICTR-97–32-DP2000:, para. 
87–90). Although there has been speculation as to why Ruggiu was hired, most 
Rwandans I spoke to believe it was because he was white.13 Both Hutu detainees 
and Tutsi survivors I spoke to said that the presence of  a muzuungu (white 
man) at RTLM gave it the appearance of strength, perhaps even international 
sanction. Indeed, some of Ruggiu’s monologues seem to serve little purpose 
other than to leverage his Europeanness for credibility. Several weeks before 
the genocide, Ruggiu en gaged in one of RTLM’s routine denunciations of the 
Arusha accords before adding a unique twist:
Then, this evening in order to feed your thoughts, we thought of searching in 
our library. We then chose for you two extracts from The Prince by Nicholas 
[sic] Machiavelli. That book about government and political principles was 
written in 1514, that is more than 490 years ago now. But good ideas don’t 
die … These two extracts are going to feed your thoughts and we remain 
open to others; dialogue and mutual listening seem to us profi table to 
everyone and if  you have written comments, we remain always available to 
be acquainted with them and perhaps even to broadcast them if  they are 
worth it. Here then is Nicholas Machiavelli who speaks through my voice. 
(RTLM, 15 March 1994)
After relaying Machiavelli’s advice about how a prince must learn not to be 
good (Chapter 15) and that he must be loved and feared (Chapter 18), Ruggiu 
signed off  in a din of classical European music. In this performance, one can 
see how the invocation of  a founding treatise of  modern Western political 
thought, the emphasis on its age, the use of European classical music (probably 
not contemporaneous with The Prince), and the alignment of Machiavelli the 
author with Ruggiu the performer (‘speak[ing] through my voice’) were brought 
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together to create an inter-textual narrative linking the political situation in 
Rwanda to a construction of European thought and authority, dangling the 
weight of centuries of ‘civilization’ in the air before RTLM’s listeners.
The power of the myth of whiteness in sub-Saharan Africa is a thing that 
cannot be discarded, yet, at the same time, must be invoked with the greatest 
caution. A priori, Ruggiu’s authority or credibility as a white man with Rwandan 
farmers who could not understand his words would seem at best dubious, one 
must recall that radio often feeds into the dynamics of other enduring social 
hierarchies and relations. As Immaculée, 36, a detainee accused of participation 
in the genocide, explained: ‘Those who understood French liked to listen to 
the muzuungu and said he was on the side of the Hutu, and that he spoke well 
and was against the Tutsi. Educated people and bourgmestres would explain 
the French broadcasts to others’ (interview, 11 July 2000). Here, one can see 
radio broadcasts as events in which different actors create multiple meanings. 
In a mutually reinforcing process, local elites could play upon and enhance 
their credibility as educated Francophones vis-à-vis those who could not speak 
French, while Ruggiu’s reach was extended and his own authority strengthened 
by the endorsement of such notables.14
Besides apparently alerting listeners to specifi c targets and hiding places,15
RTLM’s animateurs also implicated ordinary listeners in the activities of the 
genocide; farmers at roadblocks or on the street were frequently interviewed, 
and RTLM employed techniques that acted on relations among listeners. During 
an interview at a roadblock, a man once told Kantano that he and his colleagues 
had killed fi ve inyenzi. After encouraging them to ‘keep it up,’ Kantano asked: 
‘When testing if  people like a radio station, you ask the following question: who 
are the speakers of that radio whom you know? Who are the RTLM speakers 
you know? … If you do not know them that means that you do not like this 
radio’ (RTLM, 29 May 1994). 
In another instance, Kantano called on Tutsi who were not RPF accomplices 
to man the roadblocks with the Hutu. The following day, while addressing the 
people manning the roadblocks, he sug gested, ‘look around you, the enemy is 
among you’ (interview, 18 September 1995, supplied anonymously). Whether 
intended or not, such tactics probably indirectly pressured people to listen to 
RTLM or at least to conceal any opposition to it. ‘Some people were against 
RTLM but didn’t have the strength to say so in public,’ recalled Jamad, 48, a 
mason (interview, 17 August 2000); one Tutsi I met was so afraid that he went so 
far as to purchase a recording of the music of Simon Bikindi, whose anti-Tutsi 
songs were played repeatedly on RTLM before the genocide, to demonstrate 
his loyalty to the regime (interview, 11 August 2000).
RTLM explicitly informed conversations that took place away from the 
physical contexts of  listening as well. Broadcasts were often reincarnated 
elsewhere as rumour, where the possibilities for exaggeration or reinterpreta-
tion could only expand. According to one of his neighbours, a militia member 
named Hakiri used to spend mornings on the roof of  his shop with a radio 
clutched to his ear, listening to RTLM. When he listened, ‘his mood changed’ 
and he would climb down and gather people to tell them what he had heard 
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(interview, 22 July 2000). Even if  one assumes that Hakiri relayed the content 
and tone of these broadcasts as faithfully and uncritically as possible, he was 
still engaging in a process of performance, acting as a medium through which 
the project of  the genocide manifested itself  and could possibly be shaped. 
Across the country, thousands of listeners were relaying, embellishing and even 
misrepresenting RTLM’s broadcasts. One prominent Hutu extremist, taking pity 
on some Tutsi children at a roadblock, reportedly admonished the militiaman 
harassing them: ‘Don’t you listen to the radio? The French said if  we don’t stop 
killing children they’ll stop arming and helping us’ (Gourevitch 1998: 130).
The process of re-performance is even more interesting in the case of oral 
texts, such as songs, which are repeatedly played and thus more likely to be 
remembered and passed on in everyday speech. The music of Simon Bikindi, 
with its rousing tunes and anti-Tutsi lyrics, was part of RTLM’s regular fare 
and provided many of the anthems of Hutu Power. Many Hutu sang along with 
Bikindi’s songs on RTLM in bars and in streets, and even after ‘work’ shifts. 
Bikindi’s songs, however, could somehow take on a life of their own in different 
contexts of  performance. Immaculée told of  an old Tutsi woman who was 
hiding in a cassava fi eld when some passing militia, ignorant of her presence, 
started singing one of Bikindi’s songs. ‘When the old woman heard the song, 
she thought she had been found and so she ran from the bush,’ Immaculée 
explained; the old woman barely managed to relay her story to Immaculée 
before being found and killed by the militia (interview, 11 July 2000). 
As the old woman’s ‘accidental’ interpretation suggests, each context of re-
performance beyond the physical site of  listening presents opportunities for 
different mean ings to be derived, thus adding a crucial dimension of versatility 
to the circulation of  oral texts. Although the Hutu were not reshaping the 
message of the song (in the way that a rumour may mutate), the old woman’s 
behaviour was not a reaction to a song per se, but to an oral text relayed by 
particular actors (a gang of  armed Hutu) and heard in a particular context 
(while hiding in a cassava fi eld). In short, she was shaping meaning in the context 
of performance, however inadvertently. In this way, ordinary people became a 
medium through which the inescapability of the genocidal project manifested 
itself, and the old woman’s ‘mistaken’ interpretation serves as a reminder of how 
contextualized creativity can work in unpredictable and unintended ways.
RTLM sustained the larger edifi ce of  the ideology of  the genocide on a 
continuously shifting foundation of  smaller truths, performative moments 
that rendered animateurs endearing or familiar or otherwise authoritative to 
listeners. Moreover, the animateurs did not simply perform the genocide before 
captive audiences, but indirectly implicated them in the performance of  the 
project itself.
RADIO IN THE TIME OF GENOCIDE
In contemplating the question of obedience in the genocide, it is important to 
note that the capture and mobilization of state resources by its orchestrators 
mirrored a gradual appropriation of the cornerstones of collective life for the 
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purposes of the killing. The genocide extended beyond bureaucracies to other 
everyday routines and contexts. From the point of  view of most Rwandans, 
it was not simply that the priest, the schoolteacher and the radio animateur 
spoke of the same necessity to work, but that they sometimes did so as part 
of the weekly sermon, the daily lesson, the hourly bulletin. Indeed, one of the 
most pervasive and overlooked aspects of RTLM’s infl uence on listeners was 
its quotidian role.
Radio, which bookends and punctuates the daily routine of many ordinary 
Rwandans, continued to do so during the genocide. RTLM did not simply 
whip Hutu into a frenzy to channel fear and anger into sudden attacks. Rather, 
through the daily diet of informational updates, operational details (not to leave 
bodies on the road in view of Western journalists, for example) and encouraging 
monologues, it contributed to the framing of schedules and the routinization 
of ‘work’. According to one survivor, local Hutu would gather at the nearby 
government offi ce, then spend the day performing the mundane tasks of the 
genocide, occasionally coming upon and killing Tutsi. During that time, many 
people would listen to RTLM at roadblocks, in homes and in bars during 
breaks. Sometimes they would listen outdoors in groups as large as 100, closely 
following the information relayed to plan the next day’s activities. When asked 
if  this took place every day, one man replied, ‘Of course. It was work. It was 
to know what to do’ (interview, 18 August 2000). Regardless of whether all of 
the news it passed on was true (and many Rwandans recognized that at times it 
was not), those who killed still built their schedules in part around RTLM and 
used its broadcasts to help guide the details and schedules of work. ‘Kantano 
said there are no RPF here, so we can continue our work,’ one Hutu cultivator 
recalled hearing some locals say (interview, 6 August 2000).
Even Rwandans who did not kill still arranged their activities around 
and took advantage of the rhythms of ‘work’. Knowing when certain teams 
would be called up could help some Hutu evade roadblock duty by hiding or 
feigning illness. And, as in ordinary times, listening schedules were also shaped 
by gender. While the men were at work, women often listened and followed 
RTLM’s advice in other ways. Bonfride, a 21-year-old Tutsi, spent several weeks 
sheltered in the homes of sympathetic Hutu neighbours, often with families 
that had no sons. Although they risked their lives to hide a Tutsi, women in 
these families also liked RTLM’s broadcasts and heeded the station’s entreaties 
to go out and pillage the belongings of those who had been killed (interview, 
2 September 2000).16
One of the most apparent ways in which RTLM placed itself  in the daily 
routines of  listeners was through one of  its star animateurs, Noël (Noheli) 
Hitimana, who had become a household name after working at Radio Rwanda 
from the late 1970s until the early 1990s. During the early shift when farmers 
rose to tend the fi elds, one of  Hitimana’s trademarks was to call out to the 
furthest mountains in the country, issue personal greetings to specifi c regions 
of Rwanda and salute named individuals with whom he had met or shared a 
drink the night before. He was also known for his quick wit, his adroit word 
play (alluding to his name while giving Christmas greetings, for example) and 
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his fondness of  alcohol (he was supposedly fi red from Radio Rwanda after 
insulting President Habyarimana during an inebriated on-air gaffe). Despite 
(or perhaps because of) these antics, Hitimana was well liked by radio listeners 
throughout the country. 
During my time in Rwanda, I knew professionals of  both ethnicities who 
spoke highly of him as a kind man with no particular hatred or animosities 
for anyone before the period of multipartyism. Moreover, people appreciated 
his recognition of  and speaking to audiences while on the air. ‘He showed 
that Radio Rwanda was interested in its listeners,’ said Elie, 30, imprisoned 
after the genocide, adding that being mentioned by name over the radio was a 
small honour for anyone, a moment’s celebrity and recognition for hard work 
(interview, 5 July 2000). Philip, 56, also awaiting trial, claimed that two of his 
own friends were once saluted by Hitimana on Radio Rwanda. ‘He would say 
hello to this secteur and hello to that secteur. He had his own style, and people 
liked him and knew his voice’ (interview, 10 July 2000). Listening to Noël 
Hitimana at dawn while heading out to the fi elds was itself  a cultural practice, 
part of the daily process through which meanings – pertaining to the nation 
as an imagined community, or to the value of hard work as frequently extolled 
on Radio Rwanda – were brought to life.
Whether as a deliberate strategy or out of habit, Hitimana’s work at RTLM 
continued in the vein of  many of  his old practices at Radio Rwanda. For 
example, in response to criticisms of RTLM broadcast over Radio Muhabura, 
he responded with a litany of areas that had experienced RPF attacks:
It’s ridiculous to hear them declaring on their radio: ‘That murderer, Noel!’ 
Ha! Ha! If you go to Ruhengeri or Byumba and walk around to the communes 
of Butaro, Kidaho, Cyeru, Cyumba, Kivuye, Mukarange, until Muvumba, 
if  you come back to Kigombe or even to Mukingo, or up to Kora, you’ll 
understand who has suffered and who’s the murderer. You’ll understand how 
deep their sorrow is. Their sorrow! When you go on until Base, Nyamugali, 
or Nyakinama and Nyamutera, you fi nd sad people everywhere. Sad. Really 
sad. Ask them who’s responsible for their sorrow. (RTLM, 1 April 1994)
Here, one does not simply see an animateur invoking the names of specifi c 
locales; it is Noheli Hitimana, who for years has been known to salute and greet 
individuals in all of the country’s communes and secteurs. Hitimana’s invocation 
of locales capitalizes on the earlier variants of the practice to convince listeners 
of  a particular world view (in this case, that the Hutu are the victim of  the 
Tutsi) while simultaneously implicating listeners in the areas cited as fellow 
sufferers. Once the genocide began, the naming of  places by Hitimana and 
other animateurs became associated with exhortations to rush to specifi c areas 
where there were still Tutsi to be found.
Similarly, Hitimana’s habit of saluting individuals also shaped his work on 
RTLM. Several days before the genocide, during a commentary on an unrelated 
subject, he suddenly launched into an attack on opposition journalist Joseph 
Mudatsikira:
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Let me say hello, child of  my mother. Let me salute you, as you are the 
same as Noheli [i.e., also a journalist] ... If  you die just as everyone has been 
speaking about you, it is not like dying like a sheep, without having been 
spoken of. When we have spoken about you, you have effectively been spoken 
of. (Kirschke 1996: 93)
The playful familiarity adopted vis-à-vis Mudatsikira is typical of Hitimana’s 
style, even in the context of a death threat (Mudatsikira was killed several days 
after the broadcast). Kirschke adds that Hitimana ‘joked about the fact that he 
was singling out a journalist, as if it were an honour to be mentioned on RTLM’. 
Yet if  one considers Hitimana’s longstanding relationship with Rwandan radio 
listeners and his habit of naming personal acquaintances, then such an attitude 
may seem almost normal, which became the case as Hitimana began threatening 
individuals with increasing regularity. In the above examples, Hitimana converts 
his everyday habit of naming, recognizing and saluting individuals into a means 
 of denouncing, targeting and threatening them, all within the boundaries of 
the same style and the same medium. In his invocation of names and places, 
Hitimana’s broadcasts at RTLM exploited a quotidian familiarity established 
over a decade’s worth of  performative participation in the lives of  listeners, 
casting the genocide in the mould of a daily routine.
More important, however, the reliance on familiarity made Hitimana’s 
actions more than mere threats. It made them betrayals, signals to listeners 
that underneath all that defi nes their social world, even routines followed in 
the privacy of the home, lies the possibility of treachery, of being attacked by 
a Tutsi neighbour or falsely accused of treason by a Hutu friend. Providing an 
example of what to emulate and a warning of what to avoid, Hitimana showed 
that it was better to denounce than to be denounced, and that even personal 
ties of mutual benefi t or affection could be subordinated to the imperatives of 
the genocide. By setting this example in the intimacy of the home and implicitly 
telling Hutu that they too should denounce friends if  need be, Hitimana was, 
ironically, educating listeners in the rules of the genocide, helping them build 
trust in a world that was built on the mistrust of others.
Based on available information, I would like tentatively to suggest that 
the appropriation of  the rhythms of  everyday life by the proponents of  the 
genocide was part of  a dialogic process through which Rwandans actively 
sought to understand and confront a social world disrupted by four years 
of  civil war, political instability and economic crisis, now coming to a head 
with the assassination of  Habyarimana and the eruption of  widespread 
violence. The process of balancing predictability and possibility is central to 
any notion of human subjectivity, for the complete absence of either renders 
human action impossible. Thus, just as RTLM’s ideological tropes and 
performative aspects successfully mimed the familiar while resonating with 
the contingent, its appropriation of everyday routines contributed to a context 
that shaped the incentives and categories of  thought behind choices but did 
not determine them.
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Although they do not directly involve radio, two sharply contrasting anecdotes 
may shed light on this idea. In early 1995, researchers for the NGO African 
Rights interviewed Zakia Uwamugira, then 42, from Gisenyi, in northwestern 
Rwanda. Having just returned from a refugee camp in Zaire, she admitted to 
having encouraged Interahamwe through song during the genocide:
I am accused of being there when people were being killed and singing. I 
admit I did this. I was there when people were being killed. Many people. 
I joined the [animasiyo] just as I would join any other choir ... I decided 
to come back because I realised I had not done anything that was wrong. 
(African Rights 1995: 72)
In full awareness of the murders being committed around her, Uwamugira 
repeatedly insisted that she had done nothing wrong, justifying her actions 
through the lens of the weekly state-sponsored ritual of animasiyo (in which 
farmers were obliged to sing songs in praise of  the state, the MRND or the 
president, often after participating in umuganda). Similarly, many who opposed 
the genocide also carried out their struggles in the vein of  normality rather 
than nobility. Philip Gourevitch grapples with this apparent blandness in his 
profi le of Paul Rusesabagina, the Hutu manager of the Hotel Mille Collines 
in Kigali who saved hundreds of lives through his resourceful use of contacts 
in the regime, money and alcohol. ‘Paul is a mild-mannered man, sturdily built 
and rather ordinary-looking – a bourgeois hotel manager, after all – and that 
is how he seemed to regard himself  as well, as an ordinary person who did 
nothing extraordinary in refusing to cave in to the insanity that swirled around 
him’ (Gourevitch 1998: 127).17 Rusesabagina’s resistance of the genocide on its 
own terms and from within its own structures required a degree of trust in the 
system itself  and in his ability to manipulate it.
Even as everydayness came to be defi ned according to the imperatives of the 
project of extermination, different paths of action carved out by circumstance 
and will remained open: ‘under conditions of terror most people will comply 
but some people will not … Humanly speaking, no more is required, and no 
more can reasonably be asked, for this planet to remain a place fi t for human 
habitation’ (Arendt 1964: 233). Despite the impossibility of morally compar ing 
the actions of Zakia Uwamugira and Paul Rusesabagina, it is their common 
appeal to normality in a shared social world defi ned by such ‘conditions of 
terror’ that is so striking. Indeed, while it is often noted that the road to genocide 
is paved with smaller massacres, it may be more appropriate in this case to say 
that rather than violence becoming normal, it was normality itself  that was 
co-opted in the service of violence.
REVERBERATIONS
This paper hardly represents a comprehensive study of RTLM radio’s role in the 
genocide; at the very least, that would require extensive analysis of Kinyarwanda 
rhetoric in the broadcasts, more in-depth fi eldwork with listeners and more 
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research on Radio Rwanda and Radio Muhabura. Nevertheless, I hope that 
this enquiry has helped shed some light on issues of relevance to the study of 
mass atrocity and mass media. In the above arguments, a broad theme emerges 
of radio implicating rather than manipulating its listeners, informing but not 
determining their choices. In its various aspects, RTLM’s activities intertwined 
with Rwandans’ efforts to make sense of and navigate the world in which they 
lived during such diffi cult times. Radio served as a medium through which 
Rwandans experienced and enacted the genocide, its broadcasts reverberating in 
the thoughts and actions of millions of people, both participants and witnesses, 
alongside and at times in opposition to other social forces based on coercion, 
interest or fear. Its intangible power did not rest solely in words, memory, the 
psyche, the state or some combination of causal factors, but was produced in 
the process of articulation and rearticulation by animateurs and listeners.
Such a perspective on radio’s role is possible only if  one regards listeners 
(or farmers or killers) as constituted subjects rather than through a concept of 
agency that depends on unitary, autonomous actors, for whom radio is simply a 
source of information or misinformation, a stimulus eliciting a certain response. 
If  the subject is permeable to mediated discourses, fi rmly embedded in an ever-
shifting set of forces, structures and meanings, it may be that choices are shaped 
by and made in the spaces and tensions between these currents. Although this is 
hardly a novel insight given the contemporary trajectories of much of Western 
philosophy and social theory (and, subsequently, in some areas of anthropology 
and history), such developments – including the diverse and rigor ous critiques 
of positivism in social science – have yet to be adequately con fronted by much 
of the comparative and theoretical literature on mass atrocity. The fact that this 
literature takes such important human events as its object of study only makes 
this gap more saddening and only makes bridging it more urgent.
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NOTES
 1. Though not without precedent in the region, unfortunately, given large-scale massacres of 
Hutu in Burundi in the early 1970s and 1990s. It is important to interpret Rwanda’s history of 
violence in non-teleological terms. The 1959 ‘Hutu revolution’ was marked by violence aimed 
at driving out Tutsi chiefs; after independence, monarchist Tutsi guerrillas attacked the new 
state from neighbouring countries, providing a pretext for pogroms against Tutsi in the country. 
Before such violence subsided in 1967, up to 20,000 Tutsi were massacred and 300,000 were 
forced to fl ee (Prunier 1995: 62), creating one of the fi rst major refugee crises in Africa. In 
1973, President Grégoire Kayibanda’s largely unsuccessful attempt to incite violence against 
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Tutsi was the last card he played before being overthrown in a coup by Juvénal Habyarimana, 
who remained president until his death in 1994. Although Tutsi were excluded from public 
life and faced harsh discrimination, little ethnic violence was directed against them until the 
1990 civil war; between 1990 and 1994, tens of thousands of Tutsi were killed in a series of 
tightly focused and planned massacres.
 2. Kirschke (1996) argues that ‘outside Kigali and other urban centres, the station is reported 
to have attracted people from urban backgrounds ... rather than peasants from rural areas,’ a 
claim which is not supported by the fi eldwork undertaken for this essay. As one imprisoned 
Hutu told me, ‘it’s a lie if  a farmer says he didn’t listen to RTLM’ (interview, 8 July 2000). 
The station began broadcasting in late 1993, with range limited to the Kigali area; from early 
1994 onwards, its reach was more or less nationwide.
 3. This research is based on a number of  sources, including interviews and documentation. 
Interviews were conducted in the summer of 2000 with approximately 30 inmates in Rwandan 
prisons who had already pleaded guilty to some form of participation in the genocide and 
approximately 60 farmers living in rural Rwanda; conversations also took place with various 
Rwandan academics, activists and offi cials. Interviews in the fi rst two groups were conducted 
through interpreters speaking French and Kinyarwanda. Other interview transcripts were 
provided by anonymous sources. The documentation reviewed included several dozen 
transcripts of  RTLM broadcasts translated into English and French, documents of  the 
United Nations’ International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and relevant writings 
by Rwandan public fi gures and academics.
  In this essay, surnames of interviewees are omitted. Ages listed are those at the time of the 
interview. It is important to point out several empirical and methodological limitations to this 
enquiry. I have been unable to locate extensive documentary evidence (including transcripts) on 
RTLM’s competitors, namely, Radio Rwanda and Radio Muhabura (although the rival stations 
were often discussed in interviews). My lack of fl uency in Kinyarwanda, the short timeframe 
of fi eld research and security considerations (regarding the prison) made it impossible for me 
to achieve the level of  trust and familiarity with interviewees ideal for ethnographic work. 
Indeed, I would be the fi rst to acknowledge the limitations of studying radio in a language 
one does not understand.
 4. In describing on-air radio workers, especially those of RTLM, I decided to employ the French 
animateur/animatrice to emphasize the crucial performative and directive aspect of their work. 
The English equivalents of ‘journalist’, ‘broadcaster’, ‘disc jockey’ and ‘personality’ do not 
capture this dimension, nor does the Kinyarwanda word ‘umunyamakuru’ (literally, ‘one of 
the news’ or ‘newsman’). RTLM’s best-known animateurs included Kantano Habimana (who 
allegedly died of AIDS in the Congo), Valérie Bemeriki (currently in detention in Rwanda), 
Noël Hitimana (who died in a Rwandan prison), Georges Ruggiu (who pleaded guilty to the 
ICTR and was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment in 2000) and Ananie Nkurunziza 
(missing?). Other participants included editor-in-chief Gaspard Gahigi (missing?), manager 
Phocas Habimana (dead?), alleged founder and leading Rwandan historian Ferdinand 
Nahimana (sentenced to life in prison in 2003). The singer Simon Bikindi, whose music was 
featured regularly on RTLM, was arrested in the Netherlands in the summer of 2001 and is 
awaiting trial at the ICTR.
 5. At the same time, it is crucial to recall the extent to which Rwandans either resisted the genocide 
or merely sought to avoid it. Numerous Hutu risked their lives to save Tutsi, whether out of 
altruism or greed, while many avoided work for reasons of disgust, laziness or conscience. 
Indeed, it was not uncommon for individuals to have both taken lives and saved them, severely 
testing the familiar categories of perpetrator, victim and bystander.
 6. Mahmood Mamdani sums up these diffi culties well in noting the application of these arguments 
to hostel violence in apartheid South Africa: ‘All of  these explanations contain a grain of 
truth, and none can be ignored. The argument of [manipulative elite] forces is compelling, 
but it cannot by itself  explain the violence: conspiracies exist, but that fact on its own cannot 
explain why some succeed and others fail. Sociological conditions ... do explain why [people] 
are more disposed towards mobilization, as economic conditions in deprived communities 
explain the acute desperation that marks the quest to sustain life, but neither explains the 
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ways in which people actually mobilize or act. Although material conditions do explain the 
constraints under which we make real choices in real life, they cannot by themselves explain 
the choices we do make within those constraints. The old argument between structure and 
agency, between sociological and historical constraint and human will, cannot be resolved 
simply by holding up one end of the pole’ (Mamdani 1996: 225–26).
 7. Rwandan elites, casting themselves in the mould of Jacobins, emphasized progress in nearly 
all discussions of  the past. School textbooks cleanly segment the Rwandan past into the 
pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial stages, each new phase foreclosing any possibility 
of  returning to the previous ones. A book by the son of  a prominent Hutu revolutionary 
charting the anti-monarchist struggle and the subsequent achievements of the post-colonial 
state (complete with a timeline from 1884 to 1994) is dedicated to those who fought for the 
‘grands principes de Liberté, de Justice, et de Progrès pour nous’ (Mbonyumutwa 1990: 5).
 8. The Rwandan state dedicated entire years to specific development goals, such as the 
augmentation of production (1975), education (1979) and soil conservation (1980). In addition, 
state-controlled mass media were actively used to sensitize the population to such campaigns 
(Mfi zi 1983: 57).
 9. Indeed, one cannot underestimate radio’s importance as the dominant medium of orality 
and communication in the post-colonial era. In a country without a daily newspaper and few 
television sets, radio was the dominant mass medium, one whose emergence marginalized 
earlier forms of orality to refl ect a new sense of nationness, making radio a dynamic site for the 
creation of ‘imagined communities’ in ways beyond the nexus of ‘print capital’ envisioned by 
Benedict Anderson in his discussion of how newspapers contributed to the rise of nationalism: 
‘The signifi cance of  this mass ceremony – Hegel observed that newspapers serve modern 
man as a substitute for morning prayers – is paradoxical. It is performed in silent privacy, in 
the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is 
being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is 
confi dent, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion. Furthermore, this ceremony 
is incessantly repeated at daily or half-daily intervals throughout the calendar. What more 
vivid fi gure for the secular, historically clocked, imagined community can be envisioned?’ 
(Anderson 1991: 35). In Rwanda, the answer to Anderson’s rhetorical question is radio.
10. As I do not speak Kinyarwanda and my work is based mostly on RTLM transcripts rather 
than tapes, the analyses of performance here are obviously biased toward forms amenable to 
textual interpretation and are, therefore, far from comprehensive.
11. Interviews indicate that the station’s popularity and importance during the genocide stem from 
other reasons as well. Some of those I spoke to recalled being drawn to RTLM’s liveliness, 
but only when specifi cally asked about it; more general questions about the sources of the 
station’s popularity almost never received replies such as ‘because it was funny’ or ‘because 
the animateurs spoke well’. This suggests that RTLM’s entertaining style was not necessarily 
its most important aspect. Interestingly, educated Rwandans, primarily Tutsi, always pointed 
out RTLM’s ‘street style’ as the primary reason for its appeal. It is possible that the reliance 
of some published accounts on educated, urban informants magnifi ed or reproduced certain 
presumptions shared by elites.
12. At times, they were even forced to contradict the code of their rhetoric to avoid the pervasive 
infl uence of euphemism. As news spread that France was preparing to intervene in Rwanda, 
Valérie Bemeriki instructed Hutu to welcome them with fl owers and greetings of ‘bon jour’
and ‘soyez le bienvenu’. Still, after months of whipping up hatred against whites in general and 
Belgians in particular, and mixing anti-Tutsi invective with superfi cial reassurances that not 
all Tutsi were bad, it was only sensible to make the instructions absolutely clear. ‘If  you are 
told to do something, you are not told to do the opposite,’ Bemeriki announced to listeners. 
‘If  we are saying that we should welcome the French, that does not mean that we should throw 
stones at them’ (RTLM, 22 June 1994).
13. Ruggiu made some 60 hours’ worth of confessions to ICTR prosecutors, during which he 
presumably discussed in detail how he was hired and the nature of his work at RTLM, as both 
topics are featured in his plea agreement. The content of  these sessions, however, remains 
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confi dential. My numerous requests to ICTR for access to the tapes and to Ruggiu himself  
received no offi cial replies.
14. Ruggiu’s case also provides an example of the oversights that can come with an overly textual 
perspective in understanding radio. In June 2000, Ruggiu was sentenced to twelve years’ 
imprisonment by ICTR after pleading guilty to inciting genocide. In the judgement, the 
tribunal’s judges cited Ruggiu’s European background and consequent ignorance of  the 
complexities of the situation in Rwanda as mitigating factors in the sentencing. The signifi cance 
of his European background to his involvement with RTLM was not mentioned.
15. In one incident, the station issued the licence plate number of a red van reported to be ‘full 
of  accomplices’; the passengers of  the vehicle, Hutu dissidents, were stopped at a nearby 
checkpoint the same day and executed (Kirschke 1996: 121). Interestingly, Ruggiu also told 
ICTR prosecutors that at the behest of the Rwandan military, he once relayed a message to 
have a red Volkswagen stopped, giving registration number and general location, but did not 
know the result of the broadcast (ICTR–97–32–DP2000: para 171).
16. The ones who needed most to adapt to the rhythms of work crews were the Tutsi who managed 
to go into hiding. Observing patrol patterns while hiding in the fi elds during the day, they 
came out at night to fi nd food, new sanctuaries or to get news from friends. In exploiting the 
regularity of schedules, even these Tutsi seem to have developed some sense of mastery over 
how the system of the genocide worked, even if  it was working against them.
17. Resistance, of course, took on multiple and diverse forms, of which only some occurred in the 
framework of the genocide. In some instances, large groups of Tutsi were able to organize and 
defend themselves for some time, fending off  multiple attacks before succumbing to superior 
military force (Des Forges 1999: 216–20).
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RTLM: the Medium that 
Became a Tool for Mass Murder
Mary Kimani
The birth of Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) in 1993 could 
not have come at a better time for Rwanda’s Hutu elite. Finally, here was a 
radio station they could use as a mouthpiece for their ideals and a means 
to propagate their ethno-political war against the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF).
A detailed analysis of  the content of  RTLM broadcasts makes clear that 
individual broadcasters – not their guests or government offi cials – were most 
likely to use the airwaves to disseminate hate. Based on a sample of  taped 
broadcasts, individual journalists dominated the station’s programming and 
accounted for most of the infl ammatory statements. In a departure from usual 
radio programming, monologues by the station’s personalities were the most 
common format of RTLM broadcasts, followed by interviews. News items took 
up less than 2 per cent of airtime, whereas instructions and directives issued by 
the station took up less than 3 per cent. 
Three-quarters of the time used to make infl ammatory statements occurred 
when there were no guests in the studio; that is, RTLM’s on-air personalities 
were responsible for most of the station’s infl ammatory statements. 
It is important to remember that RTLM broadcasts were not responsible for 
introducing the language and ideology of hatred into the Rwandan community. 
Such language and the ideology of  ethnic confl ict and polarization already 
existed in Rwanda in the form of a powerful social construct involving ethnic 
identity. The language had been further developed in 1990–93 by Kangura and 
other media allied with Hutu Power.
RTLM, coming at the very end of the confl ict, drew its commentary, arguments 
and interpretation of issues from this existing framework. For example, certain 
words initially used by Kangura over its four years of  publication, 1990–94, 
would become popular and the vocabulary of the ensuing genocide. According 
to the testimony of language expert Matthias Ruzindana at the ICTR on 21 
March 2002, Kangura popularized words like kurimbura and gutsemba (to 
massacre), gutsembatsemba (to exterminate), kumara (to eat up), gutikiza and 
gusakumba (to clean), kumarira kw’icumu (to spear), gutema (to cut); others 
related to ‘working’, such as gukora (to work), ibikorwa (the work), ibikoresho
(the working), abakozi (the workers), umuganda (communal work); and words 
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for nocturnal patrols, irondo, and the people’s war, intambara y’abaturage. In 
those four years Kangura set a trend. By 1994, the media had a language and 
tools with which to convince the population to undertake violence as a form 
of ‘self-defence’. 
The media served the narrow political ends of their owners by playing on 
the ordinary Hutu’s fear of dispossession, violence and displacement. To do 
this the media relied heavily on half-truths and sometimes-outright lies and 
threats. The media defi ned who the enemy was, and why. Later on, they would 
also explain what was to be done to this enemy. 
By 1994, history and reality had been skewed by both politicians and their 
media to the maximum effect, as the late Archbishop of Rwanda and former 
journalist André Sibomana outlines, resurrecting patterns of  ethnic confl ict 
and making them a norm.
Through a game of repetition, drop by drop, the media build up moral and 
cultural constructs which eventually become permanent features … This 
failure on the part of party offi cials and media to stem the progress into the 
abyss contributed signifi cantly to fuelling a climate of intolerance and turned 
them into agents of destruction of Rwandan society. (Sibomana 1999: 49)
It was into this politically charged environment that RTLM was born in 
July 1993, a few months before immense international pressure was brought 
to bear on the parties in the confl ict. The result was that the combined weight 
of  the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and opposition party representation 
in the new government seemed to effectively marginalize the former ruling 
party, Mouvement Républicain Nationale pour la Democratie et le Développement
(MRND), and its allies. 
The composition of the parliament meant that agreement from at least four 
parties was required to reach a majority. From a government’s perspective, it 
was clear that the RPF would have an easier time mastering the opposition 
votes than would MRND. (Jones 1999: 139)
In the following months, tensions increased. In particular, the assassination 
of Burundi’s fi rst Hutu president would be a turning point. Melchior Ndandaye 
was assassinated by soldiers in the almost exclusively Tutsi Burundi army barely 
four months after winning a landslide election victory. The assassination gave 
Hutu politicians in Rwanda reason to wonder if  the RPA (another largely 
Tutsi army) would be satisfi ed with a negotiated solution to power sharing in 
Rwanda or if  it would seek to extend its control. The assassination was also a 
convenient example that media such as Kangura used to illustrate the ‘power 
hungry nature’ of the Tutsi. 
What RTLM clearly did was to reach a greater number of  people than 
Kangura or other media had access to. It popularized the Kangura version of 
reality. Indeed as the judges at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
stated in their judgement against the founders of RTLM and Kangura:
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29. … RTLM broadcasts exploited the history of Tutsi privilege and Hutu 
disadvantage, and the fear of armed insurrection, to mobilize the population, 
whipping them into a frenzy of hatred and violence that was directed largely 
against the Tutsi ethnic group. 
99. … Unlike print media, radio is immediately present and active. The 
power of  the human voice, heard by the Chamber when the broadcast 
tapes were played in Kinyarwanda, adds a quality and dimension beyond 
language to the message conveyed. Radio heightened the sense of fear, the 
sense of danger and the sense of urgency giving rise to the need for action by 
listeners. The denigration of Tutsi ethnicity was augmented by the visceral 
scorn coming out of the airwaves – the ridiculing laugh and the nasty sneer. 
These elements greatly amplifi ed the impact of RTLM broadcasts. (ICTR 
summary judgement, see Chapter 25)
Through RTLM, the Hutu elite of the time created an environment in which 
the ‘Tutsis of the past’ and the ‘Tutsis of the present’ became the same. The 
‘Tutsis of the past’, who had – according to mistaken beliefs of the past and 
contemporary histories – ruled Rwanda with an iron fi st and exploited the Hutu 
mercilessly, and the ‘Tutsis of the present’, who were – allegedly – invading and 
trying to take over power, were one and the same. They had to be fought and 
they had to be taught that the Hutu would never submit to them again.
The general picture painted of the Tutsi community by RTLM was that of 
a treacherous people, people who had hoodwinked the Hutu, living with them 
in apparent peace while all the while planning an attack.
In the last months before the genocide, RTLM emphasized the similarity 
between what was happening in 1994 and what had happened in 1959. It was 
a choice of  going back to the slavery that preceded 1959 or rising up and 
protecting one’s freedom, even one’s life. For that, one could not trust any 
Tutsi civilian because it was not possible to know how deeply the RPF had 
infi ltrated such people.
On 23 May 1994, Ananie Nkurunziza, responsible for political analysis in 
RTLM, made one of these comparisons between the past and the present. He 
drew on comments made by a politician in one of the parties formed during 
independence.
Recently, I am always dealing with similarities; those Tutsis killed the 
president of  the Republic. Therefore the masses got up. The population 
stood up at once. With the attacks of 1966, which are similar to those of 1994, 
the population has always been vigilant. In addition, Thaddeus Bagaragaza 
(of  APROSOMA) was asked the reason why, during the 1959 revolution, 
so many Tutsis were killed, whether they all were on the king’s side. He well 
answered that even Tutsis who were not chiefs were all on the king’s side. 
Here we have to see the similarity of things.
Kantano, we’ve already said it, Tutsis, Rwandan Tutsis, will understand 
later perhaps that they shouldn’t cling on one fi xed idea. Clinging to their 
Tutsi hood is not a sort of loneliness but a constant will to dominate, a feeling 
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of being special, supreme beings. That’s why according to Bagaragaza, a so 
big number died, because even those who weren’t chiefs considered themselves 
as superior to Hutus.1
Five days later, Kantano Habimana, another RTLM journalist adds:
Wait until we get enough bullets to chase them away, they will regret what 
brought them here. They said they will kill all Hutus but what can they use to 
decimate Hutus? One Tutsi may kill one Hutu, but in the end 6 million Hutus 
can survive, then what ethnic group would be injured the most? (Kantano 
Habimana, RTLM broadcast)
After 6 April, RTLM criticized and gave instructions and orders to people in 
the government. RTLM journalists and government offi cials sent out mutually 
reinforcing statements targeting sections of the population that were alleged 
members of RPA or its political wing RPF and anyone believed or suspected to 
be supporting it. The political elite made sure that people understood that the 
government supported the message of RTLM. Prime Minister Jean Kambanda 
called on the station and in a broadcast told the population that RTLM was 
‘one of the key weapons in the war’.
The station and government offi cials reinforced each other’s call for all able-
bodied people in Rwanda to actively participate in the campaign to fi nd the 
RPF, the RPA and all persons associated with them. Participation was made 
an imperative. Those who did not participate and wanted to fl ee the war were 
mocked by RTLM and sometimes targeted for death. RTLM, as well as political 
leaders, made it clear that killing ‘the enemy’ was the duty of every Rwandan. 
RTLM’s role in the genocide was to reinforce distorted notions of Rwandan 
history. It used these notions to describe to the ordinary population the ‘threat’ 
posed by RPA and an amorphous group of supporters that ranged from innocent 
Tutsis to the commander of the UNAMIR forces. It used these mythical images 
of Tutsi cruelty and treachery to spur people into action by presenting a fait 
accompli; participate or be subjected to slavery and extermination by the blood 
thirsty RPA. Kill or be killed.
ANALYSIS OF RTLM BROADCASTS
As part of  a master’s degree in communication psychology, I conducted a 
content analysis of  RTLM broadcasts. Written transcripts of  a selection of 
broadcasts were used; in some instances, the transcripts were compared with 
audio recordings. I relied on a database created by the International Monitor 
group, which contained transcripts of  99 tapes, 56 of  which were RTLM 
broadcasts. The recordings varied in length from 60 minutes to several hours. 
I also had access to a CD-ROM database used by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) prosecution team, which contained more than 100 
transcripts of other broadcasts. Of the transcripts obtained from the ICTR, 16 
were examined as part of the content analysis. Thus, in total, 72 transcripts of 
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RTLM broadcasts, ranging in length from one to three hours were examined. 
The tapes had been transcribed into English and French. I am fl uent in English 
and read French with relative ease.
CLASSIFICATION OF DATA AND DEFINITION OF TERMS 
The broadcasts were classifi ed according to the following characteristics:
• Format of broadcast;
• Name of broadcaster;
• Name of guest or interviewee;
• Theme or subject of the broadcast;
• Group targeted for violence or hatred by the particular broadcast;
• Type of statement that targets a group or person for violence or hatred.
Format of broadcast
The format of  RTLM broadcasts included monologues, dialogues, group 
discussions, interviews, speeches or statements, songs, news, interrogations, 
instructions.
‘Dialogue’ is defi ned as a conversation between two people while ‘group 
discussion’ involves three or more people.
An ‘interview’ is a formal question-and-answer session, making it different 
from a dialogue, which is an informal exchange of views. RTLM broadcasts 
used the interview format with guests, but broadcasters also discussed issues 
with each other. ‘Discussion’ has, therefore, been used to describe programmes 
in which two members of the team are talking about an issue while ‘interview’ 
applies when questions are put to outsiders.
‘Instructions’ are directives on what to do and how to act.
Certain broadcasts were diffi cult to categorize. For example, like other African 
radio stations, RTLM often broadcast programmes in which the broadcaster 
read out greetings and messages from the audience, often interspersed with 
music and the broadcaster’s own commentary and witticisms. I have categorized 
all such broadcasts as ‘other’ (see Table 9.1).
Name of broadcaster
Only seven RTLM journalists were well known. However, other freelance 
journalists could be heard from time to time. The staff  who transcribed the 
tapes were sometimes unable to identify the journalist; these are grouped under 
‘unknown’ as opposed to ‘other’ who were not regular journalists but were 
recognized. Jean Baptiste Bamwanga is a Radio Rwanda journalist, for example; 
however, RTLM borrowed Radio Rwanda material and he is included because 
of the frequency with which he appeared (see Table 9.2).
Name of guest or interviewee
Those interviewed by RTLM are of  particular importance to this research 
as this is where we begin our study of the interaction of the message and the 
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authority fi gures. The list (Table 9.3) includes a number of known political and 
military fi gures and certain persons linked to the launch of RTLM and Kangura
newspaper, in addition to representatives of important parties and groups. This 
is accurate only insofar as these people speak on behalf  of the party or militia 
they claim to represent. 
Theme or subject of the broadcast
From study of an initial sample, it was apparent that the classifi cation in this 
area should indicate the general tone in which the subject matter was discussed. 
In addition, certain subjects are classifi ed as general, as the subject matter, which 
was not political, was neither positive nor negative, but purely information, e.g., 
sports news, news of other countries, etc. (see Table 9.5).
Group targeted for violence or hatred 
This category deals with whether the broadcast called for action against a 
particular group of people and what kind of action was called for. I classifi ed 
the data into two broad areas: a broadcast that warned people to beware, 
watch closely for, be vigilant and wary of infi ltration by targeted persons; and 
directives. In the latter, the broadcaster asks for violent action to be taken 
against the targeted group (beaten, killed, exterminated) or gives instructions 
for people to go to a certain area and take similar action against a targeted 
group (see Table 9.6). 
I distinguished between use of the words Inyenzi and Inkotanyi. Inyenzi has 
connotations that go beyond meaning the RPA and could mean a Tutsi or 
an associate of  the RPF. Broadcasts targeting the Inkotanyi are classifi ed as 
targeting the RPF.
Type of statement that targets a group or person for violence or hatred 
Broadcasts including statements used to target people for harm or violence were 
more diffi cult to categorize. In deciding what to call a broadcast likely to create 
hatred or harm, I relied heavily on Article 20 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (UN 1966). I also considered what would be considered 
provocative in the Rwandan context. 
The defi nition I have come up with in describing what I was looking for is: 
a statement that was likely, not only to portray a group, issue or person in a 
threatening light, but also likely to impute ill or anti-social motives to a group 
or person, thereby justifying a response for self-defence, or any direct call for 
negative action, such as killing, and justifi cation for such action.
In some cases, the broadcast may be justifi ed; for instance the negative 
portrayal of the RPA after a spate of crippling bombing raids by that group 
cannot be called calls to hatred. However, these have also been identifi ed and 
classifi ed as they form part of the debate on what role the RTLM played.
I classifi ed insults and allegations of social deviancy separately. Allegations 
of  social deviance imply that a group or person is no longer acceptable in 
society and is a threat; for instance allegations of cannibalism have very different 
implications compared with calling a person a dog.
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By the end of the research, I found that some of the categories had no entries 
or that the type of content I had found in a category did not have any relevance 




The most common format of RTLM broadcasts was monologues by the station’s 
own journalists (Table 9.1). This type of broadcast took up 66.29 per cent of 
instances. Second to monologues, RTLM relied on interviews. It is interesting 
to note that news items accounted for only 1.52 per cent of all formats, and 
instructions and directives issued by the station accounted for 2.56 per cent. 
Speeches and statements were also more common than news items, taking 
up 5.84 per cent of segments. The station also aired interrogations of alleged 
soldiers of  the RPA conducted by offi cers of  the Rwandan Armed Forces. 
These make up 1.28 per cent of the broadcasts, and one of the interrogations 
featured an alleged RPA member.
RTLM’s format is a bit unusual for a news organization. One ordinarily 
expects to fi nd news, interviews and other forms of programming taking more 
airtime than monologues by journalists. Standard practice on many broadcast 
stations is not to have a person talk on air for longer than a few seconds. Even 
news bites are short and are structured in that manner on the assumption that 
lengthy monologues lose audience attention.
Table 9.1 Format of broadcast
Category No. of segments % of total
Monologue 828 66.29
Interview 236 18.90









*Total may not equal 100% due to rounding
Name of broadcaster
In the research sample, Kantano Habimana was the broadcaster on air most 
frequently (33.51 per cent of  instances), almost twice as often as his editor-
in-chief, Gaspard Gahigi (Table 9.2). The second most frequent broadcaster 
was Valérie Bemeriki, followed by Gahigi. RTLM political analyst Ananie 
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Nkurunziza was the broadcaster in 10.65 per cent of instances. These four RTLM 
journalists account for 75.76 per cent of appearances by broadcasters.
Ruggiu, broadcasting only in French, accounted for 7.97 per cent of 
appearances, while Noël Hitimana, who left the service in April after being 
wounded in a mortar explosion, accounted for 5.02 per cent. Unidentifi ed 
journalists make up 4.16 per cent, and other journalists visiting RTLM take 
up 4.24 per cent of the total.
Nkomati does not feature much, which can be explained by the allegation that 
he was sacked in May for failure to appear at work. It is unclear why Rucogoza 
is not on air more frequently. Mbilizi, a Congolese national, left RTLM in April 
and attempted to go back to his home country. Ruggiu probably fails to feature 
prominently because he could not broadcast in Kinyarwanda.
Table 9.2 Name of broadcaster
Category Instances % of total
Kantano Habimana 387 33.51
Valérie Bemeriki 195 16.88
Editor-in-chief Gaspard Gahigi 170 14.72
Ananie Nkurunziza 123 10.65
Georges Ruggiu 92 7.97
Noël Hitimana 58 5.02 
Other 49 4.24
Unknown 48 4.16
Emmanuel Rucogoza 14 1.21
Phillipe Mbilizi 11 0.95
Nkomati 6 0.52
Jean Baptiste Bamwanga 2 0.17
Total 1,155 100.00
Name of guest or interviewee
Analysis of  the data on interviews indicates that 74.91 per cent of  the time, 
there was no guest at the station. Kambanda accounted for 2.53 per cent of 
interviews; government offi cials, 3.34 per cent; unidentifi ed militiamen and 
women, 2.17 per cent; CDR militia offi cial Stanislas Simbizi and MDR party 
offi cial Frodould Karamira accounted for 1.53 and 0.99 per cent, respectively; 
while 1.45 per cent of  interviews were with members of  the RPA and RPF. 
Ordinary civilians took up 7.76 per cent (Table 9.3).
To give a clearer picture of how much airtime each interviewee was given, 
I recalculated the data based on the proportion of  interviews of  each as a 
percentage of total interviews (Table 9.4), that is, I excluded the 830 instances 
reported in Table 9.3 in which there was no interviewee. 
Theme or subject of the broadcast
Analysis of  the content of  the study sample indicates that 16.32 per cent of 
RTLM broadcasts studied contained statements alleging atrocities carried out 
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by the RPA (Table 9.5), including indiscriminate bombing of civilians, hospitals 
and orphanages, indiscriminate killings of civilians and extermination of Hutu 
populations in areas and zones occupied by the RPA. No infl ammatory content 
was found in 13.21 per cent of the broadcasts studied.
Table 9.3 Name of guest or interviewee
Category Instances % of total
No guest 830 74.91
Other 86 7.76
Government offi cial 37 3.34
Prime Minister Jean Kambanda 28 2.53
Ferdinand Nahimana 27 2.44
Unidentifi ed militia member 24 2.17
CDR militia offi cial 17 1.53
Rwanda Patriotic Army offi cer 15 1.35
MDR party offi cial 11 0.99
Rwanda Armed Forces offi cer 11 0.99
Hassan Ngeze 8 0.72
Jean Bosco Barayagwiza 6 0.54
President Théodore Sikubwabo 4 0.36
PL party offi cial 1 0.09
Gendarmerie offi cer 1 0.09
UNAMIR representative 1 0.09
Juvénal Habyarimana 1 0.09
Total 1,108 99.99*
* Total may not equal 100% due to rounding
Table 9.4 Time spent interviewing various people as a proportion of total interview time
Category Instances % of total interview segments
Other 86 30.93
Government offi cial 37 13.31
Prime Minister Jean Kambanda 28 10.07
Ferdinand Nahimana 27 9.71
Unidentifi ed militia member 24 8.63
CDR militia offi cial 17 6.11
Rwanda Patriotic Army offi cer 15 5.39
MDR party offi cial 11 3.96
Rwanda Armed Forces offi cer 11 3.96
Hassan Ngeze 8 2.87
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza 6 2.16
President Théodore Sikubwabo 4 1.44
PL party offi cial 1 0.36
Gendarmerie offi cer 1 0.36
UNAMIR representative 1 0.36
Juvénal Habyarimana 1 0.36
Total 278 99.98*
* Total may not equal 100% due to rounding
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Table 9.5 Infl ammatory content of broadcasts
Category Instances % of total
Allegations of RPA atrocities 294 16.32
Encouragement to Hutus to fi ght, kill 252 13.99
No infl ammatory content 238 13.21
Direct calls for extermination 165 9.16
Allegations that RPA wants power and control over Hutu 106 5.89
Allegations that Tutsis in the region are helping those within 127 7.05
Insults to Tutsis and RPA 88 4.89
Description of how the past infl uences present events 70 3.89 
Congratulations to FAR 60 3.33
Allegations that Tutsis plan to subjugate the Hutu 57 3.16
Allegations that RPA killed Habyarimana 50 2.78 
Allegations that political parties are supporting RPA 45 2.50 
Broadcast insults/slurs against Hutus sympathizing with the RPA 41 2.28
Tutsis, RPA are social deviants, abnormal 41 2.28 
Allegations that Tutsis are exterminating Hutus 39 2.17
Attack or harm Belgians or UNAMIR personnel 36 2.00
Threats to Hutus sympathizing with RPA, fl eeing war 24 1.33
Allegations that invalids, women, old men armed, support RPA 24 1.33 
Broadcast justifi es massacres 20 1.11 
Not all Tutsis are enemies; should live together with Hutus 16 0.89 
Allegations that Tutsis killed Habyarimana 8 0.44
Total 1,801 100.00
A clear reminder that Tutsi civilians are not necessarily linked to the RPA 
and its activities and that the two groups should live together peacefully took 
up only 0.89 per cent of all broadcasts studied. The call on Hutu civilians to 
fi ght for their country, look out for infi ltrators, avoid re-enslavement and kill 
all RPA members and their accomplices took up 13.99 per cent. Direct calls 
for the extermination of members of the RPA and all its supporters, as well as 
congratulatory messages on the extermination of RPA members and supporters 
– Inyenzi, Inkotanyi, accomplices – took up 9.16 per cent of the broadcasts.
Allegations that RPA members were not Rwandans and formed part of  a 
regional conspiracy to dominate Tutsis and set up a Tutsi–Hima empire in 
central Africa took up 7.05 per cent of  the broadcasts; allegations that the 
RPA wanted to take over the country and reinstate the monarchy, subjugating 
all Hutus accounted for 5.89 per cent.
Other allegations included statements that Tutsi civilians were part of the 
regional plan by Tutsis to take over power, or that they were actively helping 
RPA in this cause and stood to benefi t from it (3.16 per cent); that Tutsi civilians 
were actively exterminating Hutus, making such plans, or supporting them 
(2.17 per cent); that RPA members killed president Habyarimana, precipitating 
the unrest in the country (2.78 per cent); and that some political parties were 
helping the RPA (2.50 per cent). 
Insults and ethnic slurs directed at the RPA and Tutsis took up 4.89 per cent, 
and comments depicting the RPA and Tutsis as social deviants – cannibals, 
sorcerers, vampires – accounted for 2.28 per cent. Reminders about the history 
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of Rwanda, the fall of the monarchy in 1959 during the Hutu revolution and 
similarities of  those events with the present occurred in 3.89 per cent of the 
broadcasts. Threats of death or harm to the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR 
and the UNAMIR commander Roméo Dallaire made up 2.00 per cent. Death 
threats to Hutu supporters of the RPA or those accepting the fact that RPA 
was winning the war took up 1.33 per cent of the time, while slurs and insults 
directed at the two groups made up 2.28 per cent.
In the tapes studied, a total of 69.24 per cent of infl ammatory messages were 
linked to either the RPA or Tutsis.
Group targeted for violence or hatred
Calls for the audience to be on the look out for Tutsis accounted for 10.59 
per cent of all warnings and directives (Table 9.6). Words that characterized 
this type of statement were: look out for, tricks, malice, activities of the Tutsi, 
Tutsi accomplices, Inyenzi-Tutsi and Inyenzi wherever it was not qualifi ed by 
the addition of Inkotanyi.
Table 9.6 Group targeted for violence or hatred
Category Instances % of total
Warnings
Seek, watch out for RPF, RPA, Inkotanyi 598 38.61 
Seek, watch out for Inyenzi, Tutsi 164 10.59 
Seek, watch out for individual 76 4.91 
Seek, watch out for members of particular party 9 0.58 
Directives
No targeting of any group for harm 287 18.53 
Harm or kill members of RPA/Inkotanyi 149 9.62 
Identifi cation of person/groups as accomplices of Inyenzi 89 5.75 
Kill or harm Inyenzi, Tutsi 55 3.55 
Identifi ed accomplice should be sought 35 2.26 
Kill or harm individual 25 1.61 
Specifi c targeting of Tutsi females as tools of RPA to be resisted or harmed 21 1.36 
Specifi c and direct call for restraint 14 0.90 
Targeting Belgians for hatred or violence 14 0.90 
Identifi ed accomplice should be harmed or killed 9 0.58 
Encouragement of Hutu females to participate at roadblocks/fi ghting 4 0.26 
Total 1,549 100.00
Directives included targeting of  Tutsis for murder or extermination (3.55 
per cent); calls to kill or harm RPA soldiers (9.62 per cent); identifi cation of 
individuals as supporters or accomplices of the RPA (5.75 per cent); instructions 
to seek out accomplices named on RTLM (2.26 per cent); and instructions to 
kill such accomplices (0.58 per cent). Warnings to watch the activities of named 
individuals took up 4.91 per cent of the total, while instructions to kill such 
individuals accounted for 1.61 per cent.
Broadcasts citing Tutsi women as spies and asking people to watch out 
for them occurred in 1.36 per cent of  all cases, while those calling on Hutu 
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women to actively participate at roadblocks and in fi ghting the enemy took 
up 0.26 per cent.
Statements targeting the Belgian UNAMIR contingent took up 0.90 per 
cent.
The content analysis indicates that 75.14 per cent of  all inflammatory 
statements occurred when there were no interviewees. Consequently, it is 
accurate to say that RTLM journalists, rather than their interviewees, made 
most of the infl ammatory statements. 
Infl ammatory comments by civilian interviewees accounted for 6.44 per cent 
of the total. Out of the total airtime taken up by infl ammatory comments, Prime 
Minister Jean Kambanda accounts for 3.66 per cent; Ferdinand Nahimana, 2.33 
per cent; CDR member and militia man Stanley Simbizi, 2.50 per cent; MDR 
offi cial Frodouald Karamira, 2.00 per cent; unidentifi ed militia, 1.89 per cent; 
and government offi cials (mostly burgomasters), 2.33 per cent. 
Out of the 7.16 per cent of airtime taken up by comments that RPA members 
were not Rwandans and formed part of the regional conspiracy to take over 
central Africa, 5.99 per cent were made in the absence of  any interviewees. 
Similarly, during the 9.32 per cent airtime when direct calls for extermination 
were made, there were virtually no interviewees present. It is important to note 
that only 0.06 per cent of  the airtime was taken up by Rwanda government 
offi cials participating in RTLM interviews to explain that Tutsis were distinct 
from RPA and not necessarily linked with its activities, and to encourage 
coexistence. 
Out of the total airtime devoted to allegations of RPA atrocities, those made 
by government offi cials during interviews account for 0.50 per cent. Out of the 
calls alleging that Tutsis as a group were planning or committing extermination 
campaigns against Hutus, Kambanda was responsible for 0.11 per cent. 
Of the 9.35 per cent of  airtime taken up in direct calls for extermination, 
RTLM journalists were responsible for 8.10 per cent while Kambanda accounts 
for 0.11. Allegations that Tutsis and RPA were social deviants, namely cannibals, 
vampires, or unfi t for society took 2.28 per cent of the airtime; RTLM journalists 
accounted for 2.00 per cent of  this airtime while Kambanda accounted for 
0.06 per cent.
The call for all Hutus to participate actively in the events accounts for 14.10 
per cent of the airtime. Of this, RTLM journalists were responsible for 9.05 per 
cent, government offi cials for 0.78 per cent and Kambanda for 0.62 per cent.
Of 3.27 per cent of the time taken up by allegations that the Tutsi community 
was planning to take over power and subjugate Hutus, 2.16 per cent can be 
allocated to RTLM journalists, while Kambanda was responsible for 0.06 
per cent.
A study of  the types of  statements used to rouse the Hutu population to 
fi ght, defend themselves and actively participate in the events (Table 9.7) showed 
that 33.33 per cent were accompanied by allegations of RPA atrocities – claims 
of  indiscriminate bombing, massacres and extermination of  Hutus. These 
allegations also included claims that RPA was eviscerating people. In 24.24 
per cent of cases, they were accompanied by the allegation that RPA were not 
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Rwandans and were part of a conspiracy to establish a Hima–Tutsi monarchy in 
the region; 16.16 per cent included allegations that the RPA wanted power and 
control over the Hutu and might reinstate the monarchy. Reminders of past evils 
of the monarchy and links with the armed insurgencies of the 1960s accompanied 
14.14 per cent of the calls to violence. These also included reminders of how the 
Hutus had freed themselves from slavery and subjugation.
Table 9.7 Context in which inflammatory statements were made
Category Instances % of total
Reports of RPA atrocities 33 33.33 
Allegations that Tutsis in the region were 24 24.24
involved in the war or a conspiracy 
Allegations that RPA wants power and control 16 16.16
over Hutus 
Reminders of Rwanda’s past and its relation 14 14.14 
to the present
Claims that Tutsis, RPA are social deviants 7 7.07 
Allegations of Tutsis are exterminating Hutus 3 3.03
Allegations that Tutsis plan to subjugate Hutus 2 2.02 
Total 99 100
In 7.07 per cent of  the airtime, calls on the Hutu were accompanied by 
descriptions of Tutsi civilians and RPA as social deviants. This included claims 
of cannibalism, drinking victims’ blood, sorcery, and unredeemable evil natures 
that did not belong to normal society. In 2.02 per cent, allegations were made 
that Tutsi civilians were out to subjugate Hutus, were actively helping the RPA 
in that cause or hoped to benefi t from it. In 3.03 per cent, it was announced 
that Tutsi civilians were killing Hutus, or planning to do so.
CONCLUSIONS
Those who argue that RTLM was set up with the express aim of instigating 
mass murder right from the start miss the point. They fail to see the frightening 
process by which a station that was set up merely to air the political views of 
one group became the megaphone through which people were incited to mass 
murder. 
The content analysis revealed that each time the RPA made advances, the 
tenor of  the broadcasts would change, becoming more extreme, and more 
blatantly so, as time went on. The level of  inflammatory content began 
climbing in January 1994 – as it became obvious that implementation of the 
Arusha accords had fl oundered – and rose steadily until March. With the April 
assassination of  President Habyarimana, the level reached new heights and 
continued to rise steadily through June as it became evident that the RPA was 
winning the war.
Until about the beginning of April, RTLM broadcasts tended to focus on 
anti-RPA, anti-Arusha peace accords propaganda. Broadcasters focused on 
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renditions of the history of Tutsi–Hutu antagonism and allegations that the 
opposition parties were helping the RPA block installation of the negotiated 
government. There was a clear change in tone after the assassination on 6 April 
and even more so after 11 April as the RPA took over parts of Kigali, forcing 
the provisional government to fl ee to Gitarama.
During this second phase, which lasted until mid-May, there were clear calls for 
extermination of the RPA and elimination of Tutsis and all other accomplices. 
Names of people were broadcast, sometimes along with instructions on what 
to do to them. The word extermination was used repeatedly during this period. 
RTLM also broadcast allegations that Tutsi children, women and old men were 
being armed, making them legitimate targets. 
The messages were very clear: the RPA was advancing to take over the country, 
Tutsis were helping them and they were working together with the Hima and 
other Tutsis in the region to install a monarchy in the central African region 
with the intention of subjugating the Hutu. To achieve their end, the RPA and 
their Tutsi supporters were willing to do anything including exterminating all 
Hutu.
RTLM told its listeners that the only way to avoid what was coming was for 
everyone to look out for the ‘enemy in their midst’ and work with the authorities 
to ensure the extermination of the RPA and all its accomplices. It was a fait 
accompli – kill or be killed. Faced with this constant message and the follow-
up actions of  their leaders, who organized and led militia in attacks against 
Tutsi, many ordinary civilians believed the propaganda and actively took part 
in the killing campaign. Those who were not convinced were often coerced and 
threatened, sometimes even treated as accomplices to ‘the enemy’.
Extermination became a project in which lack of involvement or even fl eeing 
into RPA-controlled sectors signifi ed support for the target group.2 Radio had 
become a tool for directing mass murder.
NOTES
1. It is likely that RTLM was actually mistaken in the identity of the person they quoted. I have 
been told that Thaddeus actually belonged to MDR–Parmehutu and not APROSOMA. It is 
also likely that the spelling is Thadée and not Thaddeus.
2. ‘I have always told you. All the people who joined the part controlled by the Inyenzi Inkotanyi
are Inyenzi themselves. They approve the killings perpetrated by Inyenzi. They are criminals like 
the Inyenzi Inkotanyi. They are all Inyenzi. When our armed forces will get there, they will get 
what they deserve. They will not spare anyone since everybody turned Inyenzi. All those who 
stayed there are all Inyenzi since those who were against Inyenzi have been killed by Inyenzi.
Those who suceeded to escape run away to Ngara, Burundi and to the western part of  our 
country. Those who stayed are accomplices and acolytes of  the Inyenzi.’ (Valérie Bemeriki, 
RTML broadcast, 28 June 1994)
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The Effect of RTLM’s Rhetoric of
Ethnic Hatred in Rural Rwanda
Charles Mironko
Because of its infl ammatory rhetoric and extremist views, much has been made 
of the role of RTLM in the genocide of 1994. According to Des Forges (1999: 
71), it was the ‘sole source of news as well as the sole authority for interpreting 
its meaning’ during the genocide. Although no one really disputes the genocidal 
overtones of RTLM’s broadcasting, there is disagreement about the causal link 
between the words on the air and the violence on the ground. 
Some feel that without the assistance of RTLM, the genocidaires could not 
have succeeded to the extent that they did. Mahmood Mandani’s thesis about 
Tutsi as a racialized political identity cites RTLM as one of ‘two propaganda 
organs [that] were central to this effort [recasting Tutsi as a race]’ (Mandani 
2001:190). The US State Department asserted that RTLM broadcasts ‘ultimately 
had a lethal effect, calling on the Hutu majority to destroy the Tutsi minority. 
Experts cite RTML as an important factor in the spread of  genocide in the 
hours and days following Habyarimana’s death’ (Chalk 1999: 97). Chrétien 
and his colleagues, authors of  the most comprehensive analysis of  the role 
of media in the genocide to date, give central importance to radio (including 
RTLM), saying, ‘Two tools, one very modern, the other less [modern] were 
particularly used during the genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda: the radio 
and the machete. The former to give and receive orders, the second to carry 
them out’ (Chrétien et al. 1995: 191). 
But some scholars have contested the role of radio, specifi cally RTLM, in 
the genocide. For example, Richard Carver writes that:
Most commentary on Rwandan hate radio has worked on the simple 
assumption that since RTLM broadcast propaganda for genocide and 
genocide did indeed occur, there must be a causal relationship between the 
two … the notion that people could be incited to acts of extreme violence by 
the radio is only tenable if it is accepted that RTLM propaganda unlocked 
profound or even primordial hatred. [Milles Collines] may have produced 
propaganda for the genocide but it did not incite it. (Carver 2000:190, 
emphasis added)
Carver identifi es the leap of logic in relating hate speech to murder, without 
more compelling evidence that the murderers were, in fact, somehow motivated 
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or crucially affected by the radio’s message. Carver makes an interesting 
observation:
RTLM broadcast hate propaganda, there was genocide, and therefore one 
caused another. If we were talking about almost any other issue – violence on 
television, pornography or whatever – those arguing in favour of a ban would 
attempt to demonstrate at least a cursory link between the broadcast and the 
action. There is now an abundant research to suggest that it is impossible 
to draw a linear causal link between what people see or hear in the media 
and how they behave. But because it is genocide we abandon our critical 
faculties. (Carver 1996)
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relation between the rhetoric of 
ethnic hatred so prevalent among Rwandan political elites and the forces that 
propelled ordinary Rwandan Hutus to participate in killing Tutsis. Information 
was collected in conversations conducted in 2000 with nearly 100 confessed 
perpetrators held in six Rwandan prisons: Kigali, Butare, Rilima, Gitarama, 
Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. 
OVERVIEW OF RTLM, FORM AND FUNCTION
The RTLM signal originally reached only greater Kigali and part of  the 
surrounding countryside, but from 8 July 1993 it could also be heard throughout 
the country and in the north of Burundi. RTLM broadcast every night on FM 
106 for a few hours – more if  there were major events to report – but it also 
used FM 94, one of Radio Rwanda’s transmitter frequencies. 
RTLM was especially popular among the youth, because it played up-to-date 
music from Zaire. RTLM recruited the best Kinyarwanda and French speakers 
and journalists including foreigners. These journalists promoted the station, 
which they called ‘Radio Sympa’ (lovely radio), claiming that it was the radio 
‘of the people, for the people.’ For example, one broadcaster, Gaspard Gahigi, 
welcomes ordinary citizens:
We have a radio here, even a peasant who wants to say something can come, 
and we will give him the fl oor. Then, other peasants will be able to hear what 
peasants think. Personally, I think what complicates things is that ordinary 
citizens have no forum where they can speak. Normally, for ordinary citizens 
to speak, they speak through elections and elections are impossible. So, in 
fact, ordinary citizens have been deprived of a say but RTLM is there, we 
will give them the fl oor. (Gaspard Gahigi, RTLM, 19 March 1994)
What makes us happy here at RTLM is that we broadcast your announcements 
quickly, very quickly, I mean, it is just like making wood fi re glow [kwenyegeza]. 
You bring a message any time and you say: ‘Ha! Put it now, and then we put it 
in very quickly so that your messages reach … whoever you want.’ (Gaspard 
Gahigi, RTLM, 15 December 1993)
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Kantano Habimana, a popular RTLM broadcaster, bragged that people 
could not follow foreign news because it was in French or English. In contrast, 
RTLM’s Ananie Nkurunziza monitored foreign news for ‘our RTLM’ (31 May 
1993). Nkurunziza’s spin on international reports was an analysis that justifi ed 
RTLM hate speech, discredited the Arusha peace talks and condemned the 
international community because it was supposedly on the side of the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF). Likewise, Kantano spoke against the rival RPF radio 
station, Muhabura.
I don’t understand how a Rwandan can follow what Muhabura radio says … 
Muhabura radio broadcasts from far away in the bush. Instead of trusting 
RTLM radio, which broadcasts near him, they are together and they are also 
together with journalists whom he can see and even ask them the situation. So, 
those people who listen to Muhabura radio, let them get lost [mentally lost], 
let them get lost but they will regret it for a long time. (Kantano Habimana, 
RTLM, 25 May 1993)
RTLM broadcasts also trumpeted a version of Rwandan history that pitted 
Hutu against Tutsi in a story of foreign invasion and ethnic domination.
Tutsi are nomads and invaders who came to Rwanda in search of pasture, but 
because they are so cunning and malicious, the Tutsi managed to stay and rule. 
If  you allow the Tutsi–Hamites to come back, they will not only rule you in 
Rwanda, but will also extend their power throughout the Great Lakes Region. 
(RTLM, 2 December 1993, author’s translation from Kinyarwanda)
ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS OF CONFESSED PERPETRATORS 
My line of  questioning in interviews with confessed genocide perpetrators 
focused on the practices of media consumption in Rwanda. Ideally, I would 
have observed people listening to the radio, discussing its content and circulating 
these ideas in their everyday lives, but this was not possible during the genocide. 
Instead, I collected the comments and refl ections of low-level perpetrators six 
years after the fact, during interviews conducted in 2000. 
During the interviews, I discerned differences between the possible impact of 
RTLM on people in urban areas and on ordinary peasants (abaturage) who lived 
in remote villages (ibyaro). RTLM appears to have been especially effective in 
Kigali, where it issued vehement instructions to foment violence at roadblocks, 
broadcast names of  escaped Tutsi and their hiding places, threatened Tutsi 
youth, broadcast lists of ‘accomplices’ (ibyitso) to kill and encouraged listeners 
to ‘get rid of the dirt’ (gukuraho umwanda).
Interviews with genocide perpetrators also led me to make a distinction 
between the responses to RTLM hate speech and propaganda of two distinct 
audiences. One audience was the urban jobless youth, trained and operating 
under the umbrella of the Interahamwe. These young people held portable radios 
to their ears on roadblocks and around commercial centres. The other was pro-
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government middle-class urban dwellers, including civil servants, professionals 
and businessmen.
According to Debra Spitulnik’s approach to understanding the role of media 
in social life, it is important to
factor in what is happening at the levels of reception and lateral communication,
such as the social circulation of media discourse outside of contexts of direct 
media consumption. I suggest … that the repeating, recycling, and recontex-
tualizing of media discourse is an important component in the formation of 
community in a kind of subterranean way, because it establishes an indirect 
connectivity or intertextuality across media consumers and across instances 
of media consumption. (Spitulnik 2001: 98, emphasis added)
In the cities in the former Belgian colonies, lateral communication took 
place via a broad urban gossip network called radio trottoir (sidewalk radio), 
which transmitted ‘counter-hegemonic’ popular discourses that often contested 
information dispensed by offi cial media. Writing with respect to Kinshasa, 
Schoepf  (1993) talks about radio trottoir, an urban version of  the ‘bush-
telephone’ that used talking drums to carry news to settlements separated by 
long distances.1 Bourgault (1995: 201–3) describes the radio trottoir alternative 
to the offi cial press in the francophone West African countries of  Togo and 
Cameroon. He suggests that even if  masses at the bottom of society are passive, 
they have evolved their own discursive means to resist oppressive discourse from 
above. In densely populated rural Rwanda, a ‘bush-telephone’ operated with 
great effi ciency using word-of-mouth, without recourse to drums. 
By exploring the theme of  radio and radio consumption with groups of 
prisoners, I have been able to glimpse some of this ‘lateral communication’ and 
‘circulation’ in a newly fashioned community – the community of confessed 
perpetrators. For my analysis, I drew on three key concepts from Spitulnik’s 
(1996) article ‘The Social Circulation of Media Discourse and the Mediation 
of communities’: consumption, circulation and community. 
Examining radio and language in contemporary Zambia, Spitulnik argues 
that radio today achieves what newspapers did in the colonial world. Drawing 
on Benedict Anderson’s (1983) concept of  ‘imagined communities’, she 
writes that it creates a shared cognitive space, a community of  listeners who 
incorporate its linguistic elements into their everyday lives in both conscious 
and unconscious ways. Spitulnik focuses on the circulation of language – lexical 
items, catchphrases, semantic fi elds, and discourse styles – as evidence of this 
community of people who cannot see each other. I will consider the additional 
possibility that radio might affect more than symbolic behaviour, that is, speech, 
and actually contribute to the commission of violent actions, that is, murder.
Spitulnik locates radio within a broader discursive context and seeks to 
understand the inter-textualities or cross-linkages between mass media and 
other forms of  discourse. It has been established that the ethnically divisive 
rhetoric that characterized RTLM broadcasts overlapped with, and borrowed 
from, the social scientifi c discourse from the colonial period and with political 
RTLM’S RHETORIC OF ETHNIC HATRED IN RURAL RWANDA 129
speech from the fi rst and second republics. The importance of radio in a place 
like Zambia, as in Rwanda, is related to the fact that it is the most widely 
consumed medium in the country and ‘the same broadcasts are accessible to the 
entire national population at the same time and, thus, allow for the possibility 
of producing a degree of shared linguistic knowledge across a population of 
roughly 9.1 million’ (Spitulnik 2001: 99, emphasis added). 
If  we substitute the word ‘ideological’ for ‘linguistic’, we begin to see the 
potential for RTLM to serve both as ‘reservoir and reference point’ for ideas 
of ethnic hatred and violence for fi ve or six million Rwandans. If  we add that 
radio audiences were well aware that they were audiences (not individuals), 
that millions of others were simultaneously listening as well, the intensity of 
their potential is increased.
However, Spitulnik advances the idea that language broadcast on the radio 
is not passively consumed by listeners, but is actively re-centred, reinterpreted 
and re-circulated. The listeners are ‘active decoders … of  media messages, 
who accept, reject, or resist what is conveyed based on their own class position 
within society’ (Spitulnik 1993: 297). This latter point is crucial to understanding 
the listenership of  RTLM and prevents us from assuming that what elites, 
professionals and townspeople ‘heard’ on RTLM is the same as what rural 
dwellers ‘heard’. 
This could not have been made more clear to me in my interviews with 
confessors. The fi rst response to my questions was often a claim of ignorance 
of RTLM. Some professed to know nothing of its message or its role in inciting 
violence. Many informants told me that they did not listen to RTLM at all, 
either because they did not own radios (or had no batteries) or because they did 
not perceive themselves to be part of the target audience for this radio station. 
Radio technology in general was presented by the perpetrators as something 
alien to the rural peasantry, a medium of  information that requires special 
education or political credentials to make sense of its messages. 
I was a cultivator, so what can I tell you about it? I don’t know anything about 
the radio. (Interview, Kigali prison, 20 September 2000)
In the countryside, things of radio do not exist. (Interview, Kigali prison, 
September 2000) 
I don’t know anything about it. This is the fi rst time [I am hearing about 
this]. (Interview, Rilima prison, 21 September 2000)
We had a radio but I did not hear anything. (Interview, Rilima prison, 
September 2000)
Except that I am a peasant and it does not concern me. Do you think I even 
know what RTLM stands for? Not at all! (Interview, Gitarama prison, 9 
September 2000)
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How can you listen to the radio when you did not go to school? When you 
can’t read and write? (Interview, Butare prison, 29 September 2000)
Given these informants’ apparent lack of  identifi cation with the political 
message of  RTLM, it was interesting to explore their awareness and 
understanding of  the messages broadcast on Radio Muhabura, the station 
run by the RPF, from the National Park (Parc National des Volcans) at the 
Rwanda–Uganda border. Radio Muhabura broadcast in full AM frequency 
and could be heard in most parts of Rwanda except the south (Chrétien et al. 
1995). In separate interviews, all the confessors expressed the same thing: it was 
strictly forbidden to listen to Radio Muhabura in Rwanda, and anyone found 
doing so was beaten or otherwise punished.
One informant told me that I should have an equal or greater understanding 
of RTLM’s broadcasts than he did, as if  it broadcast to educated elites around 
the world, but was somehow opaque and foreign to Rwandan peasants:
Q: Now, do you think that in the situation you went through there is something, 
which could be attributed to what the radio broadcast?
A: Peasants [Abaturage] like us did not even have any radios.
Q: Why do they say it anyway? So, you never heard anyone saying it?
A: Radio? A person who did not have a radio heard it from someone else. 
For example, RTLM said that …
Q: But what do you think? Telling you: ‘kill or do this’ or hearing it from the 
radio, is it the same thing?
A: No. Hearing it only could not have any impact. People were forced to kill by 
those soldiers. But simply hearing from the radio could not do anything.
Q: You heard it from the radio and you saw people killing?
A: I mean, soldiers brought it [the killing] and then RTLM reported it. For 
example, I had a small radio. The radio used to broadcast it. You found 
out that what it broadcast was what the soldiers were doing. So, it was 
necessary that we do it too. Because the leadership supported it, we accepted 
it. (Interview, Ruhengeri prison, 27 September 2000)
By claiming ignorance of the radio and its message, by suggesting that they 
were essentially incapable of participating in the political project that the radio 
represents, these perpetrators position themselves as bystanders or even victims 
of the larger struggle between Hutu political elites in Kigali and the invading 
force of Tutsi exiles in the RPF. This idea of being caught between two powerful 
and dangerous forces pervades the perpetrators’ narratives and fi nds expression 
in a well-known proverb: ‘In a war between elephants, it’s the grass that gets 
trampled. We are the grass’ (Interview, Gisenyi prison, 25 September 2000). 
Far from being unable to understand what RTLM was exhorting them to do, 
though, these perpetrators offer ample evidence that they understood the radio’s 
message and that they themselves were, in fact, a specifi cally targeted audience, 
precisely because they were seen as being on the margins of ethnic politics and 
not naturally inclined to take up arms against their Tutsi neighbours. In other 
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words, the radio messages were needed to involve them in killings that many 
were not initially inclined to perform. The interviews offer further emphasis 
against the primordial hypothesis.
Q: Sure, I understand you. So, there is the issue … of RTLM? I would like 
to understand also how a radio announces something and people do it. Can 
you give me an example?
A: In fact, I don’t own a radio because I am a cultivator [umuhinzi]. From the 
fact that I was a cultivator, I had no radio. But in fact, [some people] used to 
say that radio RTLM was urging us [idushishikarije] to kill people … killings. 
It said: ‘the enemy is Tutsi.’ And when a peasant hears that, that person has 
no choice … When he meets a person he doesn’t know, he says to himself: ‘this 
is the one who came to eradicate us, he came to fi ght us.’... You understand 
that, this also brought a bad atmosphere [umwuka mubi; literally, bad air] 
among people. (Interview, Ruhengeri prison, 27 September 2000)
Another genocide confessor confi rmed:
A: RTLM? You mean that radio? People who owned radios are the ones 
who listened to it.
Q: No, you can tell me what you heard from other people.
A: The so-called radios [ibyo biradiyo] of RTLM … [implies a bad thing. With 
a dismissive tone, he looks away.] Except that they announced: ‘fi nd out who 
the enemy is.’ Then they announced that: ‘the Tutsi is the enemy.’
(Interview, Gisenyi prison, 25 September 2000)
The same informant recalled a particular announcer on RTLM encouraging 
peasants to cultivate and to be armed and vigilant while waiting for the enemy 
from outside.
Then they said: ‘Look, while a Hutu is cultivating, he has a gun because 
they were distributed to them. You should have them with you when you 
are cultivating. When the enemy comes up, you shoot at each other. When 
he retreats, then you take up your hoe and cultivate!’... Such things were 
also announced. That is, they were doing sensitization about those things 
[kubisansibiliza] among peasants. They told them: ‘Follow what the radio is 
saying.’ (Interview, Gisenyi prison, 25 September 2000)
Did RTLM get its message of hatred across to different audiences to the 
same degree? Mindful of  Spitulnik’s idea of  a mass-mediated community 
of  active consumers or, put differently, with common reference points but 
the potential for different reactions to them, let us turn to the perpetrators’ 
refl ections about radio. 
Beyond the initial claims of ignorance of RTLM’s presence, its mission and 
its intended audience, a closer analysis of the perpetrators’ refl ections suggests 
that they had a clear understanding of what they were being told to do.
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On 6 April 1994, when the president’s plane was shot down, RTLM announced 
that Habyarimana had been killed by the RPF and that everyone in the country 
should stay where they were. In interview after interview, nearly every informant 
recalled this directive disseminated via the radio. Subsequently, RTLM, aka 
‘Radio Rutwitsi’ (the radio that sets fi re) encouraged the Interahamwe in their 
mission of defeating the Inkotanyi (Rwandan Patriotic Army). It emphasized the 
message that all Hutu were at risk of being attacked, overwhelmed, recolonized 
and exploited by all Tutsi and that appropriate measures should be taken to 
prevent this. 
According to the interviewees, RTLM preached fear of and hatred toward 
Tutsi and told its listeners to avenge the ‘head of the nation’. Some recalled that 
RTLM insisted that Hutu should separate themselves from Tutsi because of 
war. They remembered that the Tutsi were identifi ed as their enemies, outsiders, 
invaders and cunning manipulators. They recalled that RTLM said that the 
only way to defend the nation in general, and one’s own safety and security in 
particular, was to pre-emptively destroy not only the Rwandan Patriotic Front, 
but also every Tutsi, even the unborn.
Don’t you know that after Habyarimana’s death, radios announced that: 
‘Inkotanyi are barking ... hohoohohooo!!!’ Also that: ‘Inkotanyi attacked 
before us. They [Tutsi] had said that they would kill Hutu and now they 
have pre-empted us. Women should go nowhere.’ (Interview, Rilima prison, 
21 September 2000)
Many of the perpetrators I spoke with expressed ambivalence about RTLM’s 
message that ‘cultivators’ (understood to be synonymous with ‘peasants’) stood 
for all Hutu and the only legitimate Rwandans. One man stated: ‘RTLM talked 
about Hutu as cultivators, the children of cultivators’ (Benesebahinzi) and said 
that ‘everyone should join in the violence against the enemy.’ The enemy was 
not limited to the RPF alone. ‘RTLM said that the enemy was your accomplice 
neighbour (icyitso), so you must be vigilant.’ 
To the extent that these perpetrators bring into the discussion the ideological 
confl ation of  the Hutu extremist elites with all Hutu and the rebel army of 
Tutsi exiles with all Tutsi, they are implicitly resisting the interpretation that 
the genocide was fundamentally rooted in primordial ethnic sentiments and 
hatred. In fact some explicitly stated the opposite:
In fact, the way everything came up, we were not … we appeared like 
people who did not know beforehand. We were all united together. We 
even started to fi ght what is known as Interahamwe. We were defeated later 
because Interahamwe had guns. At that point, they started convincing us 
[kutwinjizamo; literally, to push into us] that Tutsi are our enemies.
We shared, we were the same, we intermarried [and] there was no problem 
between us. Then, it happened just like that, eh ... even when that radio RTLM 
was talking about ‘ethnicity’ [ubwoko], Interahamwe had already been killed 
in Kamonyi. They were killed by villagers and commune police. They were 
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fi ghting together … even bourgmester was fi ghting … fi ghting Interahamwe
at Taba in Kamonyi.2
When RTLM broadcast that Tutsi have fi nished off Hutu, then we started 
being afraid. So, how did it happen? We noticed that it came from Runda. 
They came saying that … in fact, we spent the day on the hill waiting for 
Interahamwe in order to fi ght them. At around 3 p.m. people from Igihinga 
came and ordered us to eat cows belonging to other people. We took cows 
belonging to a Tutsi who was there. His cattle keeper had fl ed with them for 
security, but he lived in Runda. So, they forced us to eat them. Eeh! They 
then took four, we took three. Good. At dawn they came back and took 
another cow. Then they killed the fi rst person. They killed him because of 
people from Igihinga. That is how things started and then it grew tougher 
[ibintu birakomera; literally, it became hardened, i.e., more serious] from there 
onwards. (Interview, Gitarama prison, 29 September 2000)
Informants suggest that the rhetoric of the radio implicitly acknowledged 
the lack of  ethnic division among rural peasants. The messages recalled by 
the perpetrators seem designed to induce rural dwellers to break the bonds 
of  neighbourhood solidarity (see also Longman 1995). Perhaps in an effort 
to appeal directly to those who were less willing to kill their neighbours, this 
rhetoric often took the form of agrarian metaphors:
The radio told us to clear the bushes. There was no person who did not hear 
that! (Interview, Gisenyi prison)
RTLM said to ‘separate the grass from the millet’ [i.e., weed out the Tutsi]. 
(Interview, Gisenyi prison, 25 September 2000) 
Bikindi told people ‘to pull out the poison ivy together with its roots.’ 
(Interview, Gisenyi prison, 25 September 2000) 
In another interview that began with denial, the informant shared euphemisms 
learned through lateral communication.
Q: Uuh, so, did you listen to RTLM radio in you area?
A: Radio, where?
Q: Uuh …
A: I didn’t even own a radio then.
Q: No, you did not listen to radio RTLM. So, you didn’t hear anything from 
other people. Is it the fi rst time you hear about it?
A: RTLM?
Q: Uuh, of Kantano, etc. No … is this the fi rst time you hear about it?
A: RTLM was that radio which broadcast hot news [yashyushyaga amakuru],
telling people: ‘Work!’[Mukore] I heard about it from what people told me, 
because I did not own a radio. Or from people in a place where I would be 
staying because I did not own a radio at that time.
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Q: Uuuh, uuh, telling people to work [gukora]?
A: It told people to kill Tutsi. After all, wasn’t [it] explained openly? … 
Through conversations with other people, I heard that [RTLM] had very 
hot news during that period of killings. (Interview, Butare prison, September 
2000)
Although these comments buttress arguments about the power of radio to 
demonize, incite and perhaps even direct violence, they also yield evidence 
that as active (re)interpreters of RTLM’s message, many ordinary peasants in 
the ranks of the low-level perpetrators did not swallow everything they heard 
whole. Even as they refl ected on the role of the radio six years after the fact, 
these people make it clear that for most ordinary Rwandan peasants (abaturage), 
radio was viewed as a medium for the urban, the educated and the elite.3 This 
resonates strongly with Spitulnik’s argument that ‘the communities mediated by 
radio broadcasting are several. Since media discourse is not uniformly accessible 
or even uniformly seized upon and interpreted in the same ways, all kinds of 
outcomes are possible’ (Spitulnik 2001: 113). 
Similarly, while some Rwandan villagers may have listened to broadcasts, 
many stated that they did not. They heard the messages from others, however, 
and understood the ideological signifi cance of certain songs, speeches and the 
reporting of current events from others. Nevertheless, this information alone
did not cause them to kill. It is, therefore, necessary to explore other reasons 
why these Rwandans took part in the genocide.
NOTES
1. The Connaissida Project in Kinshasa, in which I participated in 1985–98 highlighted the 
importance of radio trottoir in changing perceptions of AIDS.
2. Survivors’ testimony collected by African Rights from Gikongoro and Butare prefectures also 
mentions initial fl ight and fi ghting by Hutu and Tutsi neighbours against Interahamwe from 
outside. The Hutu who were with them, they said, did not understand that only Tutsi were 
being targeted for killing (African Rights 1995: 329, 330, 332). 
3. To some extent, however, it seems likely that some confessed perpetrators were seeking to 
distance themselves from the local rural elites who were leaders of genocide.
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Journalism in a Time of Hate Media
Thomas Kamilindi
I have been a journalist in Rwanda for 20 years; the only time I stopped working 
was during the 1994 genocide. I think the fi rst question we should ask is should 
journalists be put on trial? Should they be judged? My answer is yes. And that’s 
why I chose to testify before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
as a prosecution witness. I testifi ed because I consider journalists to be citizens 
like any other members of society. They should be held accountable for their 
actions and if  need be prosecuted. I also testifi ed because of  my belief  that 
journalists have a major role to play for the good of society and should be held 
to account when, instead, they cause harm. Grave problems were created in my 
society. Evil took place and journalists played an important role.
Before dealing with my own experience, I think it is important to provide 
some background on the media in Rwanda, to place it in context. When we talk 
about the media, people in the West think in terms of what the news media are 
like in the Western world. That is simply not the case with Rwanda. 
The written press has existed in Rwanda only since 1933, when the fi rst 
newspaper was established – a newspaper still published by the Catholic Church, 
which is a very important institution in my country. Decades later, in the 1960s, a 
government newspaper was set up. Both of these were published in Kinyarwanda, 
my mother tongue and the native language of Rwanda. Other attempts to create 
newspapers were short-lived until 1991, when there was a kind of democratic 
explosion, and a large number of newspapers were established. 
Until the creation of RTLM in 1993, there was only one radio station: the 
government-run Radio Rwanda, which began operations in 1961. Radio Rwanda 
was the voice of authority, and authority is respected in Rwanda. People are 
raised and taught to take what they hear on the radio as gospel truth. 
In 1992, the fi rst television station emerged and remains the only one. It too 
belongs to the government. 
RTLM (Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines) was created in 1993 
by people who were, for the most part, close to or from the stronghold of 
President Habyarimana. They presented it as a commercial venture. Indeed, 
to be a member, it was necessary to purchase a share valued at 5,000 Rwandan 
francs (RWF), about US$ 30 at the time. But RTLM’s programming was not 
commercial; it was all about politics and centred on ethnic cleavages. RTLM 
followed directly from Kangura, the extremist newspaper created by a former 
bus driver, Hassan Ngeze. Kangura was backed by fi nanciers who were well 
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placed in the army and the civil administration. It is known particularly for its 
publication of the famous Hutu ‘Ten Commandments’.
No one succeeded in combating these hate media in Rwanda. They were 
very powerful and entrenched with those who held power – in the military, in 
government and in business. Even the information minister, Faustin Rucogoza, 
failed in his efforts to sanction or close down these hate media outlets. He was 
among the fi rst assassinated by the Interahamwe militia, on the morning of 7 
April 1994. 
As a simple journalist, the only weapon I had was to report the facts and 
only verifi able facts. But even that was diffi cult because it brought me many 
problems. 
In 1991, I was suspended from my job at Radio Rwanda. I learned later that 
this suspension was intended to be permanent. But I managed to get my job 
back, thanks to some good legal work by a friend who was a lawyer and also 
because of intense diplomatic and political pressure on President Habyarimana, 
who was the ultimate authority for Radio Rwanda.
In 1992, the head of the Conseil d’Administration of l’ORINFOR (Offi ce 
Rwandais d’Information), which was responsible for all of  the state-owned 
media in Rwanda (Radio Rwanda, Télévision Nationale Rwandaise and the 
written press), called me into his offi ce. He told me I was going to be arrested 
and that he couldn’t protect me. This was after broadcasts I had made about an 
attempted coup against the prime minister of the day. Once again, I was saved 
by political and diplomatic pressure, because the coup attempt was very real.
Another way to fi ght against hate media as a journalist is to have no part of it. 
In my case, I could have bought shares in RTLM because it was the fi rst private 
radio station that was going to break the monopoly of the state; to support it 
could have been seen as supporting the emergence of pluralism in the media. 
But I did not get involved because I saw who the real instigators of this new 
station were. The editor-in-chief, Gaspard Gahigi, who had been my boss at 
Radio Rwanda, asked me many times to come and work with him at RTLM. 
He said I was a good journalist who could add a lot of credibility to the new 
station. But time and again I refused because I would not use my professional 
talent or infl uence to stigmatize the Tutsi.
Then, in April 1994, came the genocide. What could the media have done? 
The media are not there to fi ght, but to set things right, to provide accurate 
information. Instead, there was much propaganda and people received messages 
of hate. You simply cannot imagine it. 
For example, on 3 May 1994, the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda (UNAMIR) came looking for a group of us at the Hotel Mille Collines. 
We were about 40 and UNAMIR wanted to evacuate us from the country. 
We hadn’t even left the lobby of the hotel when RTLM began to broadcast a 
list of  our names, including that of  my daughter and even a newborn child. 
RTLM called on the Interahamwe not to allow these inyenzi to be evacuated 
by UNAMIR, because ‘they would come back with weapons in their hands’. 
In fact, the militia blocked us on the road to the airport. We were attacked 
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and some of  us were injured. In the end, after many hours of  negotiations, 
UNAMIR brought us back safely to the hotel.
I have a daughter. She’s twelve now but she was very small at the time. One 
day, somebody said, ‘That one is a snake. They have to kill her.’ She wasn’t even 
two years old. My daughter asked me, ‘Am I a snake? Am I a snake?’ Is that the 
role of the press? Is it the role of the media to harm people? 
Imagine journalists who would enthusiastically applaud militia for the good 
work they had done at such and such a location. The journalists from RTLM 
did this each time a Tutsi family was killed. And they regarded as cowards the 
militiamen and soldiers who did not have as much zeal for the massacres.
It was a hard time to work as a journalist. In fact it seemed as if  the only 
journalists who could function properly were the ones who were in the camp 
of the killers. I wasn’t in their camp, so I had to give up my job. But there were 
still ways to be a journalist – someone who bears witness to events and informs 
others.
I resigned from Radio Rwanda a few months before the genocide started 
and, as it happened, my last day was 6 April. In a sense, I think I knew what 
was coming. As a journalist, I had been asked to broadcast news that was 
repugnant to me. 
Radio Rwanda was in effect the voice of  President Habyarimana. It was 
diffi cult to do truly professional work as we were constantly faced with demands 
from the authorities on the manner in which we should work, right down to 
the formulation of a phrase.
I recall one time when the director of ORINFOR came to the studio with 
a text that he had written about a meeting of  the central committee of  the 
president’s party – the only party allowed at the time – the MRND (Mouvement 
Républicain National pour la Democratie et le Développement). Instead of 
reading this statement word for word, as he wished, I reworked the text. I 
hadn’t even left the studio after the broadcast when the phones began to ring. 
The members of the central committee, including their leader, the upper ranks 
of the army and the director of ORINFOR were furious with me and some 
insulted me personally.
In 1992, we rebelled against this situation. The journalists of Radio Rwanda 
organized a series of strikes and I was appointed to head this protest movement. 
It was following these strikes, which resulted in many threats against me, that 
I decided to leave Radio Rwanda because it seemed impossible for me to bring 
about any change. The pro-Habyarimana forces had an enormous infl uence.
During the massacres that followed President Habyarimana’s death in the 
plane crash on 6 April, I was among many liberal Hutus accused of sympathizing 
with the Tutsi-led rebel forces of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). 
I had grown up Hutu. That is what was marked on my identity card. But I was 
born to a Hutu mother and a Tutsi father, who had taken steps to change his 
ethnicity in 1959 (he was 21 years old at the time) to survive the fi rst pogroms 
against Tutsis. I was born in the south of the country, considered at the time 
to be a largely Tutsi region and later supportive of the RPF. I was married to a 
woman whose parents were also in a mixed marriage. These conditions, among 
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many other factors, meant that after 6 April, I was one of the targets of the 
Hutu militia, directed notably by RTLM. Journalists like Kantano and Bemeriki 
who knew me very well didn’t hesitate to say over the air, ‘Does Kamilindi think 
the Mille Collines hotel is a bunker?’ They revealed to the militia where I was 
in hiding and how to fi nd me.
As it happened, on the evening of  6 April, I was in high spirits. My wife, 
Jacqueline, had baked a cake for a festive dinner at our home in Kigali. It was 
my 33rd birthday and that afternoon I had completed my last day of work at 
Radio Rwanda. After ten years at the government radio station, I had resigned 
in protest against the lack of political balance in news programming.
I remember very clearly, I was taking a shower that evening when Jacqueline 
began pounding on the bathroom door. ‘Hurry up!’ she shouted. ‘The president 
has been attacked!’ I locked the doors of the house and sat by the radio listening 
to RTLM. Of  course I detested RTLM’s violent propaganda, but the way 
things were going in Rwanda, that propaganda often served as a highly accurate 
political forecast.
RTLM reported that President Habyarimana’s plane, returning from Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania, had been shot down over Kigali and had crashed into 
the grounds of  his own palace. The new Hutu president of  Burundi and 
several of  Habyarimana’s top advisors had also been on board. There were 
no survivors.
In the days before, I had heard through sources about preparations for large-
scale massacres of  Tutsis nationwide by the president’s extremist entourage 
and about lists of moderate Hutu that had been drawn up for the fi rst wave of 
killings. But I never imagined that Habyarimana himself  might be targeted. I 
thought to myself, if  Hutu Power had sacrifi ced him, who was safe?
Along with 700 others, I took refuge in the Mille Collines hotel, where 
manager Paul Rusesabagina negotiated to save our lives, using the liquor from 
the hotel basement to buy off  bands of  killers who showed up with lists of 
victims. Leaving the hotel meant you risked dying.
But, as I said, as a journalist, there are many ways in which you can work. As a 
refugee at the Mille Collines, I asked people, ‘What are you doing so that people 
will know that you’re here?’ They said, ‘We’re not doing anything.’ So I worked 
with other refugees who had contacts, like François-Xavier Nsanzuwera. He 
was a human rights activist and had a lot of fax numbers, telephone numbers, 
all sorts of contacts. We sent fax after fax, one on top of the other when the 
telephone worked. We informed the world of what was happening. That was 
how we spoke out. We did something. 
There has been a lot of discussion about the role of the international media. 
For the most part, the international media weren’t there. On 12 April 1994, 
all foreigners were evacuated. All international public servants, aid workers, 
journalists – they were all evacuated. The genocide began in earnest in those 
fi rst two weeks and nobody knew anything about it. It was done in secrecy at a 
time when what we needed were a few courageous people to come and report 
on this country – this country, which, for many news organizations, didn’t 
seem to exist.
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But there was no structure left. You can’t imagine what it was like. By the 
time the world began to learn about what was happening in Rwanda, it was too 
late. Thousands and thousands of people were killed. I can’t help thinking that 
if  the media had been there, maybe the harm would have been less.
In their absence, I took it upon myself  to try and get the word out. On 26 
April, when the telephones were briefl y restored, I called some friends at Radio 
France International (RFI) in Paris and I said, ‘We’re still alive.’ They said, ‘We 
have no news, what’s going on? Can we interview you? Can you explain to us 
what’s going on?’ I said, ‘Yes.’ 
So they asked me how we were living, how many of us were there. I told them 
there were about 700 refugees, and we were drinking water from the swimming 
pool, the same pool the soldiers were using to wash their clothes and which 
eventually turned into a toilet. We had to drink that water without being able 
to boil it. 
They asked me, ‘What’s going on in military terms?’ I said that government 
forces were, in fact, losing ground. There were defeats everywhere. I spoke about 
the massacres, although as I explained to them, they were indescribable. There 
were no words to use.
As a journalist, I wanted the world to know about the atrocities taking place 
inside Rwanda. I probably signed my own death warrant by calling attention 
to the massacres during the RFI interview.
After that, local radio started calling the Hotel Mille Collines a home for 
‘cockroaches’. I was told they were coming for me. But the others there stopped 
me from giving myself  up. I wanted to go out because I was the source of the 
problem and I thought that if  I left, maybe they wouldn’t kill the others. If  I 
were to be killed, maybe the others wouldn’t be bombed.
The day after that interview was broadcast, a soldier arrived at the hotel to 
kill me. But as was often the case in the genocide where most people knew their 
killers, the man who had been sent to kill me had been a friend since childhood. 
He explained that the military command wanted me dead. Then he said, in 
effect, ‘I don’t know who’s going to kill you. I can’t do it. But I’m leaving the 
hotel and they’ll send someone for sure to kill you.’ Nobody else came for me, 
at least not to my knowledge. Some years later I heard Paul Rusesabagina say 
in a radio interview that an army colonel had come to see him at one point to 
establish whether I was alive. Paul refused to tell him anything, then negotiated 
with the soldiers, gave them drinks and, in the process, saved my life.
It became clear to me that the message I managed to get out through RFI was 
something that the government didn’t want the world to know. If the media had 
played its role, things probably wouldn’t have happened the way they did. 
At another point, when I was facing death, they gave me a piece of paper 
and a pen and told me to write. I wrote to my wife saying I loved her, that she 
should be strong and look after the children and that I was leaving everything 
behind for her spiritually and materially. That was one of  three times that I 
was nearly killed; that time, the soldiers who had come to kill me allowed me 
to write a message before putting the gun to my head.
JOURNALISM IN A TIME OF HATE MEDIA 141
My wife was pregnant with our third child, and I wrote, if  God wishes, you 
will have the baby. By that time I didn’t know about my fi rstborn because she 
was not with us. I mentioned my three children and told my wife to start her 
life again if  she survived. I said don’t be alone, carry on, keep going. 
The soldier told everyone to get back because he was going to fi nish me off. 
Curiously, I was not scared. I was prepared for death. It was like a dream. This 
guy cocked the pistol and just then miraculously a tank arrived while the gun was 
at my temple. It was like a movie. The commander in the tank shouted ‘Thomas 
what’s going on?’ I turned to look at him and said ‘They want to kill me.’
The commander stopped the killing. But while I survived, my fi rstborn 
daughter did not. I later discovered that she had been murdered while on a 
visit to her grandparents.
It is very diffi cult to put my life experiences behind me and to forget. My 
wife and I live with it all the time. It is part of me. Sometimes I shut myself  in a 
room and cry when I think about my little girl. It’s diffi cult when you know you 
could have been killed and you survived, but your child was killed. Every time I 
go to the memorial sites and see the skulls, I can’t help myself. When I look at 
them, I cry because I remember my daughter. Maybe her skull is somewhere, 
but I don’t know where. 
But I cannot give up my career as a journalist because life has to go on. I 
have to keep living. After all, I survived. I returned to full-time journalism in 
December 1994, once the phone lines in Rwanda started to work again and I 
was able to do freelance work for foreign news outlets. Since then I’ve worked 
for Voice of America and the BBC. I think one of the reasons I have to continue 
my work as a journalist is so that I can contribute toward preventing genocide 
from ever happening again.
I do believe that despite the genocide and the media’s role in inciting the mass 
violence, there is still a new generation who want to become journalists. I have 
spoken to students and they have sought my advice. But there are still many 
troubling questions. How does a journalist become a criminal? It’s extremely 
diffi cult to answer that question, because journalists are human like everyone 
else. Sometimes reporters think they are supermen or women, but we are human 
beings. We have feelings like everyone else, and we are members of  society. 
We can be caught up in the circle of violence like anyone else. We can identify 
with the group responsible for violence. That is why, as reporters, we should 
be more objective.
In April 2003, I was in Côte d’Ivoire as a guest at a seminar on ‘Confl ict, 
Peace and Media’, and I spoke to journalists about what we lived through in 
Rwanda. I said that certain reporters participated in the violence, while others 
spoke out against it. I reminded them that 48 journalists had been killed in 
Rwanda because they spoke out. The reporters in Côte d’Ivoire asked me, ‘How 
can we know if  what we’re doing is wrong?’ They didn’t know the answer to 
that question. Some of them had already gone too far. They had become part 
of the hate media without knowing it. So I told them, ‘look at what you write. 
Listen to what you say, and analyze yourself. If  you are demonizing people, if  
you are stigmatizing other tribes, other clans, you’re involved in violence.’
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‘How did you go this far,’ I asked. They didn’t know. So I said, ‘You’re no 
longer reporters. You’re no longer journalists, and I would like to congratulate the 
politicians who managed to co-opt you, and co-opt you without your knowing 
it. I congratulate these politicians. They’re good politicians, very effective. Now 
stand up and be reporters, do your job, report the facts objectively.’ And one of 
them replied, ‘Well there was a politician who has said we want Côte d’Ivoire 
for the people from Côte d’Ivoire. Can we repeat that?’ Well yes, you can say 
that, you can say that this politician said that. You can report that, and public 
opinion will know how to react to this politician. You can report the facts, but 
don’t get involved.
I have to admit, it’s hard to know as a reporter when you’ve taken the wrong 
turn. All I can say is, be brave and stand up for your work. 
Part Two
International Media 
Coverage of the Genocide




It was late April 1994. I was in Kigali, doing a question-and-answer session 
with a BBC presenter in London and the presenter asked me to clarify what 
all this shooting and killing was about. I found myself  saying, 
Look you have to understand that there are two wars going on here. There’s 
a shooting war and a genocide war. The two are connected, but also distinct. 
In the shooting war, there are two conventional armies at each other, and in 
the genocide war, one of those armies – the government side with help from 
civilians – is involved in mass killings. 
That may seem simplistic, but I think it is a useful way of  understanding 
what happened. 
I am writing about my own experiences reporting the war and the genocide 
for the BBC, fi ling both radio and television reports. Normally based in Nairobi, 
Kenya, I spent much of the 100 days after 6 April 1994 reporting from Rwanda, 
at times, as one of the only Western reporters still in the capital. In this paper, 
I won’t draw comparisons with other media reporting, because, quite frankly, I 
was so busy during those 100 days that I didn’t catch much of it. But I think it 
is important to go into some detail about what I did before I started reporting 
on the genocide as genocide.
I have to admit that during the fi rst few days, I, like others, got the story 
terribly wrong. Down on the ground, up-close – if  you could get close enough, 
safely enough – it did look at fi rst like chaos. I said so. I used the word chaos. 
What I could see clearly in the fi rst few days was the shooting war between the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the government, and the dead bodies. It 
was not clear who had killed whom, not at fi rst, and the shooting war appeared 
chaotic with shifting front lines, a lot of noise and a lot of red hot lead fl ying 
around. 
In a way, the shooting war was easy to describe. The genocide war took a 
little longer to confi rm. But I got there in the end. In fact, looking back now 
at the scripts of my reports broadcast on the BBC, within little more than a 
week of the beginning of the killing on 6–7 April, there were clear references 
to government-backed massacres of ethnic Tutsis and Hutu opponents of the 
regime. In other words, within the fi rst few weeks of  the killing, there was 
reportage from the fi eld sketching out the true nature of the massacres.
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My focus here will be on what I know best: the reporting I did on the 
ground. 
My fi rst two trips to Rwanda were in late 1993 and early 1994, before the 
genocide. The installation of  the broad-based transitional government was 
continually postponed. I didn’t really understand why this was happening until 
I visited an African embassy in Kigali and asked the ambassador if  he would 
give me an off-the-record briefi ng on the political situation. I can’t identify 
which ambassador it was, of course, because he spoke off  the record. 
This ambassador astonished me by not only explaining in some detail and very 
frankly how the various extremist Hutu parties were blocking the installation 
of the power-sharing government, but also by keeping me there, in his private 
offi ce, for more than four hours. 
I was a bit embarrassed at fi rst. I didn’t even have an appointment. But every 
time I looked at my watch or started to leave, the ambassador said, ‘No no, sit 
down. I want to make sure the BBC understands this – do you understand it? 
Do you realize now what is going on and how dangerous it is?’ Thanks to that 
ambassador, I was just beginning to realize. 
The ambassador kept me so long because he was frustrated that the world 
didn’t seem to be paying attention to Rwanda or realizing the dangers. When 
I left his offi ce he said something like ‘Don’t forget Rwanda, Mark, something 
big could happen here.’ 
There are some events that make us all remember exactly what we were doing at 
the time. For my parents’ generation, it was John F. Kennedy’s assassination. For 
me, it was the day the plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana 
and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi was brought down – late on the 
evening of 6 April 1994. 
I was working late in the BBC offi ce in Nairobi. At about 11 p.m., the 
phone rang. It was one of the editors in London, a man by the name of David 
Eades, who is now a BBC-TV presenter. David said they were getting news 
agency reports that a plane carrying the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda 
had crashed. I remember with crystal clarity what I said. ‘Oh my God,’ I said, 
remembering the ambassador’s warning. ‘Oh my God, this is going to be a huge 
story!’ David was taken aback by my response.
I told David I had to go to Rwanda immediately, because this event was going 
to have major ramifi cations. 
That night, I fi led a report based on information that I could gather by phone 
from Nairobi, citing information from United Nations (UN) and diplomatic 
sources and residents on the ground in Rwanda.
My fi rst report focused, not surprisingly, on the reports of the plane crash 
and ‘urgent discussions’ between the UN commander, Roméo Dallaire, and 
members of the Rwandan government. 
The next day, the machinery was set in motion. Colleagues from Reuters news 
agency chartered a plane from Nairobi to Mbarara in southern Uganda and I 
bought a seat. Kigali airport was closed, of course, so that destination was out 
of the question. Heading for northern Rwanda, for the RPF-held zone, seemed 
the best way to get some sort of angle on the story immediately. It took us most 
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of the day and night to get to Mbarara, then most of  the next day to reach 
Kabale on the Uganda–Rwanda border. After many hours waiting at the border, 
we negotiated entry into the RPF-held zone and Paul Kagame’s headquarters 
in the manager’s offi ces of an old tea estate in Mulindi in northern Rwanda. 
My memory of arriving there has a digital clarity. I remember looking down 
from the hill where Kagame had his headquarters, down to the old, long-
abandoned tea plantations. The fi eld of  bright green tea bushes was in such 
stark contrast to the dark green trees around the edges of the valley that the 
expanse of tea looked like a placid lake of green water.
I stayed for a couple of days near Mulindi and saw the start of the shooting war 
between the RPF lines just north of the town of Byumba and the government 
lines on the outskirts of the town. On 8 April, I reported on an interview with 
the RPF Secretary General Theogene Rudasingwa, who said the RPF intended 
to take military and political action to restore order in Kigali and throughout 
Rwanda. A report on 9 April, from Byumba, focused on the RPF attack against 
government troops and the RPF plan to send a detachment into Kigali to shore 
up the rebel garrison there. I signed off  this way:
The strategic outcome of the current hostilities is impossible to predict, but 
it’s a certainty that the ordinary Rwandan people, who have suffered years of 
ethnic and political violence, will be adversely affected in the short term.
When it became clear from what I saw around Byumba that the shooting 
war had started again in earnest, I decided I had to try to get to Kigali. There 
was no way I could get through those front lines and travel south toward the 
capital by land, so I took a risk and went back north into Uganda, driving 
through the night to Entebbe airport. 
By an extraordinary fl uke and some negotiations, a few other journalists 
and I met an aid worker at the airport who had a plane, which he was going to 
fl y from Entebbe to Kigali. It was half  empty, except for some food supplies, 
and he agreed to give us a lift. Again, I don’t think I’ll tell you the aid worker’s 
name, because he got into a furious argument with General Dallaire when he 
turned up in Kigali, unannounced, with a planeful of journalists. 
I don’t think General Dallaire was in a particularly good mood at the time. 
After months of  asking for more and better troops for his UN mission and 
being told none were available, he suddenly saw hundreds of them arrive, but 
not to help in his mission of pacifying Rwanda, but to take part in an entirely 
different mission – saving expatriates. 
The scene at Kigali airport was extraordinary. The shooting war was clearly 
in full fl ow. We could hear constant small arms and mortar fi re from inside the 
town. At night, we could see tracers and explosions. On the apron of the airfi eld, 
there were numerous French, Italian and Belgian military planes disgorging 
European paratroopers who had come to save European lives. 
I spent a few nights sleeping on the airport fl oor and eating French military 
rations – which are, by the way, infi nitely superior to those of  most other 
countries. By day, I went on short trips with the French military as they drove 
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into town to rescue French and other European citizens. I went on these trips 
not because I thought rescuing Europeans was the main story, but because it 
was the only story I could cover safely, or at least relatively safely. It was the 
only way I could get into town to see what was going on. No one in their right 
mind would have voluntarily gone into the city of Kigali in those early days 
without a serious armed escort. 
On 11 April, I fi led this report from Kigali:
The capital of Rwanda is in chaos. Three main military groups are contesting 
positions in the centre of the city: the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front and two 
components of the government forces, regular army troops and elements of 
the Presidential Guard, loyal to the late head of state. Reinforcements [plural] 
for the rebels are moving towards Kigali from their stronghold in the north. 
In addition to those military forces, various militias are settling ethnic and 
political scores, which broadly refl ect animosity between the Hutu and Tutsi 
tribes. But this is not just a tribal war. The Hutu are split politically and 
former neighbours are now at each other’s throats. I have defi nite evidence 
that at least a dozen people were killed this morning. The total for those 
few hours alone is certainly many more. An experienced aid worker said 
tens of thousands of people had died in the last fi ve days. Foreign residents 
are being evacuated from Rwanda in an air bridge to Nairobi and other 
regional capitals. The United Nations forces, which came here to monitor 
a ceasefi re between government and rebels, have found themselves in the 
middle of a vicious war. Loud explosions, believed to be mortar fi re, could 
be heard sporadically throughout the day near the airport compound, which 
is controlled by UN forces and French troops brought here to evacuate their 
nationals. It is not thought that the airport is being targeted, but it is close 
to positions held by the three main military groups.
It was on one of those evacuation trips with the French military that I realized 
something other than just the shooting war was going on. Standing on the back 
of a truck I looked down to see a Rwandan man attacking another Rwandan, 
in the head, with a screwdriver, clearly intent on killing him. I saw several dead 
bodies of people who had been killed with machetes. Colleagues at the other 
end of the convoy of trucks saw someone being attacked with machetes. The 
French soldiers controlling the convoy just drove past all these incidents, heading 
for the house of a European who was to be rescued. 
In a contribution to another news package broadcast 11 April, I fi led this 
report:
As the convoy left the airport to collect its mainly Belgian passengers, snaking 
its way through outlying suburbs and farms, I counted three recently killed 
people, probably Rwandans, lying in a pool of blood. Large groups of men 
armed with clubs and machetes stood around. An hour later as the convoy 
returned, there were at least eight bodies. Reporters at the front of the convoy 
saw at least two people being hacked to death. The killing is continuing.
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It wasn’t until about a fortnight after the plane went down that we started 
piecing together a clear picture of what happened starting on the night of 6 
April. We all know now, of  course, thanks to the various inquiries, that the 
Interahamwe and the army set up roadblocks within hours or even minutes of 
the signal, if  it was a signal, of the plane going down. And we all know now 
the purpose of those roadblocks.
In a live interview on 12 April, I relayed news that the interim government of 
Rwanda had reportedly fl ed to Gitarama and that thousands of refugees were 
apparently leaving Kigali by road, heading south in the direction of Burundi. 
Another report that day quoted Dallaire as confi rming that the RPF force 
sent down from the north had now linked up with the RPF battalion based 
in Kigali. 
A report from 13 April focused on the fi ght for Kigali:
The battle for Kigali continues. Small arms, automatic weapons and grenades 
are being used as rebel and government forces struggle for advantage. On 
Tuesday (April 12), the UN commander in Rwanda said the rebel forces were 
not encountering strong resistance. However, there was heavy fi ghting at dawn 
on Wednesday. The confl ict began when the president’s plane was shot down 
seven days ago. The president’s supporters blamed rival tribal and ethnic 
groups and the massacres of civilians began. Tens of thousands of people 
were killed and hundreds of  thousands displaced by the unrest. Now the 
fi ghting has a more military aspect with two highly trained armies attacking 
each other. The rebels say they are fi ghting to restore order in Kigali and then 
in the longer term to introduce democracy to Rwanda. The government army 
may be fi ghting for its own survival. The government it was supposed to be 
protecting fl ed on Tuesday for a regional town. Different groups are in charge 
of various parts of Kigali, while much of the population has fl ed. Whichever 
group comes out on top will have to manage a huge humanitarian crisis. Over 
a million people were critically short of food before the Rwandan civil war 
resumed because of drought and earlier confl ict. Hundreds of thousands of 
others will now be dependent on food aid.
Later the same day, in a report about ceasefi re negotiations, I referred to the 
RPF contention that it had no interest in a ceasefi re ‘while innocent people 
were being killed in Kigali’. I reported on:
… rebel allegations that thousands of political opponents of the late president, 
who died when his plane was shot down last week, have been systematically 
murdered by the government army and militias loyal to the former head of 
state. These allegations are supported by numerous eyewitnesses. However, the 
RPF advance has also undoubtedly led to many deaths. The main army base 
in western Kigali and the area that surrounds it is still fi rmly in government 
hands. The streets around the base are patrolled by government soldiers in 
armoured cars and tanks. Several evacuated foreign embassies in the zone are 
untouched by looters. In other parts of the west of the city, however, thugs 
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mounting roadblocks are continuing to kill people they consider to be their 
ethnic or political opponents.
Many reports, including my own, made reference to the ‘tribal’ nature of the 
confl ict and militias settling scores. But the outlines of genocide began to appear 
in news reports, even before we fi rst used the word to describe the killing. Here 
is a report from 14 April that began with the sound of gunfi re:
One of the many front lines in Kigali. The city is now divided into rebel and 
government-held zones. Where there aren’t soldiers from one side or the other, 
militias with machetes and clubs rule the streets. Neighbourhood boundaries 
are defi ned by roadblocks, often with piles of bodies next to them. Militias 
loyal to the government have killed many ethnic Tutsis. Militias loyal to the 
rebels have killed Hutus. Before the rebels came to Kigali a few days ago, what 
appears to have been a deliberate plan by Hutu militias to massacre Tutsis 
or rebel supporters was instigated – thousands were executed by bullet or by 
knife. There have been some reports that rebel soldiers are taking revenge. 
This afternoon, a reliable eyewitness saw an RPF soldier force fi ve people 
into a house and shoot them dead. The rebels hold positions near the United 
Nations headquarters and several other areas. The government holds the 
western zone, where empty foreign embassies stand, positions around the 
airport and other areas. The deafening sound of gunfi re and mortar echo 
around the misty valleys of this once beautiful city. The sickening stench of 
bodies on the streets is common, despite the mass graves – some containing 
thousands of  bodies – which have been fi lling up. The United Nations 
operation in Rwanda was helpless as the carnage gathered pace. Now its 
commander, General Dallaire, is shuttling between the two sides trying to 
arrange a meeting, which might lead to a ceasefi re. The rebels have vowed to 
capture the whole city, but they have failed to take several key points because 
of government resistance. The battle for the Rwandan capital continues.
On 15 April, I reported on the decision by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross to suspend its operations in Rwanda following an attack on a Red 
Cross ambulance, during which six wounded being carried in the ambulance 
were killed at a roadblock. The report also noted the continued intensity of 
the military battle:
The fi ghting is fi erce. Mortar and heavy-calibre automatic weapons were 
heard at various times throughout the night. Tens of thousands of people 
have been killed in the last week in clashes, which have involved tribal militias 
at least as much as regular government and rebel troops. The capital of 
Rwanda is anarchic. UN peacekeepers have failed to stop the fi ghting but 
are trying at least to organize a meeting between the two sides.
Another report on 15 April painted a more detailed picture of the suffering 
on the ground:
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The displaced people I have been able to see in the capital are undoubtedly 
but a drop in the ocean of  human suffering caused by the political and 
military unrest. Five thousand Rwandans have taken refuge in a football 
stadium in which Bangladeshi UN soldiers are billetted and a similar number 
fl ed to a UN hospital. Thousands more are in churches or in other places 
of refuge. The 5,000 displaced in the main Kigali football stadium are being 
protected by the Bangladeshis, but have very little food, no running water 
and no medical supplies. Many of  them were wounded in the fi ghting or 
are suffering from malaria and other easily preventable diseases. There are 
several Rwandan doctors in the football stadium, but they have no drugs or 
bandages. The Bangladeshis have shared some of their combat rations with 
the refugees. At a makeshift clinic under one of the main spectator stands, 
a Rwandan volunteer was handing out small sachets of apricot jam to sick 
people. ‘It’s all we’ve got,’ he said. ‘I know it’s not medicine but I’ve got to 
give them something.’ With almost all United Nations civilians and other 
aid personnel evacuated from Rwanda, there are virtually no foreign aid 
organizations here to address the catastrophe caused by the war. The main 
exception is the International Committee of  the Red Cross, but even this 
organization has had considerable diffi culties operating. Several aid groups 
are said to be standing by in Nairobi to bring in much-needed food and 
medical supplies, but until the fi ghting dies down and airport security is 
guaranteed by the UN, aid fl ights can’t come in. The UN force commander 
said improving airport security was one of his top priorities. 
My reports over the next few days focused on the withdrawal of  Belgian 
troops, the appointment of Augustin Bizimungu as the new Rwandan army chief 
of staff, the government’s claim that two million people had been displaced by 
the fi ghting and the intense battle for strategic hilltops south of Kigali.
But a dispatch on 16 April, about attempts at ceasefi re talks, cited senior UN 
offi cers who said the killing of the president’s political opponents began soon 
after the 6 April plane crash:
The immediate aim of the talks is clearly a ceasefi re so a semblance of order 
can be restored to the capital. Currently, apart from the two warring military 
sides, there are militias, bandits and looters on the streets. Near-anarchy 
prevails and hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced by the 
war. There is no effective government and the RPF rebels don’t recognize 
the interim administration, which has now fl ed the capital and is based in the 
town of Butare in the south. Meanwhile, for the fi rst time since the president’s 
plane was brought down over a week ago, a clearer picture is emerging of 
what United Nations peacekeepers think happened after the crash. Senior 
UN offi cers say massacres of the president’s political opponents from both 
Tutsi and Hutu tribes began just a few minutes after the plane was brought 
down. UN offi cers said they appealed to the presidential guard to stop the 
killing, but failed. According to the UN offi cers, it was this mass killing 
which prompted the rebels to break out of their United Nations designated 
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cantonment to mount what the rebels described as a rescue mission. The 
city is now divided into government and rebel-held zones which ethnic and 
political militias are protecting as a fi rst line of defence. UN military offi cers 
said the rebels were also fi ghting for the northern towns of Ruhengeri and 
Byumba, which are held by government soldiers but which have come under 
rebel shelling. The UN asked for a pause in the shelling, so it could pull back 
some of its units to the capital.
A report the next day, 17 April, repeated the summary, by stating: 
It’s estimated that tens of  thousands of  people have been killed in Kigali 
since the president’s plane was brought down by still unknown gunmen. First 
the president’s supporters massacred his political opponents, then the rebels 
marched on the city and military clashes began …
An 18 April report gave some credence to the Rwandan army claim that the 
RPF had rounded up 250 civilians and killed them. But the report also stated 
that: 
Most independent eyewitness accounts of killings in the Rwandan capital 
in the last few weeks have accused government soldiers and militias loyal 
to the government of  killing political opponents in very large numbers. 
The presidential guard in particular is accused of massacring ethnic Tutsis 
and Hutu members of  political parties opposed to the late president who 
died when his plane was shot down almost two weeks ago by unknown 
gunmen.
Another fi le that day contained this reference: ‘Camps full of ethnic Tutsis, 
fl eeing violence from government-sponsored ethnic Hutu militias, are said by 
Rwandan army offi cers to have been created in several parts of the country.’
In a 19 April report about the withdrawal of UN military observers, I stated 
that: 
On the streets leading to the main government army base, militias armed 
with machetes are directed by soldiers and form a fi rst line of defence against 
rebels and rebel sympathizers, who are often taken by the militia to include 
any ethnic Tutsis.
Monitoring events from Nairobi on 20 April, I reported that ‘thousands of 
people have been killed with machetes and clubs by the government militia, 
who have targeted opposition sympathizers and members of the minority Tutsi 
tribe who dominate the rebels forces.’
And again on 22 April, I made a reference to ‘militias loyal to the memory 
of the Rwandan president who was killed in a plane crash two weeks ago. The 
militias are killing political and ethnic opponents of the late president in large 
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numbers.’ The same tone permeates my 23 April report, once again from Kigali, 
which is bolstered by information from the Red Cross: 
Massacres of ethnic or political opponents of the late president, who died in 
a plane crash which rekindled the war, are continuing. Most of the massacres 
are committed by militias loyal to the late president’s memory – sometimes 
with government army soldiers present. The Red Cross estimates that up to 
100,000 people have been killed in the past two weeks.
My report from Kigali on 24 April painted a clear picture of  what was 
happening on the ground:
It’s diffi cult to imagine the scale of  the human disaster in Rwanda unless 
you’ve seen some of the many piles of bodies heaped on the streets of Kigali 
and on roadsides in the rural areas. There is little dignity for the main victims 
of this war which General Dallaire reluctantly believes still has some time 
to run. The Canadian commander is keeping lines of communication open, 
is protecting those civilians that he can and is working hard for a ceasefi re. 
But he said it was not clear to him that the tactical aims of the two armies 
had yet been achieved. Most of the killing is being done not by soldiers or 
rebels, but by machete-wielding militias who seek out ethnic and political 
opponents. The worst killing so far has been in the capital and the worst 
culprits have been militias opposed to the ethnic group from which the rebels 
are drawn, the Tutsi. Other political opponents from the Hutu tribe have also 
been killed. While this slaughter continues, there is a more conventional war 
between the government and rebel armies taking place …
Short of using the word genocide, my report from Kigali on 26 April, echoing 
charges levelled by Amnesty International, challenged the notion that the killing 
was a simple tribal confl ict.
Amnesty’s main charge is that the killings have been part of  a deliberate 
political plan, rather than pure tribal violence. The main culprits, according to 
the human rights organisation, have been supporters of the late president who 
have systematically executed known or suspected opponents of his former 
rule. This thesis fi ts broadly with the facts. It was only a matter of minutes 
after the late night plane crash three weeks ago before elements of the former 
leader’s presidential guard began killing opponents of their late head of state. 
By morning the next day, militias loyal to President Habyarimana’s party were 
on the streets seeking out opposition sympathizers. They included members 
of the Tutsi tribe, from which the rebels draw most of their support and ethnic 
Hutus from opposition parties. According to the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, up to 100,000 people have been killed. Despite the undoubted 
political motivation behind many of the killings, it is nevertheless probable 
that the majority of those to have died are Tutsi. Politics and ethnicity are 
inextricably linked in Rwanda. While many Rwandan intellectuals, particularly 
154 INTERNATIONAL MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE GENOCIDE
opponents of the former president’s military rule oppose tribal politics, it is 
still a factor in most political calculations and is likely to be for some time 
to come.
Looking back through my reports, it appears I didn’t use the word ‘genocide’ 
until 29 April, in a report fi led from Nairobi that noted that the British aid 
agency Oxfam had described the killing in Rwanda as ‘genocide’. But my reports 
had for some time been replete with references to the massacres of Tutsi civilians 
and moderate Hutus by government-backed militias.
After that, as it became clear to me what was happening, I used the word 
genocide more often. But one of the problems we faced in reporting the genocide 
as genocide – apart from, of course, confi rming the facts on the ground – was 
that it took the rest of the world, including some of my editors in London, some 
time to take it in. I’m not saying I was censored, or anything like that. Far from 
it. I think every word I sent to London was rebroadcast. But the BBC often uses 
sources of information and interviewees other than its own correspondents on 
the ground. That’s quite right and healthy, of course, but it sometimes meant 
parts of the BBC were at odds with what I was saying. 
The fi rst problem was a general one. There is a general tendency to portray 
Africa as chaotic, the Dark Continent, and so on. Sometimes indeed, it is very 
dark. It was in Rwanda in 1994. But Rwanda was not, after a while, chaotic or 
impenetrable. It was, as we now know, a very well planned political and ethnic 
genocide. That didn’t really fi t the media image of chaotic Africa and various 
things fl owed from that. 
For example, I used to take regular calls from BBC editors in London asking 
me to make sure I ‘put the other side’. The implication, of course, was that the 
RPF must be killing as many as the Interahamwe and the government army, 
and that I should be reporting this. During calls like this, I had to control my 
inner fury at the implication that I was somehow biased. But, from a London 
perspective, I could see why they were asking the question. I told them what I 
knew, that this was not a balanced picture in terms of killings, and that was that 
– whether it fi tted what we might have expected or not. My editors trusted me 
and used my material, but I still had a feeling they were a bit uneasy. 
Sometimes, if  I took my eye off  the ball and didn’t carefully monitor the 
output from London, I found that BBC newsrooms in London would revert to 
using phrases like ‘chaos’ and ‘indiscriminate mass killings’. It wasn’t chaotic, on 
the whole, and it wasn’t, on the whole, indiscriminate. I sometimes found myself  
sending my editors what for me were highly unusual memos, not for broadcast, 
asking them please to stick to my words. In response they usually did.
I sent one such memo on 20 June, headed ‘Rwanda/Guidance.’ It read as 
follows:
It is a very serious misrepresentation of the situation in Rwanda to describe 
the killings simply as ‘the slaughter of civilians’ or ‘the mass killings,’ without 
explaining who is killing whom. The vast majority of  the hundreds of 
thousands of killings in Rwanda have been committed by the government 
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militia and government army who have been implementing a well-organized 
plan of genocide of Tutsis, the tribe from which the rebels draw most support, 
and ethnic Hutu government opponents. These killings preceded, or coincided 
with, the military offensive by the main[ly] Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front 
rebels. The BBC should not fall into the trap of  bland and misleading 
descriptions of  Africans massacring Africans without explaining why, as 
the news agencies are doing most of  the time. The killings in Rwanda are 
political as well as ethnic. A BBC correspondent who has spent much of the 
last three months in Rwanda says the government militia and the government 
armed forces are responsible for most of  the bodies being found in mass 
graves in Rwanda and fl oating in rivers leading from Rwanda to Lake Victoria 
in Uganda.
Nevertheless, the ‘spin doctors’ sometimes won bizarre victories. In July 1994, 
a few dozen British and American soldiers arrived at Kigali airport to help 
distribute some aid. The United States and British army media relations staff  
promptly announced to the world, in keeping with the usual image of Western 
troops arriving in Africa, that they had ‘taken control’ of the airport. This was, 
of course, ridiculous. The RPF was by this time in control of almost the whole 
country, and had been in complete control of the airport for many weeks. A 
few lines of  this ‘taken control of  the airport’ rubbish crept into BBC news 
bulletins written in London. The phrase gave the desired impression, of course, 
that the United States and the United Kingdom had fi nally arrived to sort out 
the squabbling natives, when this was complete nonsense. 
There were more serious attempts to ‘balance’ what was essentially an 
unbalanced story. A few weeks into the genocide, some RPF soldiers killed 
fi ve churchmen. I’m not sure of  the exact circumstances, but it was public 
knowledge soon afterward because the RPF leadership publicly denounced it. 
Newsrooms around the Western world seized on the killings with undisguised 
glee – it was as if  here, at last, was proof that the ‘other side’ was just as evil. 
The problem was, this was not the proof of moral equivalence that could make 
the world feel okay about dismissing the whole Rwanda business as African 
chaos. This was not the balancing item that would make it okay to forget about 
the genocide and say, with the warring parties at each other’s throats, nothing 
could be done. Five murders, condemnable and awful though they may be, 
cannot, in my book, equate with 5,000 or 50,000 or however many had been 
committed by the other side by that time. I believe that highlighting this case, 
giving it the prominence it got, was misleading. 
On another occasion, a senior spokeswoman for a UN agency told a press 
conference in Geneva that the Hutus in southwest Rwanda, who were mainly 
fl eeing the shooting war, had good reason to fear being massacred by the 
advancing RPF. At this point there was, to my knowledge, no evidence of mass 
killings by the RPF, and this UN spokeswoman was simply wrong. Perhaps she, 
too, was seeking a moral equivalence. But she had clearly not understood the 
difference between the shooting war and the genocide war, and who was doing 
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what to whom. And yet, as a senior UN offi cial, she surely should have done. 
Her remarks were given wide credence, but again, were misleading. 
I fi led this copy on 1 May:
The statement by the UNHCR spokeswoman, Sylvana Foa, to the effect 
that the mainly Hutu people in southeastern Rwanda are in danger of being 
massacred appears to be based on mis-information. Ms Foa said that the 
Hutus are desperately afraid of  the RPF and that tens of  thousands of 
them are in danger of  being massacred. The clear implication was that 
the rebels would do the massacring. A BBC correspondent who has spent 
much of the last three weeks in Rwanda, said there had been no convincing 
evidence of the RPF massacring civilians. The RPF have openly admitted 
to killing government militias whom they consider armed combatants. Our 
correspondent says it is likely that the Hutus in southeastern Rwanda are 
scared of the RPF military advance, because they don’t want to be caught 
in the crossfi re with government troops, but that the allegation that they 
fear being massacred by rebels does not appear to have any evidence to 
back it up. The vast majority of  the killing in Rwanda has been done by 
government militias, murdering ethnic Tutsis and Hutu members of  the 
opposition parties.
In addition to fi ling the news copy, I added this guidance to the desk: ‘I 
suggest that we do not broadcast Sylvana Foa’s statement about the alleged 
fear of massacres by the RPF until some convincing evidence emerges to back 
it up.’
After the front lines began to stabilize a bit in Kigali, I ventured out of the 
airport and away from the protection of the French military. I went into town 
on my own. My fi rst stop was the Mille Collines hotel. 
I managed to get a share of a room in the hotel and decided – rather foolishly, 
in retrospect – to go to the Red Cross hospital. It was a rather dangerous thing 
to do. But I suppose I’m pleased I ventured out because I learned a lot that 
day about the genocide war. There were about six roadblocks between the 
Mille Collines and the Red Cross, with militiamen and soldiers on them. As 
we made our way toward the hospital, there was a comparatively small number 
of bodies next to each roadblock. (This is of course an extraordinary way to 
describe dead fellow humans. But Rwanda seemed to change the way we all 
saw things, including the scale. Never before then would I have used a phrase 
like ‘a comparatively small number of bodies.’) 
With some bluffi ng we managed to get past the militiamen and reached the 
hospital. I was with fellow journalist Catherine Bond. We did the necessary 
interviews with Red Cross offi cials and patients and, after about two hours, 
started to make our way back to the hotel. The piles of bodies at the roadblocks 
had grown. For the fi rst time, I had personal eyewitness evidence that pro-
government militias were killing people. There was no doubt about it. I 
remember Catherine turning to me in the car and saying we should describe 
that road between the Mille Collines and the Red Cross as ‘Machete Avenue’. 
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‘If  they can have “Sniper Ally” in Sarajevo,’ she said, ‘we can have “Machete 
Avenue” in Kigali.’ 
I think I stayed at the Mille Collines for a few more days, then I became too 
scared by the militias at the doors, and I sought a kind of refuge at the Red Cross 
offi ces. The incredibly brave Red Cross representative, Philippe Gaillard, who 
used to cross the front lines every day doing his humanitarian work, tolerated 
me on his fl oor for a few days. But Philippe made it clear that I would be kicked 
out if  any of my reports ever compromised his neutrality. I didn’t like putting 
him in this position, so I moved out when I realized that the Meridien Hotel, on 
the other side of town, had some UN offi cials staying in it and, consequently, 
had a few Tunisian UN soldiers on guard.
Staying at the Meridien was surreal. The hotel was actually on the front line 
when I moved in and, again in retrospect, it was absurdly dangerous being there. 
The RPF had dug trenches in the road just outside the entrance lobby and we 
used to actually watch them exchanging fi re with the government forces. It 
was also surreal staying there because although two of the fl oors were full of 
refugees, one of the managers of the hotel had stayed on and still had the keys 
to the kitchens and the wine cellar. Every night she served us a meal, which we 
paid for in dollars and ate while the shooting war raged, literally, outside our 
front windows. 
A colleague from Reuters news agency had a bullet come through his window 
and into his bathroom. The most sought-after rooms were at the back. 
Gradually, the RPF won the initiative in the shooting war in the capital and 
took the area encompassing the UN headquarters at the Amahoro stadium, 
the Meridien Hotel and the airport. This meant that there was some freedom 
of movement in this area, and fairly quickly the UN headquarters became a 
focus of  my activity – it was a relatively safe place to be and the UN was a 
good source of information. Not all of the UN offi cials were happy for me to 
be there, but most came round after a bit of persuasion. Some of them let me 
go on trips with them and briefed me about their version of events. Ceasefi re 
meetings were held at the Amahoro and that meant I had regular access to 
both RPF and Rwandan government offi cials. This would have been impossible 
without the UN. 
General Dallaire himself  was quite canny with the press. He would talk to 
us when he could and was quite friendly. I remember once going to his room 
to interview him. I hadn’t shaved for several days, and the fi rst thing he did was 
to open his personal suitcase and give me a disposable razor. But at the same 
time, I realized that Dallaire was using the press. If  he turned up at a meeting 
with, say, Kagame or Bagasora, with a posse of journalists in tow, it allowed 
him to get the belligerents to say, on camera – when they wanted to of course 
– that they agreed with this or that ceasefi re proposal. 
I was quite happy to be used in this way if  it meant I got better access to the 
key actors in the two wars. 
But on one occasion I deeply regretted travelling with Dallaire to a ceasefi re 
negotiation. He went across Kigali, across the front line, to meet with the 
government side in the Mille Collines hotel. The top government army and 
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gendarmerie brass were there. After the talks, the press were invited in to record 
some prepared statements. At this ceremony, a senior gendarmerie offi cer 
suddenly started publicly berating the press, especially the BBC, for spending 
too much time with the RPF and not telling the government side of the story. 
Now, let’s be clear. There were very good reasons why we didn’t spend much 
time on the government side. It was hostile and extremely dangerous. For one 
thing, the RPF were winning the shooting war and the government positions 
were being overrun. For another, the genocide war was taking place on the 
government side and it was a distinctly unhealthy place to be, of  course for 
Rwandans, but also for foreign journalists. I’d been there many times and it 
was, quite frankly, terrifying. 
Nevertheless, some misplaced pride in my objectivity persuaded me to answer 
the gendarmerie offi cer’s complaints by saying, in public, that I would welcome 
the opportunity to accompany him on a visit to the government front lines. I 
regretted it almost as soon as I had opened my mouth, but I realized that once 
I had said it, I had to go through with it. 
And so I set off, very reluctantly, again with my colleague Catherine Bond, on 
a tour of government positions near the centre of Kigali and in the district of 
Nyamirambo. I deeply regretted our itinerary, in a government military vehicle, 
because I knew, from independent sources, that the RPF had fi ring positions 
in the hills above Nyamirambo. 
At one point a mortar round landed quite near to us, quite possibly targeting 
the offi cers I was travelling with. But, on the other hand, I did learn some 
important things that day. One, the killing was continuing. I saw a deep well full 
of bodies. And, two, the government military were working in direct collaboration 
with the civilian militia. I knew this because I saw it for myself. I saw the barriers 
with bodies next to them, and I drove in a car with army offi cers who ordered the 
civilian militiamen to let them through. I also saw a senior civilian militiaman 
give orders to men in uniform. It was direct collaboration. 
Once the RPF had more or less fi rm control of most of Kigali, more and 
more journalists started arriving in the capital by road from the north, and the 
RPF began showing us things for themselves, especially genocide sites. I went 
with them a few times including, once, to the church at Nyamata where several 
hundred people were killed. But on the whole I preferred to stay near the UN 
because that way I could get parts of both sides of the story, hitching rides with 
UN offi cers as they shuttled between the two sides. I travelled, for example, 
to Gitarama to interview Theodore Sindikubwabo, the man who was briefl y 
appointed interim president after the remnants of the government had fl ed the 
capital. I got there thanks to some friendly Ghanaian military observers. I also 
made many trips outside the capital independently. 
My last trip before leaving Rwanda in late July 1994 was an independent 
journey to the town of Gisenyi on the border with what was then known, and 
I still think of, as Zaire. The RPF had claimed to have taken Gisenyi, and since 
it would be the last major town to fall to them, meaning they would have won 
the shooting war, I decided to go and check. 
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Again, there is a crystal clear picture in my mind. Gisenyi was littered with 
red beer crates, which had been looted from the brewery, and the hills around 
the town were dotted every few metres with the little piles of stones Rwandans 
use to balance their cooking pots. Hundreds of thousands of Hutus had camped 
there, in the open, before fl ooding into Zaire as the genocidaires made what I 
am convinced they thought of, at the time, as a tactical retreat. 
There was a petrol tanker on fi re at a crossroads in Gisenyi where I met a 
tall RPF offi cer called Bruce Munyango. Someone had told him I was coming 
and he greeted me. As we shook hands, I noted that one fi nger was missing on 
his right hand. ‘I’m going to take you right up to the border,’ he said, ‘to show 
you we’re in full control.’ 
He did just that. The RPF had won one of  the wars, the shooting war. 
But it didn’t feel like a triumph, because the other side had almost won the 
genocide war.
13
Who Failed in Rwanda, 
Journalists or the Media?
Anne Chaon
Did the media fail in Rwanda? Or did individual journalists fail in Rwanda? In 
his analysis of the world’s reaction to the genocide in Rwanda, Alan Kuperman 
(2000) wrote in an International Press Institute report:
Western media blame the international community for not intervening 
quickly, but the media must share blame for not immediately recognizing 
the extent of the carnage and mobilizing world attention to it.
Kuperman says the media must share the blame for the world’s failure to 
stop the genocide. I would like to be the devil’s advocate, to explain a bit about 
how we worked as reporters in Rwanda in 1994.
Before I take issue with Kuperman’s point, let me cite a few words written by 
my friend and colleague Annie Thomas, the fi rst and principal Agence France-
Presse (AFP) special correspondent in Rwanda. She was based in Nairobi at 
the time, but left Kenya immediately after the 6 April 1994 attack on President 
Juvénal Habyarimana’s plane and took the fi rst fl ight to Bujumbura. Then she 
drove north into Rwanda and made her way to Kigali through Butare. (Annie 
is still with the AFP, now based in Dakar.) Here is what she wrote:
You ask me if  I think about Rwanda sometimes: much more than sometimes. 
It has become a kind of obsession.
An obsession because of the event itself: massacres, mutilated children; 
people I met on both sides: victims and killers. I still have some faces before 
my eyes. I had nightmares every night for at least two years and, since then, 
occasionally.
An obsession because of our inability to describe properly those events 
during the fi rst few days. Being caught in Kigali for a long time, fi rst on the 
Hutu side, and then on the RPF side, it was simply impossible to say that 
hundreds of thousands of people were killed. ‘Acts of genocide,’ or ‘genocide’ 
are words, which only came later.
An obsession because of the accusations that arose later against journalists 
who were there, especially those who were with the ‘genocidaires.’ As 
journalists, as an agency, we couldn’t avoid listening to them and quoting 
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them. Jean Helene (Radio France International correspondent, killed in 
Abidjan in the autumn of 2003) suffered a lot because of those accusations 
and even AFP, afterward, has been described as ‘Interahamwe.’ (Annie 
Thomas, AFP, personal communication, February 2004)
Annie spent weeks in Rwanda in 1994, at least three weeks a month for the 
fi rst three months. She spent most of her time in Kigali or in Gitarama and 
Butare. She was an eyewitness to a massacre at Kigali hospital on 11 April, 
when soldiers entered the premises, dragged injured young men from their beds, 
pushed them toward a pile of corpses in the yard and killed them with bayonets. 
She reported that scene the very same day on the wire. 
Later, she crossed the front line and joined other journalists who had come 
from Uganda to reach the RPF zone. ‘Honestly,’ she writes, ‘for my intellectual 
comfort, I would have been much more comfortable on that side than being 
with militiamen, their machetes still dripping with blood, professing how much 
they loved France’ (Annie Thomas, AFP, personal communication, February 
2004).
In the fi rst weeks of the genocide, from April to late June 1994, I was still in 
Paris, working on the desk at AFP, editing Annie’s copy. In late June, I went 
to Rwanda to report, mainly in the northwest of  the country, the heartland 
of the former President Habyarimana, where militias were acting as the real 
authority.
It is important to understand what it was like to work as a journalist in 
Rwanda. There was shelling. There were hundreds of thousands of people on 
the roads. There were bombs. There was a civil war. There were roadblocks with 
militias, drunk or stoned, with grenades, machetes, AK-47s. 
The militia would come to get Tutsis. They would ask people for their ID 
cards and check journalists’ papers. They were looking for two RFI French 
journalists, Monique Mass and Jean Hélène, to kill them – just because they 
were able to understand their broadcasts, which were in French (they may not 
have heard the BBC broadcasts or read the newspapers). They also described 
their position very simply: Hutu majority; Tutsi minority. That’s what we worked 
on reporting every day, every hour for radio.
Did the media fail in Rwanda? Yes, defi nitely. Did journalists fail in Rwanda? 
No.
Journalists who went to Rwanda were very strongly committed to being there 
– to report and to testify. Even journalists from France, where the authorities 
were so involved with the Habyarimana regime, did as much as they could.
During three months of  genocide, from 7 April to the beginning of  July 
when the rebels came into Kigali, AFP was one of the rare media outlets to 
speak out. Sometimes, we were virtually the only international agency on the 
ground. Mark Doyle from the BBC also stayed most of the time, as did Radio 
France International (RFI). But very few media were there all the time. Why? 
Aspiring young journalists should not forget that the media are businesses. 
Media companies want to be profi table and such reporting costs a lot of money, 
particularly if  it involves the use of satellite phones.
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Another factor was the international situation at the time, the global context. 
In Bosnia, Gorazde was under siege and was bombed for weeks. South Africa 
was holding its fi rst multiracial elections, celebrating the end of apartheid. In 
the United States, people were more interested in O.J. Simpson than Rwanda. 
The French were concerned by the death of Ayrton Seyna, the Brazilian formula 
1 driver. 
At the international level at that time, people were more interested in Bosnia 
than Rwanda. The confl ict in Bosnia had started in 1992 and in Yugoslavia 
in 1991. The genocide in Rwanda would have to have lasted for two or three 
years to garner as much media attention as Bosnia. What we saw in the media 
in France was similar to that in North America. There was very little coverage 
of the genocide. 
Nonetheless, AFP kept at least two people in Rwanda, usually more. After 
the expatriates had been evacuated, in mid-April, most of  the media pulled 
their journalists out for safety reasons. They would come back later, especially 
in June, with the French intervention. But AFP’s Annie Thomas stayed, along 
with representatives from RFI, the BBC and a handful of  others. At times, 
AFP was the only wire service on the ground in Rwanda.
In a 1996 study, Garth Myers and colleagues (1996) compared news coverage 
of  Rwanda and Bosnia in six major American newspapers: The New York 
Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Christian Science 
Monitor and Boston Globe. In April 1994, there were twice as many articles 
about the confl ict in Bosnia as Rwanda.
In all of 1994, the French daily Le Monde published 1,665 articles on Bosnia 
and only 576 on Rwanda. And the Rwanda tally includes coverage of  the 
evacuation of foreigners and the outbreak in June and July of cholera in the 
Zaire refugee camps (Rabechault 2000). Among the articles in Le Monde, more 
than 60 per cent were short pieces, mainly news agency dispatches. In other 
words, some 220 articles on Rwanda that appeared in Le Monde that year were 
not bylined pieces by the newspaper’s own journalists, nor their own analysis 
or commentary.
Most journalists are not experts in genocide. Many of them – myself included 
– arrived in Rwanda with very little knowledge of the country. So, it was tempting, 
especially at the beginning, to speak of the civil war, of these massacres as a 
perverse return of a civil war, and to link these massacres to previous massacres 
since 1959. We failed to understand that the killing was something totally new, 
that this was not a continuity of what had happened before.
During those fi rst few days in April, special correspondents were much more 
likely to use words like ‘chaos’, ‘anarchy’ and ‘furore’. They were reporting on 
a resumption of the civil war. In the fi eld, it was easy to be confused and view 
the massacres as a ‘side effect’ of the fi ghting. 
Then, on 12 April, the main story became the evacuation of foreigners and 
the closing of  embassies. A special correspondent for the French public TV 
channel recalls that he had very strict orders: cover the evacuation of the French 
people, then get out. Actually, most of the TV teams came and left with the 
military planes.
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Newspapers generally gave the same amount of space to the evacuation as to 
the massacres, then reduced their coverage of Rwanda to focus on Bosnia and 
the elections in South Africa. Photographers arrived quickly, but what they got 
were pictures of corpses, never photos of massacres at the moment they took 
place. To my knowledge, there is only one video image of a massacre taking 
place (the fi lm shot by British camerman, Nick Hughes, in April 1994).
Patrick Robert, from Sygma Corbis Agency, explained that a month after he 
returned to Paris from Rwanda, he had still sold almost none of his pictures 
from Rwanda. He was there, but no one wanted to see. Journalists were there: 
but who would listen to them, or read their stories?
The fi rst time AFP used the term ‘genocide’ was on 20 April. In the weeks 
before, AFP referred to ‘massacres’, ‘killings’, ‘ethnic cleansing’. It was all too 
easy to link the situation with the past, to recall the waves of killings in Rwanda 
since 1959 and also in Burundi with massacres that followed the October 1993 
assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye.
AFP’s use of  the term ‘genocide’ was in the context of  a report quoting 
Human Rights Watch, which had warned the United Nations (UN) against 
reducing the extent of its mission in Rwanda. The executive director of Human 
Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth, said in New York that ‘Rwandans, mostly Tutsis, 
could face certain death in what would amount to genocide.’
AFP used the term again on 28 April, this time quoting Médecins Sans 
Frontières, and again on 3 May, quoting the Council of Europe. On 16 May, 
the French foreign minister, Alain Juppe, referred to ‘genocide’ in Rwanda. 
Finally, ‘genocide’ came into common media usage when the UN Committee 
for Human Rights adopted a resolution – on 25 May – acknowledging that 
genocide was being perpetrated in Rwanda.
We all know now why the international community was so reluctant to qualify 
the situation so strongly. Using the word genocide would have necessitated 
action, under the genocide convention (UN 1951). For weeks, AFP and other 
media used the word only if  it was able to quote a source using that term. 
Thanks to Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières and others, 
the reality of the genocide fi nally made its way into the media. As journalists, we 
probably avoided many errors because of these nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs). In my view, the NGOs and independent organizations did an excellent 
job, conducting inquiries and producing reports. But for weeks, the media 
underestimated what was actually going on in Rwanda.
Is it the reporter’s fault? I would say no. Even if they did not have the complete 
picture of what was going on in the whole country, they described what was 
happening. Reporting on a daily basis – on an hourly basis for a wire service, 
if  you consider that you’re almost always on a deadline for some part of the 
world – they had to provide an overall picture of the situation: fi ghting between 
government troops and the RPF, rebel progress, attempts to reach a ceasefi re 
agreement, political developments, refugees and displaced people and also, of 
course, killings.
In my view, the media failure came much more from those who were out of 
the country, in Paris, London, Washington and Ottawa. Given all the material 
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coming in from the fi eld, editors should have the responsibility to qualify the 
events. But news agencies are very careful about the use of words. At AFP we 
have a strong policy about the use of words and we have often been too cautious. 
In 1989, in Timisoara, northern Romania, some reporters described mass graves, 
with dozens of  corpses, including babies. The truth was far from this: the 
graves actually contained dead from a nearby hospital, the baby was stillborn. 
After this outrageous mistake, editors at AFP, like others, too often decided 
that emotional factors were overwhelming a reporter in the fi eld.
Another glaring failure of the media occurred at the very end of the genocide, 
when the French began ‘Operation Turquoise’ in southwest Rwanda. Dozens 
of reporters returned to the country. Although they were able at that time to 
discover the enormity of the killing campaign in this area – in such places as 
Kibuye, Cyangugu and Bisesero – they also reported on the humanitarian and 
military intervention from abroad. The result was that the reality of genocide 
was, once again, submerged in too much information.
It became worse in mid-July, when a million Hutus crossed the border 
into Zaire and cholera fl ared up in the camps. The humanitarian catastrophe 
overwhelmed the real story of the genocide. Everybody ran to Goma, because 
the story there was so easy to cover. After months of  genocide, the issue of 
good guys and bad guys disappeared completely. The enemy was cholera, but 
no political issue surrounded cholera in the camps. It seemed as if  journalists 
were more comfortable covering cholera than genocide. 
But there are some other basic facts to remember. There is what one would 
call in French ‘le concept du rapport mort/kilometre’ – in essence, the notion that 
deaths at home or close to home seem to matter more than those at a distance. 
So fi ve French dead are more important to French readers than ten German 
dead and more important than one hundred African dead. In this sense, the 
news media refl ect the public’s state of mind. 
As well, during the spring of 1994, while events were unfolding in Rwanda, 
those who wanted to know what was going on, knew. The details arrived late, 
but those who wanted to know, knew. Reporters were there, not all the time, 
but often. And their testimony was emerging from Rwanda. AFP was almost 
always there. The BBC was there. Individual reporters in the fi eld showed their 
determination. They wanted to report, to bear witness to the killing. 
To answer Alan Kuperman, I would say, ‘Yes we missed the Rwanda genocide.’ 
But Kuperman wrote in 2000, six years after the event. Journalists are neither 
historians nor sociologists. They do not work in the quiet of their study. Their 
reports become part of history, but history is knitted day by day, before their 
eyes. They don’t benefi t from the distance required to quickly understand the 
whole scene.
To their credit, individual journalists kept on working in Rwanda in the 
months and years that followed the genocide. American newspapers were 
eventually able to tell the truth about the UN and Rwanda, about Lieutenant 
General Roméo Dallaire’s famous 11 January fax. French newspapers were 
able to push for the establishment of  an information mission on Rwanda in 
the national assembly. It was far from a full commission of inquiry, but it was 
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the fi rst time that parliament questioned the presidency and the government 
about foreign policy. And a clear picture emerged of the ties between Paris and 
Kigali in the early 1990s and well into the spring of 1994.
A fi nal word: what can the media do when the world doesn’t want to listen 
or to hear?
And what about Africa itself, so silent except for the Organization of African 
Unity’s attempts to convene a summit to achieve a ceasefi re? In mid-May 1994, 
we asked all the AFP offi ces in Africa to send to Paris press reviews and remarks 
in the African media on the Rwanda issue. What reactions had they picked up 
in the press and among intellectuals? What actions, if  any, were undertaken? 
Were there any demonstrations? Any concerts like the Band Aid effort years 
earlier for Ethiopia? 
But our survey of African media coverage found the same troubling apathy 
that was prevalent in the Western media – with only a few exceptions. In the end, 
we wrote a synthesis of the African reports under the headline: ‘The deepening 
silence in Africa on the drama in Rwanda’ (Anon. 1994).
After the genocide, we all tried to understand how the world missed the 
Rwanda story. But in the end, I can only conclude that for those of  us who 
thought their work could change something in the world, Rwanda was a cruel 
disillusionment, a major failure. Reporters were there. Pictures were available. 
Stories were fi led. But if  readers, if  the people you speak to do not want to 
listen, you can’t force them. They can just turn the dial. And editors can refuse 
to publish your reports. 
A fi nal example: some time ago, in early 2004, Roméo Dallaire gave a terrifi c 
interview to TF1, the most popular French TV channel. It was broadcast in 
prime time. For such a channel, it was a very courageous move to broadcast the 
interview, but the audience declined. The number of people listening decreased 
during the programme.
Those who don’t want to listen shut their ears. That’s what happened for 
Rwanda. We can say, ‘Oh it’s the fault of  the United States that didn’t want 
to intervene. It’s the fault of the government of France.’ But the public could 
have done something.
When I returned from Rwanda in 1994, I went to my little village in eastern 
France. A fi sherman said, ‘Oh were you there? Well, don’t talk about it any 
more. We’ve had enough. We see these terrible pictures at 8 p.m., right when 
we’re eating. But what can we do? We can’t do anything.’ 
For a long time I never spoke to anyone about Rwanda and when I did it 
was when the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda called on me three 
years later to ask me for details about some of my reporting. In the meantime, 
I understood that no one else wanted to hear from me about Rwanda. I could 
not force them to listen, nor did I want to.
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Reporting Rwanda: 
the Media and the Aid Agencies
Lindsey Hilsum
In late July 1994, some 500 journalists and media technicians gathered in the 
town of Goma in eastern Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) 
to cover the influx of  an estimated one million Rwandan refugees. They 
brought with them the technology of instant, ‘real time’ news: satellite uplinks 
for transmitting pictures and sound, satellite phones for sending newspaper 
copy and computer equipment connected to satellite phones to transmit still 
photographs.
From the point of  view of  aid workers trying to cope with the needs of 
refugees, the journalists were in many ways a nuisance. They added to the chaos 
of clogged roads. They infl ated the cost of hiring a car or an interpreter. Nurses 
resuscitating children with cholera found themselves tripping over tripods and 
cameramen looking for a better angle.
But aid agency press offi cers – ever mindful of the hot competition for funds 
back home – pursued journalists, proffering not only updates and interviews, 
but free transport and accommodation in return for covering their agency’s 
programme. The aid agencies needed the journalists, and the journalists needed 
the aid agencies.
In Britain, Newsnight called it ‘the largest ever concentration of  refugees 
in recorded history.’ The exodus and the subsequent cholera epidemic became 
a huge story around the world. It led television news bulletins in Europe and 
North America for two to three weeks and was front-page news in the British 
tabloids, which rarely cover Africa. Rwanda was on the front page of the New 
York Times for six weeks in July and August.
But the public did not understand the complex political causes of the exodus 
to Goma. And they were probably not understood by many of the journalists 
who covered Goma as a humanitarian story, nor by the dozens of  young, 
inexperienced aid workers for whom Goma was their fi rst mission.
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The events that led up to the exodus – the massacre of  Rwanda’s Tutsi 
population and moderate Hutu opposition and the war between Rwandan 
government forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) – were given far less 
space and airtime. In most Western countries, with the exception of the former 
colonial power, Belgium, coverage was largely restricted to ‘serious’ newspapers 
and some radio and television reports. The story was dangerous to cover and 
diffi cult to understand. It was a big story, but not a massive one.
This is not a new issue: in the late 1960s, coverage of the war in Biafra had 
little impact on the public as long as the story was Africans killing Africans. The 
moment the story became pitiful – skeletal African babies dying of starvation 
– the imagination and the conscience of the public was engaged and it became 
a massive story.
Decades after Biafra, a number of  new factors are relevant to this study. 
First, satellite technology means TV reports can be transmitted and broadcast 
as they happen rather than days or weeks after fi lming. Second, a proliferation 
of aid agencies are competing for funds. Third, the international climate has 
changed since the end of the Cold War, and Western governments have little 
strategic or political interest in Africa. These factors have implications for the 
way coverage of humanitarian disasters affects aid policy and practice.
In this paper, I attempt to clarify the role the media played in the humanitarian 
effort in Rwanda and on its borders in 1994. The fi rst part provides the context 
of the disaster and pointers about how media infl uence works. The second part 
is a chronology of the coverage until the exodus to Goma, with reference to 
the relation between aid agencies and the media. The third part is an analysis 
of  the impact of media presence and coverage on the aid effort in Goma. It 
concludes with a number of points for further discussion.
CONTEXT: A FOREIGN POLICY VACUUM
In most Western countries there is a vacuum where there used to be a policy on 
Africa. The vacuum is fi lled by aid, much of it directed through nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs). 
Western countries had no policy to prevent or stop the killing in Rwanda 
or to contain the fl ow of  refugees. They did not actively back the RPF or 
the government. The only exception was France, which pursued a complex 
policy in which a military intervention with several aims was characterized as 
humanitarian.
Media infl uence in the foreign policy vacuum
According to Nik Gowing (1995), former diplomatic editor of ITN’s Channel 
Four News and now a BBC World presenter, ‘Neither TV journalists nor 
humanitarian organisations should delude themselves about the impact of 
their images on the making of foreign policy’ (for further detail, see Gowing 
1994). Certainly, editorials and pressure from aid agencies failed to persuade 
the West to intervene when the killing was at its height in April, May and early 
June 1994.
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The high-profi le response of governments to the humanitarian crisis in Goma 
came as thousands of members of the public – voters – gave money to NGOs 
and demanded that ‘something should be done.’
I would argue that dispatching water trucks from California or logisticians 
from Frankfurt in response to TV pictures of bodies being tipped into the 
cholera pits of Goma was not a fundamental foreign policy switch designed 
to end a crisis. It was a knee-jerk, high-profi le response, which carried little 
political risk or cost. It made good television. It also gave the impression of 
engagement and deep concern at a time when – in President Clinton’s case 
– domestic policies like healthcare reform and gun control had hit the rocks. 
(Gowing 1995)
Governments failed to come to the aid of the victims of genocide, but provided 
succour to many of the perpetrators. It was, of course, much easier to provide 
humanitarian aid than to try to prevent or stop the genocide, and how much 
outside powers could have done is still arguable. But the relatively light coverage 
of the genocide and the heavy coverage of the refugee crisis helped governments 
appear to be responding to the most important aspect of the drama.
It was not the intention of  aid agencies or journalists to help Western 
governments use humanitarian aid as a fi g leaf  for the lack of  policy on 
genocide. One can cite several examples of in-depth coverage and criticism of 
the failures of  the United Nations (UN) and national governments. But the 
issue is quantity of coverage. One of the major outcomes of the imbalance in 
reporting of different aspects of the story was that governments were able to 
hide behind a humanitarian screen.
Relation between aid workers and journalists
‘The media presence changed the perception of the Rwandan crisis in a very 
damaging way,’ said Anne-Marie Huby, who was executive director of Médecins 
Sans Frontières (MSF)–UK in the mid-1990s. ‘In the general public’s memory, 
the Rwanda crisis was people who die of  cholera. I think people forgot the 
long-lens coverage of genocide. [In Goma,] I remember CNN saying “This is 
genocide again.” We told the reporter that dying of diseases is not genocide.’
The distinction was not as important to CNN as to Huby. ‘We see a 
compelling news story, not whether it’s genocide or refugees or whatever,’ said 
Larry Register, senior international editor at the time at CNN’s headquarters 
in Atlanta. ‘Rwanda was such a straightforward story – a humanitarian tragedy 
unfolding daily.’
There is something ironic about an aid worker telling a journalist that a 
medical tragedy is not the key event. Aid workers, after all, were a major part 
of  the humanitarian story and Samantha Bolton, then the MSF’s regional 
information offi cer for East Africa and spokesperson in Goma, was interviewed 
on British television more than any other aid agency offi cial in Goma during 
the fi rst week of the crisis (Glasgow Media Group 1994).But MSF–France did 
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have a clear idea of its own limitations – in May it launched a campaign with 
the slogan ‘You can’t stop genocide with doctors.’
But the interest of  journalists in covering humanitarian aid sometimes 
overwhelms their responsibility to expose underlying issues. Timothy Weaver 
of FirstLine News, wrote:
During the emergency period [of  a humanitarian disaster] the difference 
between a humanitarian agency and the media should be at its most marked. 
The aid agency should be concerned with delivering aid, and the news agency 
should be reporting what is happening. Yet nowadays the two tend to be 
blurred. The aid agencies are the news, and the news becomes a charity 
appeal. Reporters become crusaders, demanding action to be taken, money 
to be spent, and something to be done (but not by me, because I am off to 
my next assignment, thank you very much). (Weaver 1995)
In a situation like Goma, where the human tragedy was so desperate and so 
visual, it is inevitable that some blurring will occur. But reporting on Goma 
should not be seen in isolation. From Afghanistan to Somalia, wars in what used 
to be called the Third World are increasingly being reported with an emphasis 
on the humanitarian over the political or military. This is partly because editors 
think their viewers and readers have a limited interest in complex political events 
far away. It is also a refl ection of the lack of political or strategic interests of 
outside powers – the political story is remote because it does not involve us.
Moreover, the aid worker and the journalist are often the only foreigners 
in a dangerous and threatening situation. They speak the same language and 
they stick together. Their perspectives merge and it becomes hard to maintain 
strictly distinct roles.
CHRONOLOGY OF MEDIA COVERAGE OF RWANDA UP TO 1994
October 1990 – RPF invades Rwanda
The story of the fi rst three years of the war and the 1993 Arusha accords was 
scarcely covered at all in the anglophone press. It received regular attention 
from BBC World Service radio and TV. The French and Belgian media covered 
it more because of former colonial and linguistic ties.
September 1993 – attempted coup and refugee crisis in Burundi
The killing of  between 50,000 and 100,000 Burundians and the subsequent 
exodus of 700,000 people to Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire was not big news in 
Britain or the United States. It was slightly bigger in France and much bigger 
in Belgium. Aid agencies lobbied for coverage and failed. In the end, Oxfam 
offered to fl y George Alaigiah, then BBC TV developing world correspondent, 
to Bujumbura. The images Alaigiah came back with were strong and the story 
compelling, but they did not spark more coverage. After seeing the BBC reports, 
Sue Inglish, associate editor of Channel Four News, said ‘they kicked themselves 
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for not sending a reporter,’ but once the BBC had carried the story felt they 
had missed the boat.
Anglophone aid agencies that were already in the region strengthened their 
emergency programmes, but most of the aid agencies that went out in response 
to the emergency were French and Belgian.
It is hard to say defi nitively why this huge massacre and humanitarian disaster 
did not capture the attention of the press. At the time, the media were dominated 
by the Middle East peace agreement – the handshake between Yasser Arafat and 
Yitzak Rabin on the White House lawn took place on 13 September. Previous 
massacres in Burundi – in 1988, for example – had been covered in a similarly 
limited way in anglophone countries. There was a sense of déjà vu and a lack 
of interest in the complex political causes of the tragedy.
December 1993 – food for Burundi refugees dries up
The World Food Programme (WFP) failed to get enough food to the Burundi 
refugees in Rwanda. The WFP said the problem was insuffi cient resources from 
donors and ineffi ciency and corruption within the agencies distributing food. 
NGOs and donors blamed a weak WFP offi ce in Kigali for incompetence in 
managing the food pipeline and reducing rations without informing anyone. 
Thousands of children began to die of diseases related to malnutrition, and 
MSF used the media to bring pressure on the WFP.
‘If  we really want to put pressure on the UN or the donors, we’ll work out 
where the weakness is and expose it,’ said Samantha Bolton of  MSF. ‘They 
generally react to media pressure – they’re petrifi ed of bad publicity.’ Bolton, 
who was based in Nairobi, briefed the Nairobi press corps and organized trips 
to the affected camps. ‘It became a huge scandal and there was a lot of interest. 
Because WFP was so frightened, they started pumping out press releases. It 
made them much more effi cient.’
This use of  the media to pressure the UN and donors is typical of  MSF. 
Other NGOs, anxious to maintain good working relations with UN agencies 
on the ground, are more reluctant to go public and prefer to talk to journalists 
off  the record. One result of Bolton’s work was that the WFP scandal brought 
the forgotten story of the Burundi refugees back into the news.
Whether the WFP in Kigali became more effi cient because of direct media 
pressure is open to question. By March, the food pipeline was being managed 
more effi ciently. Donors, including Echo, had been leaning on the WFP, which 
had sent senior staff  to Kigali to try to sort out the problem. It seems likely 
that the media pressure did not work directly on WFP in Kigali but on donors 
and on the WFP in Rome and Nairobi.
January–April 1994 – build up to the crisis
The mounting tension as President Habyarimana delayed implementing the 
Arusha accords received little coverage in the anglophone press and only slightly 
more in the francophone. The media were dominated by the violent build-up to 
the South African elections – at this point, Chief Buthelezi was still boycotting 
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the poll. Rwanda was a very diffi cult story to report, requiring good contacts 
and an understanding of Rwandan politics.
6 April 1994 – the plane comes down, the massacres start
When the plane carrying presidents Habyarimana and Ntaryamira was shot 
down over Kigali, there were two foreign correspondents in Kigali: Katrin van 
der Schoot, a freelance Flemish reporter for Belgian radio; and Lindsey Hilsum 
(the author of this paper), in Rwanda on a temporary contract for UNICEF 
and normally a freelance reporter for the BBC, Guardian and Observer.
Some Nairobi-based journalists managed to move south from Uganda with 
the RPF. Others persuaded a WFP offi cial in Entebbe to fl y them into Kigali 
on a plane being used to evacuate foreigners. Others drove up from Burundi. 
For most of April, there were no more than 10–15 reporters in the country at 
any time.
After foreign embassies and most aid workers left Rwanda at the end of the 
second week of April, the only real sources of information in Kigali were these 
journalists and the UN contingent. Journalists travelling with the RPF were 
strictly supervised.
Although most of the journalists were Africa specialists, even they did not 
understand what was happening at fi rst. With a shooting war in the east and the 
north and massacres in much of the country, for most of April it was genuinely 
confusing. The journalists in Kigali depended on the UN for protection. After 
a while, the UN limited their numbers, saying it could not accommodate more 
than half a dozen or so. The journalists were mainly British, French and Belgian. 
Most United States reporters had been ordered to leave by their employers 
because the situation was too dangerous. A French cameraman was shot and 
injured in Kigali. 
It was extremely diffi cult to cover the story thoroughly. ‘It was a story we 
wanted to tell but it was appallingly dangerous,’ explained Mike Jermey of 
ITN, which sent a staff  correspondent to Rwanda in May. Mark Doyle was in 
Kigali for most of April and May reporting for the BBC. His reports indicating 
the progress of  the RPF advance and the scale of  the civilian slaughter by 
government forces were frequently broadcast on the BBC World Service. When 
another BBC reporter, Fergal Keane, was stopped at a checkpoint near Butare 
in late May, the machete-wielding thugs manning it said that if  they ever saw 
Doyle they would kill him.
There was no ‘real time’ TV news because it was too risky to send an expensive 
satellite uplink into Rwanda. Channel Four News had reports from Catherine 
Bond, who had covered the war since 1990, but these were not ‘real time’ so their 
impact was limited. ‘There were a number of attempts to get in, but it looked so 
disastrous and we could not get the pictures out,’ said Sue Inglish of Channel 
Four News. The fi rst satellite uplink was erected in Kigali in late May, after the 
RPF had secured the airport and most of the massacres were over.
In April and early May, the media had little infl uence on the aid agencies, but 
were an important source of information because most agencies had lost touch 
with their local staff (many of whom were dead, while others were participating 
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in the killing). Agencies distributed goods to a trickle of refugees in neighbouring 
countries and managed to get some supplies to people in locations guarded by 
the UN. They stockpiled goods and held anxious meetings in Bujumbura trying 
to prepare for a likely exodus of refugees. The media coverage of these efforts 
did not spur aid agency supporters to send money. ‘It looked like a bloodbath, a 
civil war, so sending money wasn’t going to help,’ said one press offi cer working 
with a US-based organization.
Agencies such as Oxfam concentrated on advocating UN intervention to stop 
the killing. Others tried to publicize small efforts at humanitarian aid.
Benaco and Ngara – the story takes off
The fi rst large wave of refugees crossed into Tanzania on 28 April, the last day 
of voting in the South African elections.
‘For me the world became aware of Rwanda on the 29th April,’ said Geoff 
Lone, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regional 
delegation for East Africa. ‘Suddenly it was a humanitarian problem. The 
refugee situation translated the crisis into terms which could be understood 
by the world at large.’
By this time, news editors were aware that something major was going on 
and they were missing it because it was too dangerous and too complicated. 
But Benaco was much, much easier. It was safe – neither the journalists nor 
the expensive satellite equipment were at risk. It was accessible – the Red Cross 
would fl y you direct from Nairobi. The story made sense – refugees fl eeing war, 
being looked after by aid workers. And, for TV, the visual images were very 
strong but not so offensive that you could not show them.
News organizations started to pull reporters out of South Africa, where the 
smooth electoral process had made the story less eventful than predicted, and 
send them to Tanzania.
Of  course, the story was not simple – were these people fl eeing war or 
retribution? Were they victims or perpetrators? But the images were simple 
and recognizable: Africans on the move, living in camps, at the mercy of the 
generosity of the outside world. The aid agencies, thrilled that at last there was 
something concrete they could do, fl ocked to Benaco and eventually had their 
numbers restricted by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
As money began to fl ow in to fundraisers in Europe and the United States, 
competition for media coverage became acute. One press offi cer relates how 
the Red Cross hospital was at the entrance to Benaco, next to the camp where 
journalists slept. ‘It was impossible to get the journalists out of the hands of 
the Red Cross.’
May – genocide continues while the UN dithers
By May, more journalists were trying to cover the genocide, but it was still very 
diffi cult and dangerous to get access except via Uganda under the watchful 
eyes of the RPF.
Newspaper editorials and opinion pieces (‘op-eds’) by human rights workers 
or aid agency offi cials advocated UN intervention to stop the killing. This had 
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some infl uence within the UN. Karel Kovanda, Czech ambassador to the UN 
and a member of  the Security Council at the time, pushed hard for the UN 
Security Council’s 17 May Resolution to send 5,500 troops to Rwanda to try 
to stop the genocide. Kovanda said the turning point was an op-ed by Human 
Rights Watch, published in The New York Times in mid-April. ‘It explained the 
role of France arming Habyarimana and so on. That article was an eye-opener, 
a key to understanding Rwanda,’ Kovanda said. He contacted the writer, Alison 
Des Forges, and she provided him and other concerned members of the Security 
Council with information to supplement (and at times contradict) what they 
heard through offi cial channels.
Aid agencies and editorials pressured Western countries to back up the 17 
May Security Council Resolution. But the United States, bruised by its failure 
in Somalia, scuppered the plan by quibbling over details and delaying sending 
equipment that the African peacekeepers were to use.
In the end, it was the RPF that stopped the genocide by winning the war. It 
is interesting to note that no NGOs and few journalists were advocating that 
Western countries take a political stance and back the rebels.
Operation Turquoise – the French intervene
There was limited coverage of Rwanda in the French press after the withdrawal 
of French military trainers and embassy staff from Kigali in mid-April. During 
May, when the full horror of genocide was emerging, liberal newspapers such as 
Libération challenged the role France had played in arming the Habyarimana 
regime.
The French administration was divided about what to do and some parts 
of  the media started to push for action – what kind of  action was unclear. 
‘The military offi cers who disagreed with the decision on 8 April to withdraw 
everything used press coverage to say the decision had been racist, because [the 
government] didn’t care about people in Africa,’ said Stephen Smith, then Africa 
editor of Libération. ‘They used the media as a tool within the state apparatus, 
saying the French colonial past was being betrayed. So the media was used in 
the context of rivalry within the state apparatus, rather than as overall pressure 
on a coherent, monolithic state.’
MSF–France, with its campaign of ‘You can’t stop genocide with doctors,’ 
fed into the calls for action, and its campaign – which was purely advocacy – 
nonetheless brought in signifi cant donations from the public. But when President 
Mitterand announced in mid-June that he was sending troops unilaterally rather 
than as part of a UN contingent, MSF–France was against the move because 
French troops were seen as politically aligned with the government that was 
committing genocide.
When [French troops] intervened in the southwest and didn’t show 
independence from the former government, we in other MSF sections were 
very angry. When one MSF makes a mistake it becomes a problem for all the 
others. The French prime minister’s ratings went through the roof. Antenne 2 
was practically writing lines for visiting generals – there was collusion between 
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the press and the army. It was impossible for MSF to raise any dissenting 
voice. (Anne-Marie Huby, MSF–UK, interview)
The French government had motives too complex to explore in this report, 
but humanitarianism was the factor they wanted to advertise. They had backed 
the Hutu government and they wanted to be seen saving Tutsis.
Stephen Smith agrees that the coverage in France of  the French army’s 
‘humanitarian mission’ was largely positive. ‘The broad public opinion is that 
France was the only nation to care about human suffering. They did something 
and then got out, but by that time everyone wanted them to stay. Most people 
would say it was a success.’
When the French press started to criticize MSF for refusing to cooperate 
with the French army in southwest Rwanda, Samantha Bolton was dispatched 
to make MSF’s case. ‘It was a disaster for MSF,’ she said. ‘There were constant 
quotes like Colonel Gil saying “medical organizations whose job it is to do 
medical work refuse to do it. They are letting children die.”’
The problem was image rather than money. MSF looked inconsistent because 
it had called for intervention then didn’t like the result.
Bolton had more luck with the anglophone press, but although all major 
British TV and print media were there, as well as CNN (although not the 
American networks), June was a low point for coverage in the English-speaking 
world. This made it hard for NGOs to raise funds, even though they were 
now active in Tanzania, Burundi and some in the French protection zone. 
CARE–USA ran an advertisement in the major American newspapers (The
New York Times, Washington Post, Boston Globe, etc.) and the response did 
not even cover its costs. In July after Goma, an almost identical advertisement 
did phenomenally well.
From April to June, the UN had come under considerable criticism in the 
media for failing to do anything. The Security Council, Secretariat, Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations, UNAMIR and the specialized agencies were all 
portrayed as impotent and useless. The French intervention pointed up the 
UN’s failure.
THE IMPACT OF MEDIA PRESENCE AND 
COVERAGE ON THE AID EFFORT IN GOMA
The impact of  the media on the aid effort in Goma is diffi cult to defi ne or 
quantify because aid agencies are reluctant to ascribe anything they do to media 
infl uence. According to most agency press offi cers and workers, pandering to 
the media is something that other agencies do.
For NGOs, the main impact was, of course, on fundraising. The predominant 
TV image was the dying African child being saved by a foreign (white) nurse. For 
Mike Jermey of ITN, the most memorable image was Kevin Noone, a young 
Irish aid worker from GOAL Ireland, who rolled up his sleeves and threw the 
bodies of dead cholera victims into trucks to clear room for the living.
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Media coverage of  general humanitarian issues is essential to persuade 
regular supporters to give money to their chosen NGO. Specifi c attention raises 
the profi le of  an organization and will attract new supporters. In Britain, a 
threshold is passed when the tabloids cover the story. John Grain, operations 
room manager for Oxfam, logs credit card donations. He noted that the number 
of calls and donations mirrored almost exactly the ebbs and fl ows of TV and 
tabloid coverage of Rwanda: May, 1,000 calls; June, 134; July, 6,000 (the largest 
ever response to an appeal in a month); August, 2,500; September, 100.
Did the media infl uence the decision of agencies and governments to go to 
Goma and how long to stay? Did it infl uence what they did while there?
The proliferation of NGOs
‘The most important aspect of “the CNN factor” was that it sent dozens of 
NGOs we didn’t want,’ said Joel Boutroue, head of the UNHCR sub-delegation 
in Goma. ‘This took an inordinate amount of our time and complicated our 
job. You cannot coordinate 100 NGOs; it made for a very expensive programme 
and we’re still suffering from it.’
The most extreme example of an agency driven by the media was Operation 
Blessing, based in Virginia, USA. Operation Blessing was a department within 
the Christian Broadcasting Network, right-wing evangelist Pat Robertson’s own 
TV network. It existed simply as a function of television. Robertson and his TV 
crew, plus satellite uplink, fl ew to Goma very early in the crisis. ‘He implied the 
Hutus were heroes. Maybe he got confused,’ said Richard Walden, president 
of Operation USA, a secular outfi t that collects and transports donations in 
kind to disaster zones.
On his daily TV show ‘The 700 Club,’ Robertson appealed for doctors to 
come and save dying Rwandans. ‘We sent six medical teams each with 15 people, 
so a total of 90 people,’ said Hanan Kassir, head of international centres for 
Operation Blessing. Staff  rotated every two weeks. For nearly all, it was their 
fi rst experience in Africa. The 700 Club fi lmed their work, thus generating 
more volunteers, more sponsorship and – according to Walden who watches 
Operation Blessing closely – more general funds for Robertson’s political-
religious campaign in the US. The teams evangelized as well as treating the 
refugees. ‘Faith is something you cling to,’ explained Kassir.
Operation Blessing volunteers believe they were useful. ‘We sent 80,000 
pounds of medicines and supplies and must have treated 80,000 patients,’ said 
Kassir. Boutroue disagrees. ‘Operation Blessing … tried to cure cholera with 
the laying on of hands. They are nutcases,’ he said. Experienced health workers 
point out that two-week rotations are expensive and ineffi cient and that people 
with no previous experience of Africa could not possibly be useful in such a 
short time frame.
Operation Blessing pulled out of Goma in February. ‘We had no more funds,’ 
said Kassir. ‘We can’t take from the existing program. We’d had a good appeal 
and had used it up. We can’t just keep on helping everybody all the time.’ In 
other words, Operation Blessing only works in places while it is generating 
media coverage and thus attracting volunteers and funds.
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Boutroue is equally critical of CARE–Germany. ‘They came late, 200 Germans 
at a time rotating every two weeks, a lot of students giving the wrong drugs, 
creating resistance to diseases and giving inadequate treatment. They were 
working in total isolation and they created a lot of havoc.’ CARE–Germany’s 
refusal to coordinate with other agencies was revealed in the German press. 
‘There was a decision made by the board not to cooperate with other NGOs … 
This showed the competition inside Germany,’ said Manuela Rosper, programme 
manager with CARE–Germany. ‘We got an extremely bad press. Once you have 
a bad press and you are not in a position to defend yourself  properly, it does 
not get any better.’ Rosper defends the work their doctors did in the fi eld. ‘We 
were well prepared for the whole thing and continued until the end of the year 
… It did not affect our work in the fi eld but affected fundraising at home.’ The 
board of CARE–Germany has since changed.
CARE–Germany’s experience reveals the power of  the media over some 
organizations – the agency was in such competition with others, it refused to 
coordinate with them and, when it got bad press, it could not raise money and 
left.
There was an opportunity cost in the arrival of  ineffi cient organizations, 
especially at the beginning of the disaster when thousands of refugees were dying 
daily. ‘For every loony that rolled into the place, 20 kilos of water equipment 
didn’t get onto a plane,’ said Nic Stockton, head of Oxfam’s emergencies unit.
‘Media supply side’ NGOs do not impress experienced journalists who have 
seen this kind of thing before. However, some of the reporters covering Goma 
were ‘fi refi ghters’ – gullible novices with little prior experience of Africa or of 
emergency situations.
Aid agencies that stayed away or left
The fact that so many agencies went to Goma meant that some experienced 
agencies stayed away, notably Save the Children Fund, United Kingdom (SCF–
UK). ‘We looked at what was happening with cholera and dysentery and – given 
the lack of preparation – felt a lot of people were going to die whatever anyone 
did, and the key to that was the large concentration [of  refugees],’ said Don 
Redding, press offi cer for SCF–UK. ‘The problem was so many agencies piling 
in without coordination.’ Rather than add one more agency, SCF–UK decided 
to concentrate on working inside Rwanda. ‘We felt right from the start that 
refugee cities of that size were not sustainable and very politicised.’
Redding says that not being seen in the media to be active in Goma probably 
cost SCF money in resources not raised. However, being a member of  the 
Disasters Emergency Committee, which raises money collectively for fi ve major 
British NGOs, SCF received a share of money anyway, and felt it could afford 
to ride on the general coverage rather than needing specifi c reporting of  its 
own activities.
Geoff  Lone, head of  the ICRC regional delegation in Nairobi, said the 
media presence took the pressure off  his organization, which had some food 
stockpiled in Goma before the exodus. ‘Because the media was there, other 
humanitarian actors came … If the media had not been there, we would have 
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had to get stuck in with [UN]HCR just to keep the situation going … We 
would have been left doing more.’ ICRC puts a lot of energy into liaising with 
the media these days, but, because of the ubiquitous nature of the Red Cross 
logo, the organization’s long-established reputation and the fact that it gets 
money more from governments than private donations, it does not have to be 
seen to be there quite as much as other agencies. The arrival of other agencies 
gave it freedom to move on and apply more resources in Bukavu, where there 
were fewer agencies.
Small agencies and individuals
Aid agency managers do not usually read the newspapers or watch television 
before deciding they must do something about whatever disaster is featured. 
But they are susceptible to pressure from their supporters for whom the media 
is the only source of information. Whereas large agencies have stockpiles and 
the fi nancial security to borrow against expected income, young and small 
agencies can only respond to a crisis once they have raised funds. This makes 
them extremely vulnerable to media interest and means they cannot start doing 
anything before the media get there.
Feed the Children was founded in 1990 to take gifts in kind from Britain to 
Romania and Bulgaria; its slogan is ‘Taking the Aid Direct.’ Its awareness of 
the importance of news coverage for fundraising is shown by newspaper adver-
tisements that are headed ‘Report from Bosnia’ or ‘Report from Rwanda’ and 
imitate the layout and writing style of a news report. Feed the Children had 
not worked in Africa before. Goma provided the opportunity.
‘By July our supporters were calling to say what were we doing?’ said Stuart 
Crocker, deputy director. ‘We are responsive to the wishes and intentions of 
our supporters. We don’t want to let them down … Being so young, we have 
no underpinning levels so we are constantly working at keeping fundraising up 
and we have to focus on activities which raise money.’ They launched a Rwanda 
appeal and raised US$ 600,000 in seven weeks.
In mid-July, Feed the Children sent out two people to see what they could do. 
Interestingly, they decided Goma was too crowded with NGOs and opted to 
work in the French Protection Zone where they felt they could make more of a 
contribution. It was, therefore, the general media coverage of human suffering 
rather than specifi c coverage of their own activities that was most important. 
Their supporters are loyal.
Crocker is keen to stress that they do not want to pack up and leave with the 
journalists. ‘If  we did that our integrity would be questionable … We see our 
operation as a bridgehead, possibly expanding to Burundi and maybe Angola.’ 
But the short attention span of the media is a problem. ‘Seven weeks after we 
started, the media got more interested in political conferences and money dried 
up immediately. It was like turning off  a tap.’ Feed the Children is, however, 
still working in Rwanda.
Between April and July, better established agencies such as MSF and Oxfam 
were pushing for more coverage of the background to the crisis – the genocide, 
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the failures of the UN, the need for international action on a political front. 
Crocker has a different perspective. ‘We wish the media would focus more on 
people, the human side … In Bosnia, for example, as soon as the political and 
military viewpoint of the story dies, they discontinue interest in the continuing 
needs of the people.’
Governments
On 28 July, approximately ten days after the Goma media barrage started on 
US television, President Clinton held a meeting in the White House with repre-
sentatives of 15 American NGOs. ‘The vice-president was there, the secretary of 
defence, the deputy secretary of state [for foreign affairs], the head of USAID 
and the joint chief of staff of the US Army,’ said Richard Walden of Operation 
USA, one of the chosen NGOs. 
The media was waiting outside. The meeting was a direct result of  media 
pressure and of lobbying by all of us [NGOs] … They gave us a presentation 
– the joint chief  of  staff  said they would do what they had done for the 
Kurds. They said we should look to them for our transport needs and they’d 
be pulling water tankers out of the Gulf. They said 3,000 Americans would 
be involved, including those in Frankfurt, Entebbe and so on.
In fact, the US military effort in Goma was already underway, so the meeting 
underscored and gave further publicity to US efforts.
The Clinton administration had been criticized in the media for holding up 
the deployment of UN peacekeepers to try to stop the genocide. This was an 
opportunity to show the US army saving lives, without the risks of Somalia. 
Some journalists who saw it as a domestic rather than an international story 
and who had not followed Rwanda before were easily misled. ‘In July there 
was a story “American troops have secured Kigali airport,” quoting sources 
in Washington. But the airport had been secure for two months,’ said Mark 
Doyle of the BBC.
The British government also sent troops for the aid effort and spent 
approximately US$ 45 million on the Rwandan emergency in 1994–95. ‘There 
was day in, day out pressure from the media. What can you do? You throw 
money at the problem. I’m sure we gave more money because of  that,’ said 
one offi cial. The British did not concentrate on Goma, but worked inside 
Rwanda as well from July onward. Baroness Chalker, then minister for overseas 
development, visited Goma as a side-trip from a planned trip to Uganda at the 
end of July. Her visit was a big story especially in the tabloid press and provided 
an opportunity to publicize the aid programme and British NGOs, many of 
which were funded by the ministry.
It is important to note that NGOs in Goma were looking to governments for 
funding as much as to the general public. Press offi cers say that the messages 
they put across through the media are directed at donors – who are thinking 
of political capital at home – as much as the general public.
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Did the media infl uence what agencies did?
Within two weeks of  their arrival, journalists were wondering whether the 
refugees should go back. This was mainly because they were looking for new 
angles after endless reports of overcrowding and cholera, and those who had not 
covered Rwanda before were beginning to understand the political complexities 
and implications of the refugees’ continued presence in Zaire. Ray Wilkinson 
of UNHCR was asked quite aggressive questions about UNHCR’s policy on 
repatriation. His response was confused – an accurate refl ection of UNHCR’s 
uncertain policy.
Stockton and several other senior aid workers believe UNHCR was diverted 
into thinking about repatriation when it should have been concentrating on 
keeping people alive where they were. The WFP got into the repatriation issue 
by holding up trucks delivering food to Kibumba camp, so that any refugee 
who wanted to go home to Rwanda could hop on board for the return journey. 
Only a handful of refugees took up the offer – but it gave fl agging journalists 
a new angle.
The WFP itself  provided a different example to illustrate how they resisted 
media pressure. ‘We were pressured by journalists to distribute food, and from 
a PR point of  view we should have pushed a couple of  trucks into a camp, 
but we didn’t,’ said Brenda Barton, WFP information offi cer. She said they 
also resisted the temptation to airlift food —always a more dramatic media 
concept than trucking – and gave up air slots to allow more urgently needed 
water equipment to get in.
Publicity stunts
The US army took a different approach, in what has become a classic example of 
how a publicity stunt during a disaster can backfi re. On 24 July, before the world 
media, three US army C130s airdropped food parcels in a banana plantation 
somewhere near Katale camp north of Goma. According to Jenny Matthews, 
a British photographer who witnessed the drop, the parcels contained dirty 
clothes, Gruyère cheese (labelled ‘perishable, needs refrigeration’), ski-mittens, 
biscuits (labelled ‘do not drop’), chocolate and fl our from Sainsbury’s.
There was no need for an airdrop – food was coming in by road, and there 
had been a distribution in Katale that morning. The food was obviously 
inappropriate. Airdrops are expensive. Worst of all, the Americans persuaded 
CARE to let them have several Action Aid/Assist trucks that were desperately 
needed to transport water equipment.
The trucks couldn’t reach the place where the food had landed, so a French 
army fork-lift, which had been used for digging graves, arrived with a crane. 
Machine guns slung across their shoulders, the French troops ‘liberated’ the 
chocolate and cheese. CARE loaded some items onto the trucks to take to 
a warehouse. They dispelled local Zaireans who – encouraged by journalists 
– had arrived to help themselves. The airdrop was sharply criticized in the 
American media.
Americares, an NGO based in Connecticut, fl ew in 10,000 cases of Gatorade, 
a soda drink containing electrolites preferred by athletes. It was clearly 
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inappropriate, but according to Richard Walden of Operation USA, Americares 
nonetheless got a favourable mention for acting quickly from Dr Bob Arnott, 
the CBS medical correspondent, who fl ew into Goma on the same fl ight. It was 
an example of an agency sacrifi cing appropriateness to act quickly and get into 
the media spotlight. The New York Times was critical.
Many agencies decided to help orphans and abandoned children, either in 
Goma or within Rwanda. This decision was often media-driven – children are 
the most popular subject for stories about human suffering. By contrast, few 
NGOs or governments wanted to deal with the urgent need for latrines, the 
least popular aspect of the story. UNHCR had tremendous trouble persuading 
anyone, including governments, to work on latrines, even though they said it 
was the most crucial intervention needed after water.
These examples illustrate that the media did infl uence how agencies operated 
in Goma. NGOs with set agendas did what they always do: MSF addressed 
health problems while CARE did camp management and logistics. But some 
agencies rushed in without thinking properly about what they had to offer. 
UN agencies and governments revealed themselves to be as susceptible to 
media pressure as NGOs, despite the fact that they do not rely on the public 
for donations. They are afraid of bad publicity, which would challenge their 
legitimacy.
Visibilty and profi le
‘To the newly arrived, Goma looks as if  it is hosting some kind of competition 
election,’ wrote Richard Dowden in the Independent on Sunday. ‘Oxfam, Goal, 
Care, World Vision: WFP, UNHCR blare out their names and logos like soft 
drink manufacturers ... Echo stickers have appeared on lamp-posts all over 
Goma.’
Oxfam’s water tanks in Kibumba were the largest structure in the camp, and 
you knew who donated them by reading the six-foot high black letters an the 
side. ‘I got a sign writer in Goma to write OXFAM on the side of the tanks,’ 
said Oxfam press offi cer Ian Bray. ‘It was a backdrop for TV interviews.’ The 
decision provoked a mixed reaction within the organization. According to Bray, 
locally recruited workers liked the sign and the Oxfam T-shirt they were given 
to wear, possibly because it gave them a sense of identity and belonging. ‘I was 
appalled,’ said Nic Stockton. ‘It doesn’t make us friends in the media – it’s a 
turn off. The old image is of the Oxfam water engineer in a scruffy T-shirt doing 
a good job. I think that’s better.’
Stockton is right that branding is a turn-off for serious journalists such as 
Dowden. But if  the aim was to get the logo on TV to raise visibility, Oxfam 
needed to do more. In the fi rst week of  the Goma crisis (15–21 July), the 
Oxfam logo was featured only once on British TV news compared with twelve 
appearances of the MSF logo.
Tension between fundraisers pushing for visibility and workers in the fi eld 
guarding their integrity is nothing new, but with the proliferation of NGOs, the 
stakes were higher. Many agencies say branding is part of security – MSF workers 
always wear MSF T-shirts so they can be clearly identifi ed in a crisis. But branding 
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has gone to an extreme. ‘MSF is over the top on PR – adhesive bandages, needles 
sticking into arms had the MSF logo,’ said Richard Walden of Operation USA 
after seeing close-ups of the offending bandages on US television.
Press offi cers
As agencies feel vulnerable to the power of the media, the job of press offi cers 
has become more important. Goma marked a watershed, with large numbers of 
press offi cers present, leading to great competition for exposure. The fact that 
press offi cers are seen as so important in gaining media coverage and, therefore, 
raising money means their power within their organizations is increasing.
Over the last few years, under the guidance of  former UPI bureau chief 
Sylvana Foa, UNHCR has appointed journalists as press offi cers. They are 
inclined toward openness, in contrast with the UN bureaucrat’s traditional 
instinct for silence and obfuscation. Ray Wilkinson, one of the chief UNHCR 
spokespeople in Goma, used to be the Newsweek correspondent in East Africa, 
and knew very well what constitutes a story and what journalists need.
‘The media is your greatest asset in a crisis and you should be as open and 
frank as possible,’ said Wilkinson. ‘If  the media is talked to as an adult and 
they believe you, they are very sympathetic.’ UNHCR admitted to mistakes in 
Goma, and this may have increased their credibility because they were seen to 
be open rather than trying to hide.
Other UN organizations rushed to keep up with UNHCR. The WFP always 
had two press offi cers in Goma, even though food was not the focus of the story. 
UNICEF had an easy time attracting coverage because orphans and abandoned 
children make natural, heart-rending TV pictures. NGO press offi cers took 
the pressure off  water engineers and nurses who needed to get on with the job; 
their main task, on the other hand, was to promote their organization and 
boost donations.
The ‘war of  the press offi cers’ has become legendary, and everyone has a 
story of  a press offi cer (from another agency) who refused to let journalists 
talk to ‘the opposition’.
The same problems apply with press offi cers as with branding. Press offi cers 
who shamelessly plug their organization, exaggerate the issues and know nothing 
about the context will alienate serious journalists and attract bad publicity in 
the quality press. Some agencies take the attitude that publicity is publicity, it 
doesn’t matter if  it’s good or bad because the mere mention of the name raises 
profi le. However, journalists writing tabloid stories may welcome a simple PR 
approach of the ‘white angel saves dying black baby’ kind.
The following analysis of TV coverage in the United Kingdom reveals the 
success of press offi cers in getting their view into the media. Several reported 
that their status and infl uence within their organization has increased since 
Goma. ‘CARE had never had media coverage like that in the UK before,’ 
said Alison Campbell, CARE–UK media liaison offi cer. ‘We raised 1 million 
pounds in three or four weeks. The perception was that massive media coverage 
brought in the money.’
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Some of the income was credited to Campbell’s budget, an acknowledgement 
of the central role she played. CARE has been criticized by other agencies for 
courting publicity before their programmes were established, but Campbell’s 
technique was simple. She was always available, she would talk about almost any 
aspect of the crisis including the politics, she helped journalists with practical 
problems such as communication and transport and she was not afraid to be 
controversial.
This caused tension within CARE. Campbell highlighted the issue of killers 
in the camps and – during an interview on CNN – criticized the US airdrop. 
The next day CARE–USA sent out its PR person on a damage limitation 
exercise,’ Campbell said. ‘They’d had complaints from Denver, Colorado 
saying that CARE was unpatriotic. Within an hour of arriving, the PR offi cer 
told us not to mention the killers in the camps ... [Afterwards] CARE did 
an assessment and said the remarks had caused trouble at the time, but were 
later shown to be true. It helped us push the idea of  advocacy within the 
organization, which is traditionally conservative.
The most prominent press offi cers were the most proactive. Samantha Bolton 
of MSF was in Goma before the infl ux. She described later how she was at the 
border at dawn on 15 July when the fi rst large wave came across. By this point, 
Oxfam and MSF had been predicting the infl ux publicly for more than a week 
and were frustrated with a lack of response from UNHCR. ‘I ran back to the 
house and rang the Today programme [BBC Radio 4], the World Service and 
CNN,’ Bolton said. Bolton was not promoting MSF in what she said, but the 
fact that she, as an MSF employee, was savvy enough to know whom to call 
and how to tell the story meant she became a sought-after interviewee. (For a 
week afterward, she had a daily slot on the most popular TV morning news 
programme in the US, Good Morning America.)
What Bolton did next reveals how NGOs can use the media to pressure the 
UN. ‘I took a journalist from Associated Press with me to the UNHCR house 
to say the refugees were arriving. I said [to the UNHCR representative], “You’d 
better get down there.” He said, “Why don’t you tell them to go up beyond the 
airport?”’ According to Bolton, the HCR representative repeated this even 
after she had pointed out she had a journalist with her. The journalist went 
off  to write the story of how the UN was unprepared for the infl ux, despite 
warnings from NGOs.
Fact infl ation
In Goma, there was what Richard Dowden of  the Independent has called 
‘fact infl ation’. Ray Wilkinson described how it worked at the daily press 
conference: 
I’d say something and I’d be contradicted down the line. In a lot of 
circumstances it was a deliberate grab for headlines. MSF announced a study 
of deaths in Katale. Journalists were briefed to ask a follow-up question. I 
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was asked if  I could extrapolate to the whole population – MSF had said 
you could. Whenever I gave death fi gures I said that this was ballpark – 
approximately 20,000 dead. If  you extrapolated the MSF fi gures you got 
30,000 deaths. Inevitably they got headlines.
‘Speculation infl ation’ was also an occupational hazard of journalists and aid 
workers in Goma. Both frequently speculated that the exodus to Bukavu was 
going to be even bigger and more catastrophic. It was a kind of insurance against 
being caught off  guard as they had been over Goma. The noise of collective 
excitement drowned out more measured interpretation. One correspondent 
described seeing several thousand people on the roads leading to Bukavu in 
mid-August. Her newspaper found on the news wire a quote from an aid worker 
who thought a million were on the way. The aid worker and the reporter had 
been in exactly the same place at the same time, but the aid worker’s estimate 
prevailed because it fi t the mood of the moment. In the end, the reporter was 
proved right – but that was after the story had been printed.
Another connected issue was the down-playing of long-term health problems 
in favour of short-term issues. Cholera, with its resonance of medieval plague 
and its instant horrifi c impact, was clearly a major story. Dysentery, which 
health experts say killed more people over a longer time, was scarcely a story 
at all. It is inevitable that journalists will report what is happening at the time 
more than what experts predict. The emphasis on the immediate and things 
that happen quickly is another hazard of ‘real time’ coverage. The only way 
to improve understanding of these health issues is for journalists to become 
better educated, for aid workers to explain the issues clearly and in a more 
compelling way.
One problem with Goma was that the catastrophe was so enormous and so 
sudden that it raised the stakes for other emergencies. It became more diffi cult 
for journalists to raise editors’ interest in long-term humanitarian disasters such 
as Sudan or Angola. The only exception was Burundi, which – like a watched 
pot – refused to boil over in the way journalists and aid workers breathlessly 
anticipated.
The Goma effect was felt by agencies too: ‘It’s changed our perspective in 
that region. Before, 10,000 refugees was a lot,’ said Samantha Bolton of MSF. 
‘Now, if  there are 10,000 refugees, we say, let another smaller agency do it.’
High- and low-profi le agencies
Cholera inevitably turned attention to medical organizations, especially MSF, 
even though water and sanitation were in some ways more important in stemming 
the disease. This is partly because Western culture values medical science over 
environmental issues. ‘Medical aid is sexy – it’s like [the TV programme] ER,’ 
said Anne-Marie Huby of  MSF. ‘And everyone in MSF can talk, even the 
truck drivers. You don’t have to ask Geneva [for permission]. Our people 
are volunteers. They’re very fl exible and very young. And we have so many 
nationalities, we can talk to every journalist in his or her mother tongue.’
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Journalists have been criticized for speaking only to foreigners and not 
to Africans when covering stores like Goma. The criticism is valid, but the 
pressures of ‘real time’ reporting mean the problem is likely to get worse, not 
better. A nurse or doctor working for MSF is familiar with the language of 
television and knows more or less what the journalist wants. It’s a quick and 
relatively easy exchange. Interviewing African players in the drama is much 
more time-consuming and complicated. You have to fi nd out who exactly the 
person is as well as engaging an interpreter. Otherwise, you don’t know what 
question to ask or how to interpret the answer.
Aftermath
In 1995, journalists continued to visit Goma, but obviously in much smaller 
numbers. Boutroue believes the wide publicity given to the internal UNHCR 
report by Robert Gersony – which alleged widespread atrocities by the RPF 
against Hutus – slowed the return of  refugees to Rwanda. One can argue 
that the return was slowed because the report was right (that is, refugees had 
experienced atrocities so wouldn’t return) or because UNHCR commissioned 
the report (that is, information about the report would have circulated in the 
camps whether the foreign media got hold of it or not). The impact of media 
coverage in slowing the return cannot be clearly established.
Despite the debate within aid agencies about the morality of continuing to 
work in Goma given the presence of killers in the camps, most aid workers there 
appeared unconcerned about the question. The moral issue of giving succour 
to killers has not affected the image of aid agencies very much. Although press 
offi cers, such as Alison Campbell and Samantha Bolton, spoke openly about the 
issue from the start, only a few reporters challenged the agencies and negative 
publicity was minimal. MSF got some publicity when their French and Belgian 
chapters withdrew, citing moral issues as the reason (actually they withdrew 
at about the time MSF normally withdraws from emergencies), but the Dutch 
chapter remained, taking much of the sting out of the tail of their decision.
CONCLUSIONS FOR DISCUSSION
 1. The proliferation of  NGOs was a direct result of  media coverage. Only 
when media coverage started in earnest could NGOs raise funds. Goma, 
with its massive media coverage, thus became an opportunity for smaller, 
less experienced agencies. This lowered standards and complicated 
coordination.
 2. Better-established agencies, seeing the infl ux of new actors, felt they had to 
guard their market share by promoting their agencies more aggressively. 
They did not, on the whole, change their programmes, but they used 
their logo and name as extensively as possible and employed more press 
offi cers.
 3. UN agencies are very afraid of bad publicity. UN press offi cers tried to 
use the media to improve the effi ciency and increase openness in the UN 
bureaucracy. There are divergent views on whether this succeeded.
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 4. NGOs, especially MSF, used the media to pressure UNHCR and other UN 
agencies to be more responsive and effi cient. This had varied results.
 5. Governments responded to the crisis in Goma by sending soldiers. They 
were ‘fl ying the fl ag’ and tried high-profi le interventions that were at times 
expensive and inappropriate.
 6. In Goma, journalists added to the general sense of  chaos but did not 
signifi cantly disrupt the relief  effort.
 7. Because the media were so important in Goma, the power of press offi cers 
within organizations increased. Many press offi cers pushed for agencies 
to speak out on political issues.
 8. The suddenness and gravity of the Goma crisis, combined with the massive 
media attention, has dwarfed other emergencies and relief efforts in Africa, 
with implications for fundraising and continued aid agency interest.
 9. The massive media and aid agency attention paid to Goma helped 
governments promote their humanitarian aid programme and hide their 
lack of policy on genocide.
10. The media coverage of  Rwanda hugely increased the public’s awareness 
of aid agencies, but did virtually nothing to increase knowledge of what 
caused the exodus to Goma or of what happened to Rwanda’s Tutsi people 
and members of the Hutu opposition.
INTERVIEWEES
Interviews were conducted between May and August 1995.
Sue Adams, head of external affairs, Action Aid.
Andy Babcock, head of emergencies, ODA.
Brenda Barton, regional public information offi cer, World Food Programme, 
Nairobi.
Chris Beer, chief  executive, Helpage International.
Samantha Bolton, regional information offi cer, Médecins sans Frontières, 
Nairobi.
Joel Boutroue, head of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees sub-
delegation, Goma.
Ian Bray, press offi cer, Oxfam.
Alison Campbell, media liaison offi cer, CARE, London.
Stuart Crocker, deputy director, Feed the Children.
Mark Doyle, East Africa correspondent, BBC.
John Grain, head of operations room, Oxfam.
Anne-Marie Huby, executive director, Médecins sans Frontières–United 
Kingdom.
Sue Inglish, associate editor, Channel Four News, London.
Mike Jermey, head of ITN programming on ITV.
Hanan Kassir, head of international centres, Operation Blessing.
Mike Kiernen, media director, Interaction, Washington.
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Geoff Lone, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Regional 
Delegation for East Africa, Nairobi.
Jenny Matthews, photographer, Network, London.
Colin McCullum, chief press offi cer, British Red Cross, 
Don Redding, press offi cer, Save the Children Fund, United Kindom.
Larry Register, senior international editor, CNN, Atlanta.
Manuela Rosper, programme offi cer, CARE–Germany.
Stephen Smith, Africa editor, Libération, Paris.
Nic Stockton, head of emergencies unit, Oxfam.
Nigel Twose, director of international division, Action Aid.
Richard Walden, president, Operation USA, Los Angeles.
Ray Wilkinson, public information offi cer, United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, London.
REFERENCES
Glasgow Media Group. 1994. British television news and the Rwanda crisis, 15–21 July (part 4). 
Glasgow Media Group, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK.
Gowing, N. 1994. Real-Time Television coverage of armed confl icts and diplomatic crises: does 
it pressure or distort foreign policy decisions? Joan Shorenstein Barone Centre on the Press, 
Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 
USA. Working paper 94–1.
—— 1995. ‘Television and Foreign Policy’. In Crosslines Global Report 14–15, April/May. Crosslines, 
Geneva, Switzerland.
Weaver, T. 1995. ‘Prostituting the Facts: Aid and the Media’. In Crosslines Global Report 14 –15, 
April/May. Crosslines, Geneva, Switzerland.
15
Limited Vision: How Both the American 
Media and Government Failed Rwanda
Steven Livingston
To understand American news coverage and government policy concerning 
the 1994 Rwanda genocide, one must begin with the 1992–93 United States 
intervention in Somalia. Why did the Bush administration decide to intervene 
in the Somali crisis in the fi rst place? Conventional wisdom at the time suggested 
that the only viable explanation was the television coverage of  the horrifi c 
famine, fi ghting and disease that plagued the country. American statesman and 
scholar, George Kennan, made this argument when he explained the acceptance 
of the mission by Congress and the public. 
There can be no question that the reason for this acceptance lies primarily 
with the exposure of the Somalia situation by the American media, above all, 
television. The reaction would have been unthinkable without this exposure. 
The reaction was an emotional one, occasioned by the sight of the suffering 
of the starving people in question. (Kennan 1993a)
The idea that media attention to distant crises can trigger policy responses is 
typically referred to as the CNN effect (for a full description of this phenomenon, 
see Livingston 1997; Livingston and Eachus 1995–96; Robinson 2002). Foreign 
policy priorities are established and public attention is directed to issues that 
happen to be in the news, rather than toward strategic objectives defi ned by 
national interest. As Kennan (1993b) put it, foreign policy should not be 
determined by news stories that are ‘fl eeting, disjointed, visual glimpses of 
reality, fl ickering on and off  the screen, here today and gone tomorrow’. 
Foreign policy conducted in such a manner is not only irresponsible; it may 
actually undermine the constitutive authority of elected government.
If American policy, particularly policy involving the uses of our armed forces 
abroad, is to be controlled by popular emotional impulses, and particularly 
ones invoked by the contemporary commercial television industry, then there 
is no place – not only for myself, but for what have traditionally been regarded 
as the responsible deliberative organs of our government, in both executive 
and legislative branches. (Kennan 1993b)
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In this chapter we consider the realist critique of media and humanitarian 
interventions. At the heart of that critique is the claim that news of international 
affairs in the US media – when it is found at all – tends to be fl eeting, ephemeral 
and all too typically frivolous. We present evidence that suggests critics on this 
score are largely correct. 
Implicit in this criticism is the idea that media content, frivolous and fl eeting 
as it sometimes may be, has the capacity to reorder US foreign policy priorities. 
Kennan’s assumptions concerning Somalia offer one example of this faith in 
the power of media. This assumption is also held by the activist community 
that lobbied for US intervention in Rwanda (and elsewhere). Both the realists 
and interventionists (for lack of a better term) share the common belief  that 
media content spurs intervention, although, of  course, they hold opposing 
views regarding the wisdom of such a thing. 
We argue that this assumption regarding the power of  the news media is 
mistaken. Realists’ worries and interventionists’ hopes are misplaced. In most 
instances, media do not have the ability to reprioritize policy objectives and 
policymakers’ attention. 
Why is this important in developing our case concerning Rwanda? The United 
States stood at arm’s length from events in Rwanda in the spring of 1994 because 
policymakers believed their predecessors in the George H.W. Bush administra-
tion were lured into Somalia by television pictures. Although this assumption 
was fundamentally inaccurate, it prevailed and coloured the US response to the 
genocide in Rwanda. As a result, Rwanda became a test case for a new-found 
commitment to realist principles. Television and talk of genocide, no matter how 
compelling and emotional, would not be allowed to sway the steely-eyed pursuit 
of national interests. In short, the non-intervention in Rwanda was predicated 
on a misunderstanding of the causes of intervention in Somalia.
THE REALIST CRITIQUE OF MEDIA
It cannot be said that realist foreign policy theorists have given sustained 
attention to the issue of media and foreign affairs. The critique is more oblique. 
What is said, however, has roots in a core philosophical component of realist 
belief: foreign policy conducted properly keeps a cold eye on the rational 
pursuit of interests clearly understood. Anything else, including sentimental-
ity, is regarded, at best, as distraction. Media content is heavily laden with 
emotional freight concerning distant injustices and brewing evil. In populating 
the news with victims of one sort or another, calculations of national interest 
are supplanted by mere sentimentality. This is the core principle at the heart 
of the realist critique of the media and foreign policymaking.
Even if  emotion weren’t such a poor substitute for the rational calculation 
of national interest, news would still serve as a poor guide to a foreign policy 
process based on the more emotional landscape of international affairs. The 
news media, particularly television news, is fi ckle, shifting from one crisis to 
the next. As a result, even a foreign policy based on the pursuit of  morally 
derived duties to right wrongs would be ill-served. This criticism comes most 
often not just from realists, such as Kennan, but also from those I have referred 
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to above as interventionists – those who believe media have a responsibility to 
alert the world to circumstances such as Rwanda early, loud and unwaveringly 
(see Livingston and Eachus 1999). What evidence supports these claims? What 
do we know about media content patterns?
Systematic empirical investigation of news content supports these criticisms 
of the American news media. From 1990 to1998, American television networks 
more than doubled the time devoted to celebrity and entertainment, disasters, 
accidents and crime, while decreasing the time spent on policy and international 
affairs (Patterson 2000). Indeed, until the September 2001 attacks on the United 
States and the war in Afghanistan, international news almost disappeared 
from American television news. Foreign affairs coverage on network television 
declined from 45 per cent of stories in the 1970s to 13.5 per cent in 1995 (Hoge 
1997). Similar trends were evident in American newspapers. International news 
coverage in newspapers shrank from over 10 per cent of non-advertising space 
in the early 1970s to 6 per cent in the early 1980s and less than 3 per cent in the 
1990s (Hoge 1997). Similarly, between 1985 and 1995, international news in 
the national weekly news magazines declined from 24 to 14 per cent in Time, 
from 22 to 12 per cent in Newsweek, and from 20 to 14 per cent in U.S. News 
and World Report (Hickey 1998).
A Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism found similar results. By 2001, the 
three nightly network newscasts were devoting fully a third of their broadcasts 
to stories in the categories of lifestyle, features and crime (Kurtz 2002). In a 
study of 5,000 news stories taken from television, magazines and newspapers, 
Patterson (2000) found similar patterns in content. Other studies confi rm these 
fi ndings. Livingston and Stephen (1998) found a steady decline in international 
news content offered by the broadcast television networks between 1972 and 
1995 (Figure 15.1). 
Figure 15.1 illustrates the trends in international news content as a percentage 
of total news content per year. Several high-water marks in coverage occurred 
during or near the end of the Cold War. Interestingly, the low-water mark also 
occurred during the Cold War; Watergate dominated news in 1973–74. The 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian hostage crisis and the Cold War 
politics of  the Reagan administration led the post-Watergate resurgence in 
international news content. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern 
Bloc in 1989–90 received the greatest share of attention by the networks. 
What in general is revealed in Figure 15.1? In the 20-year period between 1972 
and 1991, 40 per cent of the network’s news content focused on international 
events. The end of the Cold War marked a dramatic shift in focus.1 In the four 
years after 1991 that are represented in Figure 15.1, the networks’ international 
news content averaged about 27 per cent. The Rwanda massacre occurred during 
this second period of relative journalistic inattentiveness to international affairs. 
Looking more closely at the crucial years when Rwanda was – or could have 
been – the focus of  media attention in the US (1993–95), we see that only 
one in four network news stories concerned international events (Figure 15.2). 
In general, following the end of the Cold War, American networks paid less 
attention to international events. 
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Figure 15.2 Proportion of domestic versus international news stories, 1993–95
Source: Livingston and Stephen 1998.
What was covered in the 1990s? Figure 15.3 (p. 193) tracks several events 
that occurred during the Rwanda crisis. A coup and civil unrest in Haiti leading 
to a mass exodus of refugees to Florida was the object of considerable media 
attention. The refugees made Haiti both a domestic and international news 
story. The election and inauguration of Nelson Mandela in South Africa also 
peaked in May. The networks devoted signifi cant resources, including mobile 
‘fl yaway’ units used to cover events in locations without suffi cient satellite uplink 
























Figure 15.1 International news as a percentage of total television network newscasts, 1972–75
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Africa and Haiti coincided with the start of the massacre in Rwanda. At the 
same time, the bloody civil war in Bosnia received signifi cant attention in April 
and May. In fact, Bosnia was such an important story to the American news 
media, we need to spend a moment putting it into proper context. 
The realists’ critique of a media-dominated foreign policy centres on claims 
that media coverage of international politics is uneven and distorting of the 
international landscape. News coverage of Bosnia relative to other humanitarian 
crises illustrates this point well. Table 15.1 lists the 13 worst humanitarian 
crises in the world in 1996 and compares the news coverage devoted to each. 
Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia and Bosnia presented the worst humanitarian 
crises, each with approximately four million people at risk of death. Ethiopia, 
Angola and Rwanda are next in severity.
Table 15.1 Number of people at risk in various countries and corresponding number and 
percentage of reports by major news organizations
Country Millions of people   No. (%) mentions in various media
 at risk (% of The New Washington  ABC CNN NPR
 column total) York Times Post
Afghanistan 4 (14) 274 (4.7) 225 (4.8) 19 (1.5) 57 (1.2) 57 (2.9)
Sudan 4 (14) 190 (3.3) 166 (3.5) 8 (0.6) 54 (1.1) 31 (1.5)
Bosnia 3.7 (13) 2,633 (45.8) 2046 (43.7) 833 (66) 3062 (66.7) 1204 (61.3)
Ethiopia 3–4 (11) 15 (0.2) 10 (0.2) 0 (0) 3 (0) 6 (0.3)
Angola 2.5 (9) 120 (2.0) 144 (3.0) 9 (0.7) 22 (0.4) 34 (1.7)
Rwanda 2.5 (9) 401 (6.9) 277 (5.9) 49 (3.9) 150 (9.8) 118 (6.0)
Sierra Leone 1.8 (6) 63 (1.0) 78 (1.6) 4 (0.3) 26 (0.5) 20 (1.0)
Liberia 1.5 (5) 164 (2.8) 150 (3.2) 32 (2.5) 49 (1.0) 46 (2.3)
Iraq 1.3–<4 (5) 839 (14.6) 679 (14.5) 150 (11.9) 540 (11.7) 201 (10.2)
Haiti 0.9–1.3 (3) 654 (11.3) 522 (11.1) 89 (7.0) 316 (6.8) 132 (6.7)
Eritrea 1 (4) 28 (0.4) 21 (0.4) 0 (0) 3 (0) 4 (0.2)
Somalia 4 (14) 312 (5.4) 309 (6.6) 69 (5.5) 294 (6.4) 102 (5.1)
Tajikistan 1 (5) 45 (0.7) 52 (1.1) 0 (0) 13 (0.2) 9 (0.4)
Total* 28.2† (100) 5,738 (99.1) 4,679 (99.6) 1,262 (99.9) 4,589 (99.2) 1,964 (99.6)
Source: Livingston 1996. The totals for those at risk are found in USMUN 1996.
* Due to rounding, percentages do not necessarily total 100 per cent in any column.
† Based on the low-end fi gure where a range has been given.
Moving to measures of  news coverage, each cell in a column shows the 
number of reports on the crises along with the percentage of total coverage of 
all 13 crises that it represents. For example, of all articles published in The New 
York Times on these 13 crises in 1996, 6.9 per cent (401 articles) were devoted 
to Rwanda. Of all Washington Post articles on these 13 crises, 5.9 per cent (277 
articles) mentioned Rwanda. 
The fi gures for Bosnia reveal the sort of distortion that concerns critics of US 
news coverage of humanitarian crises. With 3.7 million people at risk, Bosnia 
received nearly 46 per cent of the total coverage of these crises in the The New 
York Times, nearly 44 per cent of the Washington Post total and 66 and 67 per 
cent of the coverage on ABC and CNN, respectively. National Public Radio 
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devoted about 61 per cent of its total coverage to Bosnia alone. On the other 
hand, Afghanistan and the Sudan – the two places in the world that we would 
later discover harboured Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda – had more people 
at risk than Bosnia, but together received only 12 per cent of the total media 
coverage of all 13 crises concerning the worst humanitarian crises in the world 
– affecting nearly 30 million people. Nearly half  were devoted to the crisis in 
Bosnia where 3.7 million people were at risk. 
This is not to say that Bosnia wasn’t important. Nor is it to say that populations 
at risk are necessarily the only or best dimension for calibrating the importance 
of a crisis. But it does illustrate that US news coverage tends not to be calibrated 
to more complex determinants. Bosnia coverage refl ected its proximity to major 
European cities – all major operational bases for the news media – and its 
geostrategic importance. Second, Bosnia and the rest of the Balkans sit on the 
southern edge of Europe and indirectly involve at least two key NATO member 
states: Greece and Turkey. Instability along NATO’s southern tier was as much 
a catalyst for US intervention as was news coverage. Indeed, as we will argue 
below, news coverage followed US involvement. 
Table 15.1 illustrates the distortions that occur within the universe of 
humanitarian crisis reporting. But the distortions don’t end there. Most often, 
humanitarian crises are shunted aside by news of another sort.
Turning to Figure 15.3, we can see that, beginning toward the end of May 
and peaking in the summer of 1994, the O.J. Simpson drama received more 




























Figure 15.3 Coverage (in minutes) of various topics in ABC, CBS and NBC nightly newscasts, 
1994
Source: Livingston and Stephen 1998.
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little attention; it wasn’t until later, when events in the Great Lakes region of 
Africa shifted, did the news media pay signifi cant attention. By July and August 
the crisis in Rwanda centred on the hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees 
in camps such as in Goma, Zaire.
In short, during the crucial spring months of 1994, the American broadcast 
television networks devoted relatively little attention to the systematic 
extermination of nearly a million people. Figure 15.3 highlights aggregate news 
coverage of  Rwanda by the (then) three major American broadcast network 
newscasts. O.J. Simpson’s trial received more American network news coverage 
than the systematic murder of over 800,000 people. 
MEDIA EFFECTS ON POLICY
What effect does news content have on policy decision-making? Clearly, the 
foreign policy realists have a point when they argue that news content offers an 
uncertain guide to international events. But this fails to address the question 
of whether media content of any kind has the capacity to affect foreign affairs 
decision-making.
Critics and policymakers alike assume that it does. Critics who favour robust 
international responses to humanitarian crises tend to fault the news media for 
not paying more attention to Rwanda in the early weeks and months of the 
crisis, implicitly suggesting that, had more attention been given by the news 
media, Western policymakers might have responded differently. It is indeed true 




















Figure 15.4 CNN coverage of the Rwanda genocide and refugee crisis 1994 
Source: Livingston and Stephen 1998.
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Rwanda, rather than to the Hutu massacre of Tutsi in Rwanda earlier. Figure 
15.4 shows the frequency of CNN datelines (the locations from which a report 
is fi led or transmitted) over the course of the massacre and humanitarian crisis 
in the refugee camps in Zaire.
The vast majority of CNN news stories about Rwanda were not about the 
Hutu massacre of Tutsi and moderate Hutu; instead, they were about the Hutu 
refugees who fl ed Rwanda on the heels of the RPF military campaign to stop 
the genocide and unseat the Hutu government. My own observations of the 
Western press operating in Nairobi, Kenya, at the time indicated an initial mix 
of fatigue (Somalia had demoralized journalists working out of Nairobi, the 
hub of the Western press corps for much of Africa) and a sense of danger that 
prevented closer coverage at the time. This certainly was not universally true. 
Mark Doyle and Fergal Keane of the BBC, Terry Leonard of the Associated 
Press and Donatella Lorch, then with The New York Times, took enormous 
personal risks in their attempts to cover the massacre, as did many others. Yet, 
despite these efforts, most media attention failed to focus on the start of the 
crisis when, presumably, something could have been done to stop the massacre. 
But does media coverage actually have the presumed effect implied by the 
criticism? If  more media attention had been given to events in Rwanda early 
in 1994, could the massacre have been prevented? 
By the spring of  1994, American policymakers and pundits assumed that 
coverage of the Somalia crisis drove the US decision to intervene. CNN and 
other television networks covered the suffering of the Somali people and US 
policymakers responded with the intervention. Wanting to ‘learn the lessons 
of  Somalia’, the Clinton administration was adamant: it would not allow 
pictures of  yet another humanitarian crisis in Africa to drive foreign policy 
decision-making. That is what happened in Somalia and it would not happen 
in Rwanda.
The only problem with that lesson of history is that it is wrong. The American 
inaction in Rwanda was the consequence of a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the policy decisions made by the Bush administration going into Somalia 
in 1992. In their analysis of US media coverage of events in Somalia in 1991–
92, Livingston and Eachus (1995–6) found no evidence to suggest that media 
determined or otherwise served as the primary cause of the administration’s 
decision to intervene in Somalia. Instead, the decision was the consequence of 
political pressure put on the administration by key members of Congress, and 
even from offi cials within the administration itself. Livingston and Eachus’s 
fi ndings have been substantiated numerous times by subsequent analyses. In 
a summary of a decade of fairly intense scholarly investigation of the CNN 
effect, media researcher Piers Robinson (2000) concluded that only under certain 
and generally unlikely conditions might one expect media coverage to force 
intervention decisions on policymakers. ‘No evidence was found that media 
coverage could cause policymakers to pursue the more risky option of deploying 
ground troops during humanitarian crises. The idea of media driving this kind 
of intervention is a myth’ (Robinson 2000: 128). After noting the lack of effect 
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television coverage of Bosnia had on US policymaking, Susan Moeller (1999: 
225) reached similar conclusions concerning Rwanda:
And the Holocaust language and images of genocide in Rwanda did not force 
American military intervention there either. Stabilizing the internal situation 
appeared to offi cials at the Pentagon and elsewhere to be a black hole of 
commitment. But once the slaughter ended and the refugees settled in camps 
at the borders, the potential debacle turned into a doable humanitarian effort 
that the U.S. forces were well-equipped to solve. So the Americans went in.
Yet the conventional wisdom was that media were responsible for setting US 
policy priorities in Somalia and, therefore, posed that same risk (in the view of 
those who wished to avoid intervention) or promise (for those who viewed the 
lack of massacre coverage as the missing ingredient in what would otherwise 
surely have been an intervention). Media simply do not have that capability, 
however understood.
That said, it is important to note that media content can indeed have an effect 
on policy. Television diplomacy in a global information environment, for example, 
accelerates deliberations. Rather than communicating through traditional 
diplomatic channels, leaders communicate through media programming of 
various types. There are other obvious effects. Military operations are vulnerable 
to disruption by media images in at least two ways. First, such coverage may 
sap morale. During war, US and civilian casualty coverage is avoided at all costs 
for fear that support for the war will be adversely affected. Second, in this era 
of global real-time television coverage using highly mobile satellite technology, 
reporters may compromise operational security, the secrecy concerning military 
plans and manoeuvres essential to modern warfare (Livingston 1997). But 
these effects are not the same as those implied by Kennan and others who have 
argued that media can establish foreign policy priorities. Policy agenda-setting 
is left to policymakers.
NOTES
1. It would be inaccurate to ascribe the shift in focus away from international news solely to the 
end of the Cold War. Important changes to the internal dynamics of news and news culture in 
the United States were occurring simultaneously. Growing concentration of media ownership is 
pointed to by many scholars as a principle cause of the erosion of international news, and serious 
news generally. With an eye toward the bottom line, corporate media began fi lling airtime with 
exactly the sort of stories identifi ed in the content analysis results mentioned: crime, scandal 
and features. International news is expensive to produce and often, it is sometimes argued, 
unimportant to American audiences – except when the story from abroad involves Americans. 
See Bagdikian (1997) for a full discussion of the concentration of media ownership.
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Missing the Story: 
the Media and the Rwanda Genocide 
Linda Melvern 
In the course of a few terrible months in 1994, one million people were killed 
in Rwanda. It was slaughter on a scale not seen since the Nazi extermination 
programme. The killing rate in Rwanda was fi ve times that achieved by the Nazis. 
Such a crime requires motives, means and opportunity. The motive of those 
responsible for the genocide was to continue to monopolize power and seek a 
‘fi nal solution’ to the political opposition. The means was the mobilization of 
militia and use of  the civil administration to encourage people to take part. 
Both methods of mass killing had already been tried successfully in Rwanda 
and were well documented in human rights reports (Ndiaye 1993).
The opportunity for genocide was provided by a conjunction of circumstances, 
allowing the hard-liners to confuse the international community long enough to 
be able to perpetrate the crime with extraordinarily little international response. 
These circumstances, contrived or fortuitous, included the almost immediate 
withdrawal of international groups when the killing began, the resumption of 
a civil war and an inaccurate portrayal of the killing by the international press 
as ‘tribal violence’.
It is the initial inaccurate reporting of the genocide by the Western press that 
is the subject of this paper. There is no doubt that the events in Rwanda in April 
1994 took the British and the American media by surprise, but the message that 
the violence in Rwanda was the result of ancient tribal hatreds was quite simply 
wrong. The use of this cliché dominated the early reports on the genocide. The 
basic inference was that the killing represented uncontrollable tribal savagery 
about which nothing could be done. One British newspaper reported without 
question the view of  a Western diplomat in the capital, Kigali, who told a 
journalist how ‘various clans were murdering others.’ Rwanda was described 
as a failed state. There was chaos and anarchy (Hilsum 1994a).
In reality, a planned annihilation was taking place. This was not a sudden 
eruption of long-simmering hatred. Genocide does not take place in a context of 
anarchy. What was happening was the deliberate slaughter of Hutu moderates 
and all Tutsis, in carefully planned and clinically carried out massacres. There 
were daily deliveries of weapons to the roadblocks. There were dustcarts touring 
the capital into which prisoners who had been seconded to ‘clean’ the streets 
This paper fi rst appeared in Contemporary Security Policy, 2001: 22(3).
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threw bodies. There were no sealed trains or secluded camps in Rwanda. The 
genocide took place in broad daylight and was broadcast on the radio. The 
vast majority of victims in Rwanda, it has since been ascertained, died in the 
fi rst six weeks of  the genocide, in large-scale and organized massacres (Des 
Forges 1999).
The fi rst large-scale massacre to be discovered by United Nations (UN) 
peacekeepers was at a parish called Gikondo, a stronghold of the Hutu Power 
faction in the heart of the capital city, Kigali. It was Saturday 9 April. A few 
weeks before, in March, a Major Podevijn had reported to the headquarters 
of  the UN mission in Rwanda that weapons had been distributed to the 
members of  the Interahamwe in Gikondo. On this particular Saturday, the 
UN peacekeepers were answering a desperate call from two Polish military 
observers living in Gikondo. 
Setting out for the parish that day were two Polish majors, Stefan Stec and 
Maric Pazik. They were experienced peacekeepers and they had served in the UN 
mission to Cambodia. With them went Major Brent Beardsley. Beardsley was 
the staff  offi cer of the force commander, Major General Roméo Dallaire. 
The peacekeepers travelled to Gikondo in the one working Czech-made 
armoured personnel carrier (APC) with a three-man Bangladeshi crew. They 
were warned that the APC could break down at any moment. As they made 
their way through the streets, a group of people screamed at them to stop. They 
drove on. None of  them spoke as they passed bodies that were littering the 
streets. The climb up the hill at Gikondo was laborious for the road was steep 
and there were deep ruts made by torrential downpours. At the top of the hill 
was a Catholic mission, operated by Polish priests and nuns and set in terraced 
gardens surrounded by eucalyptus trees. It was a large mission, self-contained 
and dominated by a brick church. 
When they reached the church the peacekeepers left the Bangladeshi crew 
with the APC, and walked into the garden. It was there they found the bodies. 
Whole families had been killed together, each person hacked to death with 
machetes. There were terrible wounds to the genitalia. Some people were not 
dead. There was a three-month-old baby, the mother raped and the baby killed 
with a terrible wound. There were children, some with their legs or feet cut off, 
and their throats cut. Most of the victims had bled to death. 
Stec returned to the APC. He wanted to get his camcorder to fi lm it. There 
must be proof. They found the UN observers huddled together in the church. 
Military observers (MILOBS) consisted of  commissioned offi cers from the 
rank of captain to lieutenant colonel, who were deployed around the country 
to monitor and ensure that all parties followed the peace agreement.
The peacekeepers in the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) had 
come to Rwanda to monitor a peace agreement, the Arusha accords, signed in 
1993, ending a civil war between the mainly Tutsi rebels, the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) and the Hutu dictatorship that had ruled Rwanda for 20 years. The 
Arusha accords provided for radical change – political, military and constitu-
tional reform. Rwanda was to have a broad-based transitional government until 
a democratically elected government was installed. The RPF and the Rwandan 
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army would integrate; there would be disarmament and demobilization. Some 
900,000 Tutsi refugees, expelled in the anti-Tutsi pogroms that had taken place 
since 1959, were to be allowed to return home. 
At fi rst, the job of  the UN peacekeepers had seemed unambiguous: this 
was classic UN peacekeeping with the soldiers acting as a buffer between two 
former enemies. The peacekeepers observe and they mediate. But it was not 
so simple. By April 1994 the peace agreement had stalled. There were delays 
in its implementation and the peacekeeping force was too weak to make any 
difference.
The UN military observers in Gikondo were part of a team of offi cers from 
16 different countries under the command of Colonel Tikoca from Fiji, and 
supported by operations offi cer Lieutenant Colonel Somalia Iliya from Nigeria. 
It was the Polish observers who reported that the Interahamwe militia had 
carried out the killing in Gikondo under the direction of the Presidential Guard. 
On Saturday morning, 9 April, at about 9 a.m. the priests had organized a mass 
and about 500 people, sheltering in the compound, turned up at the church. 
During the mass, there were the sounds of shooting and grenades. There was 
a commotion. Then two Presidential Guards and two gendarmes burst into 
the church, followed by Interahamwe. The Interahamwe wore their distinctive 
clothing, the Kitenge, their multicoloured pants and tunics. 
After the massacre was over the priests had tried to gather the wounded in 
the porch. The priests said that the Rwandan army had cordoned off the parish. 
They said some of their parishioners did the killing. When the president’s plane 
went down (Wednesday, 6 April) there had been shooting all night long. The 
next day Tutsi had fl ed to the church for safety and some people were so afraid 
that they hid beneath fl oors, in cupboards or in the rafters. 
Another witness to the massacre recalled: ‘The militia began slashing away 
... They were hacking at the arms, legs, genitals, breasts, faces and necks.’ There 
was total panic. Some people were dragged outside and beaten to death. The 
killing lasted about two hours and then the killers had walked slowly among 
the bodies and looted them or fi nished off  the wounded. 
One of the Polish military observers had watched the local police entering the 
buildings in the compound, followed by militia armed with machetes and clubs. 
One of the militia had what looked like a Kalashnikov. The Polish observer had 
seen militia climb over the fence and said he had tried to contact UNAMIR 
headquarters, but the radio channels were jammed. He helped the wounded 
and had noticed how ears and mouths were slashed, clothes had been pulled 
off  and the genitals of  men and women mutilated. He took photographs. 
There was a pile of identifi cation cards with the ethnic designation of Tutsi, 
burned in an attempt to eradicate all evidence that these people had existed. 
The next day the Interahamwe came back. They discovered that the survivors 
were hiding in a small chapel. When they failed to break down the door, the 
militia poured petrol in through the windows of the chapel followed by hand 
grenades (Melvern 2000). 
In the next three months massacres like this became commonplace. But 
at Gikondo, there was fi lm and proof. The Polish peacekeepers thought that 
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Gikondo should alert the world, for they recognized what was happening as 
genocide.
Two days after the attack on the church in Gikondo, the story of  what 
had happened there appeared in a French newspaper, Libération, written by 
journalist Jean-Philippe Ceppi (1994). Ceppi described seeing mutilated bodies, 
the men with their penises cut, and the women their breasts. Only a dozen people 
had survived the massacre and they were not expected to live. In the roads 
around Gikondo and all over Kigali, murders were taking place. Everywhere 
there were sounds of screams and gunfi re. Presidential Guards toured the city in 
APCs, carrying lists of victims. The Interahamwe battered down doors, chasing 
Tutsi from house to house, and room to room. Nowhere was safe for Tutsi, not 
even the hospitals, where Rwandan soldiers were rampaging through the wards 
looking for them. So many bodies were delivered to the city morgue that they 
had to be stacked outside.
The French daily Le Monde also carried a story about Gikondo, published 
on Tuesday 12 April by journalist Jean Hélène (1994). Hélène described how 
the victims of the killing in Kigali were mostly Tutsi. According to the chief 
delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Philippe Gaillard, 
who had organized vehicles and delegates to go and help the wounded of 
Gikondo, an estimated 10,000 people had already been murdered in Kigali. 
Jean Hélène speculated that by the time the RPF reached Kigali, all the Tutsi 
would be dead. 
But in the Ceppi article in Libération the word ‘genocide’ was used. Ceppi 
wrote that the RPF was advancing on Kigali and, according to some reports, 
was only 15 kilometres from the capital. ‘But by the time they arrive,’ Ceppi 
reported, ‘a genocide of the Tutsi would already have taken place.’ Ceppi told 
me recently that when he got to Kigali on 8 April, over land from Burundi, 
everyone was using the word genocide. He had met Gaillard, who told him that 
a genocide of the Tutsi had just begun. Ceppi’s story in Libération on 11 April, 
as far as can be ascertained, was the fi rst mention of the word genocide in the 
media in relation to what was happening. On that day in Britain a broadsheet 
published a report from Rwanda about the evacuation of a French woman’s 
poodle as a ‘veteran of  African confl ict’, and the fi rst paragraph described 
the evacuation of foreigners from Rwanda. The headline ran: ‘Foreigners fl ee 
bloody horrors of Rwanda,’ and the story explained that there was bloodletting 
between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi groups (Hilsum 1994b).
The word genocide disappeared from news reports after that mention in 
Libération and, for the next few weeks, a fog of misinformation shrouded what 
was happening. Roger Winter, the director of  the United States Committee 
for Refugees, who had known about the problems of Rwanda since 1983, had 
just returned from Rwanda when the genocide started and he became quite 
desperate to change the perception in the press that this was tribal warfare. 
He wrote an article to explain how the violence was political in nature and 
that what was happening was a plot by an extremist clique to cling to power. 
This clique was using ethnicity to achieve its aims. Winter’s article was rejected 
by most American papers, including the Washington Post and The New York 
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Times. It was eventually published in Toronto’s Globe and Mail on 14 April 
(Winter 1994). 
The next day an article in The New York Times described Rwanda as small, 
poor and globally insignificant (Sciolino 1994). Rwanda, the newspaper 
explained, was in an ‘uncontrollable spasm of  lawlessness and terror’. No 
member of the UN with an army strong enough to make a difference was willing 
to risk the lives of its troops for this ‘failed central African nation-state with a 
centuries-old history of tribal warfare and deep distrust of outside intervention’. 
The newspaper explained that the American strategy was to keep expectations 
as low as possible. The headline on the story ran: ‘For West, Rwanda is not 
worth the political candle.’
In the first days of  the genocide the commander of  UNAMIR, Major 
General Roméo Dallaire from Canada, thought that what was going on was 
a power grab by extremists, a military coup with the intention of eliminating 
all opposing politicians and ruining forever the possibility of reconciliation. 
But the situation soon became clear to him. On 8 April, Dallaire cabled UN 
headquarters in New York with his fi rst detailed assessment. In this cable, he 
described a campaign of  terror that was well planned and organized. There 
must be no doubt, he told New York, without the presence of UNAMIR the 
situation would be much worse. 
Dallaire wanted reinforcements. He wanted to take action to try to stop 
the bloodshed and he believed that with a minimum reinforcement of  some 
5,000 armed and trained troops, a signal could be sent to those who were 
organizing the bloodshed. A show of force by the UN would intimidate the 
gangs of  militia. Protected sites could be set up for civilians. Only a lack of 
means prevented him taking action. Dallaire argued that reinforcements could 
stop the terror from spreading. He later explained that there was a window 
of opportunity when the political leaders of the genocide were susceptible to 
international infl uence. But there seemed little chance of any reinforcements. 
At the UN Secretariat in New York the focus was either on the evacuation of 
expatriates or the possibility of obtaining a ceasefi re in the renewed civil war. 
In the Security Council, there were similar concerns. On 12 April in a secret 
and informal meeting of the council, the British and American governments 
made it clear that the best course of action was to pull out all but a token force 
of the UN peacekeepers from Rwanda.
The issue of  reinforcements was not discussed in any depth in the press, 
although there was a reference to it in a New York Times editorial on 23 April 
on the need to consider whether a mobile quick-response force under UN aegis 
was necessary to deal with such calamities. The editorial began with the words: 
‘What looks very much like genocide has been taking place in Rwanda ... The 
world has few ways of  responding effectively when violence within a nation 
leads to massacres and the breakdown of civil order’ (NYT Editors 1994). The 
Security Council had thrown in the bloodied towel when it decided unanimously 
to cut back the blue helmets. The editorial ended that without a rapid reaction 
force ‘the world has little choice but to stand aside and hope for the best.’ 
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There remains to this day a lack of  interest in the circumstances of  the 
genocide. In the US there have been no congressional hearings into the decision-
making process within the US government. In Britain, both the press and 
Parliament have failed to question the policies of  the British government of 
John Major toward Rwanda. Britain is, after all, a permanent member of the 
Security Council with a special responsibility for UN policy. Although the 
former president Bill Clinton later apologized for the international community’s 
failure over Rwanda, the British government, a bystander to genocide, has yet 
to recognize its own role. Britain had voted for a peacekeeping mission for 
Rwanda in October 1993. Was there no subsequent monitoring of what was 
taking place there? What did Britain know of the unfolding of the genocide? 
What was Britain’s role in decision-making in the Security Council?
The meetings held by the Security Council to discuss what to do about the 
peacekeeping mission and the crisis in Rwanda took place behind closed doors. 
Twenty years ago, when most council meetings were held in public, it would have 
been possible to hear the options discussed, but nowadays most debates take 
place in a side room where the deals are concluded that make up ‘UN policy’. 
This means that the policies of each member government are hidden from public 
scrutiny. Throughout the genocide, the Security Council was in almost constant 
secret session, meeting sometimes twice daily and long into the night. 
These meetings would usually have remained secret forever were it not for 
the leak to me from within the council of  a remarkable 155-page document 
containing an account of them. This invaluable primary source gives a unique 
view of the council’s secret world and, without it, an account of the international 
failure over Rwanda would be incomplete (Melvern 2000). This document 
exposes some unpleasant truths – not the least of which is the fact that Dallaire’s 
military estimate to try to prevent the spread of organized killings of civilians 
was not even put to the council for discussion in the fi rst crucial weeks. Just fi ve 
days after the genocide began, the British raised the issue of reinforcements, 
but then only to dismiss the idea. 
Sir David Hannay, the UK’s ambassador to the UN, had put forward four 
options. The fi rst was to reinforce the troops. But this, Hannay warned, could 
be a repetition of Somalia. Peacekeeping was not appropriate for civil war, for 
situations where there was no peace to keep and where fi ghting factions were 
unwilling to cooperate. Inadequate effort was worse than no effort at all. Second, 
UNAMIR could pull out completely but the negative signal that this would 
send would be damaging. Third, the troops could stay on, although Hannay did 
query what they could effectively do, for there was no evidence that UNAMIR 
was in any position to protect civilians. The fourth and last idea was to pull 
most of the peacekeepers out, leaving behind ‘some elements’. Although this 
might initially attract public criticism, it seemed to be the safest course. There 
were no press reports about these choices. Whatever offi cial briefi ng information 
that comes out of any closed-door session of the council is censored – a culture 
of secrecy nowadays taken for granted.
In April 1994, the council did not address the question of genocide in Rwanda 
until three weeks after it had begun. By this time, the evidence was leaking from 
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Rwanda as hundreds of bodies clogged the Kagera River fl owing out of the 
country. The aid charity, Oxfam, had already determined that genocide was 
under way and on 28 April had issued a press release with the headline, ‘Oxfam 
fears genocide is happening in Rwanda’ (Oxfam 1994). 
There was a fl icker of interest in the press, but not a lot, for another story was 
now grabbing the headlines. Thousands of people were pouring out of Rwanda 
into Tanzania, the fastest exodus the world had ever seen. In Oxford, the press 
offi cer for Oxfam, John Magrath, noted the huge numbers of  journalists in 
South Africa covering elections for a new multiracial parliament. Magrath 
dryly recorded in his diary: ‘The South African elections were over and all 
the crews were diverted to Tanzania – the refugees became the story, not the 
genocide.’ While the genocide took place in Rwanda, the number of reporters 
never rose above a maximum of 15. In South Africa, in early May, there had 
been 2,500 accredited press.
On 29 April, the day after Oxfam’s press release, there was a long discussion 
about Rwanda in the Security Council. The president of the council, the New 
Zealand ambassador Colin Keating, who had been given a briefi ng on the 
slaughter by Médecins Sans Frontières, had proposed a presidential statement 
to recognize that genocide was under way in Rwanda. Keating believed that if  
the Security Council was to admit that this was genocide, then the states that 
had signed the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (UN 1951) were legally bound to act.1
The ambassador for the Czech Republic, Karel Kovanda, had already 
confronted the council with the fact of genocide at an informal meeting a day 
earlier, telling ambassadors that it was scandalous that so far 80 per cent of 
council efforts had been spent discussing withdrawing the peacekeepers, and 
20 per cent trying to get a ceasefi re in the civil war. He told them: ‘It was rather 
like wanting Hitler to reach a ceasefi re with the Jews.’ What was happening in 
Rwanda was genocide, conducted by the interim Hutu regime, he said. Yet the 
council had totally avoided the question of mass killing. There were objections 
to Kovanda’s outburst and afterward Kovanda said that British and American 
diplomats quietly told him on no account was he to use such infl ammatory 
language outside the council. It was not helpful.
What Keating proposed in his presidential statement was to give the killing in 
Rwanda its rightful name – genocide. The statement included the paragraph: 
The horror of Rwanda’s killing fi elds has few precedents in the recent history 
of the world. The Security Council reaffi rms that the systematic killing of 
any ethnic group, with intent to destroy it in whole or in part constitutes an 
act of genocide as defi ned by relevant provisions of international law ... the 
council further points out that an important body of international law exists 
that deals with perpetrators of genocide. 
The draft warned the ‘interim government of its responsibility for immediately 
reining in and disciplining those responsible for the brutality.’ 
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There were objections. Hannay did not want the word ‘genocide’ to appear 
in the statement, and he argued that were the statement to be used in an offi cial 
UN document, then the council would become a ‘laughing stock’. To name 
this genocide and not to act on it would be ridiculous. Nor did the US want the 
word used, and China argued against it. The Rwandan ambassador said that 
the civilian deaths were the result of civil war and he was ably supported in this 
by the French-infl uenced ally, Djibouti. The debate went round in circles. 
Keating, whose term as president of the council would end the following day, 
tried the somewhat desperate measure of threatening a draft resolution, tabled 
in his national capacity. This would require a vote, and a vote was always taken 
in public. This would expose the positions of each country to public scrutiny. 
Only after this threat was a compromise reached. Thanks to the drafting ability 
of the British, known for resolutions with mind-numbing ambiguity, a watered-
down statement was issued, and while the statement quoted directly from the 
genocide convention, it did not use the word genocide.
The Security Council condemns all these breaches of  international 
humanitarian law in Rwanda, particularly those perpetrated against the 
civilian population, and recalls that persons who instigate or participate in 
such acts are individually responsible ... the Security Council recalls that the 
killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such 
a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable by international 
law. (Security Council 1994)
The statement recognized that the massacres were systematic, although it did 
not identify the targets. It read: ‘Attacks on defenceless civilians have occurred 
throughout the country, especially in areas under the control of members or 
supporters of  the armed forces of  the interim Government of  Rwanda.’ To 
satisfy French insistence that massacres had also been conducted by the RPF, the 
statement went on: ‘The Security Council demands that the interim Government 
of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front take effective measures to prevent 
any attacks on civilians in areas under their control.’ The statement appealed 
to all states to refrain from providing arms or any military assistance to the 
two sides in Rwanda and reiterated the call for a ceasefi re. It requests that the 
Secretary General investigate ‘serious violations of international humanitarian 
law’. The statement was fi nally voted on at 1.15 a.m. on Saturday 30 April. ‘We 
ended April exhausted but hopeful that the fi rst few weeks of May would bring 
action to reinforce UNAMIR with a real force capable of doing what Dallaire 
had been urging,’ Keating said. 
Some years later, in December 1998, in a BBC Radio Four interview, Hannay 
talked specifically about the genocide convention in relation to Rwanda: 
‘Nobody ever started to say who will actually do the intervening and how will 
it be done’ (Glenny 1998). In an interview with me in December 1999, Hannay 
pointed out that the council could not conjure up troops and, although he 
believes that Dallaire did a fantastic job, Hannay remains deeply sceptical of 
Dallaire’s belief  that 5,000 troops could have prevented much of the slaughter. 
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In any case, to have mounted an enforcement mission with so few troops was 
totally against US military doctrine. Hannay explained that the British were 
‘extremely unsighted’ over Rwanda. There was no British embassy there. There 
were no British interests. Rwanda was a long way down the list of priorities and 
the telegrams about Rwanda, received from British embassies in Brussels, Paris 
and Washington were not treated as high grade. In April 1994, a lot of time and 
resources were being channelled into the problems of Bosnia and in trying to 
disarm Iraq. The staff  at the British mission in New York was overstretched. 
Hannay says the information coming from the Secretariat was insuffi cient; 
he complained about the inadequate briefi ngs available to the Security Council. 
Secretary General Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali controlled the fl ow of information 
to the council, Hannay said, allowing only those offi cials with his permission 
to brief  ambassadors. 
In all the discussions held about Rwanda before the genocide began, the 
focus had been on how to implement the Arusha accords. ‘Events proved,’ said 
Hannay, ‘we were looking in the wrong direction, and that the Secretariat was 
telling us to look in that direction.’ He had seen none of the force commander’s 
cables from Rwanda because the council was not meant to be involved in the 
day-to-day running of peacekeeping missions. Even so, Hannay is convinced 
that there was nothing the UN could have done to prevent the genocide in 
Rwanda, not with a Hutu-led government intent on it. Even had the Security 
Council recognized the killing as genocide, it would not have saved any lives. 
Hannay said that he was not a lawyer and was, therefore, not in a position to 
decide whether what was happening was genocide. ‘We knew a lot of Tutsi were 
being killed by a lot of Hutu,’ he said.
Another glimpse into British government thinking is afforded in a letter 
sent in July 1995 by the Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce (FCO), to an 
international enquiry. In this letter, written a year after the genocide ended, the 
FCO said it did not accept the term genocide. The FCO was inclined to regard 
a discussion of  whether the massacres constituted genocide as ‘sterile’. The 
FCO approach was characterized from the outset by a determination to play 
the matter down and, for a body that once regarded Africa as its area of special 
interest, an almost deliberate ignorance. For instance, on 9 May in the House 
of Commons, and in response to a question about Rwanda, Parliament was 
told: ‘More than 200,000 may have perished in the recent fi ghting in Rwanda’ 
(Lennox-Boyd 1994). 
This was an extraordinary statement. The estimated death toll had reached 
500,000 – whole families killed in organized massacres taking place nowhere 
near the renewed civil war. The lack of Parliamentary scrutiny of British policy 
is evidenced in the fact that a debate on Rwanda was not held until 24 May 
1994 – some six weeks after the genocide began – when Labour Party MP Tony 
Worthington expressed shock that so little attention had been paid to Rwanda. 
Worthington told an almost empty House at 11 p.m.: ‘It is inconceivable that 
an atrocity in which half  a million white people had died would not have been 
extensively debated in the House’ (Worthington 1994). Worthington said that 
the press had a terrible tendency to dismiss the events as tribalism. ‘Genocide 
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is certainly involved,’ Worthington told the House. Britain was a signatory to 
the genocide convention. ‘Has there ever been a clearer example of genocide?’ 
he asked. 
The Labour Party had waited until May before putting pressure on the 
government to act, and only then because Oxfam telephoned the offi ce of David 
Clark, shadow Secretary of State for defence. Clark called for the UN and the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) to organize an immediate deployment 
of forces to try to end the mass killing of civilians and appealed to Malcolm 
Rifkind, the Secretary of State for defence, so that the ‘advice and expertise 
that our armed forces possess could be made available to the UN’. On 23 May, 
Rifkind wrote back to say that troops for Rwanda would ‘probably come from 
regional forces in Africa’. 
The UK, wrote Rifkind, ‘has not been asked to provide any personnel for 
the operation’. It was an extraordinary sentence for Rifkind to write. Only a 
few days earlier Britain had voted in the Security Council to authorize more 
troops for Rwanda and, at the time, offi cials in the Secretariat were making 
desperate efforts to fi nd soldiers. This was repeated in the House of Commons 
on 14 June when, in a written answer, Douglas Hogg claimed that the UK 
government had not been asked to contribute troops to the UN peacekeeping 
operation in Rwanda (Hogg 1994). In fact, the head of the UN’s peacekeeping 
department, Kofi  Annan, said that every UN member government with spare 
military capacity had received a fax with a list of urgently needed troops and 
equipment.
In July 1994, Britain’s minister for overseas development, Baroness Lynda 
Chalker, visited Kigali. She met Dallaire and she asked him what he needed. 
Dallaire had showed Chalker his list of basic requirements, which by then had 
been faxed around the world. ‘I gave her my shopping list,’ he remembered. ‘I 
was up to my knees in bodies by then.’ Britain had previously promised Dallaire 
50 four-ton four-wheel-drive trucks, but they had not materialized. 
On a BBC 2 Newsnight programme about Rwanda, Baroness Chalker later 
blamed Dallaire’s lack of resources on ‘the UN’, which, she explained, ought 
to ‘get its procurement right’. No one challenged this remark. Only after the 
genocide was over, and in response to another massive fl ight of people from 
Rwanda, this time into Zaire, did Britain become more generous. Chalker called 
the refugee tragedy the most ghastly in living memory, a replay of the Middle 
Ages and, on 28 July, Britain offered military assistance in the form of  600 
personnel from the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME) to 
repair the large number of unroadworthy vehicles that belonged to Dallaire’s 
mission, a fi eld ambulance and a fi eld squadron of Royal Engineers to repair 
roads and drill wells. Dallaire’s only offers during the genocide, as a matter of 
record, were 50 trucks from Britain; a promise from Italy of one C130 aircraft 
plus crew; 6 water trucks, a signals squadron plus aircraft from Canada; from the 
US 50 armoured personnel carriers, leasehold; and from Japan, US$ 3 million 
toward the cost of equipment. Nothing materialized.
In the years since the genocide, the shortage of accurate media coverage has 
been placed high on the list of reasons for Western inaction. One international 
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report concluded that the Western media’s failure to adequately report that 
genocide was taking place, and thereby generate public pressure for something 
to be done to stop it, had contributed to international indifference and inaction, 
and possibly to the crime itself. Although the coverage had been handicapped 
by danger on the ground, the press, in generally characterizing the genocide 
as tribal anarchy, was fundamentally irresponsible (Millwood 1996). It was 
left to nongovernmental organizations – most notably Oxfam and Amnesty 
International – to lead a call for something to be done in Rwanda, to draw 
attention in those fi rst crucial weeks to what was really happening. 
In a letter to the Guardian on 16 April 1994, Stewart Willis, the overseas 
director of  Oxfam, had pleaded for the UN to immediately reinforce its 
peacekeepers in Rwanda: ‘It is outrageous and despicable that at the same time 
as the UN Security Council is acting with vigour to protect civilians in Gorazde, 
French and Belgian troops have to look away while people are hacked to death’ 
(Wallis 1994). At the time, the Serb bombing of the safe area of Gorazde was 
grabbing the headlines. 
On 20 April, Jeri Laber, executive director, Human Rights Watch–Helsinki, 
wrote to the New York Times that the UN should fi nd a means to protect 
the innocent. To describe ancient hatreds in Rwanda was deplorable, faulty 
and dangerous (Laber 1994). Another letter said: ‘One has to wonder why 
the atrocities in Bosnia receive the widespread attention they do while the 
massacres of tens of thousands in an African country is met with a collective 
denial of  responsibility and a hasty retreat.’ It was from William F. Schulz 
(1994), executive director of  Amnesty International to the Washington Post
on 1 May.
With no outcry about genocide in the press, no choices were given and no 
risks were taken. At the very least the genocide should have been condemned 
in the strongest possible terms by the press. Those responsible for the genocide, 
and their names were known, should have been publicly denounced. Even the 
story of Dallaire and the gallant contingent of the International Committee 
of  the Red Cross (ICRC) under chief  delegate, Philippe Gaillard, remained 
unreported. Indeed, there was later criticism of UNAMIR. One US journalist, 
Philip Gourevitch, wrote how in the summer of 1994 UN troops had killed dogs 
feeding off  the corpses. Gourevitch (1998: 148) noted: ‘After months during 
which Rwandans had been left to wonder whether the UN troops knew how to 
shoot, because they never used their excellent weapons to stop the extermination 
of civilians, it turned out that the peacekeepers were very good shots.’
While some 470 volunteer peacekeepers stayed on in Rwanda, the UN failed 
even to resupply them; at the same time, the ICRC had managed to get tonnes 
of medical equipment into Rwanda. When Dr James Orbinksi of Médecins Sans 
Frontières arrived in Kigali in June 1994, he was shocked at the state of the 
peacekeepers, astonished that they were obliged to limit their rescue attempts 
for lack of petrol. Orbinski said of their commander: ‘His tenacity and sheer 
drive to maximise the impact of UNAMIR was extraordinary.’ 
While diplomats and politicians were arguing that nothing could be done, 
these people were doing all they could to try to ease the suffering of the Rwandan 
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people. Gaillard estimated that during the three months of genocide, the ICRC 
looked after 9,000 injured people and a further 100,000 people were saved 
because of the work of ICRC delegates elsewhere in the country. In Kigali, there 
had been 1,200 surgical operations and hundreds more people were treated from 
the back of ambulances. At the end of the genocide there were 2,500 people in 
the ICRC hospital compound in Kigali. Gaillard told me that this was ‘no more 
than a drop of humanity in an ocean of blood’. It was the most extraordinary 
humanitarian operation since World War II, and my book told for the fi rst time 
the amazing story of these people (Melvern 2000). 
The international community could have publicly condemned the interim 
government in Rwanda for fl agrantly failing to fulfi l its obligations under 
international law, notably the Convention on Genocide, which it signed in 1975. 
Countries should have severed diplomatic ties with Rwanda and expelled 
Rwandan ambassadors.
Anyone who tried to represent a government that was presiding over genocide 
– in fact was perpetrating it – should have been refused a place anywhere in the 
civilized world. Instead there was silence. For three months the British and US 
administrations played down the crisis and tried to impede effective intervention 
by UN forces. There was even reluctance to take the slightest action, such as 
jamming the hate radio, which could have saved lives. The lack of action over 
Rwanda should be the defi ning scandal of the presidency of Bill Clinton. Yet 
in the slew of articles on the Clinton years that followed Clinton’s departure 
from power, there was barely a mention of  the genocide. Only Christopher 
Hitchens (2001), one of several journalists interviewed about the Clinton legacy, 
mentioned how Clinton had ‘vetoed the rescue of Rwanda’.
If the media forget this story, then the media have failed. Why this pitiful lack 
of coverage in this great age of information? The lack of adequate reporting 
of  the genocide in Rwanda raises some serious questions and most of  them 
have yet to be adequately addressed. It is an unpalatable fact, but this story 
has a tragic contemporary resonance, for the scars and the consequences of 
the genocide, largely unreported, are with us today.
NOTE
1. In April 1994, the nonpermanent members of the Security Council were: Argentina, Brazil, 
Czech Republic, Djibouti, New Zealand, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Rwanda and Spain. All but 
three of these states – Djibouti, Nigeria and Oman – had signed the genocide convention.
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What Did They Say? 
African Media Coverage of the 
First 100 Days of the Rwanda Crisis
Emmanuel C. Alozie
Issues and events in Africa attract little attention in the world press (Livingston 
and Eachus 2000). The defi ciencies in international media coverage of the 1994 
Rwanda genocide have been well established, and there is a considerable body 
of literature on Western media coverage of Africa in general (Alozie 2005a). 
But most researchers have focused on the performance of European or Western 
news media. Few have examined the coverage that African media outlets in one 
country afford to events taking place in another African country. Do African 
media, by virtue of geographic proximity or their situation in the African context, 
do a better job in their analyses and news reports of events on the continent? 
This study attempts to discern the frames that dominated the coverage of the 
1994 Rwandan crisis and genocide in two leading African newspapers: Kenya’s 
Daily Nation and Nigeria’s Guardian. It looks at the period from the start of the 
genocide, on 7 April 1994 through to the end of June. These two newspapers 
were chosen because of their prominence in their regions and indeed in Africa 
and also because one is published in Kenya – one of  Rwanda’s neighbours 
– while the other is in Nigeria on the other side of the continent.
There was a great deal of overlap between the two newspapers with regard 
to the major frames established. Both papers also went to considerable lengths 
to explore the background to the crisis and its greater implications. This is 
important considering that Western media are often accused of failing to do 
just that. However, there were also differences in coverage. The national/regional 
interest emerged as a theme in the Daily Nation but did not develop in coverage 
by the Guardian. This focus was evidently a result of  Kenya’s proximity to 
Rwanda – not the fact that the Nation is an African newspaper. And although 
both papers devoted considerable space and resources to covering the Rwanda 
events, over time, the Daily Nation offered more comprehensive accounts while 
the Guardian’s attention waned.
THE ROLE OF THE MASS MEDIA IN AFRICA
The establishment of  national media outlets and telecommunication 
components, coupled with cooperative efforts among African countries to 
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develop communication links, attest to the fact that governments realize the 
importance of effective communication for promoting national development 
and international diplomacy (Pratt 1996). However, Africa still lags woefully 
behind in the development of  media and information and communications 
technologies (De Beer 2004). Hachten (2004) blames the underdeveloped status 
of African media and communications on the inadequate fi nancial, technical 
and telecommunications resources and the lack of  professional manpower. 
De Beer (2004) includes the legacy of  slavery, apartheid, colonialism and 
imperialism as contributing factors. Zaffi ro (1993) identifi ed characteristics of 
both democratic and autocratic African states:
• Skewed, urban-based centralization of  infrastructure, resources and 
audiences;
• Emphasis on comings and goings and images of  top national political 
leaders, particularly the president;
• Heavy and often confl icting demands on media institutions to serve 
national development, to inform, educate and entertain; 
• General lack of  diversity of  information and focus between different 
national media organs;
• Structure that ensures top-down communications fl ow and is susceptible 
to monopolization and political manipulation.
In this era of  globalization, when information and communications 
technologies have become a mainstay of international economic and political 
activities, many African governments are shifting their policies to enhance 
the growth of the communication sector and engaging in cooperative efforts 
to improve communications. The revival can be attributed to press freedom 
and economic liberalization that have promoted private ownership, technical 
acquisition and enhanced professional assistance and development (Alozie 
2005b; Onwudiwe and Ibelema 2003). But development of  information and 
communications technologies is still slow (Eribo 2004) and the rate of progress 
differs from one nation to another. Few Africans are regular Internet users, for 
example, owing to cost and access problems. 
The degree of  control over and restrictions on freedom of the press vary 
greatly among African countries. For example, Kenya and Nigeria have a 
tradition of  a relatively liberal and independent press, whereas Rwanda is 
restrictive (BBC 2005a). Kenya is one of the few African countries where the 
existence of a large middle class provides substantial advertising revenue. Like 
most Africans, Kenyans rely on the broadcast media, particularly radio, for 
news. Although electronic and print media are in both private and government 
hands following recent liberalization, in the past the government dominated and 
owned the broadcast station. The reach of radio and television is expanding 
nationally, unlike in the past when only Nairobi and other major cities enjoyed 
adequate coverage. The BBC World Service, the Voice of America and Radio 
France Internationale are relayed on full-time FM stations in various parts of 
the country.
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In Nigeria, ownership of  print media is in both private and government 
hands. Currently, Nigeria has about 150 consumer publications including 
dailies, magazines, periodicals and industrial and professional journals (BBC 
2005b). All 36 states run their own radio stations and most of them operate 
television services. Broadcast services reach rural and urban areas in most 
regions, but television viewing tends to be concentrated more in urban areas 
and among the affl uent. Nigeria has a handful of privately owned broadcasting 
outlets, but the television industry is limited by high costs and scarce advertising 
revenues. International services are reaching Nigeria through the Internet, cable 
and satellite services. Radio is very common and serves as the main source of 
information for Nigerians of all socio-economic and educational levels.
The government of Rwanda owns the only television network in the country 
and a large number of the radio stations (BBC 2005c). It regulates electronic 
broadcasting and imposes censorship on the press. The fi rst privately owned 
radio station since 1994 was established in 2004 and has since been joined by 
a cluster of  competitors. Radio played a signifi cant propaganda role during 
the 1994 crisis. Rwanda’s growing numbers of  newspapers face government 
restrictions and generally exercise self-censorship. Some are outright pro-
government. The BBC World Service, Voice of America and Deutsche Welle 
broadcast on FM in Kigali. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Interest in international communications and the number of  studies of 
international news coverage and analysis have been on the rise for more than 
30 years. The increase can be attributed to the greater interaction among people 
and nations, the need to examine and understand the fl ow and exchange of mass 
media artefacts and news across boundaries, coupled with the need to promote 
international diplomacy and understanding (Anokwa et al. 2003; Herman and 
Chomsky 1988; Kamalipour 2002; Strobel 1997). Research has examined who 
controls international communications, news content, news selection and news 
fl ow – attributes that affect news content and how national and international 
relations affect news coverage and analyses (Chang 1993; Galtung and Ruge 
1970; Pool 1952; Shoemaker et al. 1991). 
Most studies have concluded that national interest, trade volume, cultural 
affi nity, political relations, confl icts and disaster and the presence of international 
news agencies infl uence international news coverage and coverage exerts an 
infl uence on public policy and the public. They have also found that the West 
and a small number of supra-news organizations in developed nations dominate 
international news and communications (Cho 2003; Golan 2003; Wanta et al. 
2004; Wu 2000).
However, despite the rising interest and growing number of  studies, little 
or nothing exists with regard to African mass media coverage and analysis of 
international issues and events. This is especially true of studies that deal with 
how the press in one African country monitors, covers and analyzes events, 
confl icts and related issues in another African country (Edeani 1994; Emenyonu 
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1995). This shortcoming exists despite the fact that, of all regions in the world, 
Africa has experienced and continues to experience the greatest number of 
internal and external confl icts as well as economic, social and political woes. 
A paucity of qualifi ed researchers, lack of avenues for publication, inadequate 
fi nancial and technical resources and government pressures have all been blamed 
for the gulf  (Alozie 2005b; Ochola 1980). It could be argued that this failure 
hinders the promotion of knowledge about events and the role of the press in 
Africa. It also prevents African leaders and government from monitoring how 
their policies and actions are viewed, leading them to feel less accountable.
The few studies that do exist on African press coverage of international issues 
have often dealt with their coverage of events, issues and nations outside the 
continent or personalities visiting the continent who may have limited impact 
in Africa (Alozie 2004; Idowu 1987; Ibelema 2001; St. Clair 2004). Critics have 
alleged that these studies do not necessarily promote knowledge of  Africa, 
infl uence events or have a direct impact on Africa because they are not focused 
on Africa. (It must be noted that some studies have examined domestic media 
and have dealt with development, internal strife and other related issues (Edeani 
1994; Emenyonu 1995; Nwokeafor and Nwankwo 1993; Umaru Pate cited in 
Onwumechili and M’Bayo 1995).) 
Critics argue that studies of  African mass media and international news 
coverage have often focused on only a few countries and have been limited 
in scope (Ochola 1980). This is true in terms of the work of Nwokeafor and 
Nwankwo (1993), Edeani (1994) and Emenyonu (1995) on Nigerian mass 
media coverage of  Africa. Umaru Pate’s work on African press coverage of 
international concerns is important. The content analysis found that African 
mass media paid more attention to events outside the continent – especially 
those in Europe and the United States – than they did to events in Africa 
(Onwumechili and M’Bayo 1995). Critics who fi nd these results startling 
contend that the African media have failed to monitor the governments in the 
region to hold them accountable for their policies and actions. On the other 
hand, those who are not surprised at Pate’s fi ndings contend that the greater 
attention paid to Europe and America is infl uenced by European colonization 
and African dependence on Europe and the United States for aid, trade and 
economic welfare.
Numerous studies have examined the portrayal of  Africa in Western and 
other regional media (Biko et al. 2000; Fair 1996; Hawk 1992). Their common 
fi nding reveals that according to the Western press, Africa is plagued with 
political and socio-economic upheavals, is prone to violent confl icts and often 
suffers from natural disasters as well as disasters caused by human beings. Critics 
point out that Western news media tend to pay attention to Africa only when 
crises occur and fail to contextualize the stories they are covering. This practice 
has resulted in a negative image of  Africa as a place where nothing works 
in spite of the progress the continent has made, considering its longstanding 
sufferings from slavery, colonialism and a battleground during the Cold War 
(Onwudiwe and Ibelema 2003).
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METHODS
In this study, I use framing to examine the coverage and analyses of the 1994 
Rwandan crisis and genocide from the outset of the genocide on 7 April 1994 
through to 29 June 1994. Two leading African newspapers were chosen for 
study because of their prominence in their regions, and indeed in Africa, and 
also because one (the Daily Nation) is situated in Kenya, one of  Rwanda’s 
neighbours, and the other (the Guardian) is in Nigeria, an African giant to be 
sure, but located on the other side of the continent from Rwanda. The reliance 
on framing allows us to discern whether the focus of these newspapers overlaps 
or whether there were marked differences in content. 
The approach
The process was straightforward. Using microfi lm copies, a research assistant 
examined every page of the issues published during the period under study. He 
extracted every account that mentioned the Rwanda genocide in any way. The 
machine he was using allowed him to create portable document format (PDF) 
images of the pages containing the identifi ed articles. 
Qualitative analysis calls for sequential and multiple reading of the texts. The 
fi rst step entailed a general reading to gain an understanding of  the stories, 
while making descriptive notes about the content of the articles (Gavrilos 2002). 
The articles were read a second time, during which detailed notes were taken 
identifying certain recurring themes, frames, values and topic categories. These 
were used to develop a framework for a third reading – an in-depth interpre-
tation of  the articles. This third reading involved applying critical analysis 
techniques to gain a deeper understanding of  the messages conveyed in the 
texts and thus discern their implications, connections, omissions, stance and 
values in relation to the theoretical underpinning and research questions being 
explored. The words ‘international’ and ‘world’ are used interchangeably to refer 
to countries and organizations outside the continent of Africa, while Africa or 
African refer to countries and organizations in Africa.
It is important to note that there is no ‘correct’ interpretation of these texts 
because a researcher’s reading, like a journalist’s, is fi ltered through the lens of 
that person’s own experiences and opinions (Kellner 2003). Kellner points out 
that an analyst’s interpretation of a text is only one probable understanding 
from a critic’s subjective position, no matter how multiperspective, and may 
not necessarily be the assessment the audience prefers or the one offered by 
others.
The newspapers
The Daily Nation is a member of the Nation Media Group (NMG), founded 
by His Highness the Aga Khan and the largest independent media group in 
East Africa. The newspaper started publishing in 1960 with a promise to do its 
utmost to help Kenya and the other East African territories make the perilous 
transition to African majority rule and full independence as peacefully and 
constructively as possible. The newspaper has been characterized as a Kenyan 
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national daily with a regional outlook. In its own promotional material, the 
newspaper says its history is closely entwined with that of modern Kenya, and 
the newspaper has remained true to its mission to be independent. Viewed as the 
leading multimedia house in the East African region with its major publications, 
The East African, The Advertiser, Monitor (Uganda) and Kiswahili papers 
Mwananchi and Mwana Spoti (Tanzania), the NMG has a strong presence in 
both print and electronic media as well as on the Internet, attracting a regular 
audience unparalleled in East Africa (Daily Nation 2005). 
Since its inception more than 25 years ago, the Guardian has been consistently 
ranked as one of the leading dailies in Nigeria and enjoys a reputation as an 
independent voice because of  its stand against military regimes, its critical 
examination of  Nigeria’s internal problems and its informed discussions of 
foreign affairs. Founded by Alex Ibru, one of Nigeria’s foremost industrialists, 
the Guardian has a liberal philosophy, with the motto: ‘Conscience, Nurtured by 
Truth’. Known for its balanced coverage of events and issues, on the domestic 
front, the paper is 
committed to the best traditions and ideals of  republican democracy. It 
believes that it is the responsibility of the state not only to protect and defend 
the citizen, but also to create the conditions, political, social, economic and 
cultural, in which all citizens may achieve their highest potential as human 
beings. It is committed to the principle of individual freedom, but believes 
that all citizens have duties as well as rights.
Its international mission states that it 
believes that Nigeria is a legitimate member of the international community, 
but holds that she can best fulfi ll her international obligations only if  her 
own security and integrity are assured. (Guardian 2005)
Framing: theoretical and methodological implications
The mass media use the relaying of information and news to infl uence society. 
Although they attempt to be objective, objectivity is difficult to achieve 
because the training, upbringing, religious, political and cultural orientations 
of journalists tend to infl uence how they report and analyze events and issues 
(Severin and Tankard 2001). Framing is used to understand the process that 
the mass media use in selecting content for public communication (Wikipedia 
2005). The frame is an abstract notion that organizes or structures the meaning 
of  artefacts. Mass media frames infl uence the audience’s perception of  the 
news; ‘this form of agenda-setting not only tells what to think about an issue 
(agenda setting theory), but also how think to about that issue’ (Value Based 
Management.net 2005). Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon (2005: 85) describe framing 
as a pattern for presenting and commenting on the news that organizes the 
political debate into what is comprehensible to the public.
Framing has grown as a methodological approach to discerning and 
interpreting the values and meaning conveyed in news. Employing framing 
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requires ‘constructing and processing discourse or characteristics of the discourse 
itself ’ (Pan and Kosicki 2003: 57). The process helps analysts determine what 
infl uenced and controlled the coverage of an issue or event. Entman (1993) and 
others have stated that framing can be used to unmask the ideology, values, 
implications, orientations, views and aims conveyed in media artefacts like 
news, commentaries and features (Alozie 2005a, b; Bishop 2005; Goffman 1974; 
Scheufele 1999; Tuchman 1978).
However, some say that framing lacks rigorous conceptualization. Carragee 
and Roefs (2004: 214) cite the conceptual ‘problems in the defi nition of frames, 
the inattention to frame sponsorship, the failure to examine framing contexts 
within wider political and social contexts, and the reduction of framing to a 
form of  media effects’. They advise that framing studies should take a cue 
from their sociological origins that relied on the holistic approach through an 
exploration of the wider historical, political, economic and cultural environment 
that affects the coverage of a subject. 
In spite of the debate over the appropriateness of framing, it remains one of 
the most useful and powerful mechanisms for examining texts and artefacts, 
which usually convey multiple meanings because of  the social and cultural 
differences that may exist within and across borders. News aims at providing 
objective facts to the public to enable them to make informed decisions on a 
variety of issues. News tells the public what has occurred, what is occurring and 
what is most likely to occur. It tells the story of those who do not want to or 
cannot tell their own stories. It tells the story of the victor and vanquished. It 
exposes the evils of the powerful or even good deeds that might not otherwise 
come to the forefront. It takes the weak and beleaguered into account. It holds 
individuals and societies responsible for their conditions and gives them hope by 
seeking help when the facts are presented. It surveys the environment to shine 
the searchlight on every human conduct no matter where, when, how, why and 
what occurs. It guides the human experience. 
Because framing requires in-depth analysis of texts, it helps us achieve the 
secondary purpose of this study: to determine if, in their coverage of the Rwanda 
genocide, the focus of the two newspapers overlapped (synchronization) or if  
there were marked differences in their content (heterogeneity). This distinction 
will help determine whether mass media closer to Rwanda covered the events 
in a different fashion than media at a distance. Does national interest relate to 
geography and the neighbourhood in which a society exists? As a neighbour, 
Kenya might have greater socio-economic ties with Rwanda than Nigeria on 
the other side of the continent. On the other hand, South Africa and Nigeria 
are regarded as the most infl uential nations in sub-Saharan Africa and, since 
independence, Nigeria has played an important role in the affairs of  Africa 
economically and politically.
FINDINGS
Examination of  coverage of  the 1994 Rwandan crisis and genocide in the 
Guardian and Daily Nation revealed four discourses: bane of a nation; Rwandan 
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national introspection; African cataclysm and introspection; and world inaction 
and indifference. 
Bane of a nation
The phenomenon of  ethnic violence, killings and refugee fl ights in Rwanda 
can be traced to Hutu efforts to dislodge the colonial administration and end 
centuries of  Tutsi domination. The Hutus took a major step in this regard 
when they overthrew the reigning Tutsi king in 1959, which helped them ascend 
to power at independence in 1962. Since then, Rwandan political and social 
institutions have been beset by one upheaval after another. Over the years, these 
sprees of violence, pogroms and refugee fl ights planted the seeds of the 1994 
crisis and genocide that cost about 800,000 lives and displaced three million 
people (Talentino 1999). The immediate catalysts of  the 1994 disorder and 
massacre were the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF’s) October 1990 invasion, 
the protracted and stalled peace negotiations, the failure to implement the 
Arusha accords and the deaths of  the presidents of  Rwanda and Burundi 
(Habyarimana and Ntaryamira, respectively) in a plane crash while they were 
returning from a peace mission.
When the Daily Nation (1994a) reported the deaths of  Habyarimana and 
Ntaryamira it highlighted historical violent events in Rwanda and Burundi:
• 1959 – Hutus overthrow Tutsi kings;
• 1965 – Attempted Hutu coup;
• 1972 – Over 100,000 Hutus massacred;
• 1993 – Peace accord signed in Arusha;
• 1993 – Melchior Ndadaye (the fi rst elected president of Burundi) killed 
in coup bid;
• 1994 – President Habyarimana of  Rwanda and President Cyprien 
Ntaryamira killed.
The report, which traced and focused on Rwanda’s political crisis since 
the RPF’s invasion in 1990, tended to describe the RPF’s military exploits as 
‘stunning and successful’ and as forcing the Rwandan government to enter into 
negotiations and make concessions to the rebels. The article stated:
Since 1959 and in subsequent Tutsi massacres at the hands of  Hutus in 
Rwanda, large numbers sought refuge in the neighbouring countries of 
Tanzania, Zaire and Uganda. Others sought refuge far away in Kenya and 
Europe, but all nursed a dream of returning back. Numbering between two 
and three million worldwide, they offered an elaborate system of fi nancing 
and support for the rebels. (Daily Nation 1994a) 
If the Tutsi viewed the invasion as an attempt to return to their homeland, ‘to 
the Hutus, both in Rwanda and Burundi, the rebels were no freedom fi ghters, 
but Tutsi seeking to hoist and reclaim their past dominance.’ Another article 
on 8 April contended:
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What is interesting about the tribal tensions is that they are a relatively new 
phenomenon. In pre-colonial era, Hutus and Tutsis were on equal footing and 
inter-marriage was common. It was Belgium modernization and democratiza-
tion that undermined local elites; tension then rose. (Daily Nation 1994b)
On 9 April, Daily Nation (1994c) reported that within hours after the deaths 
of the presidents, ‘out-of-control soldiers were on the streets of Kigali, killing, 
terrorizing, kidnapping and looting’. The same article reported that Rwanda’s 
acting Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyamana and scores of civilians including 
Christian missionaries were also killed. Daily Nation reports implied that the 
continued and ensuing political instability, insecurity, violence and killings that 
turned hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and Hutu moderates into refugees had 
become a national bane for the Rwandese. It attributed the bane to various 
groups, including government and opposition groups, who were using the 
upheaval as an excuse to settle scores and had turned the country into an 
unstable and destabilizing entity. 
The Guardian expressed similar views. Reporting on the deaths of  the 
presidents, the Guardian on Sunday of  10 April stated that they had ‘given 
feathers to the wings of  despondency and cynicism with which people like 
Kayibanda approach the seeming endless crisis in both Burundi and Rwanda’ 
(Guardian 1994a). Recounting Rwanda’s history, the article added:
Hostilities between the two tribes are nothing new. The majority Hutu ended 
Tutsi dominance of the country in a bloody rebellion in 1959, three years 
before independence. That year and over the next 15 years, tens of thousands 
of  Tutsi fl ed to neighboring [countries] mostly Uganda. At least 100,000 
were killed in the fi ghting. Nearly a million Rwandese had been driven from 
their homes by the civil war since 1990 pitting the government against Tutsi-
dominated rebels who invaded from Uganda. (Guardian 1994a)
Since independence in 1962, thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus have 
been killed in various pogroms and by the 1980s over 600 were displaced as 
a result of political crises, ethnic rivalries and economic malaise (Des Forges 
1999). During the 1994 crisis and genocide, both the Daily Nation (1994d) and 
the Guardian (1994b) tended to blame the various Hutu-dominated governments 
for the atrocities and for failure to compromise and implement peace agreements. 
They attributed these failures to the need to remain in power. However, the 
RPF was not absolved from atrocities. For example, the Daily Nation (1994e) 
blamed the RPF for the killing of  the archbishop of  Kigali, while the the
Guardian (1994b) recalled that the current crisis arose from the RPF invasion 
of Rwanda in 1990.
In a Daily Nation article (1994f), the political and socio-economic crisis in 
Burundi was often mentioned, probably because of the close history of the two 
nations and the fact that the presidents of both countries died in the 6 April 
plane crash. Most Hutus blamed the crash on the RPF, although the RPF 
denied responsibility. 
220 INTERNATIONAL MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE GENOCIDE
Rwandan national introspection 
The second theme that emerged from the analysis was the need to stop Rwanda’s 
cycle of  violence and confl agration. It explored the history of  Rwanda with 
regard to the socio-economic and political structure that existed before 
colonization, how colonial administrations affected the traditional structures 
and the post-independence negative consequences of colonial policies and the 
need for Rwandans to eschew violence and resolve their problems peacefully. 
As stated earlier, since the 1994 crisis and genocide, scholarly works on the 
history of Rwanda have called attention to the fact that for centuries Rwanda’s 
three major ethnic groups (Hutus, Tutsis and Twas) coexisted peacefully under 
the dominion of Tutsi kings. Rwanda remained at peace until the arrival of 
Europeans who introduced ethnic prejudice by favouring the minority Tutsis 
over the Hutus and Twas in social, economic and political endeavours (Jones 
2001; Talentino 1999). Assuming that the majority Hutus and Twas were docile 
for centuries while acquiescing to Tutsi dominion, it could be argued that Hutus 
became radicalized as they gained access to education and employment. They 
began to organize to oppose colonial and Tutsi dominion, culminating in their 
ascension to power at independence (Daily Nation 1994g; Guardian 1994b). 
The Hutus’ struggle for power threatened entrenched Tutsi elites whom the 
colonial masters favoured over the years and provoked them to undermine 
the Hutus. Between 1959 and 1962, Tutsis organized a campaign to eliminate 
the Hutu leaders and retain power. Historians point out that if  the Belgium 
colonial authorities had acquiesced, the Tutsi were likely to have succeeded. 
Their campaign to dislodge their Hutu counterparts and be at the helm of 
government after independence marked the beginning of modern ethnic division 
and hatred between the two groups (Jones 2001; Talentino 1999).
Taking into account Rwanda’s political violence, massacres, refugee fl ights, 
famines and the economic malaise that political instability generated, the Daily 
Nation and the Guardian urged the Rwandese to engage in a national dialogue 
and introspection to stop the cycle of violence and coexist peacefully. 
Addressing the concerns of Hutus, the Daily Nation refl ected on the military 
successes of the RPF, offered a poser and issued a caution to Rwandans when 
it stated:
Rwanda is made of Hutus and Tutsi. As well as being numerically dominant, 
the Hutus in Rwanda have been exposed to the instruments of government 
and opportunities for enlightenment, without which experience they would 
have been open to minority domination like their cousins in neighboring 
[Burundi], who for years have had to live with a Tutsi control of the Civil 
Service, military and other levers of power. (Daily Nation 1994h)
The article implies that Hutus must compromise and fi nd ways to accommodate 
the interests and safety of the Tutsi who would always clamour for their rights 
in Rwanda. The same article warned the Tutsi and the Tutsi-dominated RPF 
of the need to come to mutual agreement:
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In the unlikely event of Government forces being driven out of the capital, 
the new guerrilla-controlled authority will require public acceptance to 
rule without wielding the big stick. Can [they] suppress a Hutu majority 
and conduct the business of government as if  nothing is amiss? Could they 
possibly hold against Hutu military incursions if  the population they ruled 
gave saccour [sic] to the enemy hiding rebels, feeding them and providing 
vital intelligence?
Condemning the lack of  compromise between the Hutu-dominated 
government and the Tutsi-dominated RPF, the Daily Nation contended that 
the only way to stop the continued human, political and economic carnage in 
Rwanda was for warring groups to engage in soul-searching if  the people of 
Rwanda ever again expected to ‘settle in the same neighbourhood, walk the 
same streets and work from dawn to dusk in the same factories without a secret 
murderous thought’ (Daily Nation 1994e).
The Guardian (1994b) offered an answer and advice. It stated that to build 
confi dence and resuscitate their country, Rwandans must examine and deal 
with the root causes of  the fratricides through reallocation of  resources on 
the ‘basis of equity and justice’. If  the Hutus and Tutsis can ‘ever again share 
the challenges of nation building and pursue political rivalries in democratic 
good nature’ or allow a ‘multi-tribal nation once called Banyarwanda to roll up 
into one again’, the Daily Nation advised, they must rid themselves of current 
divisions and motives, which the paper described as primitive, reckless and a 
throwback to a distant age (Daily Nation 1994e).
The Guardian agreed. The paper noted that, when President Theodore 
Kubwabo set up an interim government, which the Guardian described as 
nationalist, he made overtures to the RPF for reconciliation, as the rebel 
group’s military success threatened the interim government (Guardian 1994c). 
The paper contended that the only way forward was for Rwandan leaders 
(especially the RPF’s) ‘to agree to a path of  reason and de-emphasize their 
expansionist ambition ... [because] indeed there has to be a limit to the agony’ for 
Rwandans. Underscoring the need for national introspection among Rwandese, 
the Guardian concluded that the ‘need for a re-arrangement of  the political 
structure of Rwanda is not in doubt. A broad-based power-sharing equation 
should be adopted in Rwanda to accommodate the feuding tribes. The present 
arrangement where domination is perceived is hardly healthy.’
African cataclysm and introspection
Covering the 1994 crisis provided these leading dailies with an opportunity 
to take stock of  events throughout Africa since the end of  colonialism, to 
point out Africa’s problems and failures and to indict governments all over the 
continent for making the region the world’s abyss despite its human and mineral 
wealth. Like Rwandan national introspection, this theme uses the Rwandan 
turmoil and carnage and the consequent regional instability, insecurity and 
humanitarian crisis it produced to examine the political, economic and social 
events that had resulted in wars, famine, deaths, economic malaise and human 
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degradation throughout Africa. The discourse urged Africans to engage in self-
examination, eschew violence and seek solutions to their internal and external 
disagreements (whether political, economic, ethnic or religious) to avoid the 
destructive consequences that have been visited on African societies historically 
and help the continent attain its place and promise in the wider world. 
If  the seeds of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda were sowed by ethnic hatred 
and distrust, competition for power, political instability, discrimination, famine 
and presidential deaths, the Daily Nation (1994i) and the Guardian (1994d) 
emphasized that these problems were not limited to Rwanda. Both pointed out 
that half  a century after African nations gained independence, most had not 
fulfi lled the political, economic and social promises that self-government offered 
them. Using Rwanda as an example of what had happened and continues to 
happen in African nations, the Daily Nation and the Guardian implied that the 
continent is a place where one violent incident or crisis begats another, one 
killing and pogrom leads to another and ethnic hatred and distrust results in 
more of the same. The Guardian pointed out that:
The story follows the same refrain. Ethnic nationalities lumped together 
join hands together to win political independence from colonial masters, so 
that they can handle their own affairs and hold their destinies in their own 
hands. As has been shown in different parts of [the] world, [especially Africa] 
from the northern to southern hemisphere, as soon as the colonialists depart, 
the union wielded together usually by force begins groaning over strains of 
diversity. (Guardian 1994d: 17) 
In the same vein, the Daily Nation (1994i) stated:
The Rwanda cauldron has followed classic African lines: an eruptive event 
(often a coup but in this case the apparent assassination of two presidents) 
followed by retributive violence against perceived enemies plus anyone who 
gets in the way, a deterioration into aimless drunken anarchy, evacuations, and 
panic-stricken refugee columns, and the disposition of so-called government 
against the so-called rebels for overall control of  the state which is about 
where we are now in Rwanda.
Both dailies tended to blame the colonial powers and the inheritors of power 
for a lack of  understanding, a failure to recognize ethnic differences and a 
tendency to gloss over differences. They contended that Africa’s historical 
orientation would consume the people if  the leaders failed to deal with the 
cataclysmic nature of  African crises through continental introspection. 
They proposed introspection as a viable vehicle for resolving domestic and 
international disagreements and to promote peace, understanding and prosperity 
(Daily Nation 1994i, j; Guardian 1994d). 
The Guardian (1994d: 17) warned that 
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it is hardly noticed that once there is a threat of  survival, politically, 
economically, and culturally to its ethnic group, something sweeps through 
their psyche and the people of that stock quickly bind together to defend 
themselves – regardless of their stations in life.
Refl ecting on the Rwandan crisis, killings and other problems plaguing Africa, 
the Daily Nation (1994k) argued that African lives and freedom are devalued in 
a continent that maintains a culture where one crisis begats another. It asked: 
‘How long can Africans continue to look on as their brothers [Rwandans and 
others] are being slaughtered?’ (Daily Nation 1994i). The Daily Nation pointed 
to the lack of attention from and the inaction of the international community 
during the Rwandan crisis (and other crises that have plagued Africa) and 
urged African leaders to develop institutions, infrastructure, resources, political 
will and treaties to deal with the problems that plagued their nations (Daily 
Nation 1994i, l).
Both papers implied that Africa would remain the world’s bottomless pit if  
its leaders did not develop policies to help their nations and each other to help 
themselves (Daily Nation 1994j; Guardian 1994e). While underscoring the need 
to stop African crises, the Daily Nation (1994j) stated that the Rwandan situation 
would ‘be a lesson enough to those African heads of states, their cronies and 
henchmen who take the peace and prosperity of their countries for granted’. 
Although these papers tended to blame outside forces and centuries-long 
exploitation for sowing the seeds of violence, ethnic hatred and distrust, it must 
be pointed out that corruption, lust for power, poor management of resources 
and ethical indifference since independence half  a century ago account for 
the lack of development in Africa. And although outsiders have not come to 
Africa’s aid many times when they were needed, they did respond during the 
Ethiopian famine in the 1980s and the civil war in Somalia.
World inaction and indifference
The Daily Nation and the Guardian also explored the failure of the international 
community (the United Nations, foreign governments, colonial masters, other 
African countries and the Organization of  African Unity (OAU)) to take 
military action to stop the massacre of non-combatants in Rwanda. In addition 
to blaming the international community for its failures, this discourse includes 
reports of  the concerted efforts of  Western countries and organizations to 
evacuate their foreign nationals while abandoning Rwandan.
As mentioned above, one of the factors contributing to the 1994 Rwanda 
crisis and genocide was the invasion of  the RPF three years earlier. Since 
independence, Rwanda had been affl icted by a cycle of pogroms between ethnic 
groups as they jostled for political and economic power (Des Forges 1999; 
Kuperman 2000). However, Rwanda’s strife remained off  the radar screens of 
the world press. As in other cases, the press paid little or no attention to the 
historical crises in Rwanda (Livingston and Eachus 2000) and this inattention 
continued until the deaths of presidents Habyarimana and Ntaryamira, which 
resulted in a few reports in the international press. 
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However, attention waned within weeks (Kuperman 2000) even though the 
deaths precipitated violence as Hutu militias and government forces took to 
the streets to massacre Tutsi, whom they blamed for sabotaging the plane 
and killing the presidents. When the situation regained world attention, the 
reaction was mixed. The Guardian and the Daily Nation contended that, instead 
of  taking action to stop the killing, the UN engaged in protracted debate, 
offered weak resolutions and vowed to disengage (Daily Nation 1994m, n; 
Guardian 1994f, g). Promises of fi nancial, capital, moral and logistic support 
were made, but failed to materialize (Daily Nation 1994m). Countries outside 
Africa refused to send troops, while the international presence was withdrawn 
(Daily Nation 1994o; Guardian 1994f). The OAU seemed moribund, unable 
to make decisions and take initiatives or action without UN approval and 
assistance (Guardian 1994h). 
As fi ghting intensifi ed and killings increased, rather than increasing its 
presence in Rwanda, the UN threatened to withdraw its peacekeepers (Guardian
1994i, j). Foreign governments (especially Western nations) evacuated their 
citizens (Guardian 1994g). With the death toll mounting and the world press 
focusing on Rwanda temporarily as the world community and UN waffl ed 
on what to do, the Guardian accused the UN of adopting ‘half-measures’ by 
failing to fulfi l its mission by expanding the mandate of the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) – ‘originally sent to Rwanda to 
monitor the implementation of the Arusha Peace Accord between the Rwandese 
Government and the RPF, to protect civilians in the country as well as provide 
security for humanitarian relief  operations’ (Guardian 1994k). In 1993, after 
the OAU brokered a ceasefi re treaty between the Rwandan government and the 
rebels, the UN sent a contingent of about 2,500 peacekeepers to monitor the 
implementation of the Arusha accords. The OAU had a transition team in the 
demilitarized zone (Guardian 1994l). Despite the presence of these peacekeepers, 
calls from General Roméo Dallaire, head of UNAMIR, and from nongovern-
mental organizations for prompt action to end the ensuing violence (Kuperman 
2000), the world community seemed to turn a deaf ear (Daily Nation 1994n; 
Guardian 1994l). 
Blaming the international community for inaction and indifference in the 
face of  the deaths of  the thousands of  black Africans, the Guardian (1994l) 
argued that there was a need for imagination from the international community 
to resolve the crisis in Rwanda. While calling for quick, swift and thorough 
investigation of the crash that killed the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi 
and condemning Rwandan presidential guardsmen for cordoning off the crash 
scene, the Guardian warned:
The present slaughter, like those before it, will of  course, come to an end: 
The people will be exhausted and riotous soldiers will need to replenish their 
arsenals. But violence will erupt again unless there is a wise intervention. And 
this will be effective only if  it goes beyond the political stereotypes now being 
known at Africa’s delinquent leadership. (Guardian 1994l)
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Considering Rwanda’s cycle of violence, the Guardian contended that it would 
take bold imagination on the part of the international community to fi nd lasting 
solutions to the current violence. It suggested that offering each of Rwanda’s 
ethnic groups political autonomy and guaranteeing their security and the power 
to manage their resources represented ways to establish lasting peace in Rwanda. 
The Guardian explained, ‘It should be clear that Euro-American concept of 
democracy (one man, one vote) taken in isolation and applied mechanically, 
cannot resolve the conflict in Rwanda’ (Guardian 1994l). The Guardian
concluded, ‘If  the practical implication is the physical separation of the two 
ethnic groups, then the peacemakers should boldly look at the option.’
The world’s inaction and indifference, the Daily Nation (1994n) pointed 
out, could be attributed to the fact ‘the industrialized world, after a burst 
of optimism about Africa’s prospect, is coming to the conclusion that many 
African countries are hopeless cases’. While expressing disgust at the failure of 
forces outside Africa, both the Guardian (1994d) and the Daily Nation (1994n) 
condemned African leaders and the OAU for bickering and for their inability 
to muster fi nancial, physical and human resources to tackle this and other 
African tragedies. However, the Daily Nation noted that ending the confl ict 
and restoring peace
is a responsibility not only for African countries, but also for the international 
community [because] ignoring the problems African countries face and 
marginalising sub-Saharan Africa in the world economy will only increase 
the chances of more Rwandas. (Daily Nation 1994n)
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The study used framing to discern the patterns that dominated the coverage 
and analyses of the 1994 Rwandan crisis and genocide in two leading African 
newspapers: the Daily Nation of  Kenya and the Guardian of  Nigeria within 
the fi rst 100 days of the genocide. Framing allowed us to determine whether 
the focus of these newspapers overlapped (synchronization) or whether there 
were marked differences in content (heterogeneity). 
Although the four themes described above dominated both papers, arguments, 
rationale and opinions tended to differ. For example, with regard to the origin 
of the crisis, the Daily Nation (1994b) believed it to be relatively recent, whereas 
the Guardian described the causes as long standing (Guardian 1994a). While the 
Daily Nation tended to be sympathetic and praised the RPF’s military successes 
(Daily Nation 1994a), some articles in the Guardian revealed scepticism with 
regard to the intention of  the RPF, whom it viewed as somewhat arrogant 
(Guardian 1994c). However, neither paper absolved the Hutu-dominated 
government of responsibility (Daily Nation 1994j; Guardian 1994e).
Reports in both papers attempted to explore the background of the crisis 
and its greater implications. This is important considering that the world press 
is often accused of failing to do so. The ability of the African press to provide 
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background could be attributed to their greater understanding of underlying 
matters that affect the continent.
Although national/regional interest emerged as a theme in the Daily Nation
(1994p, q), it did not develop in the Guardian’s coverage. The national/regional 
interest frame focused on the need to fi nd lasting solutions to the Rwandan crisis 
if  the Great Lakes Region and Eastern Africa is to achieve political, economic 
and social stability. This theme included the need to evacuate Kenyans and 
other foreigners from the country at the height of the crisis. It demonstrated the 
economic links between the two countries and other countries in the region and 
showed that there were many Kenyans living in Rwanda and many Rwandans 
living in Kenya. Reporting on the evacuation of foreigners, the Daily Nation
tended to give accounts of Kenyans who experienced the crisis. The discourse 
tended to urge the Kenyan government to take concrete steps to fi nd peace. 
This focus may be a result of the proximity of Kenya to Rwanda.
At the onset of the Rwandan crisis (within the fi rst three weeks), the Guardian
and the Daily Nation published a considerable number of  daily accounts of 
events; later, the Daily Nation offered more daily accounts over a longer time 
than the Guardian.
In terms of in-depth articles, the Guardian tended to quote Nigerian experts 
more often than the Daily Nation quoted Kenyan experts. However, both papers 
quoted national and international offi cials liberally. 
Although the role of the media in confl ict situations remains crucial (Obinor 
2005), it is important to note, that the ability of the mass media to infl uence 
the cause of the war remains neither simple nor clear, as this and other studies 
demonstrate (Ross 2003; Wolfsfeld 1997a). The themes established in this study 
(bane of  a nation, Rwandan national introspection, African cataclysm and 
introspection, and world inaction and indifference as well as national/regional 
interest) seem to be in keeping with those established in other studies dealing 
with mass media coverage and analysis of confl ict. Depending on where the 
media place themselves on a continuum of four key roles – aggressive watchdog 
of government (power corrupts frame); advocate of the downtrodden (brutal 
repression frame); semi-honest broker (responsible citizen frame); and faithful 
servant parroting government (law and order frame) – they tend to adopt 
either a ‘law and order’ frame or an ‘injustice and defi ance’ one (Wolfsfeld 
1997b, 2001).
The media have long been characterised as a social force used to the benefi t 
or detriment of the society within which they operate. When used to promote 
justice, morality, unity and harmony in society, they can act as facilitators 
of peace in times of crisis. However, they can also be used as instigators of 
confl ict and for other destructive purposes. (Obinor 2005) 
Obinor advocates continuing to examine the role of  African mass media 
during domestic and international crises, because 
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studies point to the possibility that besides its other roles, the press, particularly 
the elite press, may contribute to transforming a crisis from a macro-systematic 
crisis, hardly noted by the decision-makers, into a micro-perceptional crisis, 
receiving higher priority from them. (Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon 2005: 16)
That is, by framing the story in terms that show its pertinence and relevance 
to the local context. This is especially important in Africa where domestic and 
international crises continue unabated in the twenty-fi rst century. 
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Genocide Through a Camera Lens 
Nick Hughes
To be a journalist in Rwanda in April of  1994 was to have a window on 
Auschwitz. Yet, there are precious few records of the genocide as it took place. 
There are pictures of rotting bodies around churches, but few images of the 
killing itself. What I know is that on three different occasions, killing was fi lmed 
by a Reuters camera operator, an unknown Rwandan camera operator and 
me. Killing surrounded each of  us, and we were only able to record briefl y. 
From the top of a building called the French School, I fi lmed across a valley 
to record a street that was being cleared of Tutsi. These images are among the 
only known pictures of the genocide and they are shocking. In a sense, they 
are the only reminders that this event really happened. If  only there had been 
more such images.
As a journalist and cameraman, I was in Rwanda in the fi rst few days after the 
genocide began on 6 April. Years later, I agreed to testify before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the trial of George Rutaganda. The tribunal 
wanted to use my footage as evidence and asked me to testify. What follows is 
my description of that footage. As I told the tribunal, in the fi rst few days after 
6 April, we knew that there was killing going on. We could see bodies in the 
streets. I also knew that there was a resumption of hostilities, as I had passed 
through Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) territory when they declared that they 
were marching on Kigali.
* * *
The war had started again with ferocity. But what we didn’t know was the sheer 
scale and how organized the systematic killing of Tutsi civilians was. When we 
began to see the number of bodies increase and the way in which people were 
being killed, the nature of the killing began to sink in, but usually in recollection, 
not at the moment when we were witnessing events. I recall looking back on 
an event, four or fi ve days later, and thinking to myself, ‘Now hold on, what 
I have just fi lmed is not a normal event. I haven’t seen that anywhere else.’ I 
knew that whenever there was hostility in Rwanda, civilians got killed. There 
had been ethnic killing many times before. You expect that in Rwanda. But 
the events we were witnessing in April 1994 made us begin to realize there was 
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something more this time – there was the magnitude of the killing. It was not 
so sporadic. We noticed gangs roaming the streets looking for somebody to 
kill, in a systematic way.
On the day I shot the footage of people being killed, I was in a building of 
the French School, in central Kigali. Belgian paratroopers were there, which 
made it a relatively secure place from which to observe. The soldiers had a rocket 
launcher in the top room of the school, a building that extends up the side of 
the valley and overlooks another road going up the other side. Through the 
sights on the rocket launcher, the soldiers could see people being killed on the 
other side of the valley. I was told about this and went up to look and, indeed, 
there were bodies on the other side of the road. I set up my camera in the room 
next door to where the soldiers were located. At this point I was a bit short of 
charged batteries and tapes for my camera, so I wanted to be careful about what 
I was fi lming. Looking across the valley, I could see groups of people walking 
up and down the dirt road and I could see piles of bodies. 
At one point, I turned my camera away to look at other activity on the road. 
By the time I panned back to the fi rst spot, two or three men had been brought 
out and killed. You can see that on the footage. You can see them still being 
beaten. What is notable is that they weren’t killed instantly; they were slowly 
beaten to death, tortured. When I focused my camera that second time, I could 
see two women among one pile of bodies. There must have been about eight 
bodies by then and a group of men on the other side of the road, investigating 
something.
Both women were kneeling. One was begging, arms outstretched. 
Nonchalantly, the killers would come over and beat the men who were dying 
in front of these two women, then stroll away. 
Most of the men were carrying something in their right hand – a machete or 
club of some sort. Then I could see a child walking down the road with a club, 
coming up to the other side of the group. At the top of the road at a T-junction, 
people were going about their business, not paying attention. 
I saw quite clearly another woman who apparently lived next door; she was 
very much at home. She put her head around the door to see what was happening 
to her neighbour – to watch her neighbours being murdered in the street.
The woman on the ground pleaded for about 20 minutes. I could not fi lm the 
whole thing because I was concerned about my batteries and tape. She pleaded 
the entire time, pleaded for her life. At one point a little boy walked past and a 
man strolled into a house nearby. He had one hand in his pocket and was just 
wandering in. He had probably known this woman all her life. 
Then a pickup truck drove down the road, with about three men in the 
back. No one questioned them or impeded their progress. The driver paused 
the vehicle by the begging woman. They weren’t fl eeing the city. One was in 
uniform. They were checking that the killing was going ahead. 
Finally, a man came across the street and hit one woman on the head with 
such a force that he broke the stick he was using. She fell back. She put her arm 
up to ward off  the blow, and he must have broken it. The second blow hit her 
on the side of her head and neck. I could see her head jerk away.
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No one questioned why these people were there, why they were doing this. The 
neighbour standing in her doorway wasn’t questioning what was going on, even 
though the woman who was struck might have been her neighbour for years. It 
was as if  the two women who were being attacked in the street knew they were 
going to be killed. It was as if  these people had the authority to kill them. The 
women knew they couldn’t run away. People living on the street could have 
stopped them. There was no attempt to escape and no possibility of escape. 
This was going on up and down the street. People were brought out of 
their houses and killed on the street, systematically. It was not a rampage into 
someone’s house, to smash in the door and kill those in the front room. They 
were being dragged out and killed, their bodies piled outside so that they could 
be more easily picked up and taken away. There seems to be no question that the 
killers believed they had the right to be there, doing what they were doing. 
It was nonchalant and it was tiring. It was work. In the space of about 100 
metres, there were eleven, maybe twelve, bodies on the street. 
When the truck went past, the woman was still begging for her life, crouching 
there in a pile of bodies. The people on the truck knew what was going on. They 
knew who the people on that street were. They knew what they were going to 
do. As they drove by, one of them gave a quick wave. There was no attempt by 
anybody to help the women. It was not as if  they were being punished, attacked, 
for being a member of the opposition and given a beating. This woman was 
going to die. Everybody on the street knew that. They knew what was going 
on. There is no other explanation, but that this was systematic killing.
The organization and, above all, the nonchalance of the killers was a perfect 
vignette for the genocide, during which thousands were killed each day. 
Eventually, someone killed the two women with severe blows. I caught that 
on tape, one of the only instances, I believe, of an actual killing being recorded 
by the media. Looking back, it is surprising that given the number of bodies 
we saw around the city when we travelled with military convoys, we hadn’t 
witnessed the killing of more people. But nobody was going to kill in front of 
a camera if  they knew it was recording. I suppose, in this instance, they didn’t 
know they were being watched because we were across the valley.
What I saw through my camera lens was not just killing, but the systematic 
searching of  that street. People were going from house to house. You could 
see them walking back and forth across the street. You could see more bodies 
appearing on the side of the road. I think they were probably looting the houses 
as well as dragging people out and killing them.
Most of the killers appeared to be 20 to 30 years old. They were obviously 
quite at home. This was their area and they knew where they were. A lot of 
people were just walking around the streets as well, mostly men. They had no 
uniform. They were dressed in shabby clothing, trousers and T-shirts. Almost 
universally, they were armed with a machete or a club or both. In some cases, 
you could see a stick grenade in their hand. 
As I have said, we expected ethnic killing. The full gravity of what we witnessed 
really only sank in after we left. I remember being on a fl ight to Ethiopia with 
some journalists I was working with. We got to talking about how this killing 
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was not normal by Rwandan standards. I remember endlessly repeating to the 
other journalists and to myself, ‘How can someone just go and cut the legs off  
a woman. How can they do that?’ I remember mood swings as a result of the 
killing and the bodies that I had seen. The day I left, I began to realize that this 
was something different – the ferocity, the nonchalant killings, the systematic 
killings that I had seen in Kigali, the endless bodies and the way the people 
were killed. I remember a British journalist, my friend Catherine Bond, saying, 
‘There won’t be any Tutsi left by the time this war is over.’ That is how it was 
dawning on us after a week or so on the ground.
In early April, I was travelling from Kigali airport to the centre of town in 
the back of a small car, in the middle of a convoy of French troops. We passed 
a few bodies, then gangs of men waving machetes. On one side of the road, a 
young boy about ten years old was running through the tall grass in a fi eld. He 
stopped to beg, but he wasn’t pleading for his life. He turned and with both 
hands pointed at his younger brother who was too young to get through the 
long grass. He pleaded for his brother’s life, but we drove on. I cannot have that 
moment back, to insist that the driver of our car stop, that the whole convoy 
should stop. Two young boys, like my two sons.
A week later, a convoy of  Belgian paratroopers was going to a Catholic 
mission to rescue a white expatriate. The Belgian captain refused to allow me, 
with my camera, to ride on one of his trucks. My producer and I followed the 
convoy in a small saloon car, left abandoned by an expatriate evacuee. The 
convoy made its way through the centre of Kigali. There were a few bodies by 
the side of the road. The convoy turned into a heavily populated residential 
area and along this stretch were roadblocks every 100 metres, manned by the 
Interahamwe. The men were armed with stick grenades and they shouted, ‘Vive 
la France’, and attempted karate kicks.
Every 20 metres, there was a line of bodies neatly laid out. In some cases, 
blood poured from fatal head wounds; in places, bloodstains showed where 
more bodies had been laid out some time before. The blood ran down the side 
of the road and collected in the gutter. The gutters actually fl owed with blood. 
Between the frenzied roadblocks, the bodies and the small shops, some residents 
went about seemingly normal business, some walking slowly in conversation. I 
couldn’t use my camera during that ride. I did not have the courage. 
I know now that what I saw was human evil in majesty. Many of those who 
were there later felt a bond – a need to explain what had happened to anyone 
who would listen. 
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Media Failure Over Rwanda’s Genocide
Tom Giles
By late afternoon, they looked like water lilies cloaking the river’s surface. 
Only when the light refl ected off  the water did you catch a truer glimpse of 
them: bodies by the dozen, bloated and obscene, fl oating together downstream. 
Bit by bit, you built up a picture of something human in the expanse – a back, 
an arm, the slope of a neck. 
After minutes of concentration, perhaps, you could get a hint of someone’s 
father, someone’s brother or daughter – lost in the eddying circles that swept 
them on to Lake Victoria.
We stood on the bridge above the Rusumo Falls along the Kagera River – the 
crossing that marked the border between Rwanda and Tanzania. Behind us were 
the newly erected tents and plastic sheeting of the makeshift Ngara Camp. 
Hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees had fl ed Rwanda just days before, 
seeking shelter in this grim settlement. Hidden among them were some of the 
killers. 
These were members of  the Hutu gangs that were already responsible for 
the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of their Tutsi neighbours. They had 
encouraged this exodus, fearful of  revenge from the Tutsi army – the RPF 
– which had managed to liberate a small part of Rwanda over the border. 
A few weeks later, as the extermination continued in the vast areas the Tutsi 
army could not reach, some 800,000 would be dead. For all our frantic efforts, 
we didn’t realize we were already too late. Nothing would be done to stop the 
killing.
‘Watch the smell!’ my colleague gestured, choking. The wind must have turned 
suddenly. I looked away – in time to see a fi gure fl ushed out over the crest of 
the falls, tumbling down into a pool far below. 
It surfaced, a black body whitened by death but distinct – a small boy, a baby 
– perhaps no older than my nine-month-old son. He bobbed stiffl y – 30 or so 
feet beneath – the saddest thing you could imagine, testing and taunting your 
humanity, burnt in the mind forever. 
Two days before, at home in London, I had received a message from my TV 
news editor saying 250,000 Rwandan refugees had just crossed into Tanzania 
that day – 30 April. 
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Camps of  that size were always news, and they were there to be fi lmed. I 
would fl y out that day. Although I was aware of the killings that had begun in 
the Rwandan capital, Kigali, on 6 April, I and the rest of the world had seen 
little since to suggest the scale of what was happening. 
Apart from the images bravely snatched by the fl eeing press corps in the 
genocide’s fi rst days, there were few pictures. Once the UN had all but left 
the country, the hazards for journalists trying to get back in by land were too 
great. 
For nearly three weeks in April, after its fi rst days had passed, the story of 
one of  the twentieth century’s worst crimes had failed – in an age of  global 
satellite broadcasting – to make the top of the TV news bulletins. 
This was mainly due to the diffi culty of access into Rwanda. But there were 
other issues. Most senior correspondents were down in South Africa covering 
the election of  its fi rst black president. In comparison, this story seemed at 
fi rst too obscure for them – an African blood feud. The problem was to be 
compounded by the appalling nature of the pictures. 
Months earlier, the BBC newsroom had been bombarded with complaints 
when a small massacre in neighbouring Burundi had been shown in dreadful 
detail, once, on the lunchtime news. Someone had issued a directive about 
pictures. This was allowed to set the tone, in the BBC at least, for a story of 
unimaginably greater consequence. 
On my way to the airport, I had hoped to make copies of the rushes that had 
been sent from Rwanda. But there were almost none. The worst – the ones that 
actually showed the scale of the slaughter – had never been aired. 
They were sent to London in mid-April when the need to alert the world to 
what was happening was at its greatest. An entire news piece, gathered at great 
risk to the BBC team fi lming it, was dropped. It had been deemed too graphic 
for British viewers. 
The next day, I met the same BBC team in Nairobi. With polite exasperation, 
the cameraman explained how he had been told to make future pictures wider 
– less distinct, more impressionistic. 
He had been unable to achieve this with the offending shots, as he had tried 
to do what he thought would be right in the circumstances – to get some record, 
from a moving car and without being seen by the killers themselves, of the piles 
of bodies nine feet high that lined both sides of the road. 
With our BBC colleague, Mark Doyle, still negotiating to fl y with the UN 
peacekeepers back into the Rwandan capital, Kigali – I took another team in a 
small chartered plane to the camps. After hours of fl ying, we reached an isolated 
airstrip then drove for hours more through appalling mud-clogged tracks to 
reach the Hutu refugees at Ngara. 
We had little time to take in the scene – fi lming mass human misery in cold, 
scattergun fashion. Some of these Hutus were perpetrators or accomplices to 
the killings – not the victims. None of them would suffer too much. Ngara was 
at least full of crops, food and aid agencies. 
We had to press on, crossing the border at the Rusumo bridge. Soon after, 
the scale of the Hutus’ work became clear. 
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This corner of Rwanda had been liberated days before by the advancing Tutsi-
led army, but all around there was silence. Apart from the fl ies and vultures, it 
felt as if  all nature had fl ed the earth. 
Ahead lay towns and villages abandoned by the living, among them those 
soon to become infamous like Nyarubuye – with its church full of bodies. It 
would be more than six weeks before the full graphic horror of these scenes 
would be broadcast on the BBC. 
For now, I had to record a voice-track with the reporter and turn back with 
my rushes to reach Nairobi and the satellite feed. Alone, and abandoned by 
the pilot who had promised to return, I had to hire a passing plane on the spot 
and fl y back through a lightning storm. 
With a minute to spare, the piece was edited and rushed through the Nairobi 
traffi c to be fed by satellite to London. Finally, the story led the news again 
– though I regret much of the horror was carefully self-censored. 
For this much at least, I was commended. London now wanted human stories 
from the camps, of getting aid to the refugees, of babies born in misery. 
It was clear even then that this was not a story of refugees or of some distant 
civil war but of a systematic genocide still being carried out. But it was hard to 
get this message across – this was a complicated story in a country few people 
had heard of. Refugees were, at least, a simpler issue. 
Weeks of frustration followed. Pieces were often re-edited in London – shots 
of bodies removed. On one occasion, a shot of a sack on the ground edited in 
by us to avoid showing bodies was removed because, I was told, the viewers 
might still have thought it was a body. 
What the viewers in London weren’t seeing in scale was what I saw in pictures 
arriving back in Nairobi – corpses piled high, decaying skulls and skeletons, 
terribly injured children. 
What they did see often were images of refugees in camps and of gunfi re in 
the heat of the battle that raged for control of Kigali. Only one BBC team, from 
Newsnight, ventured further into the active killing zones at this time. 
The producer, a friend, has never forgotten the hollow faces of those Tutsis 
he met, trapped and abandoned, waiting to die in a camp south of Kigali. 
Three and a half weeks after I had fl own out, I returned to London, exhausted 
and overwhelmed by a sense of failure. Weeks later – long after the vast bulk 
of the killing had stopped – another decision was made. 
Fergal Keane’s extraordinary Panorama – ‘Journey into Darkness’ – on the 
killings at Nyarubuye would be broadcast with, at last, pictures showing the 
true scale of the horror, uncensored. 
It went out on 27 June. It was the fi rst of  many harrowing and moving 
documentaries about what happened to Rwanda’s Tutsis in the weeks from 
April to June 1994. All of  them, unfortunately, were broadcast too late to 
prevent it. 
As journalists, we were rightly quick to condemn the inaction of the UN and 
the wider international community over Rwanda. But many of those who tried 
to cover this appalling story as it happened around them still harbour, as I do, a 
lingering sense of helplessness – a sense of guilt, perhaps shame, that we didn’t 
do more to apply pressure for action when it might have made a difference.
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A Genocide Without Images: 
White Film Noirs
Edgar Roskis
‘For photographers, Rwanda was like an open-air workshop,’ says François 
Huguier, one of  the photographers who know Africa best (see Huguier and 
Cressole 1990). And indeed, we all recall the fl ood of images from July 1994, 
none of  them any less terrible for being so artistically wrought. During the 
Rwandan tragedy, there were so many journalists in the fi eld – but only at 
certain times – and so many images sent out around the world – but only from 
certain places – that it is easy to get the impression that this event was ‘over-
covered’ by the media.
But in reality, what Rony Brauman (1994: 7), former president of Médecins 
Sans Frontières, describes as ‘a planned extermination … a campaign of 
butchery organized by the legally constituted authorities, in which no opponent, 
real or imagined, was ever supposed to survive’ – in short, an indisputable crime 
of genocide – was never captured in still or moving images.
The signal for the massacres was given on 6 April 1994. ‘Less than one hour 
after the president’s Falcon 50 aircraft (a gift from France, a friendly country) 
was shot down, militiamen had erected the fi rst barriers on the road to the 
airport and in the capital … In the Gikongo district of Kigali, in a single day 
(April 10), the street was covered with corpses for an entire kilometre’ (Brauman 
1994: 11–12).
At that time, the media did not yet regard Rwanda as a ‘subject’. French 
photo agencies dispatched only two photographers: Patrick Robert from Sygma 
and Luc Delahaye from SIPA, who reached Kigali on 9 April with a Red Cross 
convoy from Bujumbura, Burundi.
‘There were six American correspondents,’ recalls Patrick Robert. ‘They had 
scarcely arrived when their editors gave them all orders to come home. At the Hôtel 
des Mille Collines, I picked up snatches of their conversations: “Too dangerous, 
not enough interest … deep Africa, you know… middle of nowhere”’.
THE MEDIA HAVE LANDED
Robert and Delahaye stayed there almost alone, aside from a handful of cor-
respondents from regional media outlets. In the coming days, they would 
This article is reprinted in translation from Le Monde Diplomatique of  November 1994.
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photograph dozens of  corpses abandoned on farms, Tutsis massacred with 
hand grenades and automatic weapons, struck down with machetes, sometimes 
left for dead. ‘But always after the fact, without ever seeing the actual executions 
themselves. The Hutu militias were too cunning for that.’ 
The two photographers moved on into territory controlled by the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF), where they met some 15 survivors and gathered their 
stories. But the photographers’ raw, unadorned images and the survivors’ simple 
accounts left editors cold. Patrick Robert returned to Paris in early May scarcely 
having sold a single photo.
From 6 April to mid-May, while the bulk of  the massacres were being 
perpetrated silently yet systematically (100,000 dead in Butare, out of  a 
population of  800,000, as of  23 April), Rwanda was still relegated to the 
inside pages of  the newspapers. The photos that were published were small 
and often old, the accounts second-hand, with little if  any news appearing for 
days at a time.1
Not until 18 May did a photograph of the Rwandan atrocities make it onto 
the front page of a French newspaper, the Quotidien de Paris. And even this 
image, of a dozen decapitated bodies in Rukara, mangled and partly eaten by 
animals, was just a snapshot taken by a doctor, Eric Girard, not by a photojour-
nalist. That same day, another Paris daily, Libération, was headlined ‘Rwanda: 
France’s guilty friendships’, but except for another photo by Eric Girard, the 
accompanying photos showed only some Rwandan refugees in Tanzania.2
From that time until the end of  Operation Turquoise, the journalists on 
the Rwanda story depended on humanitarian groups for transport, and their 
coverage refl ected this fact: it was limited to the refugee camps, at fi rst in 
Tanzania, and then mainly in Zaire. Patrick Robert recalls ruefully, ‘In the 
early days of May, before that famous exodus into Tanzania, which was really 
quite spectacular, not many people were all that interested in Rwanda.’ In other 
words, what inspired the picture-takers, the newspapers, the magazines and 
television the most was not the civil war or the planned massacres of hundreds 
of thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus,3 but the humanitarian melodrama, 
‘the endless lines of refugees, the sacks of rice, the orphans and fi eld hospitals, 
the images of downtrodden humanity and resolute volunteers, of suffering and 
salvation’ (Brauman 1994: 78). 
The peak of this coverage – when the numbers of special correspondents and 
news reports were at their highest – occurred between 14 and 20 July. ‘In the 
space of a few hours, a fl ood of 200,000 Hutu refugees arrived, followed soon in 
the Goma region [Zaire] by a veritable tidal wave of 600,000 to 700,000 people’ 
(Brauman 1994: 74–5). The Goma refugees were stricken almost immediately by 
a cholera epidemic. It was the cholera, followed by dysentery for good measure, 
plus all the spectacular visuals that came with such a massive displacement of 
population and such an unprecedented, unmanageable fl ood of refugees, that 
really triggered the media infl ux to the region.
Relying on the resources of the military forces and humanitarian groups in 
the region to take them where they could observe this phenomenon close up, 
picture-chasers from all over the globe, from the most timid to the boldest, the 
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most sensitive to the most cynical, poured into the area. As Jean-Michel Turpin, 
of the Gamma agency, describes it, 
The hotels, campgrounds, and airports were packed with photographers and 
television crews. Not really much more media than for any big event, but 
this time, we were all concentrated in a very small area, about 50 kilometres 
of highway starting at Goma. The number of journalists was unbelievable, 
and there really were dead and dying everywhere.
It was along this highway in Zaire that Turpin took that terrible photo, 
perhaps more terrifying than any other because it juxtaposed a white adult 
with a black child in a position that was intolerable and that, even though it 
was only a picture, bespoke a certain truth. 
‘At fi rst,’ Turpin relates, ‘I didn’t want to take that picture. Showing a 
colleague under those conditions – it was just too easy. Writers can do their 
jobs more discreetly, but when you work with a camera, you have to get 
up very close to your subjects and look them in the face. You have to get 
into some positions that are going to be grotesque. But that day, I had just 
seen this poor little kid grab onto a television reporter’s pant leg, and the 
reporter’s reaction was to whip out his point-and-shoot and take a close-up 
of  the kid just hanging on there. This guy wasn’t even a cameraman, he 
was just somebody who does stand-ups and talks into a microphone. He 
didn’t need that photo for anything – he was just taking it for a souvenir. 
Who could want a souvenir like that? Then half  a second later, I saw a 
photographer who was almost sitting on top of a dead child to get a shot. 
He obviously hadn’t realized it, but at that point, I had had enough. (Joannès 
1994; Roskis 1994)
It was there, in Zaire, that most of  the other images of  ‘Rwanda’ that are 
imprinted on our memory were photographed. The Goma region and the 
triangular ‘safe humanitarian zone’ created by the French military gave the 
photo stylists and other photo award hunters one compact, convenient location 
where they could instantly access an inexhaustible supply of the raw materials 
they needed to produce images of  Africa for Western consumption: large, 
anonymous groups of  people fl oating through ethereal clouds of  dust; the 
beautiful bodies of the ill and the injured; the wide, imploring eyes of children; 
infants latched on to their mother’s empty – or, with a bit of  luck, her dead 
– breast; the mandatory pushing and shoving at food-distribution points, the 
struggle for the tiniest scrap; and, most of all, courtesy of Operation Turquoise, 
images of the good White Man, hale and hearty, feared as much as admired by 
the dark masses held in awe by his confi dent gaze – the White Man, ready to 
go anywhere, any time, to help the widows, the orphans and the sick, heedless 
of  adversity, disdainful of  danger. In the end, these were comforting, iconic 
images for Western eyes and easy pickings for the media.
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THE NEED TO SHOCK
‘In Rwanda more than anywhere else, I was forced to confront the shame in 
what I do for a living,’ confesses Luc Delahaye, now with Magnum. ‘The shame 
of stopping in front of someone at the side of the road, watching their agony, 
and then taking their photo.’ But Albert Facelly, of  SIPA, sees it differently. 
‘If  we want our pictures to serve any useful purpose, then they have to shock 
people’ (Facelly 1994: 12–13).
This idea – that pictures must shock to serve a purpose, including one’s own 
– has been fully embraced by the NGOs, who apply it skilfully and somewhat 
cold-bloodedly in their communication campaigns, responding to the laws of 
a new marketplace. But this kind of shock is highly questionable, and so is the 
cause that it pretends to serve. At best these images of the dead and dying attract 
our charity. They don’t keep us from living, or even from sleeping at night, and 
they don’t keep the people who take these pictures from winning awards. 
What would we think of a Pulitzer Prize won at Auschwitz? The comparison 
may seem sacrilegious. But the fate promised the Tutsis was indeed a ‘fi nal 
solution’, a political and military crime compounded by a sinister movement, 
a ‘tropical Nazism’ (Bensussan 1995; Chrétien 1994) that was the direct source 
of this ‘humanitarian disaster’. 
Unfortunately, in our mental image of the world, the African dead remain 
eternally remote and exotic, and we want to be kept blind to the circumstances 
in which they were murdered. And that is what pictures do: they hide as much 
as they show. Behind the screen of those ever-so-photogenic refugee camps, 
the Hutu slaughterers were rebuilding their civil and military might, preparing, 
perhaps, for the next bloodbath.
NOTES
1. And yet on 27 April, Le Monde published the account of a volunteer from International Action 
Against Hunger under the headline ‘A monstrous manhunt in Rwanda’, followed the next day 
by a long report from a Red Cross representative, with a front page ‘teaser’ that read ‘The 
massacres in Rwanda’.
2. See in particular Sebastiao Salgado’s photos of Benako, ‘the largest refugee camp in the world’, 
in the 26 May edition of Paris-Match, and those of Gilles Peress (Magnum) in the 27 May and 
4 June editions of Libération.
3. In Le Monde, 20 May 1994, but no earlier, Bernard Kouchner offered an initial estimate of its 
extent: ‘between 200,000 and 500,000 dead’.
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Notes on Circumstances that Facilitate 
Genocide: the Attention Given to 
Rwanda by the Media and Others 
Outside Rwanda Before 1990
Mike Dottridge
Most reports focusing on the role of Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines 
(RTLM) and other media in Rwanda’s genocide pay little or no attention to 
events before 1990 and say little about the extraordinary profi le that Rwanda 
managed to maintain for most of the previous two decades. A few months after 
the 1994 genocide, I made a comment along the same lines as many others, that 
the tragedy which started on 6 April this year occurred because governments 
and others turned a determined deaf ear to the reports being issued by human 
rights nongovernmental organizations and eventually even to a report by one 
of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights’ own experts. This note 
is intended to put that ‘deafness’ into a longer-term context: before 1990, it was 
evident that very few people listened for information coming out of Rwanda.
A lot has been written and said about why governments and intergovern-
mental organizations turned a deaf ear to the rising tide of genocidal violence 
between October 1990 and April 1994. This three and a half years of inaction is 
part of a broader context in which journalists and others based outside Rwanda 
share responsibility for inaction.
I suppose anyone who documents political repression that involves murder or 
disappearances is haunted by ghosts afterward. Those of us who observed the 
pogroms that preceded Rwanda’s 1994 genocide and tried helplessly to react once 
the full horror began in April 1994 are probably more haunted by both guilt and 
memories of individuals whom we knew and who were slaughtered than those 
who arrived in Rwanda to witness the bloodshed or skeletons afterward. We 
know, or we think we know, that the scale of the extermination could have been 
prevented if  the world had paid some attention before 6 April and if  the world’s 
great powers had felt the inclination to react once the killings got underway.
As a desk offi cer monitoring political imprisonment in Rwanda (along with 
the some ten other countries in central Africa) for Amnesty International 
from 1979 until 1987 and supervising Amnesty’s work in sub-Saharan Africa 
(including the Great Lakes region) until 1995, I became involved with Rwanda 
at a time when the killing and persecution of Rwandese Tutsi from 1959 until 
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1966 was regarded by the outside world as a thing of the past. Further anti-Tutsi 
violence in 1973 had received little media attention and was generally dismissed 
as a relatively minor hiccup provoked by the preceding year’s political violence 
in Burundi. However, little was published about Rwanda outside its frontiers 
and, as I started digging for information about political prisoners in 1979, I 
had no idea that the fate of  more than 50 people detained fi ve years earlier 
remained unclear and was a cause for great concern.
I do not look back with great pride on what we (Amnesty International and 
others) managed to achieve during the 1980s through external pressure on the 
government of  Rwanda. We focused on abuses of  human rights concerning 
prisoners, principally political prisoners, and attempted to ascertain whether 
those we learned about were ‘prisoners of  conscience’. If  the information we 
obtained – for example on the basis of  sedition charges leading to prisoners’ 
convictions – indicated that someone was in jail for expressing his or her non-
violent opinions, Amnesty ‘adopted’ that person and sought his or her release.
With the benefi t of hindsight, it is obvious that the terms of reference with 
which we approached Rwanda, and consequently the human rights questions we 
raised, were far too narrow. Even in the specifi c fi eld of political imprisonment 
and abuse against political prisoners, we tended to base the assessment of 
whether an individual was a prisoner of conscience on the formal record (the 
charges on which someone was convicted), when in practice the authorities were 
arresting people for all sorts of reasons and using whatever charges they thought 
would sound acceptable to Rwanda’s public and result in the imposition of a 
prison sentence of a suitable length. In terms of the broader fi eld of human 
rights associated with political repression, we did not address the country’s 
structural problems until far too late.
However, it is not this mea culpa that I want to focus on here, but rather 
the implications of what we and others did or did not do when information 
about political repression and abuses of human rights in Rwanda was made 
available. For despite the inadequacy of what was achieved, it was possible to 
sneak under the fence of silence that Rwanda had constructed (by keeping its 
media almost exclusively in Kinyarwanda and under the control of ORINFOR, 
one of  the region’s more formidable propaganda agencies) and to ferret out 
information from all sorts of places, including the dungeons of Rwanda’s most 
secretive prison. The government’s newspaper and the Catholic Church’s weekly 
both published details about political trials in Kinyarwanda, which were fairly 
accessible to anyone who sought the services of a translator.
It took a while for me to get the personal testimony of someone who had 
experienced torture and imprisonment in Rwanda, for the prisoners associated 
with the Kayibanda government had been wiped out, leaving no one to interview. 
However, in 1985, a detailed interview with a former political prisoner provided 
a great deal of  detail that could be used to corroborate other second-hand 
accounts of the violence used against prisoners, and also served as an indictment 
of practices in Rwanda.
The ghosts I remember from the 1980s include a host of  people (a much 
smaller host than in 1994) who had been killed well before the Rwandan 
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Patriotic Front (RPF) launched its offensive against the Habyarimana regime 
in October 1990 – in particular, a group of  more than 50 people who were 
arrested soon after General Juvénal Habyarimana seized power in June 1973. 
They included individuals who had been well known outside Rwanda, such as 
Gaspard Harelimana, a member of the government from 1964 until 1973, and 
Aloys Munyaneza, the foreign minister in 1972 and 1973. However, the 1970s 
was a period when political repression and secret executions became the norm 
in much of Africa, to such an extent that they passed either unremarked or 
without provoking protests from either other Africans or non-Africans who 
were aware of what was occurring.
Remarkably, however, I received almost no complaints about human rights 
abuse from members of  Rwanda’s Tutsi minority. Those with experience in 
interviewing members of repressed minorities will not be surprised by this: from 
Egypt’s Copts to Pakistan’s Hindus and Christians, both religious and ethnic 
minorities often conclude that making a fuss is counterproductive and that those 
in power are probably less nasty than others who might take their place. 
During the 1980s, the amount of interest I or others were able to generate 
among journalists and political circles in Europe and North America in 
political repression in individual African countries varied according to some 
obvious criteria:
• Whose colony the country had been (if  Belgian, Spanish or Portuguese, it 
usually attracted less attention than others, unless it involved a monstrous 
dictator doing something ludicrous);
• What European language was in use in the country;
• How strong the vested interests in Africa, Europe or North America were 
to maintain silence;
• Whether a journalist who knew the country and was inclined to report 
on events there was already tied up with other stories;
• What else was going on in Africa and the rest of the developing world at 
the same time.
There was little in terms of  ‘joined up reporting’ (that is, reporting that 
identifi es the connections between developments in neighbouring countries or 
within entire subregions), which has become more common since 1994 as the 
regional nature of confl ict in the Great Lakes region of Africa and in the vicinity 
of Liberia and Sierra Leone in West Africa has become obvious. Consequently, 
from 1982 through 1986, when massacres were a daily occurrence in southern 
and southwestern Uganda and the persecution of Rwandese in Uganda1 resulted 
in Rwandese refugees seeking shelter back in Rwanda, there was little or no 
independent reporting to assess the level of oppression that Tutsi in Rwanda 
were being subjected to. The world was told (by President Habyarimana) that 
Rwanda was overpopulated and had ‘no more room’. Similarly, there was 
next to no journalistic investigation of the supply lines of Yoweri Museveni’s 
guerrilla force in Uganda (which depended heavily on the logistic support it 
received via Bujumbura, resulting in occasional arrests of Ugandans travelling 
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through Rwanda), possibly because the journalists who reported on the confl ict 
in Uganda were so appalled by what was going on that they inevitably took a 
pro-Museveni line.
Stamped on my memory is a visit to Rwanda’s high-security prison 
– Ruhengeri in the northwest, where many of  the prisoners associated with 
Rwanda’s fi rst government led by Grégoire Kayibanda had been murdered in 
the 1970s. I was accompanied by Alpha-Abdoulaye Diallo, a former foreign 
minister from Guinea who had been imprisoned for a long period in his own 
country and who had managed to avoid being starved to death – the fate of 
many hundreds of prisoners in Sékou Touré’s Guinea. The prisoners we saw 
in May 1986 in Ruhengeri prison’s ‘special section’ included the former head 
of security, Théoneste Lizinde, who had orchestrated most of the killings in 
the 1970s.
I recall three aspects of  the visit particularly vividly: the large Catholic 
confessional that hid the entrance to the special section off  the prison’s main 
courtyard; the three completely black, unlit punishment cells (‘cachots noirs’)
that you passed as you walked into the special section, where members of the 
Kayibanda government had been starved to death and more recently political 
prisoners whose cases I had handled had been confi ned for long periods; and 
Lizinde himself, the only one of the 30-odd prisoners in the special section who 
defi ed the order not to speak to the Amnesty visitors (he had, after all, been 
sentenced to death twice by that time, so possibly felt he had little to lose). 
Always one to speak out, after serving as a provincial governor after the RPF 
took power in Rwanda in 1994, he parted company again with the RPF, left 
the country again and was murdered in Kenya.2
I mention the prison visit because it illustrates for me a number of Rwanda’s 
characteristics in the 1980s, which helped facilitate the disasters of  the early 
1990s. First, the fate of  the Kayibanda government received virtually no 
attention from either journalists outside Rwanda or others with a possible 
professional interest. Indeed, when I looked at Amnesty’s almost non-existent 
records on Rwanda in 1979, I found that the organization had congratulated 
President Habyarimana for an amnesty he had announced following Kayibanda’s 
death, without realizing that this was part of the cover-up for both the former 
president’s disappearance and that of others. At the time, the only humanitarian 
organization that was aware of  these deaths was probably the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. At the end of the 1970s, there was just one Belgian 
academic who came to visit me at my offi ce in London to voice concern about 
political repression in Rwanda and to suggest that, alongside Amnesty’s protests 
at torture and other human rights violations in neighbouring Burundi, Congo, 
Uganda and Zaire, we should also be doing something about Rwanda.
Even when the international community descended on Rwanda in 1979 
with a human rights focus,3 no attention was given to the fate of members of 
the previous government. Within a few months, there were further political 
arrests, of Lizinde and others, signifying a major fall out among those in power. 
Nothing of this was mentioned in the Western media.
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It was not until 1982 that Amnesty International began publishing a signifi cant 
amount of information about political imprisonment in Rwanda, but even then 
it was hidden away in the annual report, among a mountain of other stories of 
sordid murders and torture around the world. It was not surprising that no one 
noticed. Well, that is not quite true. It was noticed in Rwanda itself and by some 
of the regime’s supporters in Belgium. When I met the Archbishop of Kigali 
on the visit to Kigali in 1986 (at that time he was still a member of the central 
committee of Rwanda’s ruling party, the only party allowed), he told us that he 
had not known anything about Amnesty before 1982 and that once he started 
reading our reports, he had ‘noted a lot of inaccuracies’, such as our failure 
to mention when a particular prisoner had been released. More signifi cantly, 
in 1983 he was reported to have been one of the fi rst people outside Rwanda’s 
security service to be allowed to visit the inmates of Ruhengeri’s special section, 
along with Minister of Justice Jean-Marie Vianny Mugemana; this visit led to 
some improvements in prison conditions there.
Soon afterward, a number of journalists (three, I think) were dispatched to 
Rwanda from Belgium to prepare reports on how rosy everything was there. I 
wish I had kept verbatim notes of my encounter with these journalists, for they 
represented a range of points of view within Belgium’s pro-Rwandese political 
spectrum, from the genuinely right wing to a newspaper traditionally associated 
with ‘Catholic trade unionism’. However, I recall that all were only too ready 
to whitewash the Rwandese government’s record. Why?
I am not satisfi ed that the international community has adequately analyzed 
and understood the inclination of Western media to misreport or simply not
report on abuses by governments for which they have a liking. I was astounded 
by it in the late 1970s when the government of Angola was able to get away 
with hundreds of secret executions (following an unsuccessful coup attempt in 
May 1977) without a word about them abroad.
It was equally shocking in the early 1980s, when some London-based 
journalists attempted to deny that massacres and torture had become daily 
events in Uganda. Rwanda represented something similar, but over a much 
longer period. The results were obvious within days of the RPF’s fi rst assault 
from Uganda into Rwanda in October 1990. When government forces themselves 
organized an incident in Kigali, claiming it was an RPF attack, to justify mass 
round-ups of  both Tutsi and suspected government opponents, the Western 
press swallowed the government version and no one was alerted to the sordid 
cases of torture and murder that followed.
Of course, there is an important distinction between the media taking no 
interest (and possibly peddling inaccurate information as a result) and the 
media actively siding with a repressive regime. However, the consequences of 
both attitudes need analyzing if  we are to understand what has to be done to 
avoid facilitating genocide.
And what is it that inspires journalists to support governments that are quite 
obviously tyrannical? In the case of Rwanda from 1960 to 1990, we know it 
was a follow-on to the support that both Belgian and some Catholic interests 
gave to the ousting of Rwanda’s mwami shortly before independence and the 
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installation of a government that was viewed by most Belgian Rwanda-watchers 
as more ‘democratic’, simply because it was composed of Hutu. 
Some of the support that Western newspapers have given to the governments 
of countries in the Great Lakes region since 1994 has been just as bizarre and 
misplaced. It is probably born out of good motives, a view of the world that 
divides political protagonists into ‘good’ and ‘bad’, seeking to support the good 
and retaining this view whatever level of evidence is available to indicate that it 
is foolhardy! However, my own assessment of the work I was involved in during 
the 1980s is that everyone should be held accountable for the consequences of 
their own actions, both journalists and human rights organizations and, of 
course, political leaders responsible for murder and torture – even those whom 
someone assesses to be ‘not as bad as their opponents’ and who, consequently, 
are allowed to get away with murder.
NOTES
1. Both Rwandese refugees who had fl ed from Rwanda between 1958 and 1966 and ethnic Rwandese 
(Banyarwanda) whose families had lived in Uganda for many generations.
2. I saw Théoneste Lizinde only once again, equally briefl y, in London, after he had been freed 
during a daring raid by the RPF on Ruhengeri in 1992 or 1993. He was accompanied by RPF 
minders on his visit to London.
3. The Franco-African summit held in Kigali decided to set up a commission of  inquiry into 
the reported murder of imprisoned schoolchildren in Bokassa’s Central African Empire, and 
a human rights seminar was organized in Kigali at much the same time. The commission of 
inquiry included a senior Rwandese judge who became involved in trying to penetrate the secret 
part of  Ngaragba prison in Bangui and whom we later approached in order to bring about 
an inquiry into the secret executions in Rwanda. At the time of  the summit, Burundi exiles 
in Rwanda sought to exploit the current international interest in human rights violations by 
claiming that massacres were occurring in Burundi, allegations which proved unfounded.
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The Media’s Failure: 
a Refl ection on the Rwanda Genocide
Richard Dowden 
In their article ‘Britannia waived the rules’ in the January 2004 issue of African
Affairs, Linda Melvern and Paul Williams argue that during the Rwanda 
genocide: ‘Britain and other great powers signalled their intention to let the 
killers conduct their grisly business unimpeded’ (Melvern and Williams 2004). 
They point out that while members of  the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council may not have recognized that genocide was taking place, they were 
aware that hundreds of thousands of people were being killed when they decided 
to withdraw the UN peacekeepers. They accuse the British government of a 
‘deliberately misconceived version’ of what was happening in Rwanda and a 
‘wilful neglect of its obligations under the genocide convention.’
With hindsight, it is obvious that the world’s political leaders and opinion 
formers failed Rwanda in 1994. Bill Clinton, then United States president, and 
Madeleine Albright, his representative at the UN and later Secretary of State, 
have recognized this and expressed regret for their part in withdrawing the UN 
force from Rwanda as the genocide started. Their British equivalents, John 
Major, then prime minister, Douglas Hurd, foreign secretary, and Baroness 
Lynda Chalker, the minister for Africa, have been less forthright. At the time, no 
one resigned and nobody’s career has been damaged by the failure in Rwanda. 
Indeed, the pivotal player at the UN at the time, Kofi  Annan, undersecretary 
general for peacekeeping, who dealt with the dispatches from the UN force 
commander in Kigali, later became secretary general. Annan’s deputy and 
successor at peacekeeping, Syed Iqbal Riza, was later to serve as Annan’s chef 
de cabinet.
The aim of this commentary is not to pass judgement on these players, but to 
try to recall the thinking of the time and revisit the context in which decisions 
about Rwanda and Africa were made. Because the genocide in Rwanda itself  
has challenged assumptions and changed perspectives, it requires a mental 
repositioning that goes further than asking who knew what when. I begin 
with my own experience as a journalist covering Africa at the time, then go 
on to examine some of the early coverage of the genocide that appeared in 
Britain’s press. 
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In 1994, I was Africa editor for the Independent. I had been in Kigali briefl y 
in January that year on my way to Zaire, as Congo was then called. All the 
diplomats, politicians and aid workers I spoke to in Kigali talked about the fragile 
but functioning Arusha peace accords, the complex power-sharing agreement 
between the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the Habyarimana 
government and several small political parties. After two years of bitter fi ghting 
and heavy negotiations, an agreement had at last been reached and signed. 
The delicate and dangerous task of implementation was then reaching its fi nal 
stages. Only one person in Kigali had warned me that there could be genocide: 
Philippe Gaillard of the International Committee of the Red Cross. He told me 
that militias were being armed by the government and that plans were being 
laid to promote mass killings of Tutsis throughout the country. 
I thought long and hard about writing a story called ‘Genocide looms in 
Rwanda.’ It might have made the front page – the aspiration of every journalist 
– but I had only one source. Everyone else I spoke to talked up the Arusha 
peace process. I did not sense anything sinister on the streets of  Kigali that 
might have made me skeptical. And, as the world-weary diplomats said, the 
worst that would happen if  the accord did not work would be another round of 
fi ghting. I had not been in Kigali long enough to make a judgement or doubt 
my interlocutors, so to write a sensational story about impending genocide 
would have been dishonest and irresponsible. It might even prompt genocide. 
I put down my pen and went off  to eastern Congo. 
On 6 April, I was packing my bag for South Africa to cover the impending 
election when the Independent’s foreign editor, Harvey Morris, called to tell me 
about the plane crash that had killed President Juvénal Habyarimana. After 
some discussion, we agreed that I should continue to South Africa but watch 
developments in Rwanda. I wrote a background article and caught the plane to 
Johannesburg. For the next three weeks the newspaper carried agency reports 
on Rwanda. As the South African polls closed, I fl ew to Kampala to try to fi nd 
out what was happening in Rwanda. 
Getting to the action was not easy. There were no fl ights to Kigali or anywhere 
else in the country. The route from Zaire in the west was impossible as President 
Mobutu Sese Seko did not allow journalists into the country except by special 
invitation. To try to get in from the south through Burundi might be impossible 
and dangerous, as that country too had been destabilized by the death of its 
president. The other viable routes were through Tanzania to southeastern 
Rwanda – a journey of at least three days, or across the Uganda border, which 
was offi cially closed. However, the World Food Programme (WFP) was running 
a cross-border feeding operation to eastern Rwanda, encouraged by the RPF, 
which controlled the border on the Rwandan side. 
The WFP lent me a vehicle and a driver and we drove into Rwanda. Once 
inside, the RPF took over and kept us waiting near the border for a couple of 
days. Eventually, the RPF gave me a guide and bodyguard and, on 2 May, we 
drove down through Rwanda to the Kagera River on the Tanzanian border. 
I learned later that the best road from Uganda into the northeast was being 
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used for military supplies, something that neither the RPF nor the Ugandan 
government wanted outsiders to see. We, therefore, had to take ill-maintained 
dirt roads.
The country was almost completely deserted. Africa’s roads, especially in a 
crowded country like Rwanda, are usually dotted with pickup trucks, walkers 
and cyclists. In two days of driving, we saw no more than a dozen people. The 
Kagera River carried scores of bloated dead bodies downstream. At the rate I 
saw them – one every four or fi ve minutes – I estimated that hundreds of people 
were being killed every day further upstream. It was hard to get close enough 
to see the cause of death, but some seemed to have their hands tied. 
From there we drove across to the refugee camps on the Tanzania side, leaving 
our RPF guide and guard in Rwanda. Here thousands of Hutus who had fl ed 
eastern Rwanda told us that RPF Tutsis were murdering Hutus and they had 
come across the border to escape. Some journalists bought this story at face 
value. Although we had seen few people on the way, I had seen no evidence 
of killing and little sign of destruction and I did not believe it. My instincts 
were confi rmed when two people separately drew me aside and whispered that 
what I was being told was untrue. I found them convincing. They were clearly 
frightened but desperate to tell their story. They said that it was these refugees 
who had done the killing and they had fl ed to escape RPF revenge.
On the way back, I saw some of the massacre sites that have been extensively 
reported and recorded. Then we turned west to Kigali and joined the RPF 
front line in the hills overlooking the city from the northeast. From a distance 
it looked peaceful. It was impossible to know what was happening there. 
It was also impossible to get the story out without leaving Rwanda. Telephones 
did not work and mobile phones did not reach that far in those days. To send 
reports back to the newspaper meant going all the way back to Uganda, another 
day’s journey on roads where you had to drive permanently in second gear. 
Once out, it might be impossible to get back in again as the WFP vehicle had 
to go back to Kampala and no other vehicles were available. 
I should also add that it was diffi cult for me to fi nd words to describe what 
was happening. I had covered nearly 20 wars, but the usual clichés of death and 
destruction mocked Rwanda’s horrors. I could fi nd no new words to describe 
what I was seeing. Furthermore, all the usual human and journalistic instincts 
to tell an important story to the world shrivelled in the face of  what I was 
seeing and hearing. I began my main report with the words: ‘I do not want to 
tell you what I saw today….’ Why should my aged parents be presented with 
this vision of hell at their breakfast table? How could I tell my wife what I had 
seen and smelled? And what of my children as they got ready for school? What 
if  they caught a glimpse of it? Why should anyone at all need to be told these 
things? I have spoken to other journalists who were there at the time and they 
recall similar feelings. 
My own notebooks and reports of  that period and other reports in the 
British press give some insight into what the world thought at the time and how 
they perceived events in Rwanda. Certainly few people thought that the plane 
crash that killed President Juvénal Habyarimana of  Rwanda and President 
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Cyprien Ntaryamira of  Burundi would trigger one of  the worst genocides 
of the twentieth century. Although the disarming and murder of the Belgian 
paratroopers, part of  the UN force, and the open killings in the streets of 
Kigali, the capital, began the next day, these events were not interpreted as a 
spur to international action. On the contrary they instigated withdrawal. The 
reasons for this lie in the failure to understand what was happening in Rwanda 
at the time and that failure has much to do with the importance – or lack of it 
– that outsiders gave to Africa, the way in which they thought of Africa and 
the language they used to describe it.
Rwanda simply wasn’t important enough. To British editors, it was a small 
country far away in a continent that rarely hit the headlines. The words Hutu 
and Tutsi sounded funny, hardly names that an ambitious news editor or desk 
offi cer would want to draw to the attention of  a busy boss and claim that 
they were of immediate and vital importance. Within a few days of the plane 
crash, The Times ran several articles about what it obviously considered an 
angle to interest its readers: the fate of the Rwandan guerrillas. Being a former 
Belgian colony and Francophone, it was of little interest to the Foreign Offi ce, 
which had been forced to cut its staffi ng levels in Africa in the 1980s and early 
1990s. Rwanda was not a country that had historical or commercial links with 
Britain and Britain had no diplomatic representation there. In London, as the 
crisis developed, Douglas Hurd’s staffers were reduced to telling the foreign 
secretary what they had seen on CNN that day. This was Britain’s main source 
of information about what was happening on the ground. 
On 7 April, all major newspapers reported the plane crash that killed the 
presidents and followed it with reports of the murder of the Belgian soldiers and 
then the evacuation of foreigners. There was little attempt to analyze Rwanda’s 
politics beyond the fact there had been a civil war that had been frozen by the 
Arusha accords. For most newspapers, the foreign story of the moment was 
Bosnia and its coverage was already stretching budgets and staffi ng levels. 
Furthermore, on 27 April, South Africans were to vote in the country’s fi rst 
democratic elections. That would mark the end of apartheid. The implications 
for Africa and black people throughout the world were immeasurable. This was 
clearly going to be a momentous event in itself, but at the time, many Western 
commentators were also predicting a ghastly bloodbath in South Africa. They 
said that the African National Congress (ANC) would break its promises 
and begin a campaign of  murder and destabilization. Others, observing the 
continuing violence in KwaZulu-Natal, predicted a tribal confl ict between Xhosa 
and Zulu. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the leader of the Zulu Inkatha movement, 
had not signed up to the national deal, and more and more people were dying 
in the gang warfare between Inkatha gangs and the ANC. 
In the end, Buthelezi signed the agreement days before the election, the voting 
was vast and peaceful and the miracle was completed by the saintly wisdom and 
demeanour of Nelson Mandela. The expectations of journalists who headed 
en masse for Durban in search of a bloodbath, were not fulfi lled. As a result 
they missed the worst bloodbath of all. 
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This group of journalists included most of the stringers for the world’s press 
based in Nairobi who usually covered East Africa. Normally, they would have 
been in Rwanda on the next fl ight, but the world’s press could not apparently 
cover more than one Africa story at a time. Some did not even try. The Financial 
Times of  London, always squeamish about stories that involve blood but not 
business, did not send its Nairobi correspondent to South Africa, but nor was 
she sent to Rwanda for more than a week after the country collapsed. 
Burundi, Rwanda’s neighbour and twin, offered more evidence that the 
world would not be moved by Rwanda’s plight. The previous autumn, the fi rst 
democratically elected president of  Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, had been 
murdered. He was the country’s fi rst Hutu president and his death was followed 
by the massacre of at least 50,000 people (FIDH 1995). Some said it was fi ve 
times that number. According to the Commission Internationale, Hutus and 
Tutsis were killed in about equal numbers. Reviewing the report, Professor 
René Lemarchand wrote:
A blind rage suddenly seized Frodebu militants and peasants alike in almost 
every province, and they killed every Tutsi in sight … the picture that emerges 
is one of unadulterated savagery. In one commune after another, scores of 
men, women and children were hacked to pieces with machetes, speared or 
clubbed to death, or doused with kerosene and burned alive. Of the active 
involvement of some communal and provincial authorities in the massacres, 
there can be no doubt … From all appearances, however, little prodding was 
needed for the crowds to heed their incitements. (Lemarchand 1995) 
Not a single staff  journalist from the British press had covered this story. 
It barely made the headlines and was hardly reported in British national 
newspapers or on national radio in Britain. Any news editor or desk offi cer who 
made a check through the records would have found that massacres of Hutus 
and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi had occurred with appalling frequency in 
the second half  of  the twentieth century. The word genocide was frequently 
used to describe these massacres, but no one had ever proposed sending a 
peacekeeping army to stop them. So why should they now? The United States 
whose airlift and fi nancial muscle were – and are – essential to any rapid UN 
peacekeeping operation, had been traumatized by the deaths of 18 of its special 
forces in Somalia on a single night the previous October. As far as Washington 
was concerned, Rwanda was Africa and Africa was Somalia. President Clinton 
was not going to allow the UN – let alone the US – to get sucked into local 
confl icts that might end in another disaster. 
The language used by the press to describe Rwanda reinforced the impression 
that what was going on was an inevitable and primitive process that had no 
rational explanation and could not be stopped by negotiation or force. A report 
in The Times warned of an ‘eruption of tribal violence’ (Bone 1994). The local 
Reuters correspondent, Thadée Nsengiyaremye (1994), reported ‘gangs of youth 
settling tribal scores hacking and clubbing people to death’. He quoted Western 
diplomats as saying ‘continuing tribal slaughter between the Hutu majority 
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and Tutsi minority in the Central African states was feared’. Lindsey Hilsum 
(1994a), writing in the Guardian, spoke of Kigali descending into chaos and 
quoted a diplomat as saying it was getting ‘messier and messier … various clans 
are murdering others, there is a general score settling going on in Kigali.’ 
All this was reported in the context of renewed fi ghting between the RPF and 
government troops. After the plane crash, the RPF abandoned the ceasefi re and 
advanced. In Kigali, the presidential guard attacked the 600-strong contingent of 
RPF fi ghters that had been allowed to come to Kigali to protect the politicians 
who had joined the government as part of the Arusha accords. The civil war 
was resumed. 
Most journalists accepted the diplomats’ implicit agenda that the killing of 
civilians was an offshoot of the renewed civil war. Hutus were afraid that the 
RPF would overrun the country and were attacking their Tutsi neighbours 
whom they regarded as RPF supporters or even a fi fth column. After the killing 
of  President Ndadaye in Burundi by Tutsi soldiers it was easy to persuade 
them that there was a Tutsi conspiracy to re-establish their supremacy in both 
countries. They may also have been persuaded that the RPF had shot down 
the plane and killed President Habyarimana. Those early reports of  ‘tribal 
bloodletting’ (AFP 1994) also implied that Tutsis were trying to take over 
Rwanda and were killing Hutus indiscriminately. The assumption was that the 
anarchy created by renewed fi ghting had allowed these ‘ancient tribal hatreds’ 
to burst forth and that they could only be suppressed by the establishment of 
a ceasefi re. 
It was not until 12 April when Catherine Bond (1994a) in The Times stated 
that ‘Tutsis were the target plus Hutus who had made the mistake of supporting 
the [Arusha accords]’. Two days later she wrote:
The majority of  the killings are carried out by militias, trained at the 
instigation of (President) Juvénal Habyarimana. The militiamen belonged 
to two political parties, which are opposed to power sharing with rebels 
from Rwanda’s minority Tutsi tribe … Increasingly in the past two days the 
militiamen have appeared on the streets armed with guns and stick grenades 
given to them by the remnants of a government led by extremists from the 
majority Hutu tribe. (Bond 1994b)
There were several references in the media to genocide in Rwanda and 
Burundi, but these referred to past massacres. This – a week after the killings 
had begun – was the fi rst hint that what was happening was not mere mayhem 
or madness but well organized. Three days later, however, the Guardian was 
still reporting ‘thousands have died in a orgy of ethnic violence between the 
majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi tribes’ (Hilsum 1994b).
The Interahamwe – the organized death squads – was not mentioned in 
the press until 30 April, when Reuters began to use the name. Meanwhile the 
use of  words and phrases like ‘tribe’, ‘orgy of  violence’, ‘bloodletting’ and 
‘settling old scores’ implied that these were something incomprehensible to 
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outsiders and uncontrollable, not amenable to reason or negotiation. There 
was no sudden breakthrough among outsiders in understanding that this 
was not just another round of  fi ghting between two ethnic groups but an 
organized mass murder of an entire population. The language of newspapers 
gradually changed throughout April from a story about a civil war to a story 
of genocide. 
In a continent not known for the ability of  its governments to command 
obedience, instil discipline or organize huge public works programmes, it is 
diffi cult to attribute the genocide purely to mobilization and obedience. Nor 
do most African people believe or obey everything they are told on state-run 
radio. Some Rwandans killed out of fear of being killed themselves. The orders 
to kill Tutsis resonated with long held fears and feelings. They were accepted as 
a permission – even welcomed – by vast numbers of Hutus. The Hutu refugees 
that I spoke with in Goma later in 1994 mostly denied that any killings had 
taken place. The few who admitted that Tutsis had been killed said that it had 
to happen. ‘They were going to do the same to us,’ one told me (Henri, personal 
communication, 1994). 
Yet, had the politicians, diplomats and journalists discovered earlier the 
organizational element that made the genocide – created from the top-down 
as well as bottom-up – they perhaps would have had a different attitude to the 
Rwanda government and the RPF. They would have seen that the massacres 
were not an offshoot of fi ghting between government and rebels. They would 
have seen them as the main issue far sooner. 
How might that have changed things? As always, might-have-beens are 
impossible to judge. But had the world’s powerful governments realized and 
accepted sooner that genocide was taking place, they might have ensured that 
the UN did not see the two parties as equal combatants in a civil war. That 
might have meant they would not have been so keen to work for a ceasefi re. 
The United States and other Security Council members may not have given the 
UN orders to abandon Rwanda when they failed to secure that ceasefi re but, 
on the contrary, they might have encouraged the RPF to take over the country 
more quickly to end the killing and establish order. The UN and aid agencies 
backed by Western governments may not then have treated the Hutu refugees 
and the soldiers that accompanied them to eastern Congo as victims in need 
of aid, but might have taken action earlier to disarm them and start to identify 
who among them was responsible for the genocide. 
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How the Media Missed 
the Rwanda Genocide
Alan J. Kuperman
From April to July 1994, approximately 500,000 Rwandan Tutsi, some 80 per 
cent of the country’s Tutsi population, were exterminated in the most effi cient 
and complete genocide of modern times. Western media blame the international 
community for not intervening quickly, but the media must share blame for 
not immediately recognizing the extent of the carnage and mobilizing world 
attention to it. They failed to report that a nationwide killing campaign was 
under way in Rwanda until almost three weeks into the violence. By that time, 
some 250,000 Tutsi had already been massacred.
During those fi rst weeks, Western reporting was marred by four lapses. First, 
it mistook genocide for civil war. The country had been wracked by a low-level 
civil war from 1990 to 1993 between the government, controlled by the Hutu 
majority, and a rebel force comprising mainly Tutsi. Although a minority, the 
Tutsi had ruled until the late 1950s when the Hutu took power and forced 
many Tutsi to fl ee as refugees. In both the 1960s and 1990s Tutsi refugee rebels 
had launched intermittent offensives against Rwanda, so on the outbreak of 
genocide on 6 April 1994, Western correspondents reported the initial burst of 
violence in Kigali as the resumption of a bloody civil war.
On 11 April, an editorial in London’s The Times pondered international 
calls for a ceasefi re and asked rhetorically, ‘Which parties would be asked to 
cease fi re against whom?’ (Times Editors 1994). A 12 April report in Belgium’s 
De Standaard on government violence in Kigali added that ‘it is absolutely 
certain that a large number of acts of terror were committed’ as well ‘in the 
area controlled by the rebels’ (Buyse 1994). Early reports also indicated that 
the Tutsi rebels were winning the civil war and had rejected government offers 
of a nationwide ceasefi re, which contradicted any notion of Tutsis as victims. 
By 13 April, Radio France International reported that ‘the fall of Kigali seems 
imminent’ (Anon. 1994a). On 14 April, The Times and Le Monde reported that 
it was now the Hutu who feared vengeance from Tutsi rebels who had gained 
the upper hand in Kigali (Bond and Prentice 1994; Hélène 1994a). 
A second mistake by international news media was to report that violence was 
on the wane when in fact it was mounting. On 11 April, just four days after the 
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fi ghting started, The New York Times reported that violence had ‘appeared to 
slacken’ (Schmidt 1994a), and Le Monde concurred the next day that fi ghting 
had ‘diminished in intensity’ (Hélène 1994b). Two days later, Le Monde said 
that ‘a strange calm reigns in downtown’ Kigali (Hélène 1994a). On 15 April, 
it reported this calm spreading to the capital’s suburbs, allowing ‘humanitarian 
organizations to cautiously resume their activities’ (Hélène 1994c). Only on 
18 April did Brussels’ La Une Radio Network question this consensus by 
explaining that the decline in reports of violence was because ‘most foreigners 
have left, including journalists’ (Anon. 1994b). The exodus of reporters was so 
thorough that it virtually halted Western press coverage. European newspapers 
that had been providing daily coverage of the violence in Kigali stopped cold 
on 18 April, for four days in France’s Le Monde and seven in Britain’s Guardian.
Ironically, this was when the slaughter reached its peak.
The third reporting error was that early published death counts were gross 
underestimates, sometimes by a factor of ten. On 10 April, three days into the 
killing, The New York Times quoted estimates of 8,000 or ‘tens of thousands’ 
dead in Kigali (McFadden 1994). During the second week, media estimates 
did not rise at all. On 16 April, the Guardian still reported only an ‘estimated 
20,000 deaths’ (Hilsum 1994). Two days later, The New York Times repeated 
this same statistic, underestimating the actual carnage at that point by about 
tenfold. Not until a few days later did the scope of  killing rapidly emerge 
(Schmidt 1994b).
Fourth, for nearly two weeks, Western news organizations focused almost 
exclusively on Kigali, a city that contained only 4 per cent of  Rwanda’s 
population, and did not report the far broader tragedy unfolding around them. 
The few reports of  violence in the countryside seemed to indicate renewal 
of  mutual communal strife or civil war, rather than genocide. On 11 April, 
Paris Europe No. 1 Radio reported that ‘Hutus are hunting down Tutsis 
throughout the country,’ but then added, ‘and the other way round’ (Giesbert 
1994). Brussels’ La Une Radio Network reported that killing and looting in 
Rwanda’s southwest was targeted against the ‘opposition’, rather than an ethnic 
group (Anon. 1994c). Likewise, on 12 April, the Washington Post wrote, ‘sketchy 
reports said fi ghting has spread to Rwanda’s countryside,’ but in a context 
suggesting combat between government troops and armed rebels (Parmelee 
1994a). The fi rst report of a large-scale massacre outside the capital came on 
16 April (Bond 1994; Parmelee 1994b).
American newspapers failed to convey the nationwide scope of the violence 
until 22 April when The New York Times belatedly reported that fi ghting bands 
had reduced ‘much of the country to chaos’ (Lewis 1994). Still, many foreign 
observers could not conceive that genocide was under way. On 23 April, the
Washington Post speculated that the dearth of Tutsi refugees fl eeing Rwanda 
was because ‘most of the borders have been sealed’ (Parmelee 1994c). Only on 
25 April was the riddle solved when the New York Times reported that violence 
had ‘widened into what appears to be a methodical killing of Tutsi across the 
countryside’, and that the missing refugees ‘either have been killed or are trying 
to hide’ (Lorch 1994).
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At least three factors help to account for these reporting lapses. First, the 
evacuation of foreign nationals left few reporters in the countryside after the 
fi rst few days or in the capital after the fi rst week. Second, the situation was 
legitimately confusing. Tutsi rebels were winning the civil war and retaliating 
against suspected civilian Hutu extremists at the same time that the civilian Tutsi 
population was being systematically exterminated. Third, even experts were slow 
to appreciate what was happening. The commander of Belgian peacekeepers 
stated on 15 April to Radio France International that ‘the fi ghting has … all but 
stopped’ (Anon. 1994d). No human rights group even suggested the possibility 
of genocide until 19 April (Human Rights Watch 1994).
In the wake of  Rwanda’s tragedy, the media harshly criticized the United 
Nations and its Western members for not immediately recognizing the killing 
campaign and reacting to prevent it. Such criticism is only partly valid. 
American and other Western offi cials did drag their feet after the genocide 
was reported, avoiding use of the word genocide for weeks afterward for fear 
of being compelled to intervene.
But the media must share the blame for failing to provide prompt notice of 
the genocide. In obscure parts of the world, where Western governments do not 
invest signifi cant intelligence assets, the news business is relied on to serve as a 
surrogate early-warning system. In Rwanda, it did not fulfi l this role.
Partly in reaction to this reporting failure in Rwanda, Western media have 
suffered from exactly the opposite problem ever since. They now exaggerate 
the extent of civilian atrocities in ethnic confl ict. Around the world, rebels and 
human rights groups learned the lesson from Rwanda that they must declare 
‘genocide’ to have any hope of Western intervention. Because the press does 
not want to get caught napping again, it duly reports such claims even though it 
cannot confi rm them. Thus, Western readers were told for months that genocide 
was raging in Kosovo, but forensic investigators have been able to fi nd just 5,000 
corpses to date, some of whom may have been armed rebels (Garvey 2004).
Likewise, Western media reported that genocide was occurring in East 
Timor after its vote for independence, but now the UN estimates that only 
1,000 were killed before and after the referendum (Anon. 2005). This is not to 
say that a few hundred or thousand deaths are unimportant. But they do not 
constitute genocide by any reasonable defi nition. The UN defi nes genocide as 
‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group as such’ (UN 1951: Article II). The defi nition has been 
broadened in practice to include destruction of political groups.
Perhaps the main reason that Western correspondents have had diffi culty 
reporting ethnic violence accurately is that at least one of the sides does not want 
them to, and reporters cannot confi rm many allegations without risking their 
lives by visiting combat zones. There is no moral requirement for journalists to 
make such a personal sacrifi ce. But so long as reporters do not confi rm the facts 
on the ground, they must try to do everything else possible to piece together 
the real story for readers – in full awareness that combatants, governments and 
private agencies are all trying to manipulate them. 
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Rwanda’s Hutu government wanted reporters to think that violence was 
civil war rather than genocide. In a similarly manipulative way, the Kosovo 
Liberation Army wanted reporters to think that Yugoslav government violence 
prior to NATO’s bombing was genocide or ethnic cleansing rather than counter-
insurgency. In both cases, Western reporters were fooled. They should take 
a lesson from this as they continue their vital task of  informing Western 
policymakers and publics about violent confl icts around the world.
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An Analysis of News Magazine Coverage 
of the Rwanda Crisis in the United States
Melissa Wall
From the days of the African nationalist movements, Western news organizations 
have tended to paint a one-dimensional portrait of  intracountry conflict 
occurring on the African continent. Various organizational constraints have 
combined with a tendency toward the stereotype to create a shallow type of 
reporting that has been much criticized in the past. When the ongoing violence 
in Rwanda suddenly burst into the news in the spring of  1994, some media 
observers hoped for more meaningful coverage. Many news organizations had 
acknowledged and pledged to overcome prior shortcomings. In addition, there 
was no longer a Cold War to provide a means of framing the confl ict. Some 
positive coverage of African politics was coming out of South Africa where the 
fi rst national elections were going to be held. The Rwanda crisis represented 
a chance for the media to truly explain to news audiences the real reasons 
– political, economic and social – for African violence, rather than relying on 
the old stereotypes of tribe versus tribe, east versus west.
Did the United States media portray the Rwanda crisis in a way that was 
different from past coverage? To make this assessment, I analyzed news magazine 
coverage of Rwanda for the entire year of 1994.
PRESS COVERAGE OF AFRICA 
Organizational demands
The type of news that gets published about Africa is infl uenced by the general 
values and organizational demands of the Western media. News is not merely the 
random reporting of events, but is rather constructed and shaped by reporters 
and editors who determine what is worthy of coverage and what is not, and 
how events will be presented (Chang and Lee 1992; Gitlin 1980; Tuchman 1978; 
White 1950). Because the media tend to value confl ict and crisis, especially when 
the news is coming from foreign countries, that is the type of story that most 
often gets reported (Fair 1993; Hachten 1992a; Lent 1977).
Logistic barriers also prevent reporters from covering African nations as well 
as they could. Reporters are often ‘parachuted’ into countries and expected to 
cover rapidly breaking, dramatic events (Rosenblum 1979). They arrive with little 
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or no knowledge of the country’s history, politics and culture and few, if  any, 
local sources. They rarely speak local languages and quickly move on when they 
or their editors decide the story is growing cold (Hess 1994; Rosenblum 1993). 
In some countries, governments exercise various forms of censorship, which can 
make the work of a reporter diffi cult if  not impossible (Hachten 1992a).
Hachten (1992a) believes that there are far too few foreign correspond-
ents bringing news from Africa to American readers. Another problem with 
international reporting of Africa is the lack of widespread news bureaus. Rather 
than being evenly distributed throughout the world, bureaus are concentrated 
primarily in western Europe. In Africa, a correspondent based in South Africa 
may be expected to cover the entire continent. One of  the reasons given is 
fi nancial (Hachten 1992b). News from Africa is not seen as a money-maker for 
news organizations (Ebo 1992). This leaves only a handful of reporters covering 
the continent – correspondents who are sometimes compelled to ‘look for news 
stories that are easy and convenient to gather’ (Ebo 1992: 16). 
Themes of coverage 
Lack of interest in covering Africa and lack of resources devoted to fi nding 
reporters who speak the languages and know the culture have contributed 
to several tendencies in news media treatment of  Africa. The fi rst is toward 
portraying any challenge to the status quo as negative. This can be seen most 
clearly in the coverage of the African nationalist movements, such as the 1950s 
independence movement in Kenya (Maloba 1992). A second trend is toward 
portraying political events in Africa as irrational tribalism; such portrayals 
rarely probe for the underlying causes of confl icts (Fair 1993; Ibelema 1992). 
This can be seen in coverage of the Biafran war in Nigeria and other wars since. 
The third tendency is toward portraying events through an East–West lens, a 
particularly popular media frame during the Cold War (Fair 1992; Govea 1992). 
All of  these tendencies rely on oversimplifi cation of complex events. Rather 
than providing context for unfamiliar confl icts and settings, they can create 
stereotypes that become fi xed in the minds of news consumers. 
The reporting of Africa’s wars of independence set the tone and structure of 
Western media coverage of African political violence (Hawk 1992). In covering 
Kenya’s struggle for independence in the 1950s, the press relied on infl ammatory 
adjectives and negative descriptions to describe the movement. Often the news 
coming out of Kenya was shaped by the colonial government, which distributed 
press handouts almost daily (Edgerton 1989). Colonial propagandists played 
up two ideas. First, Africans were primitive and irrational; therefore, Western 
coverage really could not make sense of their politics or positions (Maloba 
1992). Second, Africans who challenged colonial powers were brutal and 
savage. This idea helped dehumanize African leaders in Western press coverage 
(Hawk 1992). 
Another example of the trends in the coverage of African confl ict can be seen 
in the reporting of the Nigerian civil war, also known as the Biafran war. News 
coverage showed how the Western media continued to see African confl icts in 
simplifi ed terms, particularly tribe versus tribe. It focused on events, not on 
issues, background, consequences or other contextual sorts of  information 
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(Himmelstrand 1971). The media fi xated on tribal differences because that 
reinforced ideas about African primitivism (Artis 1970). By attributing events 
to tribalism, the press did not have to analyze complex political and economic 
situations (or any genesis of such in colonialism) (Ibelema 1992). 
This way of viewing African confl ict has yet to change. In looking at Western 
coverage of Inkatha, Brock found news stories about confl ict in South Africa 
reported as senseless tribal violence – ‘complex situations are reduced to 
“tribal”’, – and disputes among political groups such as the African National 
Congress and Inkatha are seen not as political and ideological but as primitive 
clashes (Brock 1992: 151). Fair also found that coverage of the Liberian war 
focused on African tribalism and primitivism and not the political causes. She 
interprets the emphasis on tribalism as an attempt to make Africa appear to 
be located ‘back in time’ and, therefore, incomprehensible to Western media 
consumers (Fair 1993: 14).
Studies by Govea (1983, 1992) and Fair (1992) found that confl ict in Africa 
was presented within an East–West frame even when events had little to do with 
the Cold War. In her examination of The New York Times coverage of US food 
aid to Ethiopia from 1980 to 1989, Fair (1992) found that newspaper stories 
suggested that the benevolence of the West saved the nation from complete ruin. 
The news media not only failed to focus on the political and social realities of the 
Horn of Africa, they failed to relate what was happening to environmental and 
climactic changes, instead attributing Ethiopia’s food shortage to its Marxist 
form of government. Historical background that might reveal the link between 
Western policies and tragic events such as the famine are usually left out of 
reports about Africa (Ebo 1992). 
METHODS
In this project, I analyzed all 38 full-length news reports about the Rwandan crisis 
that appeared in 1994 in Newsweek, Time and U.S. News and World Report. I 
chose news magazines for analysis because they tend to summarize the dominant 
view of a news event, and also because the writing used in them is believed to be 
colourful and full of visual images (Buckman 1993; Schramm 1988).
Shaping my analysis was the idea that news is not a random happening of 
events, but a carefully selected and constructed version of reality, determined 
by various gatekeepers and organizational routines, such as relying on 
offi cial sources (Gans 1979; Tuchman 1978). In addition to following these 
routines, reporters are also believed to construct news stories as a ‘package’ 
of ‘condensing devices’ that work as shorthand between the journalist and the 
reader (Gamson and Modigliani 1989: 3). Various researchers have identifi ed 
these condensing devices as metaphors, keywords, depictions or visual images, 
agency (the person or thing responsible for the story’s action, often identifi ed 
via headlines) and sources (Entman 1991; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Pan 
and Kosicki 1993). 
Taking all of these studies into account, I analyzed a set of dimensions that 
I believe reveals the nature of  the coverage of  the Rwandan crisis: sources, 
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metaphors, portrayals (depictions of individual people), agencies and keywords. 
Sources and portrayals were determined by content analysis of the text; keywords 
were derived by noting what words appeared in both the headlines and the text 
and what additional words seemed to have a particular salience within the text 
alone. Agency was measured by examining headlines (who or what was identifi ed 
as causing the crisis and who or what was identifi ed as solving it). Metaphors 
were open coded. The data gathered from studying each of these dimensions 
were then considered as a whole to determine overall themes in coverage. 
RESULTS
Content analysis of sources (215 in all) revealed that aid workers (22 per cent) 
were quoted more frequently than any other source, followed closely by ordinary 
local people (21 per cent). Other sources included: local opposition members 
(14 per cent), which included the Rwandan Patriotic Front and people identifi ed 
as supporting political groups opposed to the extremists; Western offi cials (13 
per cent); United Nations representatives (13 per cent); and local offi cials (9 
per cent), which included the ruling party and the former military leaders. Two 
other types of sources were infrequently quoted: experts (5 per cent), regional 
(2 per cent) and other (1 per cent).
That expert sources, such as human rights advocates or academic specialists, 
made up only 5 per cent of sources is notable as these sorts of sources could 
easily have been contacted and interviewed in the West. In fact, groups such 
as Human Rights Watch Africa were releasing regular press bulletins with 
timely, well-documented information. They were an obvious source of informed 
background and comment about what was really happening in Rwanda. Also 
notable was the dearth of sources from other African countries – people who 
might have been able to provide insights and African points of  view on the 
situation.
Collapsing source categories into non-Rwandan and Rwandan revealed 
that non-Rwandan sources (including governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations) made up 48 per cent of  all sources. These people, with one 
exception, were Westerners. Rwandans made up 44 per cent of  all sources. 
Taken alone, this fi nding might suggest that Africans were given more of  a 
voice in coverage of the confl ict (compared with Fair’s (1992) earlier fi nding 
that they were rarely quoted); however, when other results are considered, the 
presentation of Rwandans seems far from positive. 
For instance, of the 76 portrayals of Rwandans, 74 per cent depicted Rwandans 
as passive, 10 per cent as causing problems, 9 per cent as neutral and 7 per cent 
as solving problems. In comparison, of the 19 portrayals of non-Rwandans, 
usually Westerners, 75 per cent depicted them as solving problems, 19 per cent 
as passive and 6 per cent as causing problems. 
The headline analysis further suggests that Rwandans were not favourably 
portrayed. Headlines were analyzed to determine whether they listed a cause 
of the problem, a solution for the problem or neither. Most headlines (71 per 
cent) listed neither cause nor solution. Of those that did list a cause (16 per 
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cent), tribalism was either directly cited as the cause (‘Deeper into the abyss: 
an orgy of tribal slaughter kills thousands as most foreigners fl ee for their lives’ 
(Hammer et al. 1994: 32)) or indirectly through reference to the ethnicity of a 
particular group (‘The swagger of defeat: in exile, the Hutu army is stealing food, 
intimidating refugees and plotting a return to power’ (Fedarko 1994a)). Of the 
headlines that listed solutions (13 per cent), Rwandans were never seen as the 
solution, only Westerners such as the French: ‘The horrifi c scars of Rwanda’s 
civil war: France sends in troops to stop the carnage’ (Kiley and Coleman 1994: 
51, my emphasis).
The keyword results also contribute to the negative image of Rwandans and 
to the idea that the entire confl ict was based on little more than brutal tribalism: 
the words ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ appeared 55 times in the text and in 4 headlines. 
Compare this with the word ‘political’, which appeared 25 times. Also notable 
was the reliance on ethnic designations: Hutu/Hutus or Tutsi/Tutsis appeared 
456 times in the stories about the crisis. Compare the appearance of these tribal 
designations with the designation ‘extremist(s)’, which was used 14 times in 
total. Other keywords that seem to have particular salience include ‘slaughter’ 
and ‘carnage’, which appeared 19 and 9 times respectively, within the text. 
‘Slaughter’ also appeared 5 times in headlines, ‘carnage’ twice. 
Metaphors tended to cluster in particular patterns. The clusters were examined 
and used to help derive the themes of coverage listed below. Patterns included: 
comparing the violence to explosions or eruptions; comparing the movement 
of refugees to natural disasters; and comparing the events to biblical scenes or 
diseases. Examples of metaphors are included below.
Five themes in coverage
I identified five overall themes in the magazine coverage of  the Rwanda 
crisis:
1. The Rwanda violence was the result of irrational tribalism.
2. Rwandan people are little better than animals, ranging from the barbaric 
to the helpless and pathetic.
3. The violence is incomprehensible and, thus, is explained through comparison 
to biblical myths, supernatural causes, natural disasters or diseases.
4. Neighbouring African countries are just as violent and, thus, unable to help 
solve Rwanda’s problems.
5. Only the West is capable of solving Rwanda’s problems.
1. The Rwanda violence was the result of irrational tribalism. Instead of explaining 
political and other causes behind the violence, news magazines chose to present 
the crisis as another eruption of irrational African violence, fuelled by ethnic 
hatred. There was a high level of use of words that emphasized the ethnic aspect 
of  the confl ict. Consider this headline: ‘All the hatred in the world: as Tutsi 
rebels pursue their fast moving offensive, they fi nd they are taking over a once 
populous country that is now both deserted and embittered’ (Purvis 1994: 36, 
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my emphasis). Rather than ‘Tutsi rebels,’ the headline could have used the more 
accurate label ‘Rwandan Patriotic Front’.
Coverage also suggested that Rwandans were fated to kill each other. ‘Once
more,’ one headline about the Rwandan confl ict noted, ‘tens of thousands are 
massacred,’ while within the story we read: ‘For four centuries, hatred between 
the minority Tutsi tribe and the majority Hutus has been the curse of Rwanda’ 
– what is happening in Rwanda was only the ‘latest’ tragedy (Masland et al. 
1994: 33). We could only expect more of the same; after all, ‘Rwanda is helpless 
against its demons’ (Hammer et al. 1994).
Supporting the idea that events in Rwanda were beyond human control was 
the consistent use of  metaphors comparing the violence to an explosion or 
confl agration. Stories implied that the plane crash ‘sparking the fi ghting’ merely 
set off  the violent tendencies that were already present within all Rwandans 
(Kiley and Coleman 1994: 51). News accounts made it seem inevitable that 
the ‘violence exploded’ (Hammer 1994a). After all, ‘Rwanda is a crucible full 
of  explosives’ (Gibbs 1994: 57) and the entire nation was ‘like a time bomb’ 
(Gibbs, Crumley et al. 1994: 28). What happened was simply another ‘tribal 
meltdown’ (Gibbs 1994: 56) or a natural ‘spasm of  ethnic violence’ (Anon. 
1994a: 40). These sorts of metaphors implied that the violence was caused by 
something innate within the Rwandan people who were likely to burst into 
savage slaughter at any time.
In fact, the idea of this spontaneity was planted in the media by extremists who 
fl ed to Nairobi immediately after the killings began and held press conferences 
to make this claim, which was then reported in the Western press (Omaar and de 
Waal 1994). Press releases from human rights agencies revealed that extremists 
carefully planned and carried out the initial killings (Human Rights Watch 
Africa 1994). Although these releases were made available early on in the crisis, 
their contents were not reported in the news magazines until months later. 
Although the confl ict was initiated by particular political groups, we read 
almost nothing about them. By not bothering to name the specifi c parties, 
the magazines promoted the idea that the confl icts were about tribal rivalries 
and not about named opposition groups challenging the status quo. Only one 
magazine (U.S. News and World Report) named the Mouvement Républicain 
National pour la Democratie et le Développement (MRND), the late president’s 
party, and then only in one story that ran in November, seven months after 
the genocide. None of the stories mentioned the MRND’s ally, the Coalition
pour la Défense de la République (CDR), which the human rights organizations 
listed as equally if  not more virulent than the MRND, or the political party 
that opposed both, the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD). Instead, we read only 
of opposition groups, rebels and, mainly, Hutus and Tutsis.
2. Rwandan people are little better than animals, ranging from the pathetic to 
the barbaric. The analysis revealed that ordinary people were the second most 
frequently quoted group of people. If  we examine the coverage more closely, 
however, we fi nd that while Rwandans were given a voice, it was only within a 
framework that consistently presented them as pathetic and helpless victims, as 
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insensate, animal-like creatures or as barbaric savages. This is despite the fact 
that some government ministers refused to go along with the massacres and 
some Hutus put themselves and their families at risk to protect Tutsi neighbours 
and friends. Some Tutsi and Hutu – armed only with sticks and stones – formed 
neighbourhood patrols in an attempt to protect their communities (Omaar and 
de Waal 1994). Such descriptions were practically absent from the magazines.
Instead, ordinary Rwandans were presented as passive victims. In a typical 
portrayal, we read,
As a wintry morning wind whips through the camp, a dozen dying people 
huddle outside a white medical tent, waiting for the French doctors to arrive 
from the town of Goma. A father pushes his prostrate son in a wheelbarrow; 
a woman props up her husband as his head lolls. (Hammer 1994b: 17)
Ordinary people were rarely described as helping each other or fi ghting off  the 
perpetrators of  the violence. Instead, we are overwhelmed with descriptions 
such as this one of Father Oreste Incimatata who recounts what happened when 
the death squads came to his church: ‘“The women and children sang religious 
songs, cried and prayed,” said Incimatata who hid under his bed in an adjoining 
rectory during the killing’ (Hammer 1994c: 46, my emphasis).
If not passive victims, then Rwandans were compared with animals. Accounts 
described fl eeing Rwandans as ‘a mad stampede’ of refugees (Watson et al. 1994: 
26) or as a ‘human swarm’ (Hammer 1994d: 34). Comparing their movements 
with animals suggests that they are not rational, fully evolved human beings, but 
something less. This sort of metaphor dehumanizes the refugees and can make 
it diffi cult for Western media consumers to summon much sympathy. Evidence 
revealing the humanity of some Rwandans was rarely if  ever presented.
Another way in which the animal metaphors were used was in the description 
of  the youth wings that perpetrated much of  the violence. In one account, 
one such group was compared with dogs, noting that the extremist leaders 
‘let Interahamwe off  the leash’ (Ransdell 1994a: 67). In making those who 
committed horrendous crimes so abstract, the story made it more diffi cult 
for readers to understand that the violence took a great deal of planning and 
thinking to carry out. 
Also contributing to the savage barbarian image were metaphors such as
the violence was letting Rwanda ‘feed its hatreds’ (Gibbs, Marlowe et al. 1994: 
38) and Rwanda was ‘Central Africa’s slaughterhouse’ (Ransdell 1994b: 47), 
as if  the people butchered each other with the same regularity that people 
in other cultures slaughter beef. Stories suggested that Rwandans have little 
regard for human life, noting that bodies were ‘dumped like garbage’ (Anon. 
1994a: 41). 
How can people engage in such brutal behaviour? The stories implied 
because they are so unfeeling. ‘Rayontina Mukansonera, 19, describes being 
raped repeatedly by Hutu militia before escaping in the confusion following 
the rebel advance. “They showed no mercy,” she says, matter-of factly’ (Purvis 
1994: 36, my emphasis). Another story described this scene outside one of the 
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refugee camps in Zaire: ‘A shoemaker mends a pair of battered loafers, only 
inches ways from a small dead boy. “After a time you don’t even notice them,” 
he says, shrugging’ (Hammer 1994b: 15). Meanwhile, the United Nations burial 
squad loads dead bodies onto a truck under the tutelage of a European: ‘Louis
Biritsen, 37, directs the team’s movements. “Softly, softly,” he orders, as the 
workers toss a dead pregnant woman onto the heap of corpses. “You must be 
compassionate”’ (Hammer 1994b: 17). 
3. The violence is so incomprehensible, it can only be explained through comparison 
to biblical myths, supernatural causes, natural disasters or diseases. In refusing 
to consider political, economic or other causes for the violence, the magazines 
were left with explanations that seemed to indicate that the violence was simply 
beyond the comprehension of Western logic. They compared the violence to 
events from the bible, supernatural causes, natural disasters and diseases – none 
of which provided the news audience with an understanding of the underlying 
reasons for violence in Rwanda. Particularly striking was the use of  biblical 
images or myths to explain what was happening in Rwanda. Four headlines 
referred to Rwanda and the events there as constituting hell: ‘Tribal bloodlust 
and political rivalry turn the country into an unimaginable hell’ (Mutiso 1994: 
45); ‘Hell postponed’ (Michaels 1994: 56); ‘Escape from hell’ (Hammer 1994d: 
34); ‘Descent into hell’ (Ransdell et al. 1994).
The text of the stories contained other biblical references. One story noted, 
‘There are no devils left in hell … they’re all in Rwanda’ (Gibbs 1994: 56). 
Other metaphors included ‘a biblical array of pestilence’ (Watson et al. 1994: 
26) and an ‘exodus of biblical sweep’ (Hammer 1994d: 34). These images seem 
to refl ect the idea of a nation, as Fair (1993) puts it, from back in time, so far 
behind the West that what occurs there can only be related to bible stories. Other 
comparisons suggested that the violence was the result of supernatural causes, 
also unfathomable to rational, Western minds: ‘Rwanda is helpless against its 
demons’ (Hammer et al. 1994) and ‘Rwanda is tormented by its own implacable 
demons’ (Watson et al. 1994: 26). Here, so-called modern reason and rational 
thought have yet to take root.
Another means of dehumanizing the Rwandans was to describe the movements 
of great numbers of people so as to suggest that they were a natural occurrence 
in this region of  the world. This naturalness was particularly suggested by 
metaphors that compared the refugees’ exodus to movements of water, which 
was the most frequent type of metaphor in the news magazines’ coverage. Stories 
included the following water metaphors (emphasis added): ‘fl ood of  refugees’ 
(Fedarko 1994a); ‘choking the fl ow of  refugees’ (Fedarko 1994b: 56); ‘terrifi ed 
men, women and children poured’ (Hammer 1994d: 34); ‘slow moving river of  
humanity’ (Fedarko 1994b: 56); ‘[returning refugees] like trying to turn back a 
tidal wave one teacup at a time’ (Gibbs, Marlowe et al. 1994: 38); ‘tide of terrifi ed 
humanity’ (Anon. 1994b: 30); ‘latest tide [of  refugees]’ (Fedarko 1994b: 56); 
‘trickle of  Rwandans’ (Nelan 1994: 53); ‘few [refugees] trickled back’ (Watson 
et al. 1994: 26); ‘streams of  misery stretch for miles’ (Mutiso 1994: 44); ‘stream
of refugees’ (Ransdell 1994b: 47).
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This type of metaphor implies that these movements of people – like fl oods 
or other natural events – cannot be stopped by human intervention. Such terms 
exclude clear explanations of why the people are fl eeing or what other options 
they have. The use of  this metaphor also overlooks some of  the man-made 
problems that created the circumstances for the violence. Rwanda had been trying 
to carry out Western-dictated economic reforms. Structural adjustment had 
created incredible strains on the infrastructure with schools, health services and 
the nation’s entire economic system in near collapse (Chossudovsky 1995).
Other imagery suggests that what occurred in Rwanda was like malaria or 
some other disease that is endemic to Africa and has nothing to do with the 
rest of  the world. Thus, readers fi nd that ‘Rwanda is infected by tribal hate’ 
and ‘madness spread like an eager germ’ (Gibbs, Crumley et al. 1994: 30). 
This type of metaphor seems to be used merely to ‘jazz’ up what ought to have 
been a story compelling enough on its own merits. Thus, readers are told that 
‘statistics seep out of Rwanda like blood from an open wound’ (Roberts 1994: 
11). This incurable disease/untreatable wound imagery works only if  reporters 
forget to look into Rwanda’s past. Any ‘infection’ of hatred can be traced back 
to the colonial occupiers, who stressed tribal designations in ruling the country 
(Chossudovsky 1995; Kane 1995). 
4. Neighbouring African countries are just as violent and, thus, unable to help 
solve Rwanda’s problems. The news magazines suggested that there could be no 
local solutions because the entire region was just as chaotic and violent. Readers 
might assume that all African countries are inherently disorderly when they read 
about the lack of stability in Rwanda’s neighbouring countries. One magazine 
noted that the surrounding nations created a ‘logistical nightmare for U.S. 
forces … the disorganization, lack of fuel and congestion at all central African 
airports grounded many planes meant to ferry supplies’ (Gibbs, Marlowe et 
al. 1994: 39). Readers were told that Zaire has ‘been tottering on the brink 
of collapse’ (Ransdell et al. 1994), while Zairian troops loot and its ministers 
drink champagne but refuse to help. Likewise, ethnic violence was ‘the trigger 
that will blow Burundi apart’ (Michaels 1994: 56). In only one story do we read 
that Tanzania was ‘one of Africa’s most stable countries’ (Ransdell et al. 1994: 
42). No story discussed Tanzania’s willingness to take in and try to care for 
thousands of refugees, nor did the stories include information about Uganda, 
which was working to overcome its own history of violence and genocide. 
One means of making surrounding nations appear unable to help was by not 
quoting any sources from them. Thus, a regional perspective was practically non-
existent (only 2 per cent of all sources). We do fi nd one quote and a portrayal 
buried within a detailed story about the horrors of the Rwandan refugee camps. 
A Kinshasa student had come to help tend ailing refugees. Nevertheless, she 
was not asked to comment on what the crisis meant to Zaire or Africa, or even 
why she chose to come and help. If  one Zairian was helping, we might assume 
there were others, although they did not appear in the magazine coverage. 
An obvious source to comment on the situation, the Organization for African 
Unity, was mentioned only twice by the magazines. Government offi cials or 
270 INTERNATIONAL MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE GENOCIDE
others from Tanzania or Zaire could have perhaps given some perspective on 
managing the infl ux of  half  a million refugees. Only one of  the magazines 
quoted a Tanzanian (a general who advocated military intervention). Zairian 
offi cials were only quoted in the context of  their country being yet another 
example of African chaos. The Rwandan Patriotic Front was based in Uganda, 
where many of its members had previously been part of the Ugandan army. 
What was the Ugandan perspective on the confl ict? Do their offi cials see any 
workable solutions? If  the magazines were unable to unearth any alternative 
explanations or solutions from the sources they were relying on, then perhaps 
they should have considered there might not have been a lack of solutions so 
much as a lack of broad perspective.
5. Only the West is capable of solving Rwanda’s problems. Consistently, when the 
magazines did portray people taking positive steps to deal with the violence in 
Rwanda, they were almost always Westerners, either French troops or American 
aid workers. The idea that these were the sorts of  people capable of  dealing 
with the troubles was reinforced by relying on them for quotes and portraying 
them as actively helping solve the problem. The coverage suggested that groups 
from the North such as the United Nations or international nongovernmental 
organizations would provide the order the world needs.
One of the ways the stories emphasized the ability of the West to fi x Rwanda’s 
problems was by relying on Westerners as the primary sources. Not only were aid 
workers quoted most often (22 per cent), they were more likely to be portrayed 
as solving Rwanda’s problems. Typical of the coverage is this portrayal: A ‘27-
year-old American noticed an emaciated woman sitting in the dirt with three 
small children. “She didn’t look at me, but I saw her eyeing my water bottle”… 
[he] sauntered over to the woman and dropped his water bottle next to her. “It’s 
not fun to play God and fi gure who gets what,” he said’ (Hammer 1994a: 32).
In the headline analysis, the French were most often mentioned as solving 
the confl ict (named four times in the headlines). The magazines further implied 
that the preferred saviour among these groups was the United States, noting that 
diligent American aid workers were in ‘a race with death’ (Watson et al. 1994: 26), 
trying to save Rwandans from themselves. Examples of Rwandans (or citizens 
of  Tanzania, Zaire, etc.) helping to cope with the disaster are seldom found. 
Ultimately, coverage implied that only the US military could truly save Rwanda. 
As one headline noted, ‘Nice idea, wrong army, Rwanda: are the French the 
ones to make peace?’ (Stanger and Hammer 1994: 48). In addition, metaphors 
referenced the Nazi atrocities of World War II as well as suggesting that just as 
the United States devised the Marshall Plan (Gibbs, Marlowe et al. 1994: 38) for 
war-torn Europe after World War II, it now needed to reassemble Rwanda. 
CONCLUSION
Western news coverage of Africa has always tended to distort and oversimplify 
complex events. The Rwanda coverage continued the adherence to old patterns 
such as interpreting confl icts in Africa as evidence of backwardness. Some new 
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trends seemed evident as well. With the end of  East–West rivalry, the Cold 
War framework has been removed and now the coverage seems to suggest that 
violence is simply tribal or inexplicable. Western offi cials played less of a role in 
the coverage, probably because of the lack of government involvement. Western 
aid organizations seemed to be fi lling the gap, although locals were quoted 
more than has previously been the case. While these were all changes, they did 
not necessarily herald better, more comprehensive coverage. For instance, if  we 
look at the total portrait of these locals, we fi nd mainly graphic descriptions 
that confi rm that Rwandans are helpless wretches or brutal savages.
While reporting from an area with such violence can be logistically diffi cult, 
there were other ways to obtain information. Early on, various human rights 
organizations publicized the names of those who systematically planned and 
executed the genocide. These names were made readily available through written 
press releases as well as via the Rwanda Crisis Web site on the Internet. Yet 
magazines failed to use this information. Also, reporters could have sought 
comment from surrounding countries in the region. Instead, these countries were 
described as more examples of the instability of the entire continent, implying 
that Rwanda’s violence is the rule, not the exception to life on the African 
continent and that no regional government was competent to comment. 
By relying on tribalism as the explanation for the violence, the magazines 
rarely mentioned who planned and executed the genocide that started the 
violence. Readers were left to believe that this tribal violence just exploded. 
By attributing the violence to tribal strife and not to the known individuals 
who were truly responsible (‘an orgy of tribal slaughter kills thousands’), the 
coverage let the real perpetrators off  the hook.
Because Africa is one of the continents about which we often know little, news 
coverage about it takes on a special importance. In many cases, it represents 
the only information about that area that many Westerners ever encounter. 
Instead of supplying readers with full, explanatory portraits of Africa, news 
organizations have tended to stick with the easy stereotype, the image that 
can be easily absorbed by readers, however false it may be. The coverage of 
the Rwanda crisis proves no exception to the negative, shallow coverage of 
the past. Granted, events such as this confl ict were complicated and violent, 
using metaphors to try to produce ‘colourful’ reports was a disservice not only 
to Africans but also to American news consumers. The tendency to write off  
Rwanda (and perhaps all of Africa) as naturally violent and not worth analyzing 
on any insightful level made American news coverage one more terrible element 
in the entire crisis. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
 1. Trial Chamber I today delivers its judgement in the trial of three Accused 
persons: Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan 
Ngeze. The judgement will be available in written form in English tomorrow 
and in French upon translation. The Chamber will deliver orally a summary 
of the judgement. The judgement and not this summary is the authoritative 
text.
 2. Ferdinand Nahimana was born on 15 June 1950, in Gatonde commune, 
Ruhengeri prefecture, Rwanda. He was a professor of history and Dean of 
the Faculty of Letters at the National University of Rwanda. In 1990, he 
was appointed Director of ORINFOR (Rwandan Offi ce of Information) 
and remained in that post until 1992. He was a founder of RTLM and a 
member of its comité d’initiative, or Steering Committee.
 3. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was born in 1950 in Mutura commune, Gisenyi 
prefecture, Rwanda. A lawyer by training, he held the post of  Director 
of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was a founder 
of the CDR and of RTLM and a member of the Steering Committee of 
RTLM.
 4. Hassan Ngeze was born on 25 December 1957 in Rubavu commune, 
Gisenyi prefecture, Rwanda. From 1978, he worked as a journalist, and 
in 1990, he founded the newspaper Kangura and held the post of Editor-
in-Chief.
 5. The three Accused are charged in separate Indictments; they were tried 
jointly. The Accused are all charged on counts of  genocide, conspiracy 
to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
complicity in genocide, and crimes against humanity (persecution and 
extermination). Additionally, Hassan Ngeze is charged with crimes against 
humanity (murder). The Accused are charged with individual criminal 
responsibility under Article 6(1) of the Statute for these crimes. Nahimana 
is additionally charged with superior responsibility under Article 6(3) in 
respect of direct and public incitement to commit genocide and the crime 
against humanity of persecution. Barayagwiza and Ngeze are additionally 
charged with superior responsibility under Article 6(3) in respect of all the 
counts except conspiracy to commit genocide.
 6. In the Indictments, Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza were 
also charged with the crime against humanity of murder, and Barayagwiza 
was charged on counts of serious violations of Article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions and of  Additional Protocol II. On 25 September 
2002, the Chamber granted the Defence motion for acquittal in respect 
of these counts.
 7. The Accused, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, elected not to attend his trial, 
giving as his reasons that he did not have confi dence that he would be 
afforded a fair trial in light of the Appeal Chamber’s reversal of its decision 
ordering his release before the trial.
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 8. This case raises important principles concerning the role of  the media, 
which have not been addressed at the level of  international criminal 
justice since Nuremberg. The power of the media to create and destroy 
fundamental human values comes with great responsibility. Those who 
control such media are accountable for its consequences.
II. FACTUAL FINDINGS
VIOLENCE IN RWANDA IN 1994
 9. The Chamber fi nds that within the context of hostilities between the RPF 
and the Rwandan Government, which began when the RPF attacked 
Rwanda on 1 October 1990, the Tutsi population within the country was sys-
tematically targeted as suspected RPF accomplices. This targeting included 
a number of violent attacks that resulted in the killing of Tutsi civilians. 
The RPF also engaged in attacks on civilians during this period. Following 
the shooting of the plane and the death of President Habyarimana on 6 
April 1994, widespread and systematic killing of Tutsi civilians, a genocide, 
commenced in Rwanda.
KANGURA
10. Hassan Ngeze was the owner, founder and editor of Kangura. He controlled 
the publication and was responsible for its contents. The fi rst issue of 
Kangura was published in May 1990, the last in 1995. No issues were 
published between April and July 1994. Kangura was very well known in 
the country as well as internationally. It was probably the most well known 
newspaper from Rwanda during that period of time. The newspaper had 
two versions, one primarily in Kinyarwanda and one primarily in French, 
referred to as the international version.
11. On the cover of each issue of Kangura, beginning in February 1991 with the 
publication of Kangura No. 10, appeared the title ‘The Voice that Awakens 
and Defends the Majority People’. The term ‘rubanda nyamwinshi’, which 
means ‘majority people’, was used by Kangura to refer to the Hutu majority. 
The Chamber has examined a number of  articles and excerpts from 
Kangura, focusing primarily on those that addressed issues of  ethnicity 
and on those which called on readers to take action.
12. The Ten Commandments were published in Kangura No. 6, in December 
1990, within an article entitled Appeal to the Conscience of the Hutu. The 
introduction of this article warned readers:
The enemy is still there, among us, and is biding his time to try again, at a 
more propitious moment, to decimate us.
Therefore, Hutu, wherever you may be, wake up! Be fi rm and vigilant. Take 
all necessary measures to deter the enemy from launching a fresh attack.
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13. The second part of the article, entitled ‘The Tutsi ambition’, described 
the Tutsi as ‘bloodthirsty’, and referred to their continuing ideology of 
Tutsi domination over the Hutu, and to the ‘permanent dream of the 
Tutsi’ to restore Tutsi minority rule. The article referred to a plan of 
1962, in which the Tutsi were to resort to two weapons they thought 
effective against the Hutu: ‘money and the Tutsi woman’. One part of 
the article, entitled ‘The Tutsi woman’, stated that Tutsi women were 
sold or married to Hutu intellectuals or highly placed Hutu offi cials, 
where they could serve as spies in infl uential Hutu circles and arrange 
government appointments, issue special import licences, and pass secrets 
to the enemy. Another part, which included the The Ten Commandments,
exhorted the Hutu to wake up ‘now or never’ and become aware of a 
new Hutu ideology, with roots in and in defence of the 1959 revolution. 
Reference was made to the historical servitude of the Hutu, and readers 
were urged to ‘be prepared to defend themselves against this scourge.’ 
The Hutu were urged to ‘cease feeling pity for the Tutsi!’ The article then 
set forth The Ten Commandments.
14. The fi rst commandment warns Hutu men of the dangers of Tutsi women 
and deems a traitor any Hutu man who marries a Tutsi woman, keeps a 
Tutsi mistress, or makes a Tutsi woman his secretary or protégée. Another 
commandment casts as a traitor any Hutu man who enters into business 
with Tutsi partners, invests his or state money in a Tutsi company, or lends 
to or borrows from a Tutsi. Other commandments require that strategic 
political, economic and military positions be entrusted to the Hutu, that 
students and teachers should be in the majority Hutu, and that the Hutu 
be united in solidarity and ‘seek friends and allies for the Hutu cause.’ 
The ninth commandment concludes, ‘The Hutu must be fi rm and vigilant 
towards their common Tutsi enemy.’
15. In defence of his publication of The Ten Commandments, Ngeze invoked 
his publication of the Tutsi 19 Commandments in Kangura No. 4, 1990, in 
an effort to show the even-handedness of Kangura. The 19 Commandments
were addressed to Tutsi, implicitly, and called on them to get into positions 
of authority, to get to know others in authority, befriend them, and then 
replace them. There was much in the document about the importance of 
undermining Hutu confi dence, with phrases such as ‘use the educated 
Bahutu credulity’, ‘show them they are incapable’, ‘ridicule the civil servants 
under our authority as ignorant Bahutu people’, and ‘do whatever you can 
to keep the Bahutu civil servants in an inferiority complex’. Commandment 
13 told readers to ‘Keep in mind that the Hutu are created to be servant 
to other’, and Commandment 16 issued a special call to the ‘youth Tutsi’, 
stating that if  ‘we fail to achieve our goal, we will use violence’.
16. The Chamber fi nds that The Appeal to the Conscience of the Hutu and The
Ten Commandments of  the Hutu included within it, published in Kangura 
No. 6 in December 1990, conveyed contempt and hatred for the Tutsi ethnic 
group, and for Tutsi women in particular as enemy agents. The Appeal to the 
Conscience of the Hutu portrayed the Tutsi as a ruthless enemy, determined 
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to conquer the Hutu, and called on the Hutu to take all necessary measures 
to stop the enemy. Kangura published the 19 Commandments to alert 
readers to the evil nature of the Tutsi and their intention to take power 
and subjugate the Hutu. The Ten Commandments of  the Hutu and the 19
Commandments of  the Tutsi were complementary efforts to the same end: 
the promotion of fear and hatred among the Hutu population of the Tutsi 
minority and the mobilization of the Hutu population against them. This 
appeal to the Hutu was visibly sustained in every issue of Kangura from 
February 1991 to March 1994 by the title ‘The Voice that Awakens and 
Defends the Majority People’.
17. Other editorials and articles published in Kangura echoed the contempt 
and hatred for Tutsi found in The Ten Commandments. These writings 
portrayed the Tutsi as inherently wicked and ambitious in language clearly 
intended to fan the fl ames of resentment and anger, directed against the 
Tutsi population. The cover of Kangura No. 26 answered the question ‘What 
weapons shall we use to conquer the Inyenzi once and for all?’ with the 
depiction of a machete. The message conveyed by this cover was a message 
of violence, that the machete should be used to conquer the Inyenzi once 
and for all. By Inyenzi, Kangura meant, and was understood to mean, all 
Rwandans of Tutsi ethnicity, who in this issue of Kangura were stereotyped 
as having the inherent characteristics of liars, thieves and killers.
18. In Kangura Nos. 58 and 59, published in March 1994, a competition was 
launched, consisting of eleven questions, the answers to which were all to 
be found in past issues of Kangura. Various points were allocated to correct 
answers, and prizes were announced for the winners. Readers were directed 
to enter the competition by sending their responses to the questions to 
RTLM.
19. The introduction to the competition stated that the purpose of  the 
competition was to sensitize the public to the ideas of the newspaper. The 
Chamber fi nds that this competition was a joint undertaking of Kangura
and RTLM, intended to acquaint the readers of Kangura and the listeners 
of RTLM with the content and ideas of Kangura as set forth in its past 
issues. The Chamber fi nds that the competition was designed to direct 
participants to any and to all of these issues of the publication and that 
in this manner in March 1994 Kangura effectively and purposely brought 
these back issues into circulation.
CDR
20. The Chamber finds that Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was one of  the 
principal founders of  CDR and played a leading role in its formation 
and development. Barayagwiza was seen as, and was, a decision-maker 
for the party, working to some extent behind the scenes in the shadow of 
CDR President Martin Bucyana, technically as an advisor or councillor. 
At some time prior to February 1994, Barayagwiza became the head of 
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the CDR in Gisenyi prefecture and a member of the national Executive 
Committee. In February 1994, following the assassination of  Martin 
Bucyana, Barayagwiza succeeded Bucyana. The Chamber finds that 
Hassan Ngeze was a founding member of CDR and active in the party, 
and held the position of  advisor to the party. The Chamber fi nds that 
Ferdinand Nahimana was not a member of CDR.
21. The Chamber fi nds that the CDR was formed to promote unity and 
solidarity among the Hutu popular majority and to represent its political 
interests. The CDR equated political interest with ethnic identity and 
thereby equated the RPF with the Tutsi, effectively defi ning the enemy as 
the Tutsi ethnic group. The CDR also identifi ed as the enemy prominent 
political opposition leaders. The formal policy of the CDR, as refl ected in 
its political manifesto and public statements, initially condemned ethnic 
violence and called for peaceful co-existence among the various ethnic 
groups, maintaining that these ethnic groups each had their own fi xed 
political interests and that unity among the groups was not possible. 
The CDR considered the RPF to be the political representation of Tutsi 
interest, determined to seize power back for the Tutsi through force. In 
an early statement of CDR policy, Barayagwiza expressed the view that 
force could legitimately be used if  necessary to counter this aggression. In 
a communiqué issued in March 1993, the CDR called on the population to 
rise up and unseat the President and Prime Minister for their betrayal of 
the country by acceptance of the Arusha Accords, and in a communiqué 
issued in November 1993, following massacres it attributed to the RPF, the 
CDR called on the Hutu population to ‘neutralize by all means possible 
its enemies and their accomplices’, having defi ned the enemies as the Tutsi 
ethnic group.
22. The Chamber fi nds that the CDR was a Hutu party and party membership 
was not open to Rwandans of Tutsi ethnicity. This policy was explicitly 
communicated to members and the public by Barayagwiza and Ngeze. 
During the year 1994, and in particular, the period 6 April to 17 July 1994, 
Barayagwiza continued to exercise effective leadership over the CDR Party 
and its members. The killing of Tutsi was promoted by the CDR.
23. The CDR had a youth wing, called the Impuzamugambi, which became the 
CDR militia. The CDR members and Impuzamugambi were supervised 
by Barayagwiza and acted under his control in carrying out acts of 
killing and other acts of violence. Roadblocks were erected and manned 
by Impuzamugambi, for the purpose of  identifying and killing Tutsi 
civilians. Barayagwiza gave orders to the Impuzamugambi at roadblocks 
that Tutsi should not be allowed to pass and that they should kill them 
unless they had CDR or MRND cards. Barayagwiza supplied weapons 
to the Impuzamugambi which were used for purposes of killing Tutsi. The 
Impuzamugambi, together with the Interahamwe, killed large numbers of 
Tutsi civilians in Gisenyi Prefecture.
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RTLM
RTLM broadcasts
24. RTLM started broadcasting in July 1993. A number of witnesses testifi ed to 
the popularity of RTLM when it fi rst came on air, noting that people could 
be seen everywhere listening to RTLM. Its broadcasts were a common 
topic of conversation in homes, offi ces, cafes, and on the street. Almost 
everyone had a radio and listened to RTLM. After 6 April 1994, militia 
at the roadblocks listened to RTLM. Radios and weapons were the two 
key objects to be seen at the roadblocks, according to one witness.
25. Several hundred tapes of  RTLM broadcasts have been introduced in 
evidence, and various particular broadcasts have been discussed at trial. 
The Chamber has identifi ed several areas of inquiry in its review, looking 
in particular at broadcasts that raised the issue of ethnicity and broadcasts 
that called on the population to take action.
26. The Chamber fi nds that RTLM broadcasts engaged in ethnic stereotyping 
in a manner that promoted contempt and hatred for the Tutsi population. 
RTLM broadcasts called on listeners to seek out and take up arms against 
the enemy. The enemy was identifi ed as the RPF, the Inkotanyi, the Inyenzi,
and their accomplices, all of whom were effectively equated with the Tutsi 
ethnic group by the broadcasts. After 6 April 1994, the virulence and the 
intensity of RTLM broadcasts propagating ethnic hatred and calling for 
violence increased. These broadcasts called explicitly for the extermination 
of the Tutsi ethnic group.
27. Many RTLM broadcasts are excerpted in the judgement. In one such 
broadcast, aired on 4 June 1994, RTLM journalist Kantano Habimana 
told listeners:
They should all stand up so that we kill the Inkotanyi and exterminate 
them … the reason we will exterminate them is that they belong to one 
ethnic group. Look at the person’s height and his physical appearance. 
Just look at his small nose and then break it.
28. Both before and after 6 April 1994, RTLM broadcast the names of Tutsi 
individuals and their families, as well as Hutu political opponents. In some 
cases, these people were subsequently killed, and the Chamber fi nds that to 
varying degrees their deaths were causally linked to the broadcast of their 
names. RTLM also broadcast messages encouraging Tutsi civilians to come 
out of hiding and to return home or to go to the roadblocks, where they 
were subsequently killed in accordance with the direction of subsequent 
RTLM broadcasts tracking their movement.
29. Radio was the medium of mass communication with the broadest reach 
in Rwanda. The Chamber fi nds that RTLM broadcasts exploited the 
history of Tutsi privilege and Hutu disadvantage, and the fear of armed 
insurrection, to mobilize the population, whipping them into a frenzy of 
hatred and violence that was directed largely against the Tutsi ethnic group. 
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The Interahamwe and other militia listened to RTLM and acted on the 
information that was broadcast by RTLM. RTLM actively encouraged 
them to kill, relentlessly sending the message that the Tutsi were the enemy 
and had to be eliminated once and for all.
Ownership and control of RTLM
30. A number of Prosecution witnesses testifi ed as to the creation, ownership 
and management of RTLM, and the role of two of the Accused, Nahimana 
and Barayagwiza, in RTLM. The Chamber found the testimony of Georges 
Ruggiu, who testifi ed for the Prosecution, and Valerie Bemeriki, who testifi ed 
for the Defence, to be not credible, and it did not rely on the evidence of 
these two RTLM journalists. The Chamber fi nds that RTLM was owned 
largely by members of  the MRND party, with Juvénal Habyarimana, 
President of  the Republic, as the largest shareholder. CDR leadership 
was represented in the top management of RTLM through Barayagwiza 
as a founding member of the Steering Committee and Stanislas Simbizi, a 
member of the CDR Executive Committee who was added to the Steering 
Committee of RTLM in 1993.
31. The Chamber finds that Nahimana and Barayagwiza, through their 
respective roles on the Steering Committee of RTLM, which functioned as 
a board of directors, effectively controlled the management of RTLM from 
the time of its creation through and beyond 6 April 1994. Nahimana was, 
and was seen as, the founder and director of the company, and Barayagwiza 
was, and was seen as, his second in command. They represented RTLM 
externally in an offi cial capacity. Internally, they controlled the fi nancial 
operations of  the company and held supervisory responsibility for all 
activities of  RTLM, taking remedial action when they considered it 
necessary to do so. Nahimana also played an active role in determining 
the content of RTLM broadcasts, writing editorials and giving journalists 
texts to read.
32. The Chamber fi nds that after 6 April 1994, Nahimana and Barayagwiza 
continued to have de jure authority over RTLM. They expressed no concern 
regarding RTLM broadcasts, although they were aware that such concern 
existed and was expressed by others. Nahimana intervened in late June or 
early July 1994 to stop the broadcasting of attacks on General Dallaire 
and UNAMIR. The success of his intervention is an indicator of the de
facto control he had but failed to exercise after 6 April 1994.
Notice of violation
33. The Chamber considered evidence of  correspondence and meetings 
between the Ministry of Information and RTLM. The Chamber fi nds that 
concern over RTLM broadcasting was fi rst formally expressed in a letter to 
RTLM on 25 October 1993, from Minister Faustin Rucogoza. This concern 
grew, leading to a meeting on 26 November 1993 and another meeting on 
10 February, convened by the Minister and attended by Nahimana and 
Barayagwiza. At these meetings, Nahimana and Barayagwiza were put 
VERDICT: SUMMARY JUDGEMENT FROM THE MEDIA TRIAL 285
on notice of  the Ministry’s growing concern that RTLM was violating 
its agreement with the government by promoting ethnic division and 
opposition to the Arusha Accords, and that it was reporting news in a 
manner that did not meet the standards of  journalism. Nahimana and 
Barayagwiza both acknowledged that mistakes had been made by RTLM 
journalists. Various undertakings were made at the meetings, relating to 
the broadcasts of RTLM. At the meetings Nahimana was referred to as 
‘the Director’ of RTLM, and Barayagwiza was referred to as ‘a founding 
member’ of  RTLM and represented the management team. Following 
the second meeting between RTLM and the Ministry of Information on 
10 February 1994, RTLM broadcasts publicly derided the efforts of the 
Minister to raise these concerns and commented on his inability to stop 
RTLM. Nevertheless, the Minister pressed forward with a case against 
RTLM which he was preparing to bring to the Council of Ministers, shortly 
before he and his family were killed on 7 April 1994.
34. It is evident that concerns over RTLM broadcasting of ethnic hatred and 
false propaganda were clearly and repeatedly communicated to RTLM. 
RTLM was represented in discussions with the government over these 
concerns by its senior management, and Nahimana and Barayagwiza both 
participated in both meetings. Each acknowledged mistakes that had been 
made by journalists and undertook to correct them, and each also defended 
RTLM without any suggestion that they were not entirely responsible for 
its programming.
FERDINAND NAHIMANA
Rwanda: current problems and solutions
35. The Indictment alleges that in an essay he wrote entitled Rwanda: Current 
Problems and Solutions, published in February 1993 and recirculated with 
a letter in March 1994, Ferdinand Nahimana called on the population to 
fi nd a fi nal solution to the problem of Rwanda and incited the youth to 
organize self-defence groups to fi ght against the RPF. The essay called 
for the organization of civil defence, consisting of armed youth, to fi ght 
‘the enemy’, who were defi ned explicitly as the RPF and implicitly as 
‘the Tutsi league’, a veiled reference to the Tutsi population. In March 
1994, Nahimana re-circulated this essay amidst the ongoing initiative at 
that time to engage armed youth organizations such as the Interahamwe
in attacks against the Tutsi population as part of an effort to defeat the 
RPF. However, the essay stated that such initiative should be coordinated 
by government offi cials and the army. While the essay called for defeat of 
‘the enemy’, the Chamber does not fi nd that it, or the introductory letter 
to it, was a direct call for violence other than a civil defence initiative to 
be coordinated by the Rwandan army.
36. The Prosecution alleges that between January and July 1994, Ferdinand 
Nahimana organized meetings with the Interahamwe in Ruhengeri 
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Prefecture. Two such meetings are specifi cally alleged, one on 29 March 
1994 at which Nahimana is said to have given orders for the Interahamwe
to kill Tutsis from Nyarutovu commune, and one on 12 April 1994 at 
the communal offi ce in Gatonde, after which the killing of Tutsis is said 
to have started. The Prosecution relied entirely on the evidence of  one 
witness, Witness AEN, to support its allegations concerning the presence 
and participation of  Nahimana at these two meetings. The Chamber 
did not fi nd the testimony of  Witness AEN to be credible. Therefore, 
the Prosecution has not met its burden of  proof  with regard to these 
allegations.
37. A number of Prosecution witnesses testifi ed to discriminatory practices 
engaged in by Ferdinand Nahimana as a student against fellow Tutsi 
students, as a professor against his Tutsi students, in university admissions 
and faculty appointments, and as Director of ORINFOR against Tutsi 
employees. The Defence led a number of  witnesses to counter these 
allegations, which in some cases date back to the 1970s. The Chamber 
considers that these allegations are too remote to the criminal charges 
against Nahimana, and for this reason will not make factual fi ndings with 
regard to these allegations.
38. The Chamber fi nds that Ferdinand Nahimana, as Director of ORINFOR, 
ordered the broadcast on Radio Rwanda of the contents of a communiqué 
based on a fax from Nairobi, a false document stating that the PL, or 
Liberal Party, was the internal arm of  the RPF and was planning to 
assassinate Hutu leaders. This broadcast took place within a few days 
of  a PL meeting in Bugesera on 1 March 1992, resulting in the killing 
of  hundreds of  Tutsi civilians. It was broadcast four or fi ve times over 
the course of  3 and 4 March 1992. The editorial team had decided not 
to broadcast the communiqué because of  their inability to confi rm its 
authenticity. This decision was reversed by Nahimana, who by his own 
admission did not make an effort to ascertain the accuracy of the Radio 
Rwanda broadcast, which spread fear and provoked violence against the 
Tutsi population by Hutu who were falsely led to believe that they faced 
imminent attack.
Evaluation of Nahimana’s testimony
39. The Chamber has considered Nahimana’s testimony and fi nds certain 
patterns in his response to questioning. With great sophistry, Nahimana 
often pursued many lines of argument sequentially or even simultaneously 
in his testimony. Nahimana was not forthcoming in his testimony. While he 
was not entirely untruthful, in the view of the Chamber, he was evasive and 
manipulative, and there were many credibility gaps in his testimony. For 
this reason, the Chamber has been cautious in its evaluation of Nahimana’s 
testimony on particular matters of  fact, and does not generally accept 
Nahimana’s version of events.
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JEAN-BOSCO BARAYAGWIZA
40. A number of Prosecution witnesses testifi ed to Barayagwiza’s presence and 
participation in CDR meetings, demonstrations and roadblock activities. 
The Chamber fi nds that Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza convened CDR meetings 
and spoke at these meetings, ordering the separation of Hutu and Tutsi 
present at a meeting in Mutura commune in 1991, and asking Bagogwe 
Tutsi to do the Ikinyemera, their traditional dance, at this meeting and at 
another meeting in Mutura commune in 1993, publicly humiliating and 
intimidating them and threatening to kill them. Barayagwiza supervised 
roadblocks manned by the Impuzamugambi, established to stop and kill 
Tutsi. He was present at and participated in demonstrations where CDR 
demonstrators armed with cudgels chanted ‘Tubatsembatsembe’ or ‘let’s 
exterminate them’, and the reference to ‘them’ was understood to mean 
the Tutsi.
41. The Chamber finds, based on the testimony of  Witness AHB, that 
Barayagwiza came to Gisenyi in April 1994, one week after the shooting 
of the plane on 6 April, with a truckload of weapons, including fi rearms 
and machetes, for distribution to the local population to be used to kill 
Tutsi civilians. Outreach to three cellules was coordinated in advance, to 
recruit attackers from among the residents of these cellules and bring them 
together to collect the weapons. That same day at least 30 Tutsi civilians 
were killed, including children and older people, with the weapons brought 
by Barayagwiza.
42. Omar Serushago testifi ed that Barayagwiza raised funds for the purchase 
of  weapons. The Chamber decided to consider the evidence of  Omar 
Serushago with caution and require that his testimony be corroborated. 
This evidence was not corroborated and is not alone enough to sustain a 




43. The Chamber has reviewed the Radio Rwanda and RTLM broadcasts 
that were introduced by the Prosecution to establish that Hassan Ngeze 
called for the extermination of the Tutsi and Hutu political opponents, 
and that he defended the extremist Hutu ideology of  the CDR. The 
Chamber considers that through these broadcasts, Ngeze was trying to 
send a message, or several messages, to those at the roadblocks. One clear 
message was: do not kill the wrong people, meaning innocent Hutu who 
might be mistaken for Tutsi because they had Tutsi features, or because 
they did not have identifi cation, or because they had identifi cation marked 
‘RPF’. This is not the same as saying that the Tutsi is not the enemy and 
should not be killed. In the broadcasts, Ngeze did not tell those at the 
roadblocks not to kill the Tutsi. The message was to be careful and bring 
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suspects to the authorities, as much to ensure that the enemy does not 
mistakenly get through the roadblock as to ensure that the wrong people, 
meaning innocent Hutu, are not killed. In his testimony, Ngeze provided 
many explanations for what he said, describing various scenarios, including 
one to suggest he was trying to trick those at the roadblock into letting him 
pass with Tutsi refugees carrying false Hutu identity cards. Nevertheless, 
in the Chamber’s view, Ngeze also made it clear in his testimony that his 
message was not to kill Hutu by mistake.
44. The Chamber recognizes that in telling those at the roadblock not to kill 
Hutu by mistake, Ngeze was also sending a message that there was no 
problem with the killing of Tutsi at the roadblock. Such message, however, 
was implicit in the broadcasts, which repeatedly urged that suspects not 
be killed but rather be brought to the authorities. In these convoluted 
circumstances, the Chamber is unable to find that these broadcasts 
constituted a call to kill that would be clearly understood as such.
The killing of Modeste Tabaro
45. The Indictment alleges that on 21 April 1994 in Gisenyi town, Hassan 
Ngeze ordered the Interahawme to kill Modeste Tabaro, a Tutsi and a 
member of an opposition political party. Of the four Prosecution witnesses 
who gave evidence on this killing, only two testifi ed to having witnessed 
the killing of Modeste Tabaro. While the testimony of these two witnesses 
is not necessarily inconsistent, the two witnesses presented two different 
accounts of the killing that do not corroborate each other. This evidence 
is insuffi cient, in the Chamber’s view, to support a fi nding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Ngeze ordered the shooting of  Tabaro. Because 
the Prosecution has not met its burden of proof, the Chamber need not 
examine inconsistencies among or make a fi nding on the credibility of the 
Defence witnesses in respect of the allegation that Hassan Ngeze ordered 
the killing of Modeste Tabaro.
Distribution of weapons, demonstrations, roadblocks and killings in Gisenyi and at the 
Commune Rouge
46. A number of  witnesses gave evidence on Hassan Ngeze’s role in the 
distribution of weapons, at demonstrations and at roadblocks in Gisenyi, 
and on his role in killings in Gisenyi and at the Commune Rouge, a cemetery 
in Gisenyi.
47. Witness AHI testifi ed that Ngeze took part in the distribution of weapons 
on the evening of  8 April 1994. Witness AFX saw at least fi fty guns in 
Ngeze’s house, which Ngeze himself  showed the witness. Omar Serushago 
testifi ed that he saw Ngeze on the morning of 7 April transporting weapons, 
including guns, grenades and machetes. He saw him again between 13 and 
20 April in the same vehicle, parked and containing guns, grenades and 
machetes. The Chamber accepts the evidence of  Witness AHI, Witness 
AFX, and Serushago that Ngeze stored and distributed weapons, and 
played a role in securing weapons for the Impuzamugambi.
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48. A number of Prosecution witnesses saw Ngeze dressed in military attire 
and carrying a gun. A number of Defence witnesses testifi ed that he wore 
Muslim or civilian attire, not military attire, and that he did not carry a gun. 
The Chamber accepts the evidence of the Defence witnesses that they saw 
Ngeze in Muslim or civilian attire, unarmed. This does not preclude the 
possibility that there were other occasions on which he dressed in military 
attire and was armed.
49. Witness AHI testifi ed that Ngeze set up and monitored roadblocks and 
gave instructions to others at the roadblocks: to stop and search vehicles, 
to check identity cards, and to ‘set aside’ persons of Tutsi ethnicity. These 
Tutsi were transported to and killed at the Commune Rouge. The Chamber 
fi nds that Ngeze played an active and supervisory role in the identifi cation 
and targeting of Tutsi at roadblocks, who were subsequently killed at the 
Commune Rouge.
50. Many Prosecution witnesses testifi ed that they saw Ngeze in Gisenyi in a 
vehicle with a megaphone, calling or leading CDR members to meetings, 
and transporting Imuzamugambi to demonstrations, where Tuzatsembat-
sembe, or ‘let’s exterminate them’, was chanted. Witness AEU heard Ngeze 
say through the megaphone that he was going to kill and exterminate 
the Inyenzi, meaning the Tutsi. A number of Defence witnesses testifi ed 
that Ngeze did not have, or could not have had, a megaphone in his 
vehicle, although several did mention other people named Hassan who 
had megaphones and might have been confused with Ngeze. Again the 
Chamber notes that this evidence does not preclude the possibility that 
Prosecution witnesses did see Ngeze with a megaphone. The testimony 
of  the Prosecution witnesses indicates that Ngeze frequently used a 
megaphone in conjunction with his vehicle to drive around and mobilize 
CDR members and others against the Inyenzi, who were understood to 
be the Tutsi.
51. The Chamber fi nds that Ngeze helped secure and distribute, stored, and 
transported weapons to be used against the Tutsi population. He set up, 
manned and supervised roadblocks in Gisenyi in 1994 that identifi ed 
targeted Tutsi civilians who were subsequently taken to and killed at the 
Commune Rouge. Ngeze often drove around with a megaphone in his 
vehicle, mobilizing the population to come to CDR meetings and spreading 
the message that the Inyenzi would be exterminated, Inyenzi meaning, and 
being understood to mean, the Tutsi ethnic minority. At Martin Bucyana’s 
funeral in February 1994, Ngeze said that if  President Habyarimana were 
to die, the Tutsi would not be spared.
52. Witness EB gave a detailed account of an attack on 7 April against the Tutsi 
population in Gisenyi by the Interahamwe, an attack in which he and his 
family were targeted as victims. He heard Ngeze tell Interahamwe through 
his megaphone to kill Tutsi and said that some of the Interahamwe should 
go to the Commune Rouge to dig holes. Witness EB said they were then 
attacked. The attackers killed his younger brother and took his body to 
the side of the road, where the bodies were placed before being taken to 
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the Commune Rouge. He saw the body of his younger sister, and he saw 
two women, one of whom was Hassan Ngeze’s mother, thrusting the metal 
rods from an umbrella in between his sister’s thighs. She was pregnant at 
the time of her death. There were many bodies, which were loaded on a 
vehicle and taken to the Commune Rouge for burial.
53. Witness EB testifi ed that two hours later, the attackers returned and 
looted his parents’ home. The attackers returned again at 6 p.m., and 
found Witness EB’s mother there. They hit her on the forehead with a 
nail-studded club. The Interahamwe then threw a grenade into the house, 
and Witness EB was seriously wounded.
54. The Chamber considered Ngeze’s defence of alibi for 7 April 1994, based 
on his evidence and the evidence of Defence witnesses. This evidence is 
riddled with inconsistencies, in light of which the Chamber fi nds that the 
defence of alibi is not credible.
55. The Chamber fi nds that Hassan Ngeze ordered the Interahamwe in Gisenyi 
on the morning of 7 April 1994 to kill Tutsi civilians and prepare for their 
burial at the Commune Rouge. Many were killed in the subsequent attacks 
that happened immediately thereafter and later on the same day. The attack 
that resulted in these and other killings was planned systematically, with 
weapons distributed in advance, and arrangements made for the transport 
and burial of those to be killed.
56. Omar Serushago testifi ed to another scene of slaughter a week later, some 
time between 13 and 20 April at the Commune Rouge. Serushago said he 
saw Ngeze shoot a Tutsi man after asking why the man had been kept 
waiting and not killed immediately. The shooting was to be an example for 
others of how to kill. There is no corroboration of Serushago’s testimony, 
and the Chamber cannot rely solely on his testimony to substantiate this 
charge against Ngeze.
57. Hassan Ngeze challenged many of the Prosecution witnesses on the grounds 
that they were members of or affi liated with the organization Ibuka. The 
Chamber fi nds that although several Prosecution witnesses who testifi ed 
are members of Ibuka or otherwise have links with the organization, none 
of these witnesses was infl uenced in their testimony by Ibuka, which is a 
non-governmental organization assisting survivors of both Hutu and Tutsi 
ethnicity in the aftermath of the killings that took place in 1994.
Evaluation of Hassan Ngeze’s testimony
58. In addressing the charges against him, Ngeze evidenced little awareness 
of the lack of consistency in his testimony, often altering or contradicting 
what he had said within minutes of  saying it. Ngeze wavered back and 
forth in his testimony on fundamental issues, as well as virtually every 
detail of his evidence. Ngeze repeatedly and insistently denied the obvious 
in his testimony. Ngeze uses, distorts and fabricates information freely, 
marshalling it for other ends. In his testimony, as well as his other conduct 
during the proceedings, Ngeze demonstrated a thorough disregard for the 
truth, and for the solemnity of his declaration to testify truthfully.
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INTERACTIONS AMONG THE ACCUSED
59. Several witnesses testifi ed to having seen various of the Accused together at 
meetings. Witness AHA, who worked for Kangura, accompanied Ngeze to 
meetings with Barayagwiza in his offi ce and his house, where Barayagwiza 
and Ngeze discussed the CDR, Kangura and RTLM all in the context of 
the Hutu struggle against the Tutsi. Nahimana and Barayagwiza worked 
very closely together in the management of  RTLM. Barayagwiza and 
Ngeze worked very closely together in the CDR. The Chamber notes that 
Nahimana and Ngeze were not seen together as much as they were each 
seen with Barayagwiza. Nevertheless, as evidenced by the conversation 
between Ngeze and Barayagwiza, an institutional link among them all 
was perceived. At a personal level, the point of connection for the three 
Accused was Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza.
60. The Prosecution introduced evidence of meetings that took place at the 
Hotel des Milles Collines and Hotel Diplomat, one meeting between 
Barayagwiza and Nahimana and another at which Barayagwiza was 
present. Witness WD, a waiter who worked at these hotels, testifi ed to 
comments made by the two Accused that he overheard as he was serving 
them. The Chamber fi nds the testimony of Witness WD to be not credible. 
As he was the sole witness to the conversations about which he testifi ed, 
the Chamber fi nds that the Prosecution did not sustain its burden of proof 
with regard to these allegations.
61. The Chamber fi nds that Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze participated 
in an MRND meeting in 1993 at Nyamirambo Stadium in Kigali. The 
meeting was attended by about 15,000 people, including Interahamwe and 
Impuzamugambi, who were transported to the meeting by ONATRACOM 
government-run buses. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze were introduced, 
RTLM and Kangura journalists. The President of MRND, Ngirumpatse, 
spoke first and referred to RTLM as a radio they had acquired. He 
urged the crowd to listen to RTLM rather than Radio Rwanda, which 
he referred to as an Inyenzi radio. Nahimana addressed the meeting and 
said RTLM should be used to disseminate their ideas relating to Hutu 
empowerment, and he requested that people support RTLM with fi nancial 
contributions. Barayagwiza spoke about collaboration with the CDR and 
working together to fi ght the Inyenzi. He also spoke of using RTLM to 
fi ght against the Inyenzi. He said the Inyenzi were not far, and were even 
there among them. RTLM reported on the meeting and broadcast many 
of the speeches, including Nahimana’s.
62. The Chamber considered the interactions among CDR, RTLM and 
Kangura, three institutions controlled by the Accused. The Chamber 
fi nds that Kangura supported the CDR, claiming the party as its own, 
publishing a special issue on the occasion of its creation, with a membership 
application form, and urging its readers to join the party. In Kangura,
Hassan Ngeze publicly acknowledged his formal role as an advisor to 
the CDR, and through editorials, photographs, and the publication of 
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letters and communiqués, Kangura endorsed and actively promoted the 
CDR. Kangura and RTLM functioned as partners in a Hutu coalition, 
of which CDR was also a part. Kangura and RTLM presented a common 
media front, publicly interacting and promoting each other through 
articles, broadcasts, and the joint initiative represented by the Kangura
competition in March 1994. Kangura portrayed all three of the Accused 
in a common undertaking relating to RTLM. The purpose of the coalition 
was to mobilize the Hutu population against the Tutsi ethnic minority.
III. LEGAL FINDINGS
GENOCIDE
The Accused are charged with genocide.
Acts of RTLM
63. The Chamber has found that RTLM broadcasts engaged in ethnic 
stereotyping in a manner that promoted contempt and hatred for the Tutsi 
population and called on listeners to seek out and take up arms against 
the enemy. The enemy was defi ned to be the Tutsi ethnic group and Hutu 
opponents. These broadcasts called explicitly for the extermination of the 
Tutsi ethnic group. In 1994, both before and after 6 April, RTLM broadcast 
the names of Tutsi individuals and their families, as well as Hutu political 
opponents who supported the Tutsi ethnic group. In some cases these 
persons were subsequently killed. A specifi c causal connection between the 
RTLM broadcasts and the killing of these individuals – either by publicly 
naming them or by manipulating their movements and directing that they, 
as a group, be killed – has been established.
Acts of Kangura
64. The Chamber has found that articles and editorials in Kangura, such as 
The Appeal to the Conscience of the Hutu, conveyed contempt and hatred 
for the Tutsi ethnic group, and for Tutsi women in particular as enemy 
agents, and called on readers to take all necessary measures to stop the 
enemy, defi ned to be the Tutsi population. The cover of Kangura No. 26 
promoted violence by conveying the message that the machete should 
be used to eliminate the Tutsi, once and for all. This was a call for the 
destruction of the Tutsi ethnic group as such. Through fear-mongering 
and hate propaganda, Kangura paved the way for genocide in Rwanda, 
whipping the Hutu population into a killing frenzy.
65. The nature of  media is such that causation of killing and other acts of 
genocide will necessarily be effected by an immediately proximate cause 
in addition to the communication itself. In the Chamber’s view, this does 
not diminish the causation to be attributed to the media, or the criminal 
accountability of those responsible for the communication.
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Acts of CDR
66. The Hutu Power movement, spearheaded by CDR, created a political 
framework for the killing of  Tutsi and Hutu political opponents. The 
CDR and its youth wing, the Impuzamugambi, convened meetings and 
demonstrations, established roadblocks, distributed weapons, and system-
atically organized and carried out the killing of Tutsi civilians. As well as 
orchestrating particular acts of killing, the CDR promoted a Hutu mindset 
in which ethnic hatred was normalized as a political ideology. The division 
of Hutu and Tutsi entrenched fear and suspicion of the Tutsi and fabricated 
the perception that the Tutsi population had to be destroyed in order to 
safeguard the political gains that had been made by the Hutu majority.
67. The Defence contends that the downing of the President’s plane and the 
death of Habyarimana precipitated the killing of innocent Tutsi civilians. 
The Chamber accepts that this moment in time served as a trigger for the 
events that followed. That is evident. But if  the downing of the plane was 
the trigger, then RTLM, Kangura and CDR were the bullets in the gun. 
The trigger had such a deadly impact because the gun was loaded. The 
Chamber therefore considers the killing of Tutsi civilians and Hutu political 
opponents can be said to have resulted, at least in part, from the message 
of ethnic targeting for death that was clearly and effectively disseminated 
through RTLM, Kangura and CDR, before and after 6 April 1994.
Acts of Barayagwiza
Barayagwiza distributed a truckload of weapons to the local population, which 
were used to kill individuals of Tutsi ethnicity. At least 30 Tutsi civilians were 
killed, including children and older people. Barayagwiza played a leadership 
role in the distribution of these weapons, which formed part of a predefi ned 
and structured plan to kill Tutsi civilians. From Barayagwiza’s critical role in 
this plan, orchestrating the delivery of the weapons to be used for destruction, 
the Chamber fi nds that Barayagwiza was involved in planning these acts.
Acts of Ngeze
68. Hassan Ngeze on the morning of 7 April 1994 ordered the Interahamwe in 
Gisenyi to kill Tutsi civilians and prepare for their burial at the Commune 
Rouge. Many were killed in the attacks that happened immediately 
thereafter and later on the same day. Ngeze helped secure and distribute, 
stored, and transported weapons to be used against the Tutsi population. 
He set up, manned and supervised roadblocks in Gisenyi in 1994 that 
identifi ed targeted Tutsi civilians who were subsequently taken to and 
killed at the Commune Rouge. Ngeze often drove around with a megaphone 
in his vehicle, mobilizing the population to come to CDR meetings and 
spreading the message that the Inyenzi would be exterminated, Inyenzi
meaning, and being understood to mean, the Tutsi ethnic minority. In this 
manner, Ngeze instigated the killing of Tutsi civilians.
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Genocidal intent
69. In ascertaining the intent of  the Accused, the Chamber has considered 
their individual statements and acts, as well as the message they conveyed 
through the media they controlled. On 15 May 1994, the Editor-in-Chief 
of RTLM, Gaspard Gahigi, told listeners:
… they say the Tutsi are being exterminated, they are being decimated 
by the Hutu, and other things. I would like to tell you, dear listeners of 
RTLM, that the war we are waging is actually between these two ethnic 
groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi.
70. Even before 6 April 1994, RTLM was equating the Tutsi with the enemy, 
as evidenced by its broadcast of 6 January 1994, with Kantano Habimana 
asking, ‘Why should I hate the Tutsi? Why should I hate the Inkotanyi?’
71. With regard to Kangura, in perhaps its most graphic expression of 
genocidal intent, the cover of Kangura No. 26 answered the question ‘What 
Weapons Shall We Use To Conquer The Inyenzi Once And For All?’ with 
the depiction of a machete. That the Tutsi ethnic group was the target of 
the machete was clear.
72. The newspaper and the radio explicitly and repeatedly, in fact relentlessly, 
targeted the Tutsi population for destruction. Demonizing the Tutsi as 
having inherently evil qualities, equating the ethnic group with ‘the enemy’ 
and portraying its women as seductive enemy agents, the media called for 
the extermination of the Tutsi ethnic group as a response to the political 
threat that they associated with Tutsi ethnicity.
73. The genocidal intent in the activities of the CDR was expressed through 
the phrase ‘tubatsembasembe’ or ‘let’s exterminate them’, a slogan chanted 
repeatedly at CDR rallies and demonstrations. At a policy level, CDR 
communiqués called on the Hutu population to ‘neutralize by all means 
possible’ the enemy, defi ned to be the Tutsi ethnic group.
74. The editorial policies evidenced by the writings of  Kangura and the 
broadcasts of  RTLM, and the organizational policy evidenced by the 
activity of CDR, constitute, in the Chamber’s view, conclusive evidence 
of genocidal intent. Individually, each of the Accused made statements 
that further evidence this intent.
75. Ferdinand Nahimana, in a Radio Rwanda broadcast on 25 April 1994, 
said he was happy that RTLM had been instrumental in awakening the 
majority people, meaning the Hutu population, and that the population 
had stood up with a view to halting the enemy. Nahimana associated 
the enemy with the Tutsi ethnic group. As the mastermind of  RTLM, 
Nahimana set in motion the communications weaponry that fought the 
‘war of media, words, newspapers and radio stations’ he described in his 
Radio Rwanda broadcast of 25 April as a complement to bullets.
76. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza himself said in public meetings, ‘let’s exterminate 
them’ with ‘them’ being understood by those who heard it as a reference 
to the Tutsi population. After separating the Tutsi from the Hutu and 
VERDICT: SUMMARY JUDGEMENT FROM THE MEDIA TRIAL 295
humiliating the Tutsi by forcing them to perform the Ikinyemera, a 
traditional dance, at several public meetings, Barayagwiza threatened to 
kill them and said it would not be diffi cult. From his words and deeds, 
Barayagwiza’s ruthless commitment to the destruction of  the Tutsi 
population as a means by which to protect the political gains secured by 
the Hutu majority from 1959 is evident.
77. Hassan Ngeze wrote many articles and editorials, and made many statements 
that openly evidence his genocidal intent. In one such article he stated that 
the Tutsi ‘no longer conceal the fact that this war pits the Hutus against 
the Tutsis.’ His radio broadcast of 12 June 1994 called on listeners not to 
mistakenly kill Hutu rather than Tutsi. Crass references to the physical and 
personal traits of Tutsi ethnicity permeate Kangura and his own writings 
in Kangura. Ngeze harped on the broad nose of the Hutu as contrasted 
with the aquiline nose of the Tutsi, and he incessantly described the Tutsi 
as evil. His role in saving Tutsi individuals whom he knew does not, in 
the Chamber’s view, negate his intent to destroy the ethnic group as such. 
Witness LAG heard him say, ‘[I]f  Habyarimana were also to die, we would 
not be able to spare the Tutsi’. Witness AEU heard Ngeze on a megaphone, 
saying that he was going to kill and exterminate all the Inyenzi, by which 
he meant the Tutsi, and Ngeze himself  ordered an attack on Tutsi civilians 
in Gisenyi, evidencing his intent to destroy the Tutsi population.
78. Based on this evidence, the Chamber fi nds that Ferdinand Nahimana, 
Jean Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze acted with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, the Tutsi ethnic group. The identifi cation of  Tutsi 
individuals as enemies of  the state associated with political opposition, 
simply by virtue of  their Tutsi ethnicity, underscores the fact that their 
membership in the ethnic group, as such, was the sole basis on which they 
were targeted.
Individual criminal responsibility
79. The Chamber has considered the individual criminal responsibility of 
Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza for RTLM broadcasts, 
by virtue of their respective roles in the creation and control of RTLM. 
Nahimana and Barayagwiza were, respectively, ‘number one’ and ‘number 
two’ in the top management of the radio. They represented the radio at the 
highest level in meetings with the Ministry of Information; they controlled 
the fi nances of the company; and they were both members of the Steering 
Committee, which functioned in effect as a board of directors for RTLM. 
Nahimana chaired the Program Committee of this board, and Barayagwiza 
chaired its Legal Committee.
80. While recognizing that Nahimana and Barayagwiza did not make decisions 
in the fi rst instance with regard to each particular broadcast of RTLM, these 
decisions refl ected an editorial policy for which they were responsible. The 
broadcasts collectively conveyed a message of ethnic hatred and a call for 
violence against the Tutsi population. This message was heard around the 
world. ‘Stop that radio’ was the cry Alison Des Forges heard from Rwanda 
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during the killings, and it was the cry conveyed to the United Nations by 
Reporters Without Borders in May 1994. As board members responsible 
for RTLM, including its programming, Nahimana and Barayagwiza were 
responsible for this message. Both Barayagwiza and Nahimana knew that 
RTLM programming was generating concern, even before 6 April 1994. 
Yet RTLM programming followed its trajectory, steadily increasing in 
vehemence and reaching a pitched frenzy after 6 April. Nahimana and 
Barayagwiza knew that the hate being spewed by these programmes was 
of  concern and failed to take effective measures to stop their evolution 
into the deadly weapon of war and genocide that was unleashed in full 
force after 6 April 1994.
81. After 6 April 1994, although the evidence does not establish the same level 
of active support, it is nevertheless clear that Nahimana and Barayagwiza 
knew what was happening at RTLM and failed to exercise the authority 
vested in them as offi ce-holding members of the governing body of RTLM, 
to prevent the genocidal harm that was caused by RTLM programming. 
That they had the de facto authority to prevent this harm is evidenced by 
the one documented and successful intervention of  Nahimana to stop 
RTLM attacks on UNAMIR and General Dallaire. The Chamber notes 
that Nahimana has not been charged for genocide pursuant to Article 6(3) 
of its Statute. For his active engagement in the management of RTLM prior 
to 6 April, and his failure to take necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent the acts of genocide caused by RTLM that occurred after 6 April, 
the Chamber fi nds Barayagwiza guilty of genocide pursuant to Article 6(3) 
of its Statute.
82. The Chamber notes Nahimana’s particular role as the founder and principal 
ideologist of RTLM. RTLM was his initiative and his design, which grew 
out of his experience as Director of ORINFOR and his understanding of 
the power of the media. Although Nahimana disclaimed responsibility for 
RTLM broadcasting after 6 April, the Chamber considers this disclaimer 
too facile. Nahimana’s interview on Radio Rwanda, in which he said he 
was very happy with RTLM’s instrumental role in awakening the Hutu 
population, took place while the genocide was underway; the massacre of 
the Tutsi population was ongoing. Nahimana may have been less actively 
involved in the daily affairs of RTLM after 6 April 1994, but RTLM did 
not deviate from the course he had set for it before 6 April 1994. The 
programming of  RTLM after 6 April built on the foundations created 
for it before 6 April. RTLM was Nahimana’s weapon of choice, which he 
used to instigate the acts of genocide that occurred. For this reason the 
Chamber fi nds Nahimana guilty of genocide pursuant to Article 6(1) of 
its statute.
83. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was one of  the principal founders of  CDR 
and played a leading role in its formation and development. He was a 
decision-maker for the party. The killing of Tutsi civilians was promoted 
by Barayagwiza himself  and by CDR members in his presence at public 
meetings and demonstrations. Barayagwiza supervised roadblocks manned 
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by the Impuzamugambi, established to stop and kill Tutsi. Barayagwiza 
was at the organizational helm of  CDR. He was also on site at the 
meetings, demonstrations and roadblocks that created an infrastructure 
for the killing of Tutsi civilians. For this reason, the Chamber fi nds him 
guilty of instigating acts of genocide committed by CDR members and 
Impuzamugambi, pursuant to Article 6(1) of its Statute. For his individual 
acts in planning the killing of Tutsi civilians, the Chamber fi nds him guilty 
of genocide, pursuant to Article 6(1) of its Statute.
84. The Chamber further fi nds that Barayagwiza had superior responsibility 
over members of the CDR and its militia, the Impuzamugambi, as President 
of CDR at Gisenyi Prefecture and from February 1994 as President of CDR 
at the national level. He promoted the policy of CDR for the extermination 
of the Tutsi population and supervised his subordinates, the CDR members 
and Impuzamugambi militia, in carrying out killings and other violent 
acts. For his active engagement in CDR, and his failure to take necessary 
and reasonable measures to prevent the acts of genocide caused by CDR 
members, the Chamber fi nds Barayagwiza guilty of genocide pursuant to 
Article 6(3) of its Statute.
85. The Chamber finds Hassan Ngeze, as founder, owner and editor of 
Kangura, a publication that instigated the killing of Tutsi civilians, as well 
as for his acts of ordering, inciting and aiding and abetting the killing of 
Tutsi civilians, guilty of genocide, pursuant to Article 6(1) of its Statute.
DIRECT AND PUBLIC INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE
86. The Chamber examined the central principles that emerge from the 
international jurisprudence on incitement to discrimination and violence 
that serve as a useful guide to the factors to be considered in defi ning elements 
of ‘direct and public incitement to genocide’ as applied to mass media.
87. Editors and publishers have generally been held responsible for the media 
they control. In determining the scope of this responsibility, the importance 
of intent, that is the purpose of the communications they channel, emerges 
from the jurisprudence. The actual language used in the media has often 
been cited as an indicator of  intent. Critical distance is a key factor in 
evaluating the purpose of the publication.
88. The jurisprudence on incitement also highlights the importance of taking 
context into account when considering the potential impact of expression. 
Other factors relating to context that emerge from the jurisprudence, 
particularly that of  the European Court of  Human Rights, include the 
importance of protecting political expression, particularly the expression 
of opposition views and criticism of the government.
89. In considering whether particular expression constitutes a form of 
incitement on which restrictions would be justifi ed, the international 
jurisprudence does not include any specifi c causation requirement linking 
the expression at issue with the demonstration of  a direct effect. In the 
well-known Nuremburg case of Julius Streicher, there was no allegation 
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that Streicher’s publication Der Stürmer was tied to any particular violence. 
Much more generally, it was found to have ‘injected into the minds of 
thousands of Germans’ a ‘poison’ that caused them to support the National 
Socialist policy of Jewish persecution and extermination.
90. Counsel for Ngeze has argued that United States law, as the most speech-
protective, should be used as a standard, to ensure the universal acceptance 
and legitimacy of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence. The Chamber considers 
international law, which has been well developed in the areas of freedom 
from discrimination and freedom of expression, to be the point of reference 
for its consideration of  these issues, noting that domestic law varies 
widely while international law codifi es evolving universal standards. The 
Chamber notes that the jurisprudence of the United States also accepts the 
fundamental principles set forth in international law and has recognized in 
its domestic law that incitement to violence, threats, libel, false advertising, 
obscenity, and child pornography are among those forms of expression 
that fall outside the scope of freedom of speech protection.
Charges against the accused
91. The Accused are charged with direct and public incitement to genocide.
92. The crime of  incitement is an inchoate offence that continues in time 
until the completion of the acts contemplated. The Chamber accordingly 
considers that the publication of Kangura, from its fi rst issue in May 1990 
through its March 1994 issue, the alleged impact of  which culminated 
in events that took place in 1994, falls within the temporal jurisdiction 
of  the Tribunal. Similarly, the Chamber considers that the entirety of 
RTLM broadcasting, from July 1993 through July 1994, the alleged impact 
of  which culminated in events that took place in 1994, falls within the 
temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
93. In its review of Kangura and RTLM, the Chamber notes that some of the 
articles and broadcasts highlighted by the Prosecution convey historical 
information, political analysis, or advocacy of  an ethnic consciousness 
regarding the inequitable distribution of privilege in Rwanda. Barayagwiza’s 
RTLM broadcast of 12 December 1993, for example, is a moving personal 
account of  his experience of  discrimination as a Hutu. The Chamber 
considers that it is critical to distinguish between the discussion of ethnic 
consciousness and the promotion of  ethnic hatred. This broadcast by 
Barayagwiza is the former but not the latter. A communication such as this 
broadcast does not constitute incitement. In fact, it falls squarely within 
the scope of speech that is protected by the right to freedom of expression. 
Similarly, public discussion of the merits of the Arusha Accords, however 
critical, constitutes a legitimate exercise of free speech.
94. The Chamber considers that speech constituting ethnic hatred results from 
the stereotyping of ethnicity combined with its denigration. In the Chamber’s 
view, the accuracy of a generalization is only one factor to be considered 
in the determination of  whether it is intended to provoke rather than to 
educate those who receive it. The tone of the statement is as relevant to this 
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determination as is its content. The Chamber also considers the context in 
which the statement is made to be important. A statement of ethnic general-
ization provoking resentment against members of that ethnicity would have 
a heightened impact in the context of a genocidal environment. It would be 
more likely to lead to violence. At the same time the environment would be 
an indicator that incitement to violence was the intent of the statement.
95. The Accused have cited in their defence the need for vigilance against the 
enemy, the enemy being armed and dangerous RPF forces who attacked the 
Hutu population and were fi ghting to destroy democracy and reconquer 
power in Rwanda. The Chamber accepts that the media has a role to play 
in the protection of democracy and if  necessary the mobilization of civil 
defence for the protection of the nation and its people. What distinguishes 
both Kangura and RTLM from an initiative to this end is the consistent 
identifi cation made by the publication and the radio broadcasts of  the 
enemy as the Tutsi population. Readers and listeners were not directed 
against individuals who were clearly defi ned to be armed and dangerous. 
Instead, Tutsi civilians and in fact the Tutsi population as a whole were 
targeted as the threat.
96. Both Kangura and RTLM, as well as CDR in its communiqués, named 
and listed individuals suspected of  being RPF or RPF accomplices. In 
their defence, the Accused stated that these individuals were, at least in 
some cases, RPF members. The Chamber accepts that the publication of 
offi cial information is a legitimate function of the media. Not all lists and 
names published or broadcast were associated with such sources, however. 
To the contrary, the evidence reviewed by the Chamber indicates a pattern 
of naming people on vague suspicion, without articulated grounds, or in 
those cases where the grounds were articulated they were highly speculative 
or in some cases entirely unfounded. In these cases, the only common 
element is the Tutsi ethnicity of the persons named, and the evidence in 
some cases clearly indicates that their ethnicity was in fact the reason they 
were named.
97. Also, the names published and broadcast were generally done so in the 
context of a message, that was at times more or less explicit. An offi cial list 
of 123 names of suspects was published in Kangura No. 40 with an express 
warning to readers that the government was not effectively protecting them 
from these people and that they needed to organize their own self-defence 
to prevent their own extermination. This message classically illustrates 
the incitement of Kangura readers to violence: by instilling fear in them, 
giving them names to associate with this fear, and mobilizing them to take 
independent measures to protect themselves. In some instances, names were 
mentioned by Kangura without such an explicit call to action. The message 
was nevertheless direct. That it was clearly understood is overwhelmingly 
evidenced by the testimony of  witnesses that being named in Kangura
would bring dire consequences. Similarly, RTLM broadcast a message of 
fear, provided listeners with names, and encouraged them to defend and 
protect themselves, incessantly telling them to ‘be vigilant’.
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 98. With regard to causation, the Chamber recalls that incitement is a crime 
regardless of whether it has the effect it intends to have. In determining 
whether communications represent a risk of causing genocide and thereby 
constitute incitement, the Chamber considers it signifi cant that in fact 
genocide occurred. One witness described what RTLM did as ‘to spread 
petrol throughout the country little by little, so that one day it would be 
able to set fi re to the whole country’.
RTLM
 99. RTLM broadcasting was a drumbeat, calling on listeners to take action 
against the enemy and enemy accomplices, equated with the Tutsi 
population. The phrase ‘heating up heads’ captures the process of 
incitement systematically engaged in by RTLM, which after 6 April 1994 
was also known as ‘Radio Machete’. The nature of radio transmission 
made RTLM particularly dangerous and harmful, as did the breadth of 
its reach. Unlike print media, radio is immediately present and active. The 
power of the human voice, heard by the Chamber when the broadcast 
tapes were played in Kinyarwanda, adds a quality and dimension beyond 
language to the message conveyed. Radio heightened the sense of fear, 
the sense of danger and the sense of urgency giving rise to the need for 
action by listeners. The denigration of Tutsi ethnicity was augmented by 
the visceral scorn coming out of the airwaves – the ridiculing laugh and 
the nasty sneer. These elements greatly amplifi ed the impact of RTLM 
broadcasts.
100. The Chamber has found that Ferdinand Nahimana acted with genocidal 
intent. It has found him responsible for RTLM programming pursuant 
to Article 6(1) and established a basis for his responsibility under Article 
6(3) of the Statute. Accordingly, the Chamber fi nds Ferdinand Nahimana 
guilty of direct and public incitement to genocide, pursuant to Article 
6(1) and Article 6(3) of the Statute.
101. The Chamber has found that Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza acted with genocidal 
intent. It has found Barayagwiza responsible for RTLM programming 
pursuant to Article 6(3) of  the Statute of  the Tribunal. Accordingly, 
the Chamber fi nds Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza guilty of direct and public 
incitement to genocide, pursuant to Article 6(3) of its Statute.
CDR
102. The killing of  Tutsi civilians was promoted by the CDR through the 
publication of  communiqués and other writings that called for the 
extermination of the enemy and defi ned the enemy as the Tutsi population. 
For his failure to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the 
acts of direct and public incitement to commit genocide caused by CDR 
members, the Chamber fi nds Barayagwiza guilty of  direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide pursuant to Article 6(3) of its Statute.
VERDICT: SUMMARY JUDGEMENT FROM THE MEDIA TRIAL 301
KANGURA
103. The Chamber notes that the name Kangura itself  means ‘to wake up 
others’. This was the clear intent of Kangura and the publication is a litany 
of ethnic denigration presenting the Tutsi population as inherently evil 
and calling for the extermination of the Tutsi as a preventive measure. 
The Chamber notes the increased attention in 1994 issues of  Kangura
on the fear of an RPF attack and the killing of innocent Tutsi civilians 
that would follow as a consequence of such attack.
104. The Chamber notes that not all of the writings published in Kangura and 
highlighted by the Prosecution constitute direct incitement. A Cockroach 
Cannot Give Birth to a Butterfl y, for example, is an article brimming with 
ethnic hatred, but it did not call on readers to take action against the Tutsi 
population.
105. As founder, owner and editor of  Kangura, Hassan Ngeze used the 
publication to instill hatred, promote fear, and incite genocide. It is evident 
that Kangura played a signifi cant role, and was seen to have played a 
signifi cant role, in creating the conditions that led to acts of genocide. 
Accordingly, the Chamber fi nds Hassan Ngeze guilty of direct and public 
incitement to genocide, under Article 2(3)(c) and in accordance with 
Article 6(1) of the Statute.
106. For his individual acts, such as driving with a megaphone in his vehicle, 
mobilizing the population to come to CDR meetings and spreading the 
message that the Tutsi population would be exterminated, the Chamber 
fi nds Hassan Ngeze guilty of direct and public incitement to genocide, 
pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute.
CONSPIRACY
107. The Accused are charged with conspiracy to commit genocide.
108. The Musema judgement defi ned conspiracy to commit genocide as an 
agreement between two or more persons to commit the crime of genocide. 
The requisite intent for the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide is 
the same intent required for the crime of genocide.
109. The Chamber considers that conspiracy can be comprised of individuals 
acting in an institutional capacity as well as or even independently of their 
personal links with each other. Institutional coordination can form the 
basis of a conspiracy among those individuals who control the institutions 
that are engaged in coordinated action. The Chamber considers the act 
of coordination to be the central element that distinguishes conspiracy 
from ‘conscious parallelism’, the concept put forward by the Defence to 
explain the evidence in this case.
110. Nahimana and Barayagwiza collaborated closely as the two most active 
members of the Steering Committee, or provisional board, of RTLM. 
Barayagwiza also collaborated closely with Ngeze in the CDR. The 
Chamber fi nds that Baryagawiza was the lynchpin among the three 
302 JOURNALISM AS GENOCIDE
Accused, collaborating closely with both Nahimana and Ngeze. Insti-
tutionally also, there were many links that connected the Accused to 
each other through RTLM, Kangura and CDR. The evidence establishes, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze 
consciously interacted with each other, using the institutions they 
controlled to promote a joint agenda, which was the targeting of  the 
Tutsi population for destruction. There was public presentation of this 
shared purpose and coordination of efforts to realize their common goal. 
The Chamber fi nds that the Accused are guilty of conspiracy to commit 
genocide, pursuant to Article 6(1) of its Statute.
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (EXTERMINATION)
111. The Accused are charged with crimes against humanity (extermination).
112. Based on its factual fi ndings, and the legal fi ndings set forth under Genocide, 
the Chamber fi nds Ferdinand Nahimana guilty of extermination, pursuant 
to Article 6(1) of the Statute. The Chamber fi nds Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza 
guilty of  extermination, pursuant to Article 6(3) of  the Statute of  the 
Tribunal for the broadcasts of  RTLM, pursuant to Article 6(1) and 
6(3) for the activities of CDR, and pursuant to Article 6(1) for his own 
acts. The Chamber fi nds Hassan Ngeze guilty of extermination, for the 
publication of Kangura and for his own acts, pursuant to Article 6(1). 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (PERSECUTION)
The Accused are charged with persecution.
113. Unlike the other crimes against humanity enumerated in the Statute of the 
Tribunal, the crime of persecution specifi cally requires a fi nding of dis-
criminatory intent on racial, religious or political grounds. In Rwanda the 
targets of attack were the Tutsi ethnic group and the so-called ‘moderate’ 
Hutu political opponents who supported the Tutsi ethnic group. The 
Chamber considers that the group against which discriminatory attacks 
were perpetrated can be defi ned by its political component as well as 
its ethnic component. RTLM, Kangura and CDR essentially merged 
political and ethnic identity, defi ning their political target on the basis 
of  ethnicity and political positions relating to ethnicity. The Chamber 
considers that the discriminatory intent of the Accused falls within the 
scope of persecution on political grounds of an ethnic character.
114. The crime of  persecution has been held by ICTR jurisprudence to 
require ‘a gross or blatant denial of  a fundamental right reaching the 
same level of gravity’ as other enumerated crimes against humanity. The 
Chamber considers it evident that hate speech targeting a population on 
the basis of ethnicity, or other discriminatory grounds, reaches this level 
of gravity and constitutes persecution. Hate speech is a discriminatory 
form of aggression that destroys the dignity of those in the group under 
attack. It creates a lesser status not only in the eyes of the group members 
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themselves but also in the eyes of others who perceive and treat them as 
less than human. The denigration of a person on the basis of his or her 
ethnic identity or other group membership in and of itself, as well as in 
its other consequences, can be an irreversible harm.
115. Unlike the crime of incitement, which is defi ned in terms of intent, the 
crime of persecution is defi ned also in terms of impact. Persecution is not 
a provocation to cause harm. It is itself  the harm. Accordingly there need 
not be a call to action in communications that constitute persecution. 
For the same reason, there need be no link between persecution and 
acts of violence. The Chamber notes that Julius Streicher was convicted 
at Nuremberg of persecution for anti-semitic writings that signifi cantly 
predated the extermination of Jews in the 1940s. In Rwanda, the virulent 
writings of Kangura and the incendiary broadcasts of RTLM functioned 
in the same way, conditioning the Hutu population and creating a climate 
of  harm, as evidenced in part by the extermination and genocide that 
followed. Similarly, the activities of the CDR, a Hutu political party that 
demonized the Tutsi population as the enemy, generated fear and hatred 
that created the conditions for extermination and genocide in Rwanda.
116. Freedom of  expression and freedom from discrimination are not 
incompatible principles of  law. Hate speech is not protected speech 
under international law. In fact, governments have an obligation under 
international law to prohibit any advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.
A great number of countries around the world, including Rwanda, have 
domestic laws that ban advocacy of discriminatory hate, in recognition of 
the danger it represents and the harm it causes. The Chamber considers, 
in light of these well-established principles of international and domestic 
law, and the jurisprudence, that hate speech that expresses ethnic and other 
forms of discrimination violates the norm of customary international 
law prohibiting discrimination. Within this norm of customary law, the 
prohibition of advocacy of discrimination and incitement to violence is 
increasingly important as the power of the media to harm is increasingly 
acknowledged.
117. Having established that all communications constituting incitement were 
made with genocidal intent, the Chamber notes that the lesser intent 
requirement of persecution, the intent to discriminate, has been met with 
regard to these communications. Having also found that these communi-
cations were part of a widespread or systematic attack, the Chamber fi nds 
that these expressions of ethnic hatred constitute persecution. Persecution 
is broader than direct and public incitement, including advocacy of ethnic 
hatred in other forms. For example, the Kangura article, A Cockroach 
Cannot Give Birth to a Butterfl y, constitutes persecution. In this article, 
the Tutsi were described as biologically distinct from the Hutu, and 
inherently marked by malice and wickedness. The Tutsi were portrayed 
as mean and vengeful, and their weapons were defi ned to be women and 
money. The RTLM interview broadcast on June 1994, in which Simbona, 
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interviewed by Gaspard Gahigi, talked of the cunning and trickery of 
the Tutsi, also constitutes persecution.
118. The Chamber notes that Tutsi women, in particular, were targeted for 
persecution. The portrayal of the Tutsi woman as a femme fatale, and 
the message that Tutsi women were seductive agents of the enemy was 
conveyed repeatedly by RTLM and Kangura. The Ten Commandments,
broadcast on RTLM and published in Kangura, vilifi ed and endangered 
Tutsi women. By defi ning the Tutsi woman as an enemy in this way, RTLM 
and Kangura articulated a framework that made the sexual attack of Tutsi 
women a foreseeable consequence of the role attributed to them.
119. Activities and communications of the CDR, as well as acts personally 
committed by Barayagwiza, that advocated ethnic hatred constitute 
persecution.
120. For these reasons, the Chamber fi nds Ferdinand Nahimana guilty of 
persecution pursuant to Article 6(1) and Article 6(3) of the Statute for 
the broadcasts of RTLM. The Chamber fi nds Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza 
guilty of  persecution, pursuant to Article 6(3) for the broadcasts of 
RTLM and the activities of CDR, and pursuant to Article 6(1) for the 
activities of  CDR and for his own acts. The Chamber fi nds Hassan 
Ngeze guilty of persecution, pursuant to Article 6(1), for articles in the 
publication Kangura.
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (MURDER)
121. Hassan Ngeze is charged with crimes against humanity (murder). The 
Prosecution conceded during its Closing Arguments that it was not 
pursuing the allegation in the Indictment of the shooting of a Tutsi girl. 
The Prosecution failed to prove that Ngeze ordered the killing of or killed 
Modeste Tabaro, as alleged in the Indictment. The Prosecution also failed 
to prove that Ngeze killed a man in the Commune Rouge, as alleged in 
the Indictment. The Chamber therefore fi nds that Hassan Ngeze is not 
guilty of murder.
IV. VERDICT
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, having considered all of the evidence 
and the arguments:
THE CHAMBER unanimously fi nds Ferdinand Nahimana:
Count 1: Guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Genocide
Count 2: Guilty of Genocide
Count 3: Guilty of Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide
Count 4: Not Guilty of Complicity in Genocide
Count 5: Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity (Persecution)
Count 6: Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity (Extermination)
Count 7: Not Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity (Murder)
THE CHAMBER unanimously fi nds Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza:
VERDICT: SUMMARY JUDGEMENT FROM THE MEDIA TRIAL 305
Count 1: Guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Genocide
Count 2: Guilty of Genocide
Count 3: Not Guilty of Complicity in Genocide
Count 4: Guilty of Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide
Count 5: Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity (Extermination)
Count 6: Not Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity (Murder)
Count 7: Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity (Persecution)
Count 8: Not Guilty of Serious Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II
Count 9: Not Guilty of Serious Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II
THE CHAMBER unanimously fi nds Hassan Ngeze:
Count 1: Guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Genocide
Count 2: Guilty of Genocide
Count 3: Not Guilty of Complicity in Genocide
Count 4: Guilty of Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide
Count 5: Not Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity (Murder)
Count 6: Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity (Persecution)
Count 7: Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity (Extermination)
V. SENTENCING
Having found the three Accused guilty, the Chamber now proceeds to the 
sentencing of the Accused.
FERDINAND NAHIMANA
I call on Ferdinand Nahimana to rise for sentencing and face the Court.
Ferdinand Nahimana, you were a renowned academic, Professor of History 
at the National University of Rwanda. You were Director of ORINFOR and 
founded RTLM radio station as an independent private radio. You were Political 
Adviser to the Interim Government sworn in after 6 April 1994 under President 
Sindikubwabo.
You were fully aware of  the power of  words, and you used the radio – the 
medium of communication with the widest public reach – to disseminate hatred 
and violence. You may have been motivated by your sense of patriotism and the 
need you perceived for equity for the Hutu population in Rwanda. But instead 
of following legitimate avenues of recourse, you chose a path of genocide. In 
doing so, you betrayed the trust placed in you as an intellectual and a leader. 
Without a fi rearm, machete or any physical weapon, you caused the deaths of 
thousands of innocent civilians. Representations were made by your witnesses 
as to your good character and high standing in society but in the Chamber’s 
view, these circumstances are not mitigating. They underscore your betrayal 
of public trust.
Having considered all the relevant factors, the Chamber sentences you in respect 
of all the counts on which you have been convicted to imprisonment for the 
remainder of your life. 
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HASSAN NGEZE
I call on Hassan Ngeze to rise for sentencing and face the Court.
Hassan Ngeze, as the owner and editor of a well-known newspaper in Rwanda, 
you were in a position to inform the public and shape public opinion towards 
achieving democracy and peace for all Rwandans. Instead of using the media 
to promote human rights, you used it to attack and destroy human rights. 
You had signifi cant media networking skills and attracted support earlier in 
your career from international human rights organizations who perceived 
your commitment to freedom of expression. However, you did not respect the 
responsibility that comes with that freedom. You abused the trust of the public 
by using your newspaper to instigate genocide. The Chamber notes that you 
saved Tutsi civilians from death by transporting them across the border out of 
Rwanda. Your power to save was more than matched by your power to kill. 
You poisoned the minds of your readers, and by words and deeds caused the 
death of thousands of innocent civilians.
Having considered all the relevant factors, the Chamber sentences you in respect 
of all the counts on which you have been convicted to imprisonment for the 
remainder of your life.
JEAN-BOSCO BARAYAGWIZA
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was Director of Political Affairs in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and a founder of  RTLM. He was also the founder of  CDR 
and its President in Gisenyi Prefecture, later National President of CDR. He is 
a lawyer by training and in his book professes a commitment to international 
human rights standards. Yet he deviated from these standards and violated the 
most fundamental human right, the right to life. He did so both through the 
institutions he created, and through his own personal acts of participation in 
the genocide. He was the lynchpin of the conspiracy, collaborating closely with 
both Nahimana and Ngeze.
Having considered all the relevant factors, the Chamber considers that the 
appropriate sentence for Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza in respect of all the counts 
on which he has been convicted is imprisonment for the remainder of  his 
life. However, in its decision dated 31 March 2000, the Appeals Chamber 
decided:
[T]hat for the violation of his rights the Appellant is entitled to a remedy, to 
be fi xed at the time of judgement at fi rst instance, as follows:
If  the Appellant is found not guilty, he shall receive fi nancial compensation;
If the Appellant is found guilty, his sentence shall be reduced to take account 
of the violation of his rights.
The Chamber considers that a term of  years, being by its nature a reduced 
sentence from that of life imprisonment, is the only way in which it can implement 
the Appeals Chamber decision. Taking into account the violation of his rights, 
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the Chamber sentences Barayagwiza in respect of all the counts on which he has 
been convicted to 35 years’ imprisonment. Pursuant to Rule 101(D) of the Rules, 
Barayagwiza is further entitled to credit for time served, to be calculated from 
the date of his initial arrest in Cameroon, on 26 March 1996. Credit for time 
served has been calculated as seven years, eight months and nine days. Therefore, 
Barayagwiza will serve twenty-seven years, three months and twenty-one days, 
being the remainder of his sentence, as of 3 December 2003.
Pursuant to Rules 102 (A) and 103, the three Accused shall remain in the 
custody of  the Tribunal pending transfer to the State where they will serve 
their sentences.
26
The Pre-Genocide Case Against 
Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines
Simone Monasebian
Wars are not fought for territory, but for words. Man’s deadliest weapon 
is language. He is susceptible to being hypnotized by slogans as he is 
to infectious diseases. And where there is an epidemic, the group mind 
takes over.
Arthur Koestler (1978)
On 3 December 2003, the judges of  the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) convicted Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza 
of genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, conspiracy to 
commit genocide, crimes against humanity (persecution) and crimes against 
humanity (extermination). Nahimana and Barayagwiza were the directors of 
Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM), Rwanda’s fi rst private 
radio station. RTLM, which broadcast from July 1993 to July 1994, was found 
to have fanned the fl ames of hate and genocide in Rwanda. The case against 
Nahimana and Barayagwiza, in what was referred to as ‘the Media Trial’, 
raised important principles concerning the role of the media, which had not 
been addressed at the level of international criminal justice since Nuremberg. 
Nahimana was sentenced to life in prison and Barayagwiza received a sentence 
of 35 years (ICTR 2003: para. 1106–7).
The jurisdiction of the ICTR was limited to serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed between 1 January and 31 December 1994 (ICTR 
n.d.). However, in their deliberations, the judges also considered RTLM’s 1993 
broadcasts (ICTR 2003: para. 103–4, 953, 1017). The judgement received 
worldwide attention. A New York Times editorial heralded the verdicts as 
‘rightly decided’, ‘welcome’, ‘pos[ing] no threat to journalistic free speech’ and 
‘demonstrat[ing] that the international community will demand justice for 
those who committed crimes against all humanity’ (NYT Editors 2003). Even 
renowned American free speech advocates heralded the convictions (Abrams 
2003).
If ever there was a textbook case of broadcasting genocide, RTLM’s emissions 
after 6 April 1994, fi t the bill – chapter and verse. Most political, legal and 
humanitarian activists would agree that RTLM’s post-6 April broadcasts should 
have been stopped.1 Can the same be said of the pre-6 April broadcasts which 
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the judges also criminalized?2 This paper looks at those earlier broadcasts, 
so that we may better answer what should have been done about them at the 
national and international levels. It is only by answering that question that we 
can know when is it too early or too late to shut down hate media before it 
begins broadcasting genocide. 
Although the ICTR judges found the pre-plane crash broadcasts to be violative 
of international humanitarian law regulations, such as those in Articles 19 and 
20 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (UN 1966), some 
human rights organizations have found otherwise. In Broadcasting Genocide: 
Censorship, Propaganda and State-Sponsored Violence in Rwanda 1990–1994,
Article 19, the international centre against censorship, writes that there is 
no freedom of  expression issue with regard to RTLM broadcasts after the 
plane crash as ‘giving orders to carry out human rights abuses is not protected 
whether this is done in writing, orally by two-way radio or by public broadcast 
... International law clearly permitted external intervention to jam broadcasts 
at [the post-plane crash] stage, which is the course of action which should have 
been undertaken’ (Article 19 1996: 166–7). 
In the view of Article 19, however, RTLM’s hate speech before the plane crash 
should not, and could not, have been banned or jammed. They argue that ‘[t]he 
emphasis should rather be on promoting pluralism in privately owned media 
and supporting attempted reform of the state broadcasting system as a means of 
marginalizing extremist propaganda and developing the middle ground’ (Article 
19 1996: 171). They go on to conclude that the owners of RTLM should only 
be indicted for charges brought in relation to post-plane crash broadcasts. 
RTLM’S BROADCASTING AND OPERATIONS 
BEFORE THE PLANE CRASH 
Even so the tongue is a little member, and boasteth great things. Behold how 
great a matter a little fi re kindleth!
And the tongue is a fi re, a world of iniquity: so is the tongue among our members, 
and it defi lith the whole body, and setteth on fi re the course of nature; and it 
is set on fi re of hell.
Epistle of James, 3: 5–6
Witness GO summed up RTLM’s pre-plane crash broadcasts as follows: ‘In fact, 
what RTLM did was almost to pour petrol – to spread petrol throughout the 
country little by little, so that one day it would be able to set fi re to the whole 
country’ (ICTR transcript, 4 June 2001: 33). 
By 11 July 1993 (only three days into its broadcasting), the writing was already 
on the wall. Employing a cynical play on a well known Rwandan proverb, 
one of the speakers at RTLM’s 11 July general assembly of shareholders was 
quoted as having uttered the words: ‘Aho umututsi yanitse ntiriva,’ meaning ‘No 
chance for the Tutsi.’3 Those same words were also featured on the cover of a 
July 1993 issue of the notorious hate journal Kangura, in relation to RTLM, 
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as well as in an article about RTLM in that issue (Anon. 1993). Those covering 
that general assembly came away with the clear impression that RTLM would 
help Kangura further extremist objectives and show the Tutsis, and those who 
did not follow the extremists’ line, their true place (Anon. 1993: 13, ICTR 
transcript, 2 November 2000: para. 166–7, and 7 February 2001: para. 12–14, 
26–8, 29, 33–5).
RTLM and its listeners knew early on that its programming was having a 
potentially violent impact on Rwandan society. On 20 November 1993, for 
example, an RTLM broadcaster recounted a telephone call from a listener 
expressing grave concern about being stoned because the radio station had 
been talking about him (ICTR exhibit 1D50D: 13).
Although the broadcasts showed marks of hatred and persecution in advance 
of Burundian Hutu President Melanchoir Ndadaye’s assassination, after that 
21 October 1993 assassination, RTLM broadcasts became exceedingly virulent; 
RTLM regularly began to employ the mantra ‘amakuru ashyushye’ (‘we have hot 
news’). This phrase became Pavlovian, putting listeners in an expectant mood 
(Chrétien expert report: ICTR exhibits P117B and P163B). This ‘hot news’ 
stood out from the cold traditional rhetoric before RTLM (Dr M. Ruzindana 
expert report, ICTR exhibit P110A: 36). 
Ferdinand Nahimana himself  testifi ed that, immediately after the events in 
Burundi, the station became known as a Hutu Power radio station advocating 
extremism (ICTR transcript, 23 September 2002: 105–8). 
Although very few cassettes from RTLM’s early broadcasts could be retrieved, 
notes of  those monitoring RTLM at the Rwandan Ministry of  Information 
provide information. Witness GO’s notes for 22 October 1993, report broadcasts 
containing the statements: ‘We Hutus must prove to the Tutsis that we are 
strong’ and ‘You Hutus, you must be on the look-out. You might meet the fate 
of the ones in Burundi’ (ICTR exhibit P34: 10, quoting RTLM broadcasters 
Kantano Habimana and Noël Hitimana, respectively). 
A few brave members of the government tried to call RTLM to order. Among 
them were Jean Marie Vianney Higiro, the director of the Rwandan Offi ce of 
Information (ORINFOR); Faustin Rucogoza, the minister of  information; 
and Alphonse Marie Nkubito and Francois Xavier Nsanzuwera at the Kigali 
prosecutor’s offi ce – all of  them Hutu. RTLM responded by targeting, or 
intensifying its targeting, of them. RTLM was always above the law.
On 25 October 1993, the Ministry of  Information sent RTLM a letter of 
caution asking the station to assess the possible consequences of its programmes 
(ICTR transcript, 5 April 2001: 112). Before writing the letter, the minister 
himself had paid a visit to the station’s offi cials to discuss the violative broadcasts 
(ICTR exhibits P28E and F). The letter was occasioned by the increasingly 
ethnically divisive broadcasts after the assassination of Burundian President 
Ndadaye. The very day RTLM received the letter, a high-level Hutu Power 
offi cial sent RTLM a letter that was read aloud twice by one of the broadcasters. 
That letter criticized Minister Rucogoza’s letter to RTLM and stated that the 
minister had evil intentions and that his Hutu Power members were 100 per 
cent behind RTLM (ICTR exhibit 1D49D). Immediately after reading that 
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letter, the broadcaster, eager to whip up revulsion against Tutsis, stated that 
bloodthirsty Tutsi dog-eaters assassinated Ndadaye, mutilated his body, and 
then secretly buried him (ICTR exhibit 1D49D: 3). 
The broadcaster’s words were untrue. According to Human Rights Watch, 
‘[a]ll the reports of  torture and mutilation were false’ (Commission Interna-
tionale 1994).
Human Rights Watch, the International Federation of  Human Rights 
Leagues, SOS-Torture, and the Human Rights League of the Great Lakes 
organized an international commission of inquiry similar to that which had 
[earlier] documented abuses in Rwanda. The commission arranged for an 
autopsy by a forensic physician who found that Ndadaye had been killed by 
several blows of a sharp instrument, probably a bayonet. The body had not 
been mutilated and showed no signs of torture. (Des Forges 1999: 136) 
In the days after the murder of Ndadaye, Hutu attacked Tutsi in many parts 
of Rwanda. They killed some forty in Cyangugu, twenty each in Butare and 
Ruhengeri, seventeen in Gisenyi, thirteen in Kigali and drove many others 
from their homes. Assailants tried to assassinate Alphonse-Marie Nkubito, 
a high-ranking judicial offi cial and human rights activist who had frequently 
defended Tutsi, although himself  a Hutu. (Des Forges 1999: 137)
For the anti-Tutsi propagandists, the assassination of the Burundian president 
offered just the kind of tragedy most helpful to their cause. It gave RTLM the 
chance to establish itself  as the most virulent voice in the campaign against 
Tutsi (ICTR exhibit P181: 135). 
In response to the letter from the minister of information, RTML journalists 
resorted to insults rather than compliance (ICTR exhibit P28E: para. 2). 
In a note that witness GO drafted for his boss, the minister of information, 
in the days after Ndadaye’s assassination, he noted RTLM’s endless calls for 
Hutus to be on their guard. GO emphasized that RTLM ‘programs do not take 
into account ... audience sensitivities. Nobody is unaware that Rwandese are 
very sensitive to ethnic and separatist speeches’ (ICTR exhibit P33: K0032662). 
In another handwritten note drafted shortly after the Ndadaye assassination, 
witness GO indicated that the station was ‘indulg[ing] in an intentional race to 
misinformation, which stirred up fi re, ethnic hatred and led to some innocent 
people’s death’ (ICTR exhibit P35: K00032671).
On 26 November 1993, RTLM offi cials Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza and Felicien Kabuga were called to a meeting at the Ministry 
of Information. There, RTLM was warned about its broadcasts, which were 
unsubstantiated, irresponsible and caused ethnic division within the population 
(ICTR transcript, 5 April 2001: 129–31, and 135–6 and exhibit P28E). Witness 
GO, who was assigned the task of monitoring RTLM on a daily basis, testifi ed 
that RTLM’s programmes became even worse after that meeting, going further 
in inciting ethnic hatred (ICTR transcript, 5 April 2001: 112, 159–60). Tensions 
in the country regarding RTLM also increased thereafter. Witness GO, for 
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example, saw an Interahamwe member beat up an acquaintance of GO’s, who 
was saying that RTLM was leading Rwandans ‘into an abyss’ (ICTR transcript, 
9 April 2001: 19–20). 
On the day of the 26 November meeting, the Belgian ambassador to Kigali 
warned his government that RTLM had called for the assassination of Prime 
Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and the Prime Minister-designate Faustin 
Twagiramungu (Chrétien expert report: ICTR exhibits P117B and P163B: 
26930).
In early December 1993, UNAMIR, which received news of  suspicious 
movements of armed militiamen, reported that RTLM continuously broadcast 
bitter and increasingly passionate propaganda calling on the Hutu to confront 
the Tutsi (FIDH and HRW 1999: 173, Chrétien expert report: ICTR exhibits 
P117B and P163B: 26930). 
On 3 December 1993, a group of high-ranking Rwandan military offi cers 
wrote to UNAMIR’s commander, General Dallaire, warning specifi cally about 
the dangers of political assassination and widespread killings (ICTR transcript, 
Des Forges testimony, 22 May 2002: 121). International journalist Collette 
Braeckman testifi ed that she had met with Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiy-
imana in December 1993, ‘who of her own initiative, told me that the radio 
RTLM was mounting a campaign, an ethnic hate campaign’ (ICTR transcript, 
29 November 2001: 25–60). According to the prime minister, RTLM had also 
stated that ‘the chairman of my party and myself  were condemned to die’. In 
addition, ‘in particular the RTLM were launching a denigration campaign with 
regard to the Belgian contingent in Rwanda’. 
On 17, 20 and 21 December 1993, one RTLM broadcaster was heard stating 
that although the Tutsi minority claim they are being persecuted, they and their 
women are the ones holding Rwanda’s wealth. A Tutsi businessman by the name 
of Charles Shamukiga was particularly singled out (ICTR exhibit P36/14 E). 
Both Human Rights Watch expert witness, Dr Alison Des Forges, and former 
Kigali prosecutor, Francois Xavier Nsanzuwera, testifi ed that this dangerous 
propaganda was untrue, that the wealth was not in the hands of Tutsis (ICTR 
transcript, 22 May 2002: 198–200, and 24 April 2001: 30–8, respectively). Even 
an expert witness for the Nahimana defence, Helmut Strizek, testifi ed that this 
broadcast constituted dangerous propaganda under the circumstances (ICTR 
transcript, 7 May 2003: 45–9). 
Dr Des Forges also went on to explain
There were, of course, a small number of Tutsi who were wealthy, most of 
them because they were in business. But the great majority of  Tutsi who 
had been excluded from access to secondary education, for example, were 
ordinary farmers on the hills, living at the same level of  poverty as their 
Hutu neighbours. The assertion that Tutsi were wealthy was one frequently 
made on RTLM, and in Kangura, and if  I’m not mistaken, repeated by 
Mr Barayagwiza in his book, sometimes associated with the fi gure that 
70 per cent of  the wealthy people of  Rwanda were Tutsi. This attempt to 
depict the Tutsi as the wealthy, the unjustifi ably wealthy in a country of 
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enormous poverty, where poverty was getting clearly worse, contributed to 
the hostility against Tutsi. I mentioned yesterday the importance of land in 
this agricultural country and how the fi elds of Tutsi were allocated almost 
immediately when the genocide began, often to the very people who had killed 
them. Other kinds of property was allocated as well. I’m thinking particularly 
of the contents of the small traders’ booths at the open-air market in Butare, 
which were distributed to people who had participated in attacking Tutsi. 
So the idea that the Tutsi wealth set them apart was unjustifi ably earned. 
And, what’s more, the prospect that that wealth could become a reward for 
people who participated in attacks against Tutsi, all of this is an important 
theme throughout these months that comes to extraordinary importance in 
the period of the genocide itself. 
I would remark in this context, based on the discussions I have had with 
colleagues in genocide studies who work particularly on the fi eld of  the 
Holocaust, that the accusation that Jews were extraordinarily wealthy and 
had an unjustifi ably large share of the wealth of Germany was a frequent 
accusation at the time of  the Holocaust. (ICTR transcript, 22 May 2002: 
198–200)
Charles Shamukiga, who was spoken about in the context of  an RTLM 
broadcast falsely attributing the wealth to be in Tutsi hands, was often a 
target of RTLM before 7 April 1994 and this was a matter of great concern. 
Shamukiga spoke to then-Prosecutor Nsanzuwera about this programme and 
Nsanzuwera went to see him with a brigade commander. On the morning 
of  7 April, Shamukiga called Nsanzuwera to ask whether it was true that 
the president had been killed, because, on 2 April, RTLM had broadcast that 
Agathe Uwilingiyimana was planning the president’s assassination, and then all 
the Tutsis would be exterminated. Shamukiga stated that if  the president was 
in fact killed then they would be exterminated, and at that point Nsanzuwera 
could hear the Presidential Guard soldiers break into Shamukiga’s house. His 
last words were ‘this is it, I am going to die’ and he was killed. Shamukiga and 
Sebera were two Tutsi businessmen who were often targeted by RTLM before 
7 April. Sebera was also killed in the genocide (ICTR transcript, Nsanzuwera, 
23 April 2001: 116–21, and 24 April 2001: 30–8). 
On 28 December 1993, an RTLM broadcaster acknowledged being told 
his false programmes were ‘heating up heads’ and could cause ethnic violence 
(ICTR transcript, Nahimana testimony, 14 October 2002: 98–9): 
Dear listeners who are tuned to Radio RTLM, I am here at Kigali International 
Trade Fair ... Er, I came from Radio Rwanda. As I said a few moments ago, I 
invited you, but I have also just met young men some of whom are Inkotanyi.
The Inkotanyi have been here for a long time and we live with them. We live 
together and have become quite familiar. They said: ‘we have listened to 
Radio RTLM, the things that you have just stated, namely that there are milk 
containers [ibyansi] and there are people who take drums to Nyacyonga in 
order to welcome the Fearless Inkotanyi, those things that you are saying on 
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Radio RTLM to heat up heads, are they really true, or your intention is to 
push people to kill one another?’
The minister of information later complained to RTLM offi cials about that 
particular broadcast as well as another on that date, which he explained were 
intended to incite ethnic unrest (ICTR exhibit P32B: 1–2):
On the 28 December 1993, on the eve of the FPR battalion’s arrival in Kigali, 
the RTLM broadcast throughout their programmes that this battalion was 
going to travel by a bus which was given to them only up until Nyacyonga 
but after Nyacyonga, they would get out of  the bus and I quote ‘march 
through Kigali.’ These false rumours resulted in the soldiers being warned 
... [O]n the same day, the RTLM made a statement about a welcome plan 
according to which the parents and relatives of the Inkontanyi must go and 
meet them in Nyacyonga, with churns full of milk4 and beating drums. And 
as though this reference wasn’t obvious enough, they had to add that this 
is what is needed to be done if  one had to welcome the King Kigeli as he 
returned to restore his royalty.
Remarks and references of these kind need no comment. I simply wanted 
to point out this fact. The same journalist was able to gather statements in 
Nyamirambo where the International Fair was taking place and one of the 
people interviewed, it was the journalist himself  who recounted this, this 
person had expressed strong concerns about the false rumours that I have just 
mentioned. This person was saying expressly that if  such remarks continue 
to be made, they will only incite people to start fi ghting. This is with regards 
to an anxiety expressed which was reported by one of the RTLM journalists. 
I am only making reference to this case because you yourselves broadcasted 
it. We record these types of complaints everyday.
Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro, the director of  ORINFOR, was a frequent 
target of RTLM’s wrath before 7 April 1994. Higiro, who had tried on several 
occasions to call RTLM to order for its reckless broadcasts, was often denounced 
by RTLM as a ‘inyernzi’ collaborating with the enemy. On 7 January 1994, an 
RTLM broadcaster warned Higiro that if  he continued to insist RTLM should 
be shut down then the Hutu people would rise up against him and things would 
turn bad against him (ICTR transcript, 6 November 2002: 33–7). Higiro did 
not go back to work after 6 April 1994, because he had fl ed in fear for his life 
(Higiro, see Chapter 7). 
Self-fulfilling prophesies of  violence were one of  RTLM’s specialties 
before and after 6 April 1994. On 21 January 1994 (ICTR exhibit P36/38D), 
RTLM broadcasters suggested that moderate opposition politicians Faustin 
Twagiramungu and Landould Ndasingwa5 were behind an assassination plot and 
incited the population against them. They also suggested that Twagiramungu 
should be tear-gassed (ICTR transcript, 21 January 1994: 5–8). This was 
neither the fi rst nor the last time that false and incendiary broadcasts against 
Twagiramungu were made. In October 1993, RTLM suggested Twagiramungu 
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was involved in the assassination of  President Ndadaye (ICTR exhibit P54: 
K0160116–K0160118).
On 21 January 1994, particularly clear warnings are acknowledged by RTLM 
that its ‘heating up heads’ was a cause of violence. In this same broadcast Tutsis 
are repeatedly referred to as ‘tricky’:
So, [laughter] ... small children in Nyamirambo near the Café du Peuple 
—near the Café du Peuple in Nyamirambo – very small children – small 
Tutsi children came up to me and said, ‘Hello Kantano. We like you, but 
please, do not heat up our heads.’ [laughter]. I laughed my head off: ‘Hey, 
kids, how do I heat up your heads?’ They answered, ‘you see when we walk 
around, we are few in number and when you talk about Tutsis we are afraid, 
and we see CDR members are going to pounce on us. Leave that alone and 
do not heat up our heads!’
No! Of course, you’re only kids. That’s not what I’m talking about. But of 
this war, the current war, the period we are in, this diffi cult period when the 
Hutus and the Tutsis are deceiving one another and are at confl ict … lying 
in order to entrap and kill one another. I cannot but explain the situation 
and mention the liars by name. As long as the Tutsis wish to regain power 
through trickery, everyone has the duty to alert the majority people and tell 
them to be on their guard because the achievements they fought for in 1959 
are under threat. You are young, you know nothing about the events of 1959 
or the current situation. You still have a lot to learn. Nonetheless, listen to 
your elder brothers and sisters and ask your fathers and mothers, ‘What’s 
going to happen to us now that you want to take us back to the past?’ Ask 
them questions.
As for me, all I am doing is explaining events as they unfold. Each and 
every event calls for commentary. Children, do not be overly upset with 
me, I have nothing against the Tutsis, the Twas or the Hutus. I am a Hutu, 
but I have nothing against the Tutsis. However, given the current political 
situation, I have the duty to explain and say, ‘Beware! The Tutsis are trying to 
appropriate the Hutus’ property by force or trickery.’ However, my remarks 
do not in any way imply hatred for the Tutsis. They are simply clarifi cations. 
Indeed, every event calls for commentary. (RTLM transcript of broadcaster 
Kantano Habimana, ICTR exhibit P36/38E)
Although many of the pre-7 April RTLM broadcasts that have been found 
mention the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), RTLM journalists in that period 
acknowledged that to them there was no difference between Tutsis and the RPF. 
In a 1–2 February 1994 emission, an RTLM broadcaster is heard saying that 
‘Tutsis and RPF are the same’ (ICTR exhibit P36/44C). RTLM’s incendiary 
anti-RPF propaganda was not merely anti-RPF, it was also anti-Tutsi. RTLM 
equated the RPF to the Tutsi.
In February 1994, RTLM was called in by the Ministry of Information for 
a second time. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Felcien 
Kabuga, along with Phocas Habimana, represented RTLM (ICTR transcript, 
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9 April 2001: 35, 40–1). Radio Rwanda covered part of the meeting. The video 
excerpts were televised by Radio Rwanda (ICTR exhibits P177A and C); the 
journalist notes in his coverage of that meeting that 
The situation is very hot, but for some, it even heats up the heads. Radio 
RTLM is loved, but it is also in trouble during these days. While some still 
want its programs to reach them, others are complaining about it, accusing it 
of fostering division, especially between Hutus and Tutsis. In a recent meeting 
that the Minister of Information held with the RTLM bosses, he expressed 
his views about this radio. He said: ‘Your radio misleads the population and 
its programs can cause ethnic division.’ He added: ‘It should cease persuading 
Rwandans that the Tutsis are at the root of  the problems that Rwanda is 
experiencing since this is not true. It should stop slandering and harassing 
people. If  it is not careful, severe measures may be taken against it.’
In the video, the minister himself  is seen telling the RTLM offi cials that:
The kind of press that I strongly wish to see in Rwanda, our country, is the 
one that supports democracy and peace, the one that promotes reconcilia-
tion among Rwandans. As for the type of press that sets one ethnic group 
against the other, which sets the heads on fi re, sets one region against the 
other, or causes strife between Rwandans and their friends, this has no place 
and should never have any in this country.
Normally, a good journalist should abide by the following principles:
Principle one: He should avoid slander (calumny)
Principle two: He should avoid pointing an accusing finger without 
evidence
Principle three: He should report unaltered facts
Principle four: He should avoid reporting lies
Visibly, RTLM journalists have not adhered to these principles, and this is 
the topic that we are going to discuss during this meeting. During our last 
meeting, we had agreed that the RTLM programs would be neutral vis-à-vis 
political parties and ethnic groups. Unfortunately, RTLM continues to show 
that it is a political party, that it serves the MRND and the CDR, and that 
it is a Hutus’ mouthpiece … If this attitude is not redressed, the government 
may take measures against RTLM.
Witness GO testifi ed that the RTLM contingent stated that they would 
continue to give time to anyone who would come to testify about Tutsi tricks 
and their Hutu accomplices; they called the Arusha accords, not a peace accord, 
but rather a trap to neutralize the revolution of 1959. The RTLM contingent 
threatened the ministry and accused it of  becoming perfect Inyenzis. The 
minister appealed to RTLM to stop broadcasting hate (ICTR transcript, 9 
April 2001: 49, 54, 58). 
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A ‘working document’ prepared by the ministry for that February meeting 
noted that RTLM would regularly:
• assimilate all the members of the RPF to the iniquitous Tutsi;
• assimilate the political problems of the country to the RPF;
• reduce the political problems of  Rwanda to the ethnic hatred between 
Hutu and Tutsi;
• assimilate the Tutsi from the inside with the Inkontanyi;
• explain to the country that all the evil the country suffers is caused by the 
Tutsi. (ICTR exhibit P29B: 1–3)
The minister’s written address for that meeting noted that complaints about 
RTLM were being received by human rights associations on a daily basis and 
that RTLM was leading the country into a race war based on incitement and 
misinformation during particularly dangerous times (ICTR exhibit P32B: 
1–3).
Witness GO drafted a report of the meeting. When he took it to Barayagwiza 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Barayagwiza grabbed it, read it closely, then 
threw it in GO’s face. Barayagwiza said that he no longer wanted to see an 
Inkontanyi in his offi ce and that if the Ministry of Information people continued 
to proceed in the manner they were, then its members would see what was going 
to happen (ICTR transcript, 10 April 2001: 4–6). 
On 25 February 1994, the human rights defence association, AVP, condemned 
the calls for the extermination of the Tutsi that were being broadcast by RTLM. 
On the same day, Interahamwe President Robert Kajuga presided over a meeting 
of Interahamwe leaders calling for great vigilance vis-à-vis Kigali Tutsi, who 
should be listed (Chrétien expert report: ICTR exhibits P117B and P163B: 
26927; FIDH and HRW 1999: 195).
For some time before February 1994, Minister of  Information Rucogoza 
had been telling Kigali Prosecutor Francois Xavier Nsanzuwera that RTLM 
was inciting ethnic hatred and violence and that he was worried about it (ICTR 
transcript, 23 April 2001: 39–41). In February 1994, Rucogoza called a third 
meeting regarding the media and RTLM, which he asked Nsanzuwera to attend. 
Ferdinand Nahimana attended on behalf  of RTLM. Also at the meeting was 
Andre Kameya, editor-in-chief of the moderate opposition magazine Rwanda 
Rushya. The minister said that although he respected freedom of speech, the 
inciting broadcasts and newspaper reports must be stopped. Mr Kameya told 
Nahimana that, although his paper criticized the regime, it did not promote 
ethnic division like RTLM, which was broadcasting hate messages. He called 
RTLM journalists criminals, which angered Nahimana, who accused Kameya6
of behaving like an agent of the RPF. Nahimana would not accept the fact that 
RTLM was doing anything wrong. After the meeting, RTLM’s programmes 
became even worse (ICTR transcript, 23 April 2001: 33–41). 
Rucogoza told Nsanzuwera that he was still worried about RTLM’s broadcasts. 
Although Nsanzuwera had initially favoured fi ning RTLM as a sanction, he 
now suggested that it was time to shut the station down. Rucogoza replied that 
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‘if  we do so, they are going to kill us; they are going to massacre us’ (ICTR 
transcript, 23 April 2001: 39–41). 
Witness GO testifi ed that from the time the minister of information wrote the 
25 October 1993 letter to RTLM, RTLM targeted and threatened him on the 
radio often. On 7 April 1994, Rucogoza and his entire family were exterminated, 
as were four other Ministry of Information staff working on the RTLM dossier 
(ICTR transcript, 10 April 2001: 7–11, 39–40). 
An RTLM transcript from 18 March 1994 contains one of the threats made 
against Rucogoza by RTLM’s Kantano Habimana:
We met and then he asked: ‘Kantano, why do you really talk about me?’ 
Ha! In fact, I think people told me that he has become wise. Our bone of 
contention was that he wanted to close down the RTLM, the people’s radio 
... Ha! He probably realized this was no easy task; he realized that this was 
like carrying a cross. He has given up and this is no longer one of his topics. 
Obviously, he reports what his bosses want him to say, but he realized that 
the idea of closing down the people’s radio could cause him a lot of trouble, 
which is why he gave up. I said to him: ‘If  you have now given us peace, we 
will do the same for you. We will then leave you alone.’ This was the only 
bone of contention between us. We here (at the RTLM) harbor no hatred, 
but we cannot put up with people who look down upon us or who irritate 
us. That is all. We have nothing against people whosoever, and Rucogoza can 
thus rest easy, if  he has given us peace, all we can do is reciprocate. (ICTR 
exhibit P36/65D)
People were afraid to fi le complaints against RTLM, but Francois Xavier 
Nsanzuwera’s boss, Alphonse Marie Nkubito, fi led one because Kantano 
Habimana of  RTLM made a broadcast stating that Nkubito was part of  a 
plot to murder the president and was receiving large amounts of money for his 
participation in this plot. This was broadcast shortly after Nkubito escaped a 
grenade attack. Nkubito asked Nsanzuwera to speak to broadcaster Kantano 
Habimana; Nsanzuwera mentioned that he also wanted to ask Noël Hitimana 
about other broadcasts that were inciting hatred. Nsanzuwera summoned both 
broadcasters in March 1994. Kantano claimed that all he had done (regarding 
the Nkubito broadcast) was to read a telegram given to him by his supervisor, 
Ferdinand Nahimana. Kantano said that if Nsanzuwera wanted the original, he 
should ask Nahimana for the text, because at RTLM the journalists were only 
small fi sh and that Nahimana wrote some of the editorials (ICTR transcript, 
23 April 2001: 43–50). 
Dealing with RTLM was diffi cult. The station’s journalists announced on 
the radio when they had been summoned to the prosecutor’s offi ce. Staff within 
the prosecutor’s offi ce would spend their days listening to RTLM, because 
the mention of someone’s name on the radio was almost a sentence to death. 
It was especially diffi cult for Nsanzuwera to summon the RTLM journalists 
between 1992 and 1994, as it was not easy to ask for gendarmarie reinforcement. 
Initially the journalists refused to appear. Then, later, when Kantano informed 
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his listeners about being summoned, it was tantamount to calling on the 
Interahamwe and Impuzamgambi to besiege the prosecutor’s offi ce. When the 
RTLM journalists were summoned in March, neighbourhoods in Kigali that 
were controlled by the Interahamwe and Impuzamgambi were in such a state 
of continuous violence that people were afraid to set foot outside after dark 
(ICTR transcript, 23 April 2001: 43–50). A 30 March 1994 RTLM transcript 
describes youth surrounding the prosecutor’s offi ce on behalf of RTLM (ICTR 
exhibit P41B: 9–10). 
After Nsanzuwera informed Nkubito about his conversation with Kantano 
Habimana, Nkubito replied that, even if  Ferdinand Nahimana was behind the 
broadcast, he could not be summoned because that meant the whole Akazu
(those close to the president) was behind RTLM. He advised Nsanzuwera not 
to try to interrogate Nahimana, as he would be killed (ICTR transcript, 23 
April 2001: 43–50). 
Nkubito was often targeted on RTLM; he was called an accomplice of the 
RPF. The fi rst time Nsanzuwera heard his own name on RTLM was in late 
February or early March 1994, when he arrested a suspect in the killing of 
Minister Gatabazi: he was threatened on the radio (ICTR transcript, 23 April 
2001: 85–95). An RTLM transcript of 30 March 1994 contains an exchange 
regarding two visits of  RTLM broadcasters to Prosecutor Nkubito’s offi ce 
(ICTR exhibit P41B: 9–10). The journalists revelled in recounting that youth 
surrounded the prosecutors offi ce threatening consequences should action be 
taken against them.7
On 30 March 1994, an RTLM broadcaster incited Hutus against Tutsis by 
making false claims about a supposed plot to exterminate Hutus in the Bugesera 
region. This was particularly incendiary in light of the massacres of Tutsis that 
took place in that region in March 1992, after a similar communiqué was read 
on the air (ICTR exhibit P41B: 1).8 In the same emission, RTLM broadcaster 
Valérie Bemeriki called for violence and shooting on the spot. 
In RTLM broadcases on 10, 11 and 14 March 1994, Bemeriki acknowledged 
that RTLM was being called ‘Radio Nkotsa’ (Nkotsa is a bird that signifi es 
doom and bad omens (ICTR transcript, 14 October 2002: 2)). She also warned 
the conseillier who used this term, and went on to say that RTLM teaches 
Rwandans how to behave, and that it awakens all Rwandans including those 
in the army. She went on to target specifi c Tutsis in a certain area, referring 
to them as people ‘all from the same ethnic group’ congregating for ‘dubious 
purposes’ (ICTR exhibit P36/53B). 
International journalist Collette Braeckman testifi ed that during a March 
1994 conference on the role of the press in Kigali, she was present at a session 
when Rwandan journalist François Byabyibwanzi spoke, saying that some of the 
press were emphasizing ethnic groups and telling people to be ‘suspicious of our 
neighbours’; he said that this type of discussion ‘could push Rwandans to kill 
each other’. According to Braeckman, Byabyibwanzi ‘particularly questioned 
RTLM’. Nahimana and Gaspard Gahigi, the editor-in-chief of RTLM attended 
that conference (ICTR transcript, 29 November 2001: 98–107, 111). 
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Witness BI testifi ed that in the pre-April period she was mentioned several 
times on RTLM as an accomplice of the enemy, and each mention was followed 
by an attack (ICTR transcript, 8 May 2001: 80–98). She and other human rights 
activists would listen to RTLM because the broadcasters had started to mention 
specifi c neighbourhoods and name individual people; some hours later these 
neighbourhoods and individuals would be attacked and ransacked by members 
of the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi. In March 1994, these youth militias 
were omnipresent, uniformed, carrying radios and singing songs about the 
extermination of the enemy (ICTR transcript, 8 May 2001: 61–71). 
On 30 March 1994, notorious extremist Coalition pour la Défense de la 
République (CDR) party member Katumba9 was killed in Kigali. RTLM 
transcripts show that immediately on his death, his brother came to RTLM for 
‘assistance’ (ICTR exhibit P103/187B: K0113770). In a 1 April 1994 emission, 
RTLM broadcasters target people, including a Tutsi doctor, who they claim to 
be the killers based on what they refer to as rumours (ICTR exhibit P103/189B: 
K0165912–3).
RTLM was in the business of stirring up trouble by interpreting mundane 
disputes as part of the enemy’s supposed master plan to destroy the majority 
people (that is, Hutus). According to RTLM, any controversy, no matter how 
big or small, was due to the RPF and Tutsi. On 30 March 1994, law students 
at the faculty of  law in Mburabutaro were protesting their conditions. On 
RTLM, Valérie Bemeriki and another journalist both suggested the strike was 
an Inkontanyi trick (ICTR exhibits P41B: 12–13 and P103/187B: K0113761). 
The second journalist, however, was unprepared for the live response given to 
him on the scene by a courageous student who protested the station’s blaming 
the strike, and everything else, on Tutsis and demanded that the station verify 
its reports (ICTR exhibit P103/187B: K0113753–6). 
On 2 April 1994, RTLM claimed that moderate Hutu Prime Minister Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana was planning to assassinate the president and would stage a 
coup with those who came from her own prefecture. It went on to announce 
that if  the president was killed, the Tutsis be exterminated. Five days later, 
Agathe Uwilingiyimana was indeed killed by the Presidential Guard (ICTR 
transcript, Nsanzuwera testimony, 23 April 2001: 95–8). 
Also on 2 April, one broadcaster repeatedly attacks two of RTLM’s favourite 
pre-7 April 1994 targets, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, and moderate Joseph 
Kavaruganda, president of the Supreme Court of Appeal, both of whom were 
killed violently on 7 April:
Mrs Uwilingiyimana Agathe is alerting people that she saw a person with a 
dagger [near her house]. Imagine that this is the fi rst time she sees a person 
carrying a weapon!! Now if  you go to visit Mrs Uwilinigiyimana you have 
to be thoroughly searched. It is a pity that there is little confi dence. (ICTR 
exhibit P103/190B: K0147056) 
How is Mrs Uwilinigiyimana Agathe, minister of the never ending transitional 
government? She is also threatened! She says that she spends sleepless nights 
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though she is protected by UNAMIR troops. She is terrifi ed by a knife!! 
People were really astonished when they heard the statement on the radio! 
They ask themselves why such a statement about the knife is broadcasted 
before any investigation is made! What would have happened if  they had 
seen a gun! (ICTR exhibit P103/190B: K0147059) 
I think people should know that diamond can cut diamond. What is a shame 
after all is to hear a statement from the Prime Minister’s offi ce that they have 
seen a simple knife! A knife, which has not even a safety catch! The visitor 
could even hold a gun or show it to the security service of the Prime Minister. 
They could then keep it for him! So, there must be ‘something in the wind’ 
for those people who think they could be killed. They should not think 
they are wanted because of power sharing, but it is rather because of their 
treachery! A person named Kavaruganda, Joseph, President of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal, is also afraid because of his treachery. That is fi ne! Should 
they be afraid since those traitors have betrayed the people! (ICTR exhibit 
P103/190B: K0147060) 
Kavaruganda is screamingly funny! Because of  his wickedness, he has no 
driver! (ICTR exhibit P103/190B: K0147060)
Mugenzi Justin, president of PL party, said at Nyamirambo regional stadium 
that those who plot against our republic will undergo a terrible disaster and 
that that disaster is death which always threatens people like Kavaruganda 
and Agathe. (ICTR exhibit P103/190B: K0147061)
In a 3 April 1994 emission, an RTLM broadcaster repeatedly goes after Tutsis 
as well as Kavaruganda once again:
There are lots of  information. Mr Twiringiyimana Augustin who lives in 
Sector Rusiga in Shyorongi has just phoned me to ask RTLM to condemn 
Tutsis who send names of Hutus to the RPF so that they can be exterminated. 
So we ask you Noel to inform the people about our imminent death. (ICTR 
exhibit P103/192F: K0147079)
[People] have sent RTLM a list of persons who are accomplices of Inkontanyis.
Those persons are the following: Mr Sebucinganda of  Butete in Kidaho 
commune, Ms. Laurencia Kura, wife of Gakenyeri, living in Butete sector, 
The Counsellor of Butete Sector is also an accomplice of Inkontanyis. (ICTR 
exhibit P103/192F: K0147080)
And Kavarurganda!? Will he go to Shyorongi to rest there? He will not fi nd 
a way to go there. People will not allow him to arrive at the place. He cannot 
dare go there now if  he is a man. I saw the people of  Kimihurura asking 
his bodyguards to shoot him but the latter laughed. I was watching. (ICTR 
exhibit P103/192F: K0147087)
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Mugabo Xavier who lives in Kagarama was seriously beaten by Makuza’s 
relations. They have robbed him of everything. Keep courageous and take 
care dear brother! Your neighbors are known and they are Tutsi relations 
of Gastete. The latter has fl ed and his whereabouts are not known. Among 
your neighbors we can name the three brothers who work at Rwanda foam 
and whose names are Marco and Victory. People who beat you are known 
but we think there is no problem since you are also strong. (ICTR exhibit 
P103/192F: K0147086) 
Two Hutus particularly targeted by RTLM in the pre-7 April period were 
André Gasesero (a primary school teacher) and Zacharia Serubyobo (a 
tradesman). Both were horrifi cally killed in April 1994. For RTLM, the only 
thing almost as bad as a Tutsi was a ‘Hutu who does not remember ... the 
Revolution of 1959’.10 Witness GO knew these two men well and testifi ed in 
detail about several pre-April 1994 RTLM broadcasts inciting violence against 
them, particularly because they had good relations with their Tutsi neighbours 
and were falsely said to be involved in plots against Hutus. They became so hated 
as a result of RTLM’s broadcasts that even their valuables were destroyed after 
they were killed. GO testifi ed to RTLM’s pre-April targeting of other moderate 
Hutus and Tutsis in that same neighbourhood, who were later slain during the 
genocide (ICTR transcripts, 22 and 23 March 1994, and 10 April 2001: 62–7, 
92–3, 100–101; exhibits P36/43D and P33: K0032661–K0032662).
Another witness, FW, testifi ed that even before 7 April 1994, he heard 
incendiary ethnically oriented songs by the notorious anti-Tutsi musician Simon 
Bikindi, ethnic propaganda and the notoriously anti-Tutsi ‘Ten commandments 
of Hutus’ on RTLM (ICTR transcript, 1 March 2001: 122–3). 
Radio Rwanda journalist Thomas Kamilindi testifi ed that from January to 
April 1994, RTLM broadcast messages that brought fear to the Tutsi people 
and to the political opponents of the regime. He went on to state that during 
this period RTLM
[O]ften talked about the history of  Rwanda, how the history of  Rwanda 
evolved, with emphasis on domination and colonization of Tutsis over Hutus. 
And they referred to 1959, saying that it was the victory of the Hutus over that 
colonization. But also about the war – they said that the RPF was infi ltrating 
through bars, drinking bars that were being opened in the town, and that 
young Tutsi girls were infi ltrating all the way to the top commandant of 
UNAMIR. Commander General Dallaire, according to RTLM, the Tutsis 
of RPF, the Inyenzi – the enemy Inyenzi had given him a woman to live with 
him, a companion. (ICTR transcript, 21 May 2001: 68)
Dr Alison Des Forges noted that, well before 6 April 1994: ‘Often RTLM’s 
attacks on UNAMIR were personalized at General Dallaire and in many cases 
involved insinuations of sexual activity between UNAMIR offi cers and Tutsi 
women’ (ICTR transcript, 22 May 2002: 119). 
Even Jean-Marie Biju-Duval, lead counsel for Ferdinand Nahimana, has 
stated in regard to RTLM’s broadcasts of January through March (particularly 
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March) 1994, ‘the propaganda that was being broadcast albeit, this is very 
unfortunate – was a political propaganda based on ethnic views’ (ICTR 
transcript, 25 April 2001: 21–2).
People were afraid of RTLM, and they nicknamed it ‘Radio Rutswitsi’even 
before 7 April 1994 (rutswitsi means to burn, which in Rwanda refers to sowing 
and spreading ethnic violence (ICTR transcript, Nsanzuwera testimony, 24 
April 2001: 42–3)). The messages of hate and ethnic violence were so frequent 
that people were very afraid of RTLM. They believed they had to listen to it 
constantly. Well before April 1994, one would fi nd little radios in offi ces, cafés, 
bars, taxis – everywhere people gathered, they would be listening to RTLM 
(ICTR transcript, 23 April 2001: 50–5, 75–85, 87–8, and 24 April: 42–3). People 
told Prosecutor Nsanzuwera that they would even pay journalists not to have 
their names mentioned on RTLM, because it was considered a death sentence 
(ICTR transcript, 23 April 2001: 95). The messages of RTLM were messages 
of  hatred and of  incitement to violence even before 7 April. Overwhelming 
evidence suggests that RTLM was created for the reality that came later. As 
one witness testifi ed: the genocide didn’t happen in one day after beginning on 
7 April, because before 7 April RTLM prepared the genocide, and after 7 April 
it implemented it (ICTR transcript, GO testimony, 10 April 2001: 44–5). 
Finally, it is important to observe that warning calls to be on guard against 
the FPR and to prepare for war were accompanied by statements claiming 
and highlighting the unchangeable nature of ethnic differences: Hutus should 
recognize each other, assemble together, learn their secret, in the face of the 
‘international Tutsi community’, which is raising funds (RTLM broadcasts 
of 25 and 26 October 1993). In a programme recorded on 31 October 1993, 
Ferdinand Nahimana recalled that 90 per cent of RPF members were Tutsis. In 
November 1993, RTLM affi rmed that the Inkotanyi were the direct successors of 
the Inyenzi, who had already launched attacks in 1962 and 1967, that President 
Obote had helped Rwanda, but the Inyenzi were allies of Museveni. Concerning 
the events in Burundi, RTLM broadcaster Noël Hitimana was happy that Mrs 
Agathe Uwilingiyimana had at last recognized that a Hutu is a Hutu and a 
Tutsi a Tutsi. He then embarked on commentaries on the cultural, physical 
and psychological distinctions between a Hutu and a Tutsi. In conclusion, he 
hurled: ‘You can be recognized, irrespective of your physical appearance’ or 
the shape of your nose – the difference is like that between a white and a black 
(Chrétien et al. expert report: ICTR exhibits P117B and P163B: 26793; ICTR 
exhibits P117B, P163B, P36/4C: K0146846). 
Additional references to pre-7 April 1994, criminal RTLM broadcasts can 
be found throughout the Chrétien et al. expert report tendered into evidence 
in the Media Trial (exhibits P117B and P163B).
RTLM’S INFECTIOUS STYLE BEFORE 6 APRIL 1994
speak to me as to thy thinkings,
As thou dost ruminate, and give thy worst of thoughts
The worst of words.
William Shakespeare, Othello Act 3 Scene 3
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In a conference paper presented in March 1994, RTLM editor-in-chief Gaspard 
Gahigi claimed that Radio Rwanda’s formal and outmoded language was a 
major reason for its lack of impact on the Rwandan population. According to 
Gahigi, Rwandans were ‘poorly informed’ because the ‘offi cial media has ... 
retained its traditional rhetoric’ (ICTR exhibit P76: 16). RTLM, on the other 
hand, presented informal and unstructured commentaries on various subjects, 
usually in the form of dialogues, and relied on lengthy interviews with guests to 
fi ll time. They also introduced the modern concept of audience participation, 
broadcasting RTLM’s studio telephone number and inviting listeners to call 
in with their comments. Broadcasters often relayed messages from listeners 
or referred to conversations they had had with those who called the station 
(Article 19 1996: 84–7).
On many occasions before April 1994, RTLM’s broadcasts were crude. The 
incredibly heavy drinking and unprofessionalism for which Noël Hitimana 
lost his position as a Radio Rwanda broadcaster became an asset at RTLM. 
His alcoholism also provided material for jokes that were no doubt intended 
to shock listeners. On 3 April 1994, Hitimana used shock humour by making 
light of his drinking with a listener who, supposedly, telephoned to ask why he 
was always in such a good mood. Hitimana responded by using a traditional 
expression to broach the taboo subject of alcoholism and joked about the extent 
of his drinking (ICTR transcript, 5 November 2002: 119–21).
In that same broadcast, Hitimana, who was notorious for his vulgarity, used 
the act of passing wind as a metaphor – ‘If a person breaks wind it’s better if it 
stinks’ (ICTR exhibit P103/192F: K0147081). This type of language, although 
shocking and offensive to some listeners, attracted a certain section of the 
population who were to form its most avid fans: young people and delinquents. 
This was an important target audience as young, destitute people formed the 
vast majority of militia members, with the exception of high-ranking leaders 
who tended to be older and part of the elite. This was a group that had not 
been impressed by the standard government propaganda about the RPF 
and Tutsis, based on uninteresting and obscure references to the past. In his 
writings, Ferdinand Nahimana (1993: 21) once quoted an elderly informant 
who said that oral history might be lost because ‘our children are more 
fascinated by the radio’. RTLM set out to be the radio station that fascinated 
and captured the minds of the youth. In August 1993, Nahimana explained 
to Reporters Sans Frontières reporter Phillippe Dahinden that RTLM was 
‘an entertainment radio geared to the youth’ (ICTR transcript, 24 October 
2000: 68–74). 
Witness Z1 for Nahimana’s defence noted the immaturity of RTLM’s listeners 
and the danger some messages posed to young minds even before the plane crash 
(ICTR transcript, 5 November 2002: 100–1). Z1 testifi ed that even before 6 April 
1994, RTLM broadcasted ‘incendiary messages’ and such messages could have 
been received negatively by listeners who were not ‘mature enough to analyze 
such information’ (ICTR transcript, 5 November 2002: 93–4).
THE PRE-GENOCIDE CASE AGAINST RTLM 325
THE JOURNALISTS HIRED BY RTLM BEFORE 6 APRIL 1994
According to the accused, Ferdinand Nahimana, RTLM journalists were the 
cream of the crop and only became unprofessional and unhinged alcoholic, 
marijuana smokers after 6 April:
I said that after the 6th of  April until July, these were not journalists like 
the ones I had known before; Kantano, Gahigi, all of them, before the 6th 
of April, they were normal journalists. Now what happened after the 6th of 
April, in fact I am able to deduce that their behavior, the way they acted was 
because of  the state of  war, amongst other things, the drugs and alcohol, 
which was exaggerated. And then another element ... which I found that 
maybe exacerbated the behavior of these journalists, on the 17th of April 
1994, when a bomb fell on the RTLM building and journalist Hitimana was 
hit and his leg had to be amputated ... and these journalists were unnerved ... 
Otherwise, I do not want to give the impression that before the 6th of April 
these journalists were not good journalists. They were among the cream of 
journalists before the 6th of  April 1994. (ICTR transcript, 25 September 
2002: 27–8) 
Nahimana’s testimony was rebutted by his own witness, Z1, who was in as 
good a position as the accused to know the truth (ICTR transcript, 5 November 
2002: 99–100):
Q: I am asking you, did RTLM journalists discredit RTLM before the 6th 
of April 1994? Yes or no.
A: Yes.
Q: ... Why do you say that RTLM journalists were not la crème de la crème 
before the 6th of April 1994?
A: According to the information that you gave to me, that is, RTLM 
journalists being cream of the cream, I would say that I do not agree with 
that assertion, because I have an experience, and my experience is that among 
those journalists there were some journalists who had worked at ORINFOR 
and had been dismissed from ORINFOR due to lack of  professionalism 
and lack of seriousness, and since I was among the leaders, senior offi cials 
of ORINFOR, I knew that those journalists were not competent, and they 
were working in RTLM. I knew that they were not the cream of the crop, 
because I knew why they had been dismissed.
When asked questions about three of  the RTLM journalists (Hitimana, 
Rucogoza and Gahigi) who had previously worked at ORINFOR, witness 
Z1 was able to provide specifi c information about their misconduct (ICTR 
transcript, 5 November 2002: 102–4). He recounted that he had seen Noël 
Hitimana (one of  the fi rst journalists hired by RTLM in 1993) drunk while 
he was working at ORINFOR. Although Hitimana was fi red after a specifi c 
episode of misconduct, his alcoholism was chronic and persistent and he was 
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not fi red for that episode alone, but because the administration’s patience had 
fi nally run out. 
Z1 testifi ed that ORINFOR employee Emmanuel Rucogoza, who came to 
work for RTLM in January 1994, was sacked and dismissed from ORINFOR 
for misconduct and ‘there was also the fact that he was incompetent’ (ICTR 
transcript, 6 November 2002: 17–18). Regarding Gaspard Gahigi, hired by 
RTLM in 1993, Z1 stated: ‘What I can remember about [Mr Gahigi] is that at 
times he drank a bit, a bit too much, and I believe it was not acceptable’ (ICTR 
transcript, 7 November 2002: 63). 
Another RTLM journalist who began working for RTLM in January 1994, 
Valérie Bemeriki, was an Interahamwe (ICTR transcript, 10 April 2003: 33–4). 
Georges Ruggiu, who also began working for RTLM in January 1994, had no 
previous journalism experience.
Cream of the crop? – certainly not. RTLM offi cials employed the bottom 
of the barrel to assist them in their criminal enterprise. An enterprise often 
aimed at mobilizing the lowest common denominator. As Hitler wrote in Mein
Kampf: ‘All propaganda has to be popular and has to adapt its spiritual level 
to the perception of the least intelligent of those towards whom it intends to 
direct itself.’
CONCLUSION 
Long before the common era, Pindar stressed that ‘words have a longer life 
than deeds’ (Pindar 518–438 BC). In more modern times, ‘[Edmund] Burke said 
there were three estates in parliament; but in the reporters’ gallery yonder, there 
sat a fourth estate more important than them all.’ RTLM’s broadcasts after 6 
April could not have had the impact they did without the several months of 
conditioning of the population by its earlier emissions. Although this review 
of RTLM’s impact before 6 April can leave no doubt that its broadcasts were 
violative of  international criminal and humanitarian law, the more diffi cult 
question remains at what point should the international community have 
stepped in to ban or jam its airwaves. 
In the Media Trial, the ICTR judges held that: ‘In considering whether 
particular expression constitutes a form of incitement on which restrictions 
would be justifi ed, the international jurisprudence does not include any specifi c 
causation requirement linking the expression at issue with the demonstration 
of a direct effect’ (ICTR 2003: para. 1007). The judges cited the Nuremberg 
verdict against Der Stürmer publisher Julius Streicher for the proposition that 
there need not be such a direct causal link: 
In the ... case of  Julius Streicher, there was no allegation that Streicher’s 
publication Der Stürmer was tied to any particular violence. Much more 
generally, it was found to have ‘injected into the minds of  thousands of 
Germans’ a ‘poison’ that caused them to support the National Socialist policy 
of Jewish persecution and extermination. In international humanitarian law 
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the question considered is what the likely impact might be, recognizing that 
causation in this context might be relatively indirect.
The Media Trial judges found no problem in criminalizing the pre-plane crash 
broadcasts along with those thereafter. There is no doubt that the likely impact 
of those earlier broadcasts was known to all, even if  the causation element of 
these early broadcasts was relatively indirect. 
The judges took pains to note that they were not troubled by a possible 
chilling effect of criminalizing such speech, where the objectionable speech was 
that of a powerful majority against a vulnerable minority:
1008. The Chamber notes that international standards restricting hate speech 
and the protection of freedom of expression have evolved largely in the context 
of national initiatives to control the danger and harm represented by various 
forms of prejudiced communication. The protection of free expression of 
political views has historically been balanced in the jurisprudence against 
the interest in national security. The dangers of censorship have often been 
associated in particular with the suppression of political or other minorities, 
or opposition to the government. The special protections developed by the 
jurisprudence for speech of this kind, in international law and more particularly 
in the American legal tradition of free speech, recognize the power dynamic 
inherent in the circumstances that make minority groups and political opposition 
vulnerable to the exercise of power by the majority or by the government. These 
circumstances do not arise in the present case, where at issue is the speech 
of  the so-called ‘majority population’, in support of  the government. The 
special protections for this kind of speech should accordingly be adapted, in 
the Chamber’s view, so that ethnically specifi c expression would be more rather 
than less carefully scrutinized to ensure that minorities without equal means of 
defence are not endangered.
1009. Moreover, the expression charged as incitement to violence was situated, 
in fact and at the time by its speakers, not as a threat to national security but 
rather in defence of national security, aligning it with state power rather than 
in opposition to it. Thus there is justifi cation for adaptation of the application 
of  international standards, which have evolved to protect the right of  the 
government to defend itself  from incitement to violence by others against it, 
rather than incitement to violence on its behalf  against others, particularly 
as in this case when the others are members of  a minority group. (ICTR 
2003, emphasis added)
Although criminalizing the pre-April speech is justifi able under international 
law, the practicality and legality of jamming the airwaves of RTLM before 6 
April is not as clear. Before the international community resorts to jamming, 
the government (or moderate elements therein) ought to be given a chance 
to discipline broadcasters. In Rwanda, the moderate elements were thwarted 
at every juncture in their courageous attempts to call RTLM to order. The 
international community failed to support the efforts of those elements through 
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sanctions, fi nancial support and perhaps the creation of another radio station 
(the cure to objectionable speech often being more speech rather than less). If  
in future scenarios the international community seriously supports democratic 
reforms to counter hate speech, the last resort of jamming of a radio station 
by the international community (after most of the damage has already been 
done) may not be necessary. 
NOTES
 1. See, for example, the testimony of Dr Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch: ‘At the time, 
when I talked to people on the telephone, and I would say that I talked to General Dallaire; 
I talked to representatives of  the church; I talked to representatives of  nongovernmental 
organizations, as well as to many ordinary people – and I would say that, of those contacts I 
had, the vast majority talked of the need to silence RTLM. To me, this became an essential 
point of action. We who were trying to stop the genocide saw RTLM as a crucial aspect of 
that killing campaign ... in other words, it’s what people said to me at the time when I talked 
to them on the telephone. It was “stop this radio.” And the accounts of  daily broadcasts 
– whether they were naming specifi c targets, whether they were encouraging attacks in general 
– these struck terror into the hearts of the victims who listened to the radio, who listened to 
RTLM as much as they could. The victims listened to this radio. They took it seriously, as 
well as the assailants at the barriers and on the streets’ (ICTR transcript: 23 May 2002, para: 
265–9; see also, Des Forges 2002). 
 2. The judges found that RTLM broadcasts, to varying degrees, were criminal both before and 
after 6 April 1994 (ICTR 2003: para. 485–7, 953, 974, 1017).
 3. Kangura editor, Hassan Ngeze, testifi ed that this Kinyarwandan phrase appears in Kangura
46 because it is a quote from the RTLM general assembly, which both he and witness AHA 
covered (ICTR transcript, 1 April 2003: 81–6, and 3 April 2003: 5–9). Ngeze also testifi ed that 
this phrase essentially stems from a Rwandan proverb, ‘Aho umutindi yanitse ntilva’ (‘where 
an unfortunate person puts anything to dry, the sun will not shine’). One of the speakers at 
the general assembly changed the word ‘umutindi’ to ‘umututsi’, so that it would mean Tutsis 
have no chance (because of RTLM).
 4. See Hassan Ngeze’s trial testimony about the word ‘milk’ being used as reference to the Tutsi 
group, (ICTR transcript, 2 April 2003).
 5. Ndasingwa, a Tutsi, was regularly a target of RTLM prior to 7 April 1994. Ndasingwa was 
brutally killed on 7 April 1994, at home, alongside his Canadian wife.
 6. Kameya was killed during the genocide (ICTR transcript, 23 April 2001: 33–41).
 7. Nsanzuwera and Nkubito miraculously survived. The latter was able to exit the country with 
foreign assistance and the former narrowly escaped death numerous times while hiding in 
the Milles Collines hotel, and later in Kabuga, all the while still targeted by RTLM (ICTR 
transcript, Nsanzuwera testimony, 23–24 April 2001)
 8. In March 1992, a large massacre of Tutsi civilians by machete occurred after the repeated 
broadcasting of a controversial incendiary tract on Radio Rwanda. Nahimana was the director 
of ORINFOR at the time and authorized the broadcast of this unverifi ed tract. 
 9. For information about Katumba’s CDR activities, see ICTR exhibit P128 (as read out in court 
on 16 May 2002) and testimony of Agnes Murebwayire on 4 December 2001.
10. The Revolution of 1959 signifi es the Hutu overthrow of the Tutsi regime, and often involved 
machetes.
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The Challenges in Prosecuting Print 
Media for Incitement to Genocide
Charity Kagwi-Ndungu
It is up to the Inyenzis now to demonstrate that they are courageous and 
to know what will happen in the future. They should understand that if 
they commit the slightest mistake, then all of them will perish, and that 
if they make a mistake of once again attacking, launching an attack, no 
accomplice will survive in Rwanda. They should know that today all Hutus 
have become united; we’re united as one man.
Hassan Ngeze (1994)
The standard arguments for free speech are well known. We cannot know the 
truth or the value of an hypothesis if  its opponents are forbidden to challenge 
it or if  its proponents are not allowed to defend it. Most of  an individual’s 
beliefs, including his or her scientifi c beliefs, are justifi ed by his or her perception 
that they have emerged unscathed from the free confrontation of ideas and the 
unrestrained search for facts. We would be hard pressed to fi nd a single idea 
now generally accepted that was not offensive to the majority at some time in 
history.
Throughout history, institutions and individuals have engaged in large-scale 
efforts to persuade and convince others of  the rightness of  their ideological 
views, cultural values and beliefs. The truth is that there have always been excuses 
and rationales for slavery, for the genocide of  Jews, Gypsies and American 
Indians, with racial and cultural terms of ‘us and them’ and with the theft of 
land and resources. 
The crime of ‘incitement to genocide’ knocks against the right to freedom 
of  expression. The challenge is how to counter future war propaganda and 
speeches that jeopardize the lives of  minority groups. Some parameters are 
laid down in the international law, especially in the landmark judgment in The
Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze,
case no. ICTR-99–52-T (the ‘Media Trial’) on the responsibility of the media 
and journalists and their role in the crimes committed in confl ict situations 
without jeopardizing press freedom. 
The defi nition of genocide set forth in the genocide convention (UN 1951) 
is authoritative and has been incorporated verbatim into the statutes of 
the Yugoslavian and Rwandan tribunals as well as those of  the permanent 
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International Criminal Court. In addition to the crime of  genocide itself, 
the genocide convention provides that the following acts shall be punishable: 
conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide.
Article III(c) of  the convention prohibits ‘direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide’. In specifying this distinct act, the crime is crafted in such a 
way as to preclude any defence of freedom of expression. The crime of direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide, like conspiracy, is an inchoate crime, 
in that the prosecution need not make proof of any result. It is suffi cient to 
establish that:
• The act of direct and public incitement took place.
• The direct and public incitement was intentional.
• It was carried out with the intent to destroy a protected group in whole 
or in part.
The genocide convention is not the only international document that speaks 
to the concept of freedom of expression. During the relevant period in 1994, 
Rwanda was a party to the following international conventions and treaties 
that directly address the limits of freedom of expression:
• Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(UN 1951) – ratifi ed by Rwanda 16 April 1975.
• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN 1966a) – ratifi ed 
by Rwanda 16 April 1975; Articles 19 and 20 specifi cally identify the 
right of freedom of expression, its limits and the responsibilities that are 
associated with this right.
• Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (UN 1966b) – ratifi ed by Rwanda 16 April 1975.
• International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN 
1966c) – ratifi ed by Rwanda 16 April 1975.
• International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination (UN 1965) – ratifi ed by Rwanda 16 April 1975; in Article 5, 
‘state parties undertake to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination in 
all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as 
to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law’.
• African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (OAU 1981) – ratifi ed by 
Rwanda 15 July 1983; Article 9 provides that ‘every individual shall have 
the right to receive information’ and ‘every individual shall have the right 
to express and disseminate his opinions within the law’. 
These conventions show that freedom of expression is not absolute and can 
be limited in instances where it confl icts with the rights of others. Attaining the 
right balance between freedom of expression and its limits had indeed proved 
diffi cult in international law. ‘International law … requires a contextual analysis 
… The use of the right to freedom of expression, if  aimed to destroy the rights 
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of others, constitutes an abuse of that right and as such may be restricted by 
law’ (Farrior 1996). Although under international conventions and treaties all 
speech is protected, every one of these instruments also recognizes that certain 
restrictions on speech are permissible and are, in fact, often required to uphold 
certain other fundamental rights.
A BRIEF COMPARISON OF KANGURA AND DER STÜRMER
On 20 April 1923, the fi rst copy of Der Stürmer (‘The Attacker’) was published; 
71 years later in Rwanda the newspaper Kangura1 (‘Awake’) fi rst appeared. 
Fifty-nine issues of Kangura were published, more or less monthly, as well as 
a number of international issues. Publication ceased during the genocide and 
resumed in September 1994. 
Circulation
Der Stürmer circulation amounted to a few thousand, fl uctuating throughout 
the years of its publication. However, the sales fi gures do not refl ect the number 
of people who actually read Der Stürmer or Kangura. Der Stürmer was displayed 
in specially constructed cases all over Germany. Constructed by local supporters 
in places where people naturally congregated – bus stops, parks, street corners, 
etc. – these display cases were often large and adorned with phrases from the 
paper such as ‘Die Juden Sind Unser Unglück’ (‘The Jews are our misfortune’) 
(Bytwerk 2001). 
Before the genocide, approximately 66 per cent of Rwandans were literate. 
Kangura was printed in relatively small numbers, but each issue was circulated 
to numerous readers. It was common practice for a person to buy a newspaper, 
photocopy it and distribute it, read it to his neighbour who could not read and 
read it in public places for people to listen (ICTR transcript, Marcel Kabanda, 
13 May 2001: 58–9).
In January 1992, an article written by François Akimana, president of 
the Executive Committee of the National Parti pour la libération du peuple 
Hutu (PALIPEHUTU), describes the circulation of Kangura’s international 
edition:
I do not have words to describe the prevailing situation. When this issue 
of the Kangura newspaper appeared, in some areas of Bujumbura, all the 
Hutus, particularly PALIPEHUTU members, heaved a deep sigh of relief. 
They distributed the newspaper everywhere, including prisons, to the extent 
that a copy could cost up to a 1,000 Burundi francs, that is, if  you are lucky 
enough to get one because some people preferred to frame them so they could 
enlighten all family members. (Akimana 1992)
During the Media Trial, several witnesses gave evidence of this system of 
oral reporting. Witness FS (ICTR transcript, 7 February 2000: 40–1) stated 
that in Rwanda, people commonly read to each other. For example, he said an 
illiterate person might ask his child who goes to school to help him read articles 
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from newspapers. Thus, people who could not read bought Kangura and asked 
others to read it for them.
Witness ABE (ICTR transcript, 27 February 2000: 49–50) stated that the 
literacy levels in Rwanda were very low; however, those who could read Kangura 
were able to explain it to those who could not read and thus the messages were 
widely disseminated. Witness AGX (ICTR transcript, 21 June 2001: 74) testifi ed 
that although he did not buy Kangura, he borrowed copies from his neighbours 
and friends to read. Witness AFB (ICTR transcript, 6 March 2001: 23) stated 
that he did not buy Kangura but people who bought it would tell him the main 
points in each issue. Defence witness RM 10 (ICTR transcript, 20 January 2003: 
34), who was illiterate, said that she would buy Kangura and ask someone to 
read it to her; she stated that this was a common practice in Rwanda. 
Style
Like Der Stürmer, Kangura was fi lled with stories of scandal and crime. The 
articles were written by the editor Hassan Ngeze, a couple of staff  writers and 
readers who submitted articles. Like Der Stürmer, the quality of the publication 
from a purely journalistic standpoint was lamentable. Nevertheless, both 
Kangura and Der Stürmer enjoyed enormous infl uence and support from leading 
authorities. Both were written in a style that the average person could easily 
understand. The writing was simple and straightforward, using short sentences 
and basic vocabulary. Ideas were repeated. Headlines, such as ‘Inhabitants of 
Kigali remain vigilant: the enemy is still among us’ (Kangura no. 20, August 
1991) grabbed the reader’s attention. And the cartoons were easily understood. 
Both journals adopted their local community’s style of  speaking, and had a 
similar effect. 
In Der Stürmer, caricatures were used to present various themes of  anti-
Semitism. Jews were depicted as unshaven, short and fat with large, hooked 
noses and bulging eyes. They were also shown as vermin, snakes and spiders. The 
female form was often displayed nude or partly nude. In Der Stürmer, ‘Aryan’ 
women were often illustrated as the victims of Jews. These nude women made 
the paper especially attractive to young males (Bytwerk 2001). 
Kangura also printed caricatures that were easy to comprehend by a largely 
illiterate community. The images were graphic and reinforce its message of 
morbid psychological antagonism of the Hutu masses against the Tutsi ethnic 
group. In Kangura, Tutsi women were depicted as seductress spies, and the Tutsi 
feudal regime was a consistent theme.
While Der Stürmer focused on a worldwide conspiracy of the Jews to take over 
the world based on the protocols of the elders of Zion,2 Kangura propagated 
the ancient plan of the Tutsi to conquer the Central Africa region.3 This was 
a theory based on the 19 Tutsi commandments.4 It linked Tutsis living inside 
Rwanda with those who had exploited Hutus in the past, with the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) and with all the Tutsi in the diaspora. For example, in 
a Kangura editorial in July 1991, Hassan Ngeze (1991) asserts: ‘Tutsis always 
seek to reconquer power which Gahutu seized.’5 He states that it can be proven 
that 85 per cent of Tutsis within the country have close or loose ties with the 
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refugees and have become Inyenzi-inkotanyi. He warns that Tutsis within the 
country always help their brothers, work day and night and never surrender. His 
message was clear that the Inyenzi were supported by Tutsis the world over.
Impact
Albert Forster, Gauleiter of Danzig, wrote:
With pleasure I say that the Stürmer, more than any other daily or weekly 
newspaper, has made clear to the people in simple ways the danger of Jewry. 
Without Julius Streicher and his Stürmer, the importance of  a solution 
to the Jewish question would not be seen to be as critical as it actually is 
by many citizens. It is therefore to be hoped that those who want to learn 
the unvarnished truth about the Jewish question will read the Stürmer.
(Bytwerk 2001)
Similar letters came from Heinrich Himmler (1937) and other prominent 
Nazis. In a leading article in Der Stürmer, Streicher wrote about the paper’s 
impact and goal:
The continued work of the Stürmer will help to ensure that every German 
down to the last man will, with heart and hand, join the ranks of  those 
whose aim is to crush the head of the serpent Pan-Juda beneath their heels. 
He who helps to bring this about helps to eliminate the devil. And this devil 
is the Jew. (Streicher 1937)
Similarly the impact of Kangura in shaping public opinion about the Tutsis 
in Rwanda and neighbouring countries was phenomenal. In Kangura no. 54 
published in January of 1994, Hassan Ngeze informs the readers of Kangura
that he has fulfi lled his self-appointed task of uniting the Hutu and revealing 
to the people who the Tutsi is. He states this in a section titled ‘The role of 
Kangura in the salvation of Rwanda’:
Before Rwanda was attacked, Kangura revealed the plan. We started urging 
the Hutus to unite, not to listen to what the enemy was asking them to do, 
especially as the enemy was the cause of the war amongst them. From that 
time, the truth preached by KANGURA has played a remarkable role in the 
reconciliation of Hutus and the return of those who had been misled. Today, 
Hutus from different parties meet, discuss and share a drink. The irrefutable 
proof of this is the speech Justin MUGENZI delivered during the MRND 
meeting the day before yesterday in Nyamirambo. Who could have thought 
that MUGENZI will one day become an Interahamwe? Kangura’s role will 
be studied in the history of Rwanda and that of the region we live in where 
a lot of Tutsis reside; Besides, Kangura has revealed to the coming generation 
who the Tutsi is. (ICTR transcript, Marcel Kabanda, 16 May 2002: 176, 
emphasis added; Ngeze 1994)
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It was clear that the message in Kangura was read and taken seriously by 
the Rwandan community. In the Akayesu case, the Trial Chamber held that, 
‘In light of the culture of Rwanda, acts of incitement can be viewed as direct 
or not, by focusing mainly on the issue of whether the persons for whom the 
message was intended immediately grasped the implication thereof ’ (ICTR 
1998a: para. 558).
The message in an article signed by François Akimana, the president of 
PALIPEHUTU, refl ects the effect of Kangura. In reference to international issue 
3, he states that for the Hutus, ‘Kangura has become a culture, an extraordinary 
culture which reassured them in the same manner as Baby Jesus, and when 
Christmas Day came’ (Akimana 1992: 5; ICTR transcript, Kabanda, 14 May 
2002: 131–4). He goes on to describe the reaction of the Tutsis in Burundi when 
they saw the issue: ‘They fell sick, they had liver crisis. They died because of 
the truth that they had come to see in Kangura newspapers.’
CALL FOR EXTERMINATION
In December 1941, Julius Streicher wrote that ‘if  the danger of ... reproduction 
of that curse of God in the Jewish blood is fi nally to come to an end, then there 
is only one way – the extermination of that people whose father is the devil’ 
(Taylor 1992: 378). 
Issue 26 (November 1991) of Kangura was titled ‘Tutsi: race Of God!? What 
arms shall we use to conquer the Inyenzi once and for all?’ (ICTR exhibit P7 
translated in P115/26/A: K015110). In this issue, the Tutsi ethnic group was 
ironically referred to as ‘the race of God’.6 The question about conquering the 
Inyenzi once and for all carried an ominous message calling for a fi nal solution 
to the evil that, according to Kangura, the Tutsi ethnic group posed in Rwanda. 
An article on page 7, informed readers that:
Historians and sociologists tell us that Rwanda is inhabited by three ethnic 
groups, which are the Twas, the Hutu, and the Tutsi. They say that these ethnic 
groups can co-exist in harmony and work together if  Tutsis do not behave 
themselves in a bragging manner, people who like to boast, talk a lot, tell lies 
and are hypocrites, people who are never satisfi ed and people who want to have 
everything, they’re thieves, they are involved in intrigues, they are wicked, they 
are killers. And they are people who have grudges just like serpents. (ICTR 
transcript, Hassan Ngeze, 2 April 2003: 87–8; Moustapha 1991)
CHALLENGES FACED DURING THE MEDIA TRIAL
Translation of Kangura
One of the greatest challenges was that not all 73 Kangura issues were translated 
into English and French. This was and still is a subject in contention with the 
defence. When litigated before the Trial Chamber, it was held that such an 
exercise would stretch the resources of the Tribunal beyond its capacity. The 
Trial Chamber noted that the resources of the tribunal were not unlimited and 
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that only the relevant portions need be translated. The defence attourneys were 
asked to explore less expensive measures, such as securing the cooperation of 
their clients who were fl uent in Kinyarwanda and French or using Kinyarwanda 
investigators. 
Addressing this matter in the judgement, the Chamber noted that: defence 
counsel availed themselves of the opportunity to select issues for translation and 
that copies of all issues within the custody of the prosecution were furnished 
years ago to the defence in hard copy and electronically on a CD-ROM. 
The Chamber also noted that the extracts of  Kangura relied on by both the 
prosecution and the defence were read into the trial record during presentation 
of both their cases. This included simultaneous translations into English and 
French. Thus, the relevant translations were provided to the Chamber for its 
consideration (ICTR 2003a: para. 44).
Temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Article 7 of the statute of the ICTR states:
The territorial jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for Rwanda shall 
extend to the territory of Rwanda including its land surface and airspace as 
well as to the territory of neighboring States in respect of serious violations 
of  international humanitarian law committed by Rwandan citizens. The 
temporal jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for Rwanda shall extend 
to a period beginning on 1 January 1994 and ending on 31 December 1994. 
(ICTR 1994: article 7)
Only fi ve issues of Kangura were published in 1994 before the genocide. The 
famous ten commandments of the Hutu were only republished in December 
1990. The 19 Tutsi commandments were also republished in Kangura in 
November 1990.
The defence contention, which is still a matter of appeal, was that the Chamber 
had no jurisdiction over Kangura issues published before 1994. In pre-trial rulings, 
the Court held that although many of the events referred to in the indictment 
preceded 1 January 1994, such events ‘provide a relevant background and a 
basis for understanding the Accused’s alleged conduct in relation to the Rwanda 
Genocide of 1994’ (ICTR 1999: para. 3). The Appeals Chamber confi rmed the 
Trial Chamber’s decision that an accused could not be held accountable for 
crimes committed before 1994 and that such events would not be referred to 
‘except for historical purposes or information’ (ICTR 2000a: 6).
Evidence was adduced that, in March 1994 (issues 58 and 59: 7–11), Kangura 
called on and directed its readers to read almost all editions of the newspaper 
by publishing ten questions, whose answers could be found in previous issues,
and offered several prizes. In its judgement, the Trial Chamber held that ‘the 
competition was designed to direct participants to any and to all of  these 
issues of  the publication and that in this manner in March 1994 Kangura
effectively and purposely brought these issues back into circulation’ (ICTR 
2003a: para. 257).
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PROSECUTION OF JOURNALISM AT NUREMBURG 
The Media Trial marked the fi rst time since Nuremberg that hate speech had 
been prosecuted internationally as a war crime. The trial of Julius Streicher was 
characterized in the Akayesu judgement of the tribunal as the ‘most famous 
conviction for incitement’ (ICTR 1998a: para. 550). The different treatment of 
two Nazi defendants at Nuremberg – the publicist Julius Streicher and head 
of  the radio division of  the propaganda ministry, Hans Fritzsche – was an 
early indication of  ambiguity in international law regarding the incitement 
that would well outlast the Nuremberg trials. Streicher, a committed Nazi and 
the publisher of Der Stürmer, was convicted of crimes against humanity and 
hanged for having provoked hatred against the Jews and having called for the 
annihilation of the Jewish race. He received this punishment even though he 
had held no offi cial government or party position and his journal was not an 
offi cial party or state organ.
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg linked Streicher’s 
propaganda with the war crimes that had been carried out to establish a parallel 
to the specifi c intent requirement in criminal law. The tribunal held that 
Streicher’s incitement to murder and extermination at the time when Jews 
in the East were being killed under the most horrible conditions clearly 
constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds in connection with 
War Crimes, as defi ned by the Charter, and constitutes a Crime against 
Humanity. (Avalon Project 2005)
The tribunal’s reference to ‘crimes committed in the East’, and not those 
committed within Germany, implicitly linked the alleged crimes against humanity 
with war crimes. The link to the actual killing in the East also established an 
element of causation in the defi nition of actionable incitement, which seemed 
to require both inciting words and the physical realization of their message. 
Although not charged with ‘direct incitement’, Hans Fritzsche was accused 
of  inciting and encouraging the commission of  war crimes ‘by deliberately 
falsifying news to arouse in the German people those passions which led them 
to the commission of atrocities’. The Nuremberg Tribunal held that there was 
defi nite evidence of anti-Semitism in his broadcasts, and that he had blamed the 
war on the Jews. But, said the tribunal, ‘these speeches did not urge persecution 
or extermination of Jews.’ Consequently, it was ‘not prepared to hold that they 
were intended to incite the German people to commit atrocities on conquered 
peoples’. In effect, Fritzsche’s anti-Semitic propaganda was not ‘direct’ enough 
to consist of incitement to commit genocide.7
The Fritzsche holding set a tough standard of causality between targeted 
words and specifi c events. Although the tribunal characterized Fritzsche’s 
virulently anti-Semitic statements in his broadcasts as ‘strong statements of a 
propagandist nature’, it found no evidence of explicit calls for the extermination 
of the Jews (Avalon Project 2005). Accordingly, it concluded that it was ‘not 
prepared to hold that [these statements] were intended to incite the German 
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people to commit atrocities on conquered people’, and that Fritzsche ‘cannot 
be held to have been a participant in the crimes charged’. His aim was rather to 
arouse popular sentiment in support of Hitler and the German war effort. The 
term ‘on conquered people’ again suggests a focus on crimes against the peace. 
The tribunal held that Fritzsche was not aware that the information was false. It 
also noted that he was not aware of the extermination of the Jews in the East. 
His position and offi cial duties were also held not to be suffi ciently important to 
infer that he took part in the originating or formulating propaganda campaigns. 
Fritzsche was considered a ‘conduit’ of propaganda, not a liable participant.
DIRECT AND PUBLIC INCITEMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA
The crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide is punishable 
under Article 2(3)(C) of the Statute of  the ICTR and Article 4 (3)(e) of  the 
Statute of  the International Criminal Tribunal for the (former) Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). The ICTY has issued no indictments against journalists. In the fi rst 
conviction of the ICTR, for direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
the Trial Chamber described the essential elements of the crime of direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide:
directly provoking the perpetrator(s) to commit genocide, whether through 
speeches, shouting or threats uttered in public places or at public gatherings, 
or through the sale or dissemination, offer for sale or display of  written 
material or printed matter in public places or at public gatherings, or through 
the public display of  placards or posters, or through any other means of 
audiovisual communication. (ICTR 1998a: para. 559)
The Akayesu case determined that the mens rea required for the crime of 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide lies in the intent to prompt 
directly or to provoke another to commit genocide. It implies a desire on the 
part of the perpetrator to create by his or her actions a particular state of mind 
necessary to commit such a crime in the minds of the person(s) he or she is 
engaging. That is to say that the person who is inciting to commit genocide 
must have the specifi c intent to commit genocide, that is, to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such (ICTR 1998a: 
para. 560).
The Trial Chamber held that genocide fell within the category of  crimes 
so serious that direct and public incitement to commit such a crime must 
be punished as such, even when such incitement fails to produce the result 
expected by the perpetrator (ICTR 1998a: para. 552). Whether a communication 
constituted incitement depended on the context in Rwanda at the time of these 
events. The Chamber noted that the facts should be considered
on a case-by-case basis whether, in light of the culture of Rwanda and the 
specifi c circumstances of the instant case, acts of incitement can be viewed 
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as direct or not, by focusing mainly on the issue of whether the persons for 
whom the message was intended immediately grasped the implication thereof. 
(ICTR 1998a: para. 558)
The Akayesu Trial Chamber opined that the direct element of  incitement 
should be viewed in light of its cultural and linguistic content. It noted that a 
particular speech may be perceived as ‘direct’ in one country, but not in another 
depending on the audience (ICTR 1998a: para. 557). 
The next conviction for the crime of  direct and public incitement was in 
the case of  the Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu (ICTR 2000b). Others include: 
The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda (ICTR 1998b); The Prosecutor v. Eliézer 
Niyitegeka (ICTR 2003b); The Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli (ICTR 2003c).
PARAMETERS OF PRESS FREEDOM 
During the Media Trial, the Chamber examined a number of  articles and 
excerpts from Kangura, focusing primarily on those that addressed issues 
of  ethnicity and on those that called on readers to take action. During its 
deliberations, the Chamber accepted that the media has a role to play in the 
protection of democracy and, where necessary, the mobilization of civil defence 
for the protection of a nation and its people. The Chamber noted that what 
distinguished both Kangura and RTLM from an initiative to this end was their 
consistent identifi cation of  the enemy as the Tutsi population. Readers and 
listeners were not directed against individuals who were clearly defi ned as armed 
and dangerous. Instead, Tutsi civilians and in fact the Tutsi population as a 
whole were targeted (ICTR 2003a: para. 1025). 
The Chamber considered that it was critical to distinguish between the 
discussion of ethnic consciousness and the promotion of ethnic hatred (ICTR 
2003a: para. 1020). It also held that speech constituting ethnic hatred results 
from the stereotyping of ethnicity combined with its denigration (ICTR 2003a: 
para. 1021).
With regard to the RTLM broadcast stating that the Tutsi ‘are the ones who 
have all the money’, the Chamber held that, although this broadcast, which 
did not call on listeners to take any action, did not constitute direct incitement, 
it demonstrated the progression from ethnic consciousness to harmful ethnic 
stereotyping (ICTR 2003a: para. 1021).
The Chamber opined that the context in which the statement is made to 
be important. A statement provoking resentment against members of  an 
ethnic group would have a heightened impact in the context of  a genocidal 
environment. It would be more likely to lead to violence. At the same time the 
environment would be an indicator that incitement to violence was the intent 
of the statement (ICTR 2003a: para. 1022).
Although the Chamber accepted that Hassan Ngeze had only reprinted the 
ten Bahutu commandments and the 19 commandments of the Tutsi, it found 
that the clear intent of the publication of the latter was to spread fear that the 
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Tutsi endanger the Hutu, and of the former to tell the Hutu how to protect 
themselves from that danger (ICTR 2003a: para. 1022).8
The Chamber noted that the positioning of  the media with regard to the 
message indicates the real intent of the message, and to some degree the real 
message itself. The editor of Kangura and RTLM’s broadcast journalists did not 
distance themselves from the message of ethnic hatred; rather they purveyed it 
(ICTR 2003a: para. 1024).
The Chamber also noted that the editorials and articles reviewed during the 
trial consistently portrayed the Tutsi as wicked and ambitious, using women and 
money against the vulnerable Hutu (ICTR 2003a: para. 187). The presentation 
of Tutsi women as femmes fatales focused particular attention on them and the 
danger they represented to the Hutu. This danger was explicitly associated with 
sexuality. By defi ning Tutsi women as an enemy in this way, Kangura articulated a 
framework that made the sexual attack of Tutsi women a foreseeable consequence 
of the role attributed to them (ICTR 2003a: para. 188). 
CAUSATION
The Chamber reaffi rmed the Akayesu decision that incitement was a crime 
regardless of whether it has the effect it intends to have. In determining whether 
communications represent intent to cause genocide and thereby constitute 
incitement, the Chamber considered it signifi cant that in fact genocide occurred. 
That the media intended to have this effect is evidenced in part by the fact that 
it did have this effect (ICTR 2003a: para. 1039).
In considering whether particular expression constituted a form of incitement 
on which restrictions would be justifi ed, the Chamber noted that the international 
jurisprudence does not include any specifi c causation requirement linking the 
expression at issue with the demonstration of a direct effect. In the Streicher 
case, for example there was no allegation that the publication Der Stürmer 
was tied to any particular violence. Much more generally, it was found to have 
‘injected into the minds of thousands of Germans’ a ‘poison’ that caused them 
to support the National Socialist policy of Jewish persecution and extermination 
(ICTR 2003a: para. 1007). 
NOTES
1. Beginning with issue no. 10 (February 1991), the slogan ‘The voice that awakens and defends 
the majority people’ appeared on the cover.
2. For example, in a lead article that appeared in March 1933 just after the Reichstag fi re, the 
claim was that the fi re was part of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy based on the Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion. Julius Streicher (1933a) claimed that the ‘Zionist protocols’ were agreed on by 
the Jews at the World Jewish Congress in 1897 in Basel. In July 1933, he wrote the secret goals 
of the Jewish people are laid out in the ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion’, which Stürmer had 
written about more than a hundred times and that ‘contain the Jewish plan for world conquest’ 
(Streicher 1933b). 
3. Published in Kangura issue no. 4 (November 1990) right after the 1 October attack of  the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front.
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4. The expert report of Professor Kabanda (exhibit P116(b) page 7 in the Media Trial) states that 
these commandments were purportedly exhumed in 1962 in the Congo. Their authenticity is 
yet to be established and their author is unknown.
5. Referring to the 1959 revolution, which was politically orchestrated communal violence that 
resulted in thousands of mostly Tutsi casualties and forced roughly 300,000 Tutsis to fl ee to 
neighbouring Burundi and Uganda.
6. Evidence entered during the testimony of Dr Ruzindana, a sociolinguistic expert (21 March 
2002: 124–5). According to the judgement in the Media Trial (ICTR 2003a: para. 246) by 
Inyenzi, Kangura meant, and was understood to mean, all Rwandans of Tutsi ethnicity, who 
in this issue of Kangura were stereotyped as having the inherent characteristics of liars, thieves 
and killers. The Trial Chamber found that the message clearly conveyed to the readers of this 
issue was that the Hutu population should ‘wake up’ and take the measures to keep the Tutsi 
enemy from decimating the Hutu (para. 1035).
7. Fritzsche, acquitted by the tribunal at Nuremberg, was later to be tried in Germany and convicted 
of similar crimes (Tusa and Tusa 1984: 477–8).
8. In paragraph 156 of  the judgement, in the discussion of  the evidence on the two sets of 
commandments the Chamber held that an article in issue 40 (October 1993) of Kangura titled 
‘A cockroach (Inyenzi) cannot bring forth a butterfl y’ explicitly called on the Hutu to follow 
the ten commandments. Similarly, it could reasonably be held that Kangura supported the ten 
commandments, in substance if  not in form, based on the letter published in issue 36 (May 
1992) of Kangura calling on men to divorce their Tutsi wives. Although the article was signed 
by someone else, it was published by Ngeze.
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‘Hate Media’ – Crimes Against 
Humanity and Genocide: Opportunities 
Missed by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda
Jean-Marie Biju-Duval
On 3 December 2003, nine years after the genocide and three years after the 
‘Media Trial’ began, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
sentenced Hassan Ngeze, Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza 
to life in prison. (For procedural reasons, Barayagwiza’s sentence was later 
reduced to 35 years.) 
These three defendants had initially been charged separately, but the ICTR 
decided to try them together because of the roles all three had played in the 
Rwandan media in 1994. Ngeze was editor-in-chief of the newspaper Kangura,
while Nahimana and Barayagwiza were among the founding members of 
Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) and sat on its board of 
directors.
Fifty-six years after the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the Media Trial gave 
the international criminal justice system the opportunity to rule on an issue 
that has been central to its jurisdiction since its very inception: propaganda in 
the organs of the press as a crime against humanity and a crime of genocide. 
In an international context, free of  bilateral antagonism and above any 
suspicion of  imposing ‘victor’s justice’, the ICTR’s judges could have freely 
and serenely invoked the enduring principles of international law and applied 
them with all the rigour that the rules of  criminal procedure require. But as 
the following discussion will show, most of the hope that they would do so has 
now been dashed.
THE RESPONSE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
TO PROPAGANDA: FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
NUREMBERG TO THE BANALIZATION OF GENOCIDE
The principles for determining what types of propaganda constitute international 
crimes originated in the verdict handed down by the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg on 1 October 1946, when it pronounced the death 
sentence of Julius Streicher, editor-in-chief of the newspaper Der Stürmer, but 
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acquitted Hans Fritzsche, Ministerialdirektor (permanent secretary) at the Reich 
Ministry of Propaganda and chief of radio propaganda for the Nazi party.
In its rulings on Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda, the Nuremberg Tribunal drew 
a perfectly clear dividing line between propaganda such as Fritzsche’s, which 
was violently anti-Semitic but did not call directly for extermination, and the 
direct calls for extermination that Streicher was publishing at the very time 
that the extermination was in progress. Only the latter were deemed to meet 
the defi nition of crimes against humanity.
Taking this seminal judgement as its precedent, the United Nations gave this 
distinction the force of international law on 9 December 1948, when it adopted 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
which established the international crime of ‘direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide’ (UN 1951). 
When the constituent elements of this new international crime were being 
debated, the question of the criminalization of ‘hate media’ was raised in the 
clearest possible terms. The USSR demanded that propaganda that tended to 
incite racial hatred be classifi ed as a crime, inasmuch as such hatred was the 
source of acts of genocide. To this end, the Soviets proposed two amendments 
to the convention. The fi rst would have criminalized ‘all forms of  public 
propaganda (press, radio, cinema, etc.) aimed at inciting racial, national or 
religious enmities or hatred’. The second would have criminalized ‘all forms 
of  public propaganda (press, radio, cinema, etc.) aimed at provoking the 
commission of acts of genocide’. Both amendments were rejected by a large 
majority (28 to 11 against the fi rst, with 4 abstentions, and 30 to 8 against the 
second, with 6 abstentions ) (UN 1948). Only direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide was included in the fi nal defi nition.
More than 40 years later, the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and 
the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsis obliged international tribunals to again 
consider when hate speech should be classifi ed as a crime against humanity. The 
ICTR ruled on the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide 
in its fi rst judgement regarding the Rwanda genocide of 1994:
Direct and public incitement must be defi ned … as directly provoking the 
perpetrator(s) to commit genocide, whether through speeches, shouting or 
threats uttered in public places or at public gatherings, or through the sale 
or dissemination … of  written material or printed matter … or through 
the public display of  placards or posters, or through any other means of 
audiovisual communication. (ICTR 1998: para. 559)
Following the Streicher precedent, the ICTR applied this defi nition to the 
bourgmestre of  a commune who, at the very time when the genocide was being 
committed, made public calls for the people of  his commune to participate 
in the extermination – calls that were immediately followed by action. This 
case, however, involved speech by a government offi cial to the citizens of his 
jurisdiction, not a propaganda message disseminated through the press.
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In another case heard by the ICTR, charges were laid against Georges Ruggiu, 
who had been a journalist at RTLM from April to July 1994 and the direct 
author of  incendiary broadcasts at the very time that Rwanda was bursting 
into fl ames. This case gave the tribunal the opportunity to rule on the specifi c 
question of whether journalists could participate in the commission of the crime 
of genocide actively, directly and personally, via the airwaves (ICTR 2000).
The Media Trial brought the issue of  the ‘media of  genocide’ before the 
Rwanda tribunal once more and raised a new question – the criminality of the 
propaganda that was broadcast and published before 6 April 1994, when the 
attack on the president’s plane precipitated the massacres and genocide. On 
this question, the parties took three clearly different positions:
• The prosecution argued for a very extensive defi nition of the forms of 
hate speech that constitute a crime.
• The defence for Hassan Ngeze took a more restrictive position, based on 
the principle of freedom of expression.
• The defence for Ferdinand Nahimana focused on the necessarily strict 
interpretation of the concept of crimes against humanity that is imposed 
by international law.
The judgement in this case rendered on 3 December 2003 appears to mark 
a break with the principles established at Nuremberg. To make a fi nding of 
criminality with regard to RTLM’s radio broadcasts before 6 April 1994, which 
did not contain any direct calls for extermination, the judges of  the ICTR 
chose to extend the defi nition of crimes against humanity through the press 
to include all bellicose speeches targeting civilian populations on the basis of 
‘ethnic stereotyping’ (ICTR 2003a).
To the legal scholar, this extension of the defi nition raises concerns not only 
about the fundamental rights guaranteed by the principles of the legality and 
non-retroactivity of the criminal law, but also about the future of a body of 
international criminal law whose effectiveness depends on consensus among 
nations. Even more important, this approach tends to blur the criteria set out 
in the 1948 convention and dangerously to ‘banalize’ the notion of  crimes 
against humanity and genocide, without contributing in any useful way to their 
prevention and punishment.
By expanding the sphere of crimes against humanity to include the hateful 
aberrations of  the media in a time of  crisis, the judges in the Media Trial 
have opened a Pandora’s box that is all the more dangerous because they 
have shown such extreme fl exibility in the way they interpret the spoken and 
written word.
Defi nition of the crime of incitement: an illegitimate and dangerous extension of the 
criminal sphere
When delegates to the United Nations were debating what kinds of  speech 
could be prosecuted as crimes before international tribunals, they were guided 
by one major concern. The delegates did not want to create an opportunity 
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for totalitarian states to justify repression of their domestic opposition or to 
interfere in the domestic affairs of other states.
Everyone agreed that hate speech was dangerous. But everyone also agreed 
that it was diffi cult to defi ne and interpret. If  the crime’s boundaries were to 
become too blurry, the charge might be misused. In addressing the question 
of  propaganda that leads to genocide, the United Nations decided in 1948 
that propaganda would be treated as an international crime only from the 
moment that this hate speech contained calls for genocidal extermination. This 
‘moment’ must not provide any cause for debate, and the evidence must dispel 
any dangers of  exegesis and interpretation. That is why the incitement must 
be ‘direct and public’.
In the Media Trial, however, the judges refused to accept this limitation 
to unequivocal calls for genocide. Instead, the judges opted for an extensive 
approach to criminalization, which inevitably involved them in the business of 
interpreting speech, to the detriment of the certainties that are essential to the 
judicial process.
An extensive conception of persecution as a crime against humanity: abandoning the 
Nuremberg criteria
Article 3 of  the Statute of  the ICTR (1994) is devoted to crimes against 
humanity, which consist of ‘inhumane acts’ including ‘persecutions on political, 
racial and religious grounds’, committed ‘as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or 
religious grounds’. The concept of persecution as a crime against humanity thus 
supposes a level of gravity that has no equivalent in the forms of persecution 
contemplated in human rights law1 and that must rise to the same degree 
of  inhumanity as the other acts listed in Article 3: murder, extermination, 
enslavement, imprisonment, torture and rape. And whatever the act, it must 
be committed as part of  a widespread, systematic attack against a civilian 
population and in full knowledge of this context.
In the Media Trial, the reason that the Offi ce of the Prosecutor attempted 
to apply the concept of persecution to propaganda was to criminalize RTLM 
broadcasts before 6 April 1994, whose content would not bear characterization 
as the crime of ‘direct and public incitement to commit genocide’. Taking over 
where the prosecution left off, the ICTR judges went so far as to extend the 
concept of crimes against humanity to any hate speech targeting a population on 
discriminatory ethnic or political grounds, regardless of its actual consequences 
(ICTR 2003a: para. 1069–82).
This extension is unprecedented and bears no comparison with the other 
inhumane acts that, as part of a widespread and systematic attack, constitute 
crimes against humanity: extermination, enslavement, murder, rape, and so 
on. Belonging to a group targeted by racist, bellicose or discriminatory speech 
cannot be considered a matter of equal gravity with being physically murdered, 
raped or enslaved because of one’s ethnicity. The extension of the concept of 
crimes against humanity to any political or ethnic hate speech2 results in a 
dilution and hence a dangerous banalization of such crimes. 
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Paradoxically, the judges in the Media Trial cited the Nuremberg precedent, 
even though the Nuremberg tribunal refused to apply this very label to the 
most virulent anti-Semitic speeches broadcast as part of  a systematic policy 
– Fritzsche’s policy – simply because these speeches did not unequivocally call 
for extermination. In reality, the Media Trial judges were making their own 
law and imposing it retroactively, even though it had been expressly rejected 
when the convention of 1948 was drafted: they were defi ning propaganda as a 
crime against humanity if  it was of a kind that could create the conditions for 
genocide (see ICTR 2003a: para. 1073).
In contrast, when the International Criminal Tribunal for (the former) 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) dealt with the issue of hate speech, it clearly affi rmed that 
speech inciting hatred cannot, in itself, constitute a crime against humanity 
(ICTY 2001a: para. 209). This tribunal’s analysis, which is faithful to the 
Nuremberg criteria, is also embraced in the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, which criminalizes ‘incitement’ only to the extent that someone directly 
and publicly incites others to commit the crime of genocide (ICC 2002: art. 
25.3(e)).
Thus, in light of  the body of  international law that, since 1946, has been 
completely consistent in refusing to treat propaganda speech, however hateful, 
as an international crime unless it directly calls for genocide, the judgement in 
the Media Trial must be seen as an isolated aberration for which there is scarcely 
any explanation other than considerations of judicial convenience.
An extensive conception of the crime of direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide: the banalization of genocide
From the outset, the judges in the Media Trial based their approach to the 
concept of incitement to commit genocide on an excerpt from statements made 
by the Soviet delegate during the debates in which the 6th Committee of the 
United Nations General Assembly delimited this concept in October 1948 (UN 
1948). The USSR wished to include in this crime all forms of  propaganda 
‘preparatory’ to genocide, in other words ‘forms of public propaganda that tend 
to incite racial, national or religious hatreds or that are aimed at provoking the 
commission of acts of genocide’. 
The suggestion was rejected in favour of a more restrictive defi nition confi ned 
to communications calling directly and intentionally for the execution of the 
crime of genocide. The most intense hostility toward the Soviet amendment was 
expressed by the delegate from the United States, and a large majority agreed 
that, as the Greek delegate put it, ‘However regrettable these acts may be, they 
do not come under the convention on genocide’ (UN 1948, translated). It is 
surprising, to say the least, that the ICTR’s judges should make this rejected 
proposal the fi rst argument in their demonstration.
The judges went on to offer an interpretation of the judgement of the IMT at 
Nuremberg that was also surprising. In particular, they offered an astonishing 
posthumous defence of  Fritzsche, who was Goebbels’ right arm, while they 
failed to stress the violently anti-Semitic nature of his broadcasts.
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But what was actually remarkable about the Fritzsche trial was that even 
though it was held at a time when the public tolerated and even encouraged the 
summary settling of accounts with anyone suspected of having collaborated 
with the Nazi occupiers, the judges took the risk of going against public opinion. 
Although they were fully aware of the violence of the defendant’s anti-Semitic 
hate speech, they nevertheless found that it did not constitute a crime against 
humanity. In contrast, Streicher’s direct calls for extermination earned him a 
death sentence. Paradoxically, by including hate speech in the sphere of crimes 
against humanity, the ICTR judges were drawing conclusions from these two 
precedents that are the opposite of those that actually arise from them.
It goes without saying that hate speech and calls to violence present a special 
kind of danger. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN 
1966) provides that such acts be prohibited by law, and we should all be pleased 
that states provide punishments in their domestic legislation to give effect to this 
prohibition. But it is equally apparent that these acts are not comparable to the 
absolute crime that genocide represents, and they have never been regarded by 
international law as having to be incorporated into the international punishment 
of this crime.
The same applies to RTLM’s denunciations of  individuals by name over 
the radio, generally aimed at publicly stigmatizing them as belonging to the 
rebellion. In this regard, it is signifi cant that to demonstrate the criminality of 
these denunciations, the ICTR judges repeatedly observed that they were not 
based on any serious investigation and that the journalist did not provide the 
evidence of his good faith, much less of the accuracy of his assertions. On the 
contrary, what the judges’ observations actually show is that these oral attacks 
did not enter the sphere of  genocide: by its very nature, a direct and public 
call to genocide cannot be based on any kind of  justifi cation. The question 
does not arise. When Streicher says ‘The Jews of Russia must be killed. They 
must be extirpated and exterminated,’ no judge inquires into whether he has 
just cause for saying this. Here we come to the very core of what constitutes a 
crime against humanity: it is unjustifi able by its very nature.
By taking the criminal status of  direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide and extending it to words and actions that cannot bear comparison 
with the unsurpassable gravity of the crime of genocide, the judges in the Media 
Trial have encouraged an unacceptable banalization of this crime. 
Identifi cation of the crime of incitement in the Rwandan press: the dangers of 
interpretation versus the requirements of criminal procedure
From the very outset, the circumstances of the Media Trial were exceptionally 
favourable to the analysis of facts and the establishment of ‘proof’. Every issue 
of Kangura ever published was available, and there were nearly 300 recordings of 
hundreds of hours of RTLM radio broadcasts. Thus it was possible to obtain an 
extremely representative if  not complete sense of the reality of the propaganda 
that these two press organs were disseminating in Rwanda in 1993 and 1994. 
Thus, there was good reason to believe that the judges could fully evaluate the 
actus reus (conduct component) of the crimes being prosecuted, and in any case 
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of the crime of incitement, without recourse to any other, less certain forms of 
evidence, such as direct or indirect testimony. Instead of vainly attempting to 
probe the defendants’ hearts and minds or presumptuously attempting to lay bare 
the journalists’ implicit suggestions, double meanings and unavowed motives, 
the judges at Arusha should have stuck to the evidence of the crimes.
This evidence was duly documented in the recordings assembled by the Offi ce 
of the Prosecutor. From April to July 1994, the very time when the genocidal 
operations were in progress, RTLM journalists were making broadcasts in 
which they directly called for the massacre of  the Tutsis. These broadcasts 
on their own suffi ced to identify the crime and its perpetrators beyond any 
reasonable doubt.
This evidence also highlighted the lack of any such calls to extermination in 
the broadcasts made before 6 April 1994.
Instead of  confusedly lumping propaganda speech together with calls for 
extermination out of some short-sighted judicial opportunism, the ICTR should 
have seized this historic moment to subject these realities to a judge’s impartial 
eye. By strictly enforcing the applicable law, the judges could have demonstrated 
that the international criminal justice system can rise above the pressures placed 
on it by the vagaries of diplomacy and the media.
This opportunity was missed. Instead of applying the simple, steadfast criteria 
of international law to realities that are so distinct from one another that they 
can never be confused, the ICTR judges chose to apply new, complex, uncertain 
methods to a reality that they absurdly oversimplifi ed for this purpose.
The uncertainties of interpretation: condemnation to the benefi t of the doubt
The crime of  direct and public incitement to commit genocide presupposes 
that the communication in question is unambiguous and unequivocal. As soon 
as a communication can be interpreted in a variety of  ways, it fails to meet 
the defi nition of  this crime. Streicher’s articles were unequivocal. He called 
for extermination; this is a direct and public incitement to commit genocide. 
Fritzsche’s broadcasts were quite violently anti-Semitic and called for combat 
against the ‘Judeo-Bolshevik enemy’, but they were equivocal about the 
plans for extermination; hence, they did not rise to the level of crimes against 
humanity. Ever since 1946, this has been the test in law. Regardless of whether 
a communication is explicit or implicit, it must be unequivocal.
Yet the judgement handed down in the Media Trial makes the equivocal 
nature of the communications the very cornerstone of its reasoning. According 
to the judges, if  RTLM’s broadcasts before 6 April 1994 were criminal, it is 
because the journalists, under the cover of verbal attacks against the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels, historically referred to by the terms Inyenzi or 
Inkotanyi, were actually in certain cases targeting the entire Tutsi population 
in an equivocal, undifferentiated fashion.
And yet an analysis of the broadcasts themselves does not confi rm this inter-
pretation, a fact that the judges themselves acknowledged, citing numerous 
broadcasts in which the above terms referred unequivocally to the RPF fi ghters 
alone, and not to the Tutsi civilian population.
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One thing is certain: the meaning that the judges attributed to these broadcasts 
was based on their interpretation of a language of which none of them had any 
mastery (Kinyarwanda) and on an assumption that was only hypothetical. They 
were operating in the shifting sands of interpretation, with their judgement at 
the mercy of contrary winds.
The case of Léon Mugesera demonstrates this. In November 1992, just a few 
months after the massacres of  the Tutsi population of  the Bugesera region, 
Mr Mugesera, a well-known Rwandan university professor and an infl uential 
politician, made a speech in his commune that the ICTR’s offi cial historiogra-
phers, on the authority of the prosecutor’s expert witnesses Alison Des Forges 
and Jean-Pierre Chrétien, have since cited as the archetype of speech that incites 
genocide. In this speech, the expressions ‘Inyenzi’, ‘accomplices of the Inyenzis’
and ‘Inkotanyi’ recur repeatedly, and the speaker repeatedly exhorts his listeners 
to fi ght them because, ‘the person whose neck you do not cut is the one who 
will cut yours’. Subsequently, Mr Mugesera was exiled to Canada, where the 
minister of immigration initiated deportation proceedings against him on the 
basis of this same speech. Relying on the testimony of Des Forges and Chrétien, 
the minister represented this speech as constituting an incitement to murder, 
genocide and hatred and a crime against humanity. Thus, in considering Mr 
Mugesera’s case, the highest Canadian courts also found themselves attempting 
to interpret this speech.
The judgement that the Canadian court delivered on 8 September 2003, 
the day after the arguments in the Media Trial had ended, undermined in 
advance the basic foundations of the judgement that the ICTR was to render 
three months later. The method of  interpretation that the Canadian judges 
applied led them to conclusions diametrically opposed to those of expert witness 
Alison Des Forges, who was the key prosecution witness in the Media Trial and 
whose theories were the basis for the judgement rendered by the ICTR on 3 
December 2003. Rejecting with the greatest fi rmness the interpretation that this 
expert witness was trying to impose, the Canadian judges expressed a defi nitive 
certainty: nothing in this speech could be seriously suspected of constituting 
an incitement to a crime against humanity or an incitement to murder or even 
an incitement to hatred.3
Such are the vagaries of interpretation. And that is why, when they ventured 
into interpretation, the judges in the Media Trial were building their judgement 
on sand.
The uncertainties of causality: abandoning the rules of criminal procedure
The judges’ embarrassment becomes most obvious at those points in the 
proceedings where, uncertain of the exact meaning of a communication, they 
invoked its supposed effects to prove that it constituted criminal incitement 
(ICTR 2003: para. 1029).
This subsidiary approach by way of  causality is not in itself, devoid of 
legitimacy. When it is possible to observe concordance and concomitance 
between a communication and the commission of acts of  genocide, it is not 
unreasonable to suspect that this communication may have constituted a direct 
call to genocide. 
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Such was indisputably the case for a signifi cant number of RTLM broadcasts 
over the months April to July 1994. In the heart of Kigali, at the very time when 
acts of genocide were being perpetrated there, Kantano Habimana, RTLM’s 
star broadcaster, called on the militiamen at the barriers to identify the ‘small 
noses’ and kill them. This is direct and public incitement to commit genocide.
But this was not the case before 6 April. Although RTLM had been 
broadcasting since July 1993, only when other ‘causes’ arose that were effective 
in other ways did massacres break out across the country. They did not occur 
until the disastrous attack of 6 April killed two Hutu heads of state, the RPF 
resumed its armed struggle and military, paramilitary and civilian authorities 
issued the orders for genocide. Not until RTLM’s journalists came under the 
sway of an army engaged in total war did they themselves make the transition 
from propagandists to combatants and then to criminals. Nothing in the events 
preceding 6 April 1994 allows the propaganda that was broadcast by RTLM to 
be interpreted as a call to commit crime. The causal approach that the judges 
adopted for this period actually leads to the opposite interpretation from the 
one they reached: from July 1993 to April 1994, no causal link can be established 
between RTLM’s broadcasts and acts of anti-Tutsi violence. During this period, 
the political assassinations were directed exclusively against Hutu leaders,4
and in the only collective massacre recorded, the victims were Hutu civilians, 
mostly members of the Mouvement Républicain National pour la Democratie et 
le Développement (MRND)5 and the perpetrators were the RPF.6
This situation was understood clearly enough by Rwandan civil society. 
On the eve of the genocide, in mid-March 1994, Father André Sibomana,7 a 
priest, journalist and human rights activist, invited RTLM’s editor-in-chief to 
participate in a seminar that the Belgian embassy was hosting in Kigali, on the 
subject of ‘objectivity and honesty in political information’. Thus RTLM was 
perceived as a radio station engaged in political combat in a context where the 
ethnic factor played a major role, but not as an instrument of civil war, much 
less one of planned genocide.
Despite these obvious circumstances, the ICTR judges, assuming the 
prosecution’s role, attempted to establish a connection, a supposed direct 
causal link, however tenuous, between a very small number of broadcasts and 
murders of Tutsi civilians committed after 6 April, thus mistakenly thinking 
that they could provide a posteriori proof of criminal incitement. And to this 
end, they discarded the rules of criminal procedure and gave probatory weight 
to allegations and documents that were devoid of any value as legal evidence. 
Instead of sticking to the indisputable evidence of fact and law, the judges, under 
the cover of excellent intentions to protect human rights and under pressure 
from public opinion, took the risk of  letting their decision rest on infi nitely 
shifting, crumbling foundations.
IDENTIFYING THE GUILTY: THE TEMPTATION TO SCAPEGOAT
Genocide and crimes against humanity imply by their nature a large number 
of  participants or even, in the case of  Rwanda, countless perpetrators. The 
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commission of  these crimes assumes a form of  organization put in place by 
authorities or at the very least ‘leaders’ whose responsibility is of the essence even 
if they are physically remote from the site of the crime and its immediate authors. 
These are the planners, the organizers, the order givers, the people in charge. 
Ever since Nuremberg, international criminal law has developed around the 
responsibility of those who order and organize the crimes much more than of 
those who simply carry them out – not only because these are essential respon-
sibilities, but also because no international jurisdiction would have the capacity 
to judge all of the participants in such crimes. If  we cannot judge all of these 
participants, then we must judge those with the highest degree of responsibility 
and so, in a sense, judge through them the crimes committed by others. 
By virtue of the subject that they deal with and the symbolic role that they 
necessarily play, international criminal tribunals run a risk that national courts 
face only rarely: that of  using the defendant who is at hand as a means of 
condemning the guilty parties who are not. This risk becomes even greater 
when a trial is intended not only to prosecute individuals but also to try a 
criminal phenomenon, such as propaganda. And when the person accused 
under these circumstances has been singled out in the media for condemnation 
by international public opinion before his trial even begins, the risk becomes 
tremendous. His value as a symbol of guilt makes him a scapegoat too convenient 
to be spared. 
That is what happened to Ferdinand Nahimana, who was left alone in 
the defendants’ box to answer for the actions of  RTLM’s journalists in the 
absence of the station’s president, its general manager and its editor-in-chief 
for radio. As early as May 1994, addressing the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights, the nongovernmental organization Reporters Sans Frontières 
groundlessly denounced Nahimana as the archetype of the intellectual extremists 
who founded RTLM. As the star defendant in the Media Trial, in his accusers’ 
imaginations he became the ideal choice for the role of  the Goebbels of  the 
Rwanda genocide.
The crimes of thought and speech that RTLM radio had committed against 
the Tutsi population were rooted in the history of Rwanda, and so there was a 
felt need to associate them with a Hutu ‘ideologue’ and, even better, a renowned 
historian who was widely known as one of the founders of this station. The 
opportunity was too good to miss, and the risk of the trial becoming a sacrifi cial 
rite rather than a vehicle of justice was immense.
The only way to avoid this risk and resist this temptation would have been to 
rely on the absolutely rigorous principles of individual criminal responsibility in 
international law that were established at Nuremberg and that have been further 
refi ned in the statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR and the decisions made by 
those tribunals. These principles distinguish two forms of  responsibility, or 
more precisely, one general principle of responsibility and one exception that 
is strictly defi ned to address the specifi c role of superior authorities:
• A defendant cannot be found guilty unless it is proved that he or she 
personally committed a positive act aimed at deliberately executing a 
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crime. This is the direct individual responsibility provided for in Article 
6.1 of the statute of the ICTR (ICTR 1994).
• The statute of  the ICTR also establishes a specifi c responsibility that 
represents an exception to this first principle: the responsibility of 
superiors who did not personally order or commit a crime but did allow 
their subordinates to do so and failed to take any action to prevent or 
punish them. This noteworthy exception was designed to hold military 
commanders accountable for crimes committed by their soldiers. It 
‘extends to civilian superiors only to the extent that they exercise a degree 
of  control over their subordinates which is similar to that of  military 
commanders’ (ICTR 2002: para. 42; ICTY 1998: para. 378). This is the 
criterion of ‘effective control’. 
Whichever of these forms of responsibility is involved, the proof on which 
it is based must be established ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’ and, once again, 
with a rigour commensurate with the legal, human, historical and symbolic 
issues associated with any trial for crimes against humanity. The ICTR judges 
should, therefore, have gone beyond the rumours and denunciations in the media 
and insisted on verifying the facts for themselves, hearing the direct witnesses 
and accessing the original documents. Only by thus strictly adhering both to 
the principles and to the evidence could the judges at the Media Trial have 
resisted the siren’s song of public opinion or, more prosaically, the pressures 
from friend and foe in Kigali. 
Fifty years after Nuremberg, this extremely political trial provided an 
opportunity to demonstrate that in the twenty-fi rst century, international 
criminal justice was not just ‘victor’s justice’ and did not depend on which side 
won. Instead, it could have been shown to be a solemn vehicle for the triumph of 
justice, in which the principles of law prevailed over any form of opportunism, 
whatever the good intentions behind it.
But what actually happened in the Nahimana case (to cite only this example) 
is that the judges acted just as they had when they redefi ned the elements of the 
crime of incitement. They abandoned a strict interpretation of the principles of 
individual criminal responsibility, they deemed certain facts to be decisive that 
it is fair to say had not been proven and they remained silent about other well-
known facts that had been amply demonstrated in the course of the trial. 
The disappearance of the criteria of law 
The Nahimana case demanded a new, rigorous form of analysis in light of the 
principles of international criminal law. Unlike Streicher, Fritzsche and Ruggiu, 
Ferdinand Nahimana was never prosecuted for statements that he had made 
personally. (For that matter, he never spoke over the airwaves of RTLM at any 
time in 1994.) Nor was he being prosecuted for orders that he had given to 
others. He was being prosecuted mainly for statements made by broadcasters 
on this radio station when he himself  was either outside Rwanda or in the 
remote western part of the country and was not maintaining any contact of any 
sort with these journalists or with their manager who remained in Kigali. The 
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presumption that he had the material ability to exercise ‘effective control’ over 
these journalists, similar to the control that military commanders exercise over 
their subordinates, while these journalists were located in Kigali and encircled 
by the RPF, was extremely audacious not to say completely implausible.
This assumption was all the more tenuous because Nahimana was a civilian 
and after 7 April 1994, RTLM, like the government radio station and various 
other private and quasi-public institutions, had been requisitioned by the army, 
which both controlled it and provided its logistical support and which, moreover, 
was doing so in a context of war, civil war and genocide. But the ICTR judges 
carefully refrained from citing these specifi c circumstances and examining them 
in light of the demands of international law, that is, the fundamental criterion 
of the effective ability to control and punish. Their silence on this matter was 
tantamount to abandoning this criterion entirely.
It is signifi cant that the judges do not cite this fundamental criterion at any 
point in their lengthy discussion about control over RTLM radio before 6 April 
1994. Instead, they merely contend that the defendant played ‘a very active role 
in the management’ of  RTLM as a member of its board of directors. Not a 
word about his personal ability to give orders or impose punishment, that is, 
to be a superior in the full sense of the word, with possession of the effective 
control that the international criminal tribunals, in their judgements, have 
been careful to distinguish from mere infl uence that is insuffi cient to impose 
criminal liability.8
Regarding the key period, from April to July 1994, the judges’ ‘demonstration’ 
becomes even sketchier. According to them, despite his break with RTLM, 
Ferdinand Nahimana continued to have authority over it, because they say that 
in early July 1994, he intervened (under circumstances unknown) to stop the 
broadcasting of attacks on UNAMIR – an indicator, according to the judges, of 
his de facto control over this radio station (ICTR 2003a: para. 568). Ferdinand 
Nahimana absolutely denies having made such an intervention. In any case, 
this in no way demonstrates that Mr Nahimana possessed this quasi-military 
power to control and punish from which the responsibility of superior authority 
arises. The cardinal criterion – the rule of law – has completely disappeared 
and been replaced with an opportunistic assessment of both the facts and the 
law – one that totally contradicts earlier decisions made by these same judges 
(ICTR 2002: para. 43 and 163; ICTR 2003b: para. 474–7).9
Identifying the guilty: rejecting the evidence and accepting the hypothesis
‘Who is hiding behind RTLM?’ Reporters Sans Frontières demanded to know 
when its spokesperson, Philippe Dahinden, addressed the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights on 25 May 1994, at the height of the genocide, 
while RTLM continued to broadcast its calls for extermination. Who was at the 
controls? Who commanded this battalion of ‘journalists’ engaged in this ‘war 
of words’, an integral part of the total war and genocide that unfurled before 
the eyes of a deliberately passive ‘international community’?
What was going on between April and July 1994?
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Rejecting the evidence
The judges do not dispute that Ferdinand Nahimana was absent throughout 
this period. The army had seized control over the radio station and the effective 
day-to-day management was provided by its director, Phocas Habimana, and 
its editor-in-chief, Gaspard Gahigi. These facts were established incontrovert-
ibly by the only two direct witnesses called to appear, both of them journalists 
who were present at RTLM from April to July: Georges Ruggiu, a witness for 
the prosecution, and Valérie Bemeriki, a witness for the defence.
This direct testimony from both sides was completely consistent with the 
situation then prevailing in Rwanda and especially in Kigali, which was encircled 
by RPF troops. The only people who had effective control of RTLM were the 
ones who were in the studios in Kigali, directing, monitoring and sanctioning the 
actions of the soldier-broadcasters, who wore military uniforms and carried out 
the orders of the only authority that had the means of commanding obedience 
in the midst of the massacres: the army.
UNAMIR commander Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire confirms 
that when he tried to do something about RTLM’s broadcasts, the person he 
contacted was General Augustin Bizimungu, the chief  of  staff  of  the army 
(Dallaire 2004: 442).
With a wave of  their hand and a few scant remarks, the judges dismissed 
the entire testimony of both these witnesses as lacking credibility, swept this 
evidence aside and blithely ignored an entire aspect of the reality without which 
no valid judgements could be made.
Accepting the hypothesis
Conversely, the judges accorded the most uncertain allegations the status of 
legal proof when they pointed to a hypothetical connection between Ferdinand 
Nahimana and RTLM. Mr Nahimana’s conviction as a superior authority 
because of criminal broadcasts made from April to July 1994 was based on a 
single element of proof: the indirect testimony of an expert witness, Alison Des 
Forges, whose bias and whose willingness to distort the meaning of a text had 
been so scathingly criticized by the Canadian judges in the Mugesera case.
Ms Des Forges asserted that on 28 February 2000, more than fi ve years after 
the fact, she had a telephone interview with a French offi cial who told her 
that he had been present at a conversation in Goma, in late June or early July 
1994, between a diplomat from Operation Turquoise and Ferdinand Nahimana, 
during which Mr Nahimana had promised to intervene to stop the broadcasts 
against UNAMIR. Ms Des Forges said that the content of  this telephone 
interview was based on a French diplomatic telegram. From this, the judges 
concluded that Mr Nahimana had effective superior authority over the radio 
station (ICTR 2003a: para. 568 and 972).
But contrary to what the judges concluded, this supposed conversation, which 
Ferdinand Nahimana denied, clearly proved nothing, because there was nothing 
to establish that he did subsequently intervene.10 Moreover, RTLM stopped 
broadcasting the day before Kigali was taken by the RPF on 3 July 1994. The 
station did not resume broadcasting until 9 July, when it set up shop briefl y in 
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Gisenyi, in the extreme northwest of Rwanda, before going silent for good on 
14 July. RTLM’s broadcasts ceased because of the military victory of the RPF, 
not because of this hypothetical conversation!
Abandoning the search for the truth
What must be emphasized here is the break down of any thoroughness in the 
search for the truth in a matter that the judges themselves regarded as one 
of the essential foundations of their judgement. This was a piece of hearsay 
evidence; the witnesses cited were known and available, yet none of them was 
called to appear. The alleged telegram was neither entered into evidence by the 
prosecutor nor demanded by the judges. 
On 9 May 2003, the judges deliberately opposed the appearance of one of 
the witnesses, stating: ‘The Chamber sees no reason to call this witness under 
Rule 98 and does not fi nd it “essential to truth-seeking” to do so.’ Six months 
later, the same judges made the telephone conversation with expert witness 
Des Forges the cornerstone of their decision to sentence Ferdinand Nahimana 
to life imprisonment. 
The demonstration beyond any reasonable doubt that a defendant has 
participated in a crime against humanity cannot be based on confi dences that 
the court refuses to verify and that merely suggest a hypothesis that is refuted by 
the offi cial statements of direct witnesses.11 Beyond the fate of the individual who 
is convicted and sentenced under such circumstances, such laxness on the part 
of the judiciary can cast discredit on international justice. As always, defending 
human rights means defending the rights of the individual and, by defending the 
right of Ferdinand Nahimana to a fair trial, we act to ensure that international 
justice does not quickly become a laughing stock to its detractors.
The same is true for another essential aspect of participation in a crime under 
international law: the demonstration of criminal intent.
From the search for criminal intent to the trial for intentions
The law emphasizes that where incitement to genocide is concerned, criminal 
intent must be demonstrated in its strictest and fullest sense:
That is to say that the person who is inciting to commit genocide must have 
himself  the specifi c intent to commit genocide, namely, to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. (ICTR 
1998: para. 560)
Unless the accused confesses to such intent, it must be clearly determined 
from the accused’s own words and deeds:
The Chamber notes, however, that the use of  context to determine the 
intent of an accused must be counterbalanced with the actual conduct of 
the Accused. The Chamber is of the opinion that the Accused’s intent should 
be determined, above all, from his words and deeds, and should be evident 
from patterns of purposeful action. (ICTR 2002: para. 63)
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To overcome the evidence to the contrary, the judges claimed to discern this 
genocidal intent in Ferdinand Nahimana on the basis of statements by third 
parties, of a speech in which he called for the unity of all Rwandans without 
ethnic distinction and, last, of a deliberately abridged interview whose meaning 
could be ambiguous only if  someone added a word that did not appear in it 
and removed those words that made its meaning clear.
‘Well if not you, it was your brother, or another just like you’: the logic of scapegoating
While not disputing the lack of  any contact between Ferdinand Nahimana 
and RTLM’s journalists from April through July 1994, the judges made these 
journalists’ broadcasts during this period the proof  of  his genocidal intent 
(ICTR 2003a: para. 957–60). The judges thus took criminal intent, that 
most intimately personal element of the crime, and collectivized it by a logic 
exemplifi ed in the above line from the French moralist La Fontaine’s fable of 
the wolf and the lamb: the logic of scapegoating.
What makes this detour through the words of  third parties all the more 
unacceptable is that the judges never even suggested that during this period 
the accused gave any kind of instruction for criminal broadcasts of this kind 
to be made. 
Proof through absurdity
On 21 February 1993, more than a year before the genocide, at the peak of 
an RPF offensive that brought over a million refugees to the gates of Kigali, 
Ferdinand Nahimana published an essay entitled ‘Rwanda: current problems 
and solutions’. In it, he wrote:
Regionalism, ‘collinisme’,12 and ethnism, these are the true causes of  the 
disaster that is now befalling Rwanda and its peoples.
In Africa today, ethnic, tribal, regional, and even religious differences 
continue to impose tremendous burdens that impede the development of 
peoples and nations. Ethnic identity has been used as a tool to divide and 
foment hatred among members of  the national community. Ethnism has 
been erected into a system for the mutual exclusion of members of different 
ethnic groups. 
In fact, the Republic was nearly brought down (and this is no secret) by 
the revenge-seeking mobs of the former monarchists, their descendants, and 
their supporters who have now organized themselves into what they call the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) Inkotanyi.
That is why the leaders of the parties must realize without delay that the 
number 1 enemy of Rwanda and democracy is the RPF. (Prosecution exhibit 
P25B in the Media Trial, translation)
There is no ambiguity here: the only enemy of Rwanda is the RPF–Inkotanyi,
and all of  the vital forces in Rwandan society, without ethnic or regional 
distinction, must unite against it. Nahimana therefore suggested the establishment 
of a civil defence organization to be overseen by the government authorities:
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For this operation to succeed, all of society must recognize the need for it 
and stand as one against any form of collective threat or aggression. This 
recognition will then automatically repudiate hatred and division based on 
ethnic and regional origin.
Yet according to the judges, this essay must be regarded as proof  of  the 
intention to exterminate all or part of  the Tutsi population – men, women, 
and children, the old and the young – a year and a half  later. Why? Because its 
author was imprudent enough to commit the inexpiable crime of alluding to 
the existence of a ‘Tutsi league’ from which the RPF may have emerged (ICTR 
2003a: 966).
Here we come to the culmination of this logic of ultimate causes that demanded 
a guilty verdict for Ferdinand Nahimana, as well as of its intrepretive corollary, 
criticized earlier with regard to the analysis of the propaganda broadcast by 
RTLM. Taken to its fi nal conclusion, the judges’ approach amounts to making a 
text say the opposite of what it really says, despite all the evidence, even though 
all of the accused’s other writings belie this misleading interpretation.
Manipulating the evidence
On 24 April 1994, when Ferdinand Nahimana again set foot on Rwandan soil 
in the border town of Cyangugu after twelve days in exile with his family in 
Burundi and Zaire, a journalist from Radio Rwanda asked him about his journey 
and the current situation. In response he cited the need to ‘stop the enemy’, 
declared his refusal to accept the ‘dictatorship’ of the Inkotanyi, and stated his 
satisfaction with the way that the country’s two radio stations had called on the 
people to cooperate with the military authorities to confront the invader.
At that time, the international press was still hesitant in its analysis of the events 
in Rwanda (whether they constituted war or civil war, interethnic massacres 
or genocide), while the United States and the United Kingdom were working 
successfully to prevent recognition of the genocide by the Security Council.
Here too, the judges take this single public statement, which lasted only a few 
seconds, and turn it into an endorsement of ethnic extermination. But they do 
so only through an incomplete interpretation of a deliberately abridged text. 
The recording of Nahimana’s words came from the archives of the RPF regime 
and the last part of it was suppressed, but the judges ignored the protests of 
the defence and refused to discuss its admissibility.
There was nothing in this statement that could be seen as a form of criminal 
incitement, but the judges claimed to have found that it contained an idiomatic 
expression with a double meaning – an expression that actually was not even 
there (the verb gukora, which normally means ‘to work’ but in a certain context 
can mean ‘to kill’). They thus misconstrued a statement from which an essential 
portion had to be excised and a word that the accused never uttered had to be 
added simply to make it not explicitly criminal, but just possibly ambiguous. 
And it was on the basis of these elements alone that the judges decided that 
Ferdinand Nahimana’s intention to exterminate the Tutsi population of Rwanda 
had been established beyond any reasonable doubt.
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In the search for a symbolic scapegoat, the rules of  criminal procedure 
were abandoned in favour of  a ‘trial for intentions’ in which evidence was 
amalgamated and manipulated – in other words, the fi rst step down the road to 
political trials, which pose a mortal danger for international criminal justice.
* * *
International criminal justice embodies the defence of the individual’s humanity 
against mass crimes and crimes by the state. When the state is criminal or 
criminally complicit or impotent, international criminal justice is the last recourse 
for the individual and, through the individual, for outraged humanity. When 
faced with violations of human rights so extreme as to constitute dehumaniza-
tion, this justice must be the highest and most unyielding form of civilization in 
the defence of the individual, without compromise, connivance or calculation, 
with complete independence, and with no other concern than to enforce the law 
rigorously and impartially. That is its sole source of legitimacy; that is what its 
effectiveness depends upon.
As defenders of the individual, lawyers are by their very nature at the heart of 
this new struggle between civilization and barbarism. As counsel for a defendant 
on trial before an international court, the ICTR, I have a duty to point out the 
dangers that, within this court charged with protecting the rights of humanity, 
threaten their very foundations: human rights, and among these the right to 
a fair trial.
As defence counsel for Mr Ferdinand Nahimana, and through him for the 
rights of any individual accused of a crime, I cannot stand silent and let judicial 
methods and behaviours that I fi nd contrary to the rules of justice take root to 
the naïve or cynical applause of public opinion. 
Resist the temptation to be arbitrary or opportunistic, and stick to the strict 
enforcement of the existing rules. Resist the temptation to scapegoat, and convict 
only on the basis of indisputable evidence. These are the principles that must 
guide international justice in the twenty-fi rst century.
NOTES
 1. The ICTY Trial Chamber defi ned persecution as ‘the gross or blatant denial, on discrimina-
tory grounds, of  a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty law, 
reaching the same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited in Article 5 [of the Statute]’ 
(ICTY 1998: para. 621). ‘It would be contrary to the principle of legality to convict someone 
of persecution based on a defi nition found in international refugee law or human rights law’ 
(ICTY 1998: para. 589).
 2. ‘The Chamber considers it evident that hate speech targeting a population on the basis 
of  ethnicity, or other discriminatory grounds, reaches this level of  gravity and constitutes 
persecution under article 3(h) of its Statute’ (ICTR 2003a: 1072).
 3. The Canadian judges’ conclusions were unequivocal: ‘The Kabaya speech was made on 
November 22, 1992 by a political fi gure before a partisan meeting in a context of  armed 
aggression. The speech was improvised and not based on any notes, and the various speakers 
were not consulted before beginning to speak. The speaker spoke fl uently, used clear and 
colourful language, sometimes even brutal language. This speaker was a fervent supporter of 
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democracy, patriotic pride and resistance to invading foreign forces. The themes of his speeches 
were elections, courage and love. His family life, his personal and professional relationships, 
his past, did not indicate any tendency toward racism. Even though it is true some of  his 
statements were misplaced or unfortunate, there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that 
Mr Mugesera, under the cover of anecdotes or other imagery, deliberately incited to murder, 
hatred or genocide. The principal witnesses for the Minister – Ms Des Forges, Messrs Gillet, 
Reyntjens, Overdulve and Hnadye – only provided a biased or misinformed view of the events 
concerning Mr Mugesera.’ (Mugesera v. Canada 2003: para. 240–1).
 4. The murders of Gatabazi, an opponent of President Habyarimana, and Gapyisi, Bucyana, 
Rwambuka and Katumba, all hostile to the RPF.
 5. President Habyarimana’s party, to which Ferdinand Nahimana belonged.
 6. Massacres at Kirambo on 18 and 19 November 1993.
 7. Father Sibomana was a correspondent for Reporters Sans Frontières.
 8. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY clearly condemned the theory that infl uence, independent 
of  any offi cial command authority, can suffi ce to impose the responsibility of  superior 
authority: ‘It is clear, however, that substantial infl uence as a means of control in any sense 
which falls short of the possession of effective control over subordinates, which requires the 
possession of  material abilities to prevent subordinate offences or to punish subordinate 
offenders, lacks suffi cient support in State practice and judicial decisions. Nothing relied 
on by the Prosecution indicates that there is suffi cient evidence of State practice or judicial 
authority to support a theory that substantial infl uence as a means of exercising command 
responsibility has the standing of a rule of customary law, particularly a rule by which criminal 
liability would be imposed.’ (ICTY 2001b: para. 266)
 9. Two of the three judges who rendered this decision were also members of the Chamber that 
rendered the judgement in the Media Trial. In the Media Trial, they went so far as to stress 
that for a political authority, the minister of information, issuing orders during an attack was 
not suffi cient proof of a superior–subordinate relationship, that is, the ability to prevent and 
to punish.
10. The judges recognized this expressly in paragraph 62 of their interlocutory decision of 13 
May 2003.
11. RTLM journalist, Valérie Bemeriki, offi cially denied having received any instructions to go 
easier on UNAMIR.
12. Defi ned in the judgement as ‘a cantonal regionalism consisting of favoritism or preference 
based on a person’s hill of origin.’
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A Lost Opportunity for Justice: 
Why Did the ICTR Not Prosecute 
Gender Propaganda?
Binaifer Nowrojee
72. The newspaper and the radio explicitly and repeatedly, in fact relentlessly, 
targeted the Tutsi population for destruction. Demonizing the Tutsi as having 
inherently evil qualities, equating the ethnic group with ‘the enemy’ and 
portraying its women as seductive enemy agents, the media called for the 
extermination of the Tutsi ethnic group as a response to the political threat 
that they associated with Tutsi ethnicity.
118. ... Tutsi women, in particular, were targeted for persecution. The 
portrayal of the Tutsi woman as femme fatale, and the message that Tutsi 
women were seductive agents of the enemy was conveyed repeatedly... [and] 
vilifi ed and endangered Tutsi women ... defi ning the Tutsi woman as an 
enemy in this way... articulated a framework that made the sexual attack of 
Tutsi women a foreseeable consequence of the role attributed to them. (ICTR 
2003, judgement see Chapter 25)
In December 2003, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
delivered a judgement that convicted three media executives for their role in 
instigating hatred and inciting genocide. It was a signifi cant judgement in that 
it acknowledged the powerful role that the media and hate speech can play in 
inciting people to mass violence. In Rwanda, the consequences were devastating. 
In a three-month period, some 800,000 were killed and thousands were raped 
and mutilated.
Why were none of these men held responsible for their role in provoking the 
sexual attacks against Tutsi women? Clearly the evidence was there. In strong 
language, the court found that these media executives had ‘targeted’, ‘vilifi ed’ 
and ‘endangered’ Tutsi women in such a way that made the sexual attacks ‘a 
foreseeable consequence of the role attributed to them’ (ICTR 2003, judgement 
summary: para. 118).
But the ICTR prosecutor never led charges to hold these three defendants 
responsible for their part in encouraging the brutal rapes and sexual mutilations. 
In fact, in arguing the case, the prosecutor paid little or no attention to the 
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vicious gender propaganda, despite the strong evidence that continued to make 
its way into the courtroom and, ultimately, into the judgement. 
This negligence is part of  a larger failure of the Prosecutor’s Offi ce at the 
ICTR to fully deliver justice to Rwanda’s victims. Given the overwhelming 
evidence of widespread sexual violence during the genocide, the lack of account-
ability for these crimes can only be attributed to the lack of a comprehensive 
strategy on the part of  the Prosecutor’s Offi ce to effectively investigate and 
prosecute these crimes.
The legacy is that the crimes against Rwandan women are largely going 
unpunished by the ICTR. At the tenth anniversary of the genocide (in April 
2004), the fi gures were dismal: of the completed cases, 90 per cent had no sexual 
violence convictions. In 70 per cent of those cases, the prosecutor had not even 
brought sexual violence charges. 
The ‘Media Trial’ judgement (ICTR 2003), in particular, stands as a 
symbol of the neglect of the prosecutor to pursue the sexual violence crimes 
against women even though she possessed strong evidence, thus making the 
prosecutor responsible for an injustice to women in the course of administering 
international justice.
WIDESPREAD SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING THE GENOCIDE
When Roméo Dallaire, commander of the United Nations peacekeeping force 
during the Rwanda genocide, testifi ed before the ICTR, he graphically described 
the female corpses he had witnessed:
we could notice on many sites, sometimes very fresh – that is, I am speaking 
of my observers and myself  – that young girls, young women, would be laid 
out with their dresses over their heads, the legs spread and bent. You could 
see what seemed to be semen drying or dried. And it all indicated to me that 
these women were raped. And then a variety of  material were crushed or 
implanted into their vaginas; their breasts were cut off, and the faces were, 
in many cases, still the eyes were open and there was like a face that seemed 
horrifi ed or something. They all laid on their backs. So there were some men 
that were mutilated also, their genitals and the like. A number of them were 
– women had their breasts cut off  or their stomach open. But there was, I 
would say generally at the sites you could fi nd younger girls and young women 
who had been raped. (ICTR-98–41-T transcript, 20 January 2004)
The following month, when Dallaire’s assistant, Major Brent Beardsley, 
followed as a witness in the same ‘Military I’ case, the prosecuting lawyer 
asked: ‘With respect to the female corpses, in particular, did you make any 
observations about any particular characteristics that those corpses may have 
had?’ Beardsley replied:
Yes, two things, really. One, when they killed women it appeared that the 
blows that had killed them were aimed at sexual organs, either breasts or 
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vagina; they had been deliberately swiped or slashed in those areas. And, 
secondly, there was a great deal of what we came to believe was rape, where 
the women’s bodies or clothes would be ripped off  their bodies, they would 
be lying back in a back position, their legs spread, especially in the case of 
very young girls. I’m talking girls as young as six, seven years of age, their 
vaginas would be split and swollen from obviously multiple gang rape, and 
then they would have been killed in that position. So they were laying in a 
position they had been raped; that’s the position they were in. 
Rape was one of the hardest things to deal with in Rwanda on our part. 
It deeply affected every one of us. We had a habit at night of coming back 
to the headquarters and, after the activities had slowed down for the night, 
before we went to bed, sitting around talking about what happened that day, 
drink coffee, have a chat, and amongst all of  us the hardest thing that we 
had to deal with was not so much the bodies of people, the murder of people 
– I know that can sound bad, but that wasn’t as bad to us as the rape and 
especially the systematic rape and gang rape of children. Massacres kill the 
body. Rape kills the soul. And there was a lot of rape. 
It seemed that everywhere we went, from the period of 19th of April until 
the time we left, there was rape everywhere near these killing sites. (ICTR-
98–41-T transcript, 3 February 2004)
Sexual violence, directed predominantly against Tutsi women, occurred on 
a massive scale during the Rwanda genocide. Although the exact number of 
women raped will never be known, testimonies from survivors confi rm that 
rape was extremely widespread. Thousands of women were individually raped, 
gang-raped, raped with objects such as sharpened sticks or gun barrels, held in 
sexual slavery (either collectively by a militia group or singled out by one militia 
man) or sexually mutilated. These crimes were frequently part of a pattern in 
which Tutsi women were raped after they had witnessed the torture and killings 
of their relatives and the destruction of their homes. Many women were killed 
immediately after being raped or raped to death using sharp sticks or other 
objects (Nowrojee 1996). 
The sexual violence was perpetrated largely by members of  the Hutu 
militia groups known as the Interahamwe, by other civilians and by soldiers 
of the Rwandan armed forces (Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR)), including 
the Presidential Guard. Administrative, military and political leaders at the 
national and local levels, as well as heads of militia, directed, encouraged and 
allowed both the killings and sexual violence to further their political goal: the 
destruction of the Tutsi as a group. Sexually subjugating and mutilating Tutsi 
women was both a way to punish the women and to attack the ethnic group. 
GENOCIDE PROPAGANDA AGAINST TUTSI WOMEN1
The outpouring of  violence directed against Rwandan women on the basis 
of their gender and ethnicity was fuelled by the hate propaganda before and 
during the genocide. To this end, the media played a role in propagating and 
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disseminating stereotypes of Tutsi women as devious seductresses who would 
use their beauty to undermine the Hutu community. The hate propaganda 
before and during the genocide demonized Tutsi women’s sexuality and, as 
the Media Trial judgement noted, ‘made the sexual attack of Tutsi women a 
foreseeable consequence’. 
In the years preceding the genocide, the organizers used propaganda to 
heighten fear and hatred between Hutu and Tutsi. Through the written press and 
then through Radio-Télévision des Milles Collines (RTLM), extremists taught 
that the two were different peoples: the Hutu part of  the larger category of 
‘Bantu’ and the Tutsi part of the ‘Ethiopid’ or ‘Nilotic’ group. Such categories, 
once thought to be real, are now recognized to be inaccurate groupings and 
a legacy of nineteenth century European racism. Simplifying and distorting 
history, the propagandists insisted that Tutsi were foreign conquerors, who had 
mastered the majority Hutu through a combination of ruse and ruthlessness. 
According to these beliefs, the Tutsi had refused to accept the destruction of 
their power in the 1959 revolution and were determined to re-assert control 
over the Hutu. 
In their drive to dominate, propagandists said, Tutsi used their women – 
thought to be more beautiful than Hutu women – to infi ltrate Hutu ranks. 
Through the written press and then through RTLM radio, extremists portrayed 
Tutsi women as devious seductresses who would undermine the Hutu. The 
propaganda warned Hutu men to beware of Tutsi women. Military men were 
barred from marrying Tutsi women. The stereotypes also portrayed Tutsi 
women as arrogant and looking down on Hutu men whom they considered 
ugly and inferior (Chrétien et al. 1995).
Beginning in 1990, over a dozen newspapers in Kinyarwanda or French were 
launched, and they systematically exploited ethnic hatred (Chrétien et al. 1995: 
45–7). Although these papers had a relatively small circulation, mostly in the 
capital, Kigali, they were often taken to the countryside by urban workers on 
the weekends and their message was shared widely in rural communities. In 
some cases, the local authorities in the rural areas were provided with copies. 
In addition to articles excoriating the Tutsi community, the magazines printed 
graphic cartoons portraying Tutsi women using their supposed sexual prowess 
on UN peacekeepers (Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) supporters according to 
the propaganda) and the moderate Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana in 
various sexual poses with other politicians (Chrétien et al. 1995: 336, 368). 
Kangura (‘wake up’ in Kinyarwanda) magazine was the fi rst and most virulent 
voice of  hate. Kangura often warned the Hutu to be on guard against Tutsi 
women. According to Kangura, ‘[t]he Inkotanyi [a word used to refer to the 
RPF meaning ‘fi erce fi ghter’ in Kinyarwanda] will not hesitate to transform 
their sisters, wives and mothers into pistols’ to conquer Rwanda (Anon. 1991). 
In the December 1990 issue of Kangura, editor Hassan Ngeze published the 
‘Ten Commandments’ of the Hutu, four of which dealt specifi cally with women 
(Anon. 1990):
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1. Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, wherever she is, works for 
the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor 
any Hutu who: marries a Tutsi woman; befriends a Tutsi woman; employs a 
Tutsi woman as a secretary or a concubine.
2. Every Hutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and 
conscientious in their role as woman, wife and mother of  the family. Are 
they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest? 
3. Hutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and 
sons back to reason. 
7. The Rwandese Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. The experience 
of the October [1990] war has taught us a lesson. No member of the military 
shall marry a Tutsi.
Another issue of Kangura (1992, 29 (January): 16–17) accused Tutsi women 
of  monopolizing positions of  employment in both the public and private 
sectors, hiring their Tutsi sisters on the basis of their thin noses (a stereotypi-
cally ‘Tutsi feature’), thereby contributing to the unemployment rate of  the 
Hutu, particularly Hutu women. Kangura called on Hutu to use the necessary 
vigilance against the Tutsi, whom it dubbed the inyenzi (cockroaches), and 
accomplice Hutu (ibyitso: traitors). One Hutu woman commented, ‘According 
to the propaganda, the Tutsi were hiding the enemy. And their beautiful women 
were being used to do it. So, everybody knew what that meant’ (Human Rights 
Watch/FIDH interview, 18 March 1996, Kigali).
THE IMPACT OF THE MEDIA PROPAGANDA DURING THE VIOLENCE 
When the violence began in 1994, not surprisingly, aggression against Tutsi 
women targeted their sexuality and was fuelled by both ethnic and gender 
stereotypes. Rape served to shatter the image of Tutsi women – as spies for the 
Tutsi community through their sexual prowess – by humiliating, degrading, and 
ultimately destroying them. Even Tutsi women married to Hutu men were not 
spared, despite the custom that a wife was protected by her husband’s lineage 
after marriage.
Throughout the genocide, women were consistently raped, with explicit verbal 
reference to their status as Tutsi women. It is clear that the rapists took up the 
media message that raping Tutsi women was justifi ed because of their ethnicity 
and gender. Of the statements that concentrated on the Tutsi stereotype, the 
overwhelming majority were sexual references. Tutsi women were perceived 
as overly sexualized, ‘destroying the country with their seduction’; therefore, 
many rapists referred to their right to satisfy their sexual desire by force. Rape 
witnesses and victims report the following statements, among others: ‘Now we 
can have Tutsi women for free,’ ‘The tables have turned so now I can satisfy my 
sexual desires’ or ‘It is unfortunate to be killing Tutsi women since they taste 
better than Hutu women.’ Rapists repeatedly referred to Tutsi genitalia and the 
desire to see what Tutsi look or taste like. Rape survivors recount comments 
such as: ‘We want to see how sweet Tutsi women are,’ or ‘You Tutsi women 
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think that you are too good for us,’ or ‘We want to see if  a Tutsi woman is like 
a Hutu woman,’ or ‘If  there were peace, you would never accept me,’ or ‘You 
Tutsi girls are too proud,’ apparently setting the stage for their degradation. 
Many statements from broadcasters or in Kangura were cast in the form of a 
proverb. The use of proverbs suggests a concerted effort to promote slogans to 
motivate rapists and provide a broadly accessible terminology of justifi cation 
in perpetrating sexual violence. Rape survivors and witnesses recount rapists 
saying: ‘Tutsi caused problems and must be exterminated with their eggs,’ ‘If  
you cannot catch the lice, you kill its egg’ and ‘If  you set out to kill a rat, you 
must kill the pregnant rat.’
Statements during rape also referred to non-sexual Tutsi stereotyped char-
acteristics. Most either labelled Tutsi women as generally arrogant or sexually 
arrogant in their sexual refusal of  Hutu men. Rapists also repeatedly used 
general ethic insults, such as ‘Tutsi snake’. 
Different rapists throughout the country repeatedly employed the same 
terminology – echoing the invectives in the media propaganda – while raping 
Tutsi women. The statements at the time of rape demonstrate links with the 
media propaganda that had advocated the same gender and ethnic stereotypes. 
Specifi c insults deployed by the radio and print media were repeated by rapists 
during rape. This direct correlation between media propoganda and statements 
by rapists demonstrates a causal link between the propaganda and the ensuing 
sexual violence across the country. 
THE MEDIA TRIAL: A SQUANDERED OPPORTUNITY 
TO PROSECUTE GENDER PROPAGANDA
In December 2003, the ICTR Trial Chamber handed down a judgement in 
the Media Trial against two founders of  RTML and the editor of  Kangura 
newspaper. The three were found guilty of  genocide, conspiracy to commit 
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide and crimes against 
humanity (extermination and persecution). RTLM founder, Ferdinand 
Nahimana, and former Kangura editor, Hassan Ngeze, received life sentences; 
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, another RTLM founder, was sentenced to 35 years.
Despite the strong evidence in the possession of the prosecuting attorneys, 
the Prosecutor’s Offi ce had not brought charges against the accused for their 
role in inciting sexual violence against women. Throughout the trial, strong 
evidence of the gender propaganda and its devastating impact on Tutsi women 
made its way into the courtroom, and in the judgement the court referred to 
it several times and noted its devastating impact on Tutsi women. Because the 
prosecutor had not brought sexual violence charges, the Trial Chamber was not 
able to convict on that basis; it could only note the many references to women 
that had arisen during the course of the trial. 
The Trial Chamber noted that Tutsi women were particularly targeted for 
persecution: the presentation of Tutsi women as femmes fatales and a danger 
to the Hutu that was explicitly associated with sexuality. By defi ning the Tutsi 
women as enemies in this way, Kangura articulated a framework that made the 
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sexual attack of Tutsi women a ‘foreseeable consequence’. The court found that 
Kangura played a substantial role in inciting Hutu hatred and violence against 
Tutsis, especially Tutsi women:
The newspaper and radio explicitly and repeatedly, in fact relentlessly, 
targeted the Tutsi population for destruction. Demonizing the Tutsi as having 
inherently evil qualities, equating the ethnic group with ‘the enemy’ and 
portraying its women as seductive enemy agents, the media called for the 
extermination of the Tutsi ethnic group as a response to the political threat 
that they associated with Tutsi ethnicity. (ICTR 2003, summary judgement: 
para. 72)
The Trial Chamber highlighted the Ten Commandments of the Hutu and the 
Kangura article entitled ‘Appeal to the conscience of the Hutu,’ which contained 
various myths about the Tutsi people, including that they were all bloodthirsty 
and that they used the two weapons of ‘money and Tutsi women’ against the 
Hutu. The article warned of an impending Tutsi attack and rallied its readers 
to commit acts of violence against Tutsis to ‘deter the enemy’.
An article published in issue 19 of Kangura described Tutsi women enemy 
agents who infi ltrated Hutu households through marriage. The Chamber held 
that this passage promoted the stereotype that Tutsi women intentionally used 
their sexuality to lure Hutu men into liaisons to promote the ethnic dominance 
of the Tutsi over the Hutu. 
The judgement recounts testimonies from witnesses who described the effect 
of the Kangura publications and the RTLM broadcasts in inciting Hutu men to 
attack and kill Tutsi women, including their own Tutsi wives.2 RTLM broadcasts 
denounced specifi c Tutsi women, who were later targeted for violence. Witness 
BI, who was specifi cally singled out on RTLM broadcasts that alleged her 
mother was a Tutsi who had married a Hutu man to make him lose his head, 
was then violently attacked in her home. Another broadcast about her used 
explicit sexual imagery and resulted in a sexually motivated attack against her 
(ICTR 2003: para. 442).
THE ICTR’S SHAMEFUL RECORD IN 
PROSECUTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE CRIMES
The Media Trial is unfortunately symptomatic of a larger neglect by the ICTR 
prosecutor to fully prosecute crimes of sexual violence directed at Rwandan 
women during the genocide. The ICTR was tasked with prosecuting serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed during 1994 in Rwanda 
or by Rwandan citizens in neighbouring states. Rape is a prosecutable crime 
under international law. 
Given the evidence and the elements of the crimes that the ICTR was tasked 
with prosecuting, virtually every defendant coming before this international 
court should be charged and convicted, where appropriate, for their role in 
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perpetrating such acts against women or for command responsibility in not 
preventing the acts of their subordinates. 
Ten years after the genocide, the ICTR had handed down 21 sentences: 18 
convictions and 3 acquittals.3 This is approximately a third of those in custody. 
An overwhelming 90 per cent of those judgements contain no rape convictions. 
More disturbing, there are double the number of acquittals for rape than rape 
convictions. 
No rape charges were even brought by the Prosecutor’s Offi ce in 70 per cent 
of  the adjudicated cases. In the 30 per cent that included rape charges: only 
10 per cent were found guilty for their role in the widespread sexual violence. 
Double that number, 20 per cent, were acquitted because the court found that the 
prosecutor did not properly present the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.4
In real numbers, that means only two defendants have specifi cally been held 
responsible for their role in the sexual violence crimes (a third was convicted 
by a judgement which was reversed on appeal), despite the tens of thousands 
of rapes committed during the genocide.5 How can this be? 
It is hard to imagine that anyone present in Rwanda during the genocide 
would not have been aware that tens of thousands of women were being attacked 
with such ferocity. Political, administrative and military leaders at the national 
and local levels as well as heads of militia directed, encouraged or permitted 
the killings and sexual violence to further their political goals: the destruction 
of the Tutsi as a group. They bear responsibility for these abuses.
Much has been written by legal scholars celebrating the international tribunals 
as an important step in ending impunity for sexual violence against women. 
The widespread evidence of  sexual violence as a weapon of  confl ict in the 
former Yugoslavia and during the genocide in Rwanda has led to groundbreak-
ing judgements through the UN tribunals set up to try those responsible for 
crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes.6 The ICTR was feted by 
lawyers for its fi rst landmark judgement in the case of Akayesu that expanded 
international law on rape – a point of  pride that ICTR offi cials always cite 
as a manifestation of their commitment to prosecute sexual violence. Yet, as 
groundbreaking as the Akayesu judgement is, it is increasingly standing alone 
as an exception – an anomaly. 
If  the current trend continues, when the doors of  the ICTR close, its 
judgements will not tell the full story of what happened during the Rwanda 
genocide. They will not correctly refl ect responsibility for the shocking rapes, 
sexual slavery and sexual mutilations that tens of  thousands of  Rwandan 
women suffered. 
The jurisprudence as it stands now – a growing string of acquittals for rape 
– in fact will do the opposite. The record of this tribunal in history will not only 
minimize responsibility for the crimes against women, but will actually deny that 
these crimes occurred. A reader of the ICTR jurisprudence will be left believing 
mistakenly that the mass rapes had little or nothing to do with the genocidal 
policies of the leaders. That indeed is a serious miscarriage of justice.
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PROSECUTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT
There is a reason why 90 per cent of the ICTR judgements do not contain rape 
convictions and why the number of rape acquittals is double the number of 
convictions. At the ICTR, crimes of sexual violence have never been fully and 
consistently incorporated into the investigations and strategy of the Prosecutor’s 
Offi ce. No comprehensive prosecution strategy or a precise work plan to 
document and bring the evidence of sex crimes into the courtroom has been 
pursued consistently for the past decade. 
This is not to say that the Prosecutor’s Offi ce has neglected this issue entirely 
– not at all. Approximately half  the cases that the court will ultimately hear 
contain allegations of sexual violence.7 Commendable efforts have been made, 
but the problem is that they have not been consistently pursued. The squandered 
opportunities, periods of  neglect and repeated mistakes have caused major 
setbacks to effective investigations and prosecutions of sexual violence crimes. 
Ten years after the genocide, international justice for Rwandan women remains 
unattainable largely because of a lack of political will in the Prosecutor’s Offi ce 
to comprehensively investigate or refl ect the widespread sexual violence in the 
indictments – particularly during the tenure of Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte. The 
sporadic attention to gender crimes over the years has implicitly sent a message 
to the investigations and prosecution staff  that this issue is not important. The 
lack of  sustained attention by the leadership has in turn resulted in a weak 
institutional capacity within the Prosecutor’s Offi ce to effectively investigate 
and develop the evidence to prosecute these crimes. 
Some cases have moved forward without rape charges, sometimes even when 
the prosecutor is in possession of strong evidence. Other cases with rape charges 
have come to trial without adequate attention to ensuring that the necessary 
evidence has been collected. In a signifi cant proportion of the cases, rape charges 
have been added belatedly as amendments, as an afterthought, rather than an 
integral part of  a prosecution strategy to acknowledge that rape was used as 
a form of genocidal violence. To this day, trial team leaders continue to have 
differing, and even contradictory, interpretations of legal responsibility for the 
violence against women and what legal approaches to adopt in the courtroom. 
Despite the rhetoric and the repeated pronouncements expressing a 
commitment to prosecuting rape, the Prosecutor’s Offi ce has never articulated 
and pursued a consistently defi ned prosecution strategy of  how this crime 
fi ts into the genocidal policies of the leaders nor has it consistently employed 
effective investigative techniques to fully document the crimes against women. 
The four prosecutors that have held this offi ce since 1994 have adopted a 
variety of  approaches to this issue. As a result, there has never been one 
identifi ed work plan pursued consistently by all investigators and trial lawyers 
in putting together their cases on this issue over the decade. To date, the lack 
of a coherent and consistent policy on sexual violence prosecutions remains 
a major impediment. Prosecuting trial attorneys are quick to blame their 
shortfalls on inadequate investigations or unwilling rape victims, rather than 
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to reinvigorate their investigations and to fi nd ways to make the process more 
enabling for rape victims to testify. 
MORE MUST BE DONE BY THE ICTR PROSECUTOR 
Sexual violence against women and girls in situations of  armed confl ict or 
systematic persecution constitutes a clear breach of  international law.8
Perpetrators of  sexual violence can be convicted for rape as a war crime, a 
crime against humanity or as an act of  genocide or torture, if  their actions 
meet the elements of each. Leaders in positions of responsibility who knew or 
should have known of such abuses and who took no steps to stop subordinates 
who committed sex crimes can also be held accountable. 
It is therefore part of the mandate of the ICTR. It is the job of the prosecutor 
to effectively investigate and prosecute this crime with the same seriousness 
as other international crimes under his or her brief. Given what happened 
in Rwanda, accountability for the sexual violence should be integrated in 
virtually all the cases given its widespread and systematic use during the Rwanda 
genocide. 
Although the Media Trial judgement is a lost opportunity for the ICTR 
prosecutor to deliver justice to women, it provides an avenue to redress the 
historic neglect of gender crimes. The Trial Chamber language that identifi es the 
mass rapes as ‘a foreseeable consequence’ of the gender propaganda provides a 
strong basis on which the prosecutor can build to argue that the top military and 
government command should have had reason to know that widespread sexual 
violence would be directed at Tutsi women and, therefore, bear responsibility 
for not preventing or punishing their subordinates. 
NOTES
1. The report, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath
(Nowrojee 1996) published by Human Rights Watch was written by Binaifer Nowrojee, a 
consultant to the Women’s Rights Project. It was based on interviews and research conducted 
in Rwanda in March and April 1996 by Binaifer Nowrojee and Janet Fleischman. It remains 
one of the only dedicated studies of the impact of sexual violence against women during the 
Rwanda genocide. Readers are referred to it for further information and details on the issue of 
sexual violence during the genocide.
2. For example, witness GO described the effect of RTLM broadcasts of the Ten Commandments in 
inciting Hutu men to kill their Tutsi wives: ‘The goal of mentioning the ten Hutu commandments 
was to ensure that the population understood that all the Hutus must become united. And they 
must have a single fi ghting goal that they should aim for. And that they should have no link or 
no relationship between Hutus and Tutsis. And it’s for that reason that some men started killing 
their wives who were Tutsis. In other cases, children who, with the result of a mixed marriage, 
whether they had a Tutsi mother or a Hutu father, but thought that they were more Hutu than 
Tutsi, killed their own mothers. Just that it was explained to Hutu widows, i.e., Hutu women 
who had been married to Tutsi men, and whose husbands had been killed and whose children 
had been killed, that in fact, it was not a problem. That they had just gotten rid of enemies. 
And that the only persons who had any link with these people were those women. And that is 
indeed how things happened.’ (ICTR 2003: para. 438)
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3. As of  April 2004, the ICTR had indicted 82 people and made 66 arrests. Sixteen indicted 
suspects remained at large and six others were no longer in custody: one died before trial, two 
have had indictments against them withdrawn and three have been acquitted. Among the 60 in 
custody, 18 were convicted (12 had appeals pending), 21 accused were on trial and another 21 
were in detention awaiting trial. The Appeals Chamber has so far confi rmed seven convictions 
and one acquittal. Still in question was whether the ICTR would bring any new indictments 
for crimes committed by members of  RPF credited with ending the genocide before taking 
power; and whether the ICTR will opt to transfer some of its caseload either to Rwanda or 
some other national jurisdiction in order to meet the 2008 completion deadline (ICTR detainees 
– status chart as of 15 March 2004; see <http://196.45.185.38/ENGLISH/factsheets/detainee.
htm for updates.).
4. Alfred Musema (ICTR-96–13), life sentence for rape (2000), overturned on appeal and acquitted 
of rape (2001); Eliezer Niyitegeka (ICTR-96–14), acquitted of rape (2003); Juvénal Kajelijeli 
(ICTR-98–44A), acquitted of  rape (2003); and Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda (ICTR-99–54), 
acquitted of rape (2004).
5. Jean Paul Akayesu (ICTR-96–4), 15 years for rape (1998), upheld on appeal (2001); Alfred 
Musema (ICTR-96–13), life sentence for rape (2000), overturned on appeal and acquitted of 
rape (2001); Laurent Semanza (ICTR-97–20), 7 and 10 years for two counts of rape, appeal 
pending.
6. In 1998, the ICTR handed down a landmark judgement in the case of Akayesu. It was the fi rst 
conviction for genocide by an international court; the fi rst time an international court punished 
sexual violence in an internal confl ict; and the fi rst time that rape was found to be an act of 
genocide to destroy a group. In 2002, the ICTY issued a signifi cant ruling in the Foca case, 
convicting three men for rape, torture and enslavement as crimes against humanity. It was the 
fi rst indictment by an international tribunal solely for crimes of sexual violence against women 
and the fi rst conviction by the ICTY for rape and enslavement as crimes against humanity.
7. Unless of  course the rape charges are withdrawn, as was done in the case of  Emmanuel 
Ndindabahizi in 2003.
8. Rape, when committed on a mass scale, is explicitly identifi ed as a crime against humanity. Rape 
and other forms of sexual violence against civilians are a violation of the Geneva Conventions 
and their Additional Protocols (for both international and internal confl icts). Sexual violence can 
be a crime under the Genocide Convention (UN 1951) if  committed with the intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group through killing or serious bodily 
harm. Rape can also be a form of torture.
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Intervening to Prevent Genocidal 
Violence: the Role of the Media
Frank Chalk 
The media of  mass communications today include traditional printed 
newspapers, magazines and journals, as well as the twentieth century’s core 
electronic resources: radio, television and the Internet. In wealthy nations, the 
print media, television and the Internet predominate, while in poorer states, 
often marked by low rates of literacy, the medium of choice for shaping and 
reinforcing public opinion is radio.
In utilitarian genocides, largely motivated by the desire to create, expand 
and preserve formal states and empires, the perpetrator calls directly on the 
professional armed forces of the state to facilitate the acquisition of wealth, 
eliminate a perceived threat or spread terror. But in genocides motivated 
by the search for a perfect future inspired by a utopian ideology, the state 
demonizes the victim group and its members, excluding them from the universe 
of mutual human obligations. This process usually requires intensive, sustained 
propaganda to mobilize violence on a grand scale. Crimes against humanity, and 
especially genocide, require the spread of hate propaganda and disinformation 
throughout the general population to reinforce key motivating beliefs. Other 
motives – acquisition of wealth, elimination of a perceived threat and spread 
of terror – often play a role in ideologically motivated genocides, but largely 
among the ordinary killers who operate at a social and political level below 
that of the key architects of the genocide.
ACUTE CURRENT QUESTIONS REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA
The media do not make ideologically motivated genocide happen, but they 
facilitate and legitimate it. Low-level Hutu perpetrators of the Rwanda genocide 
affi rm that broadcasts by radio station RTLM affected their thinking in key 
ways. Even before the death of President Habyarimana, RTLM reinforced their 
fear of a Tutsi conspiracy to commit genocide against them, a fear amplifi ed by 
reports of killings of Hutu civilians by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as it 
advanced into northern Rwanda. Following the death of the president, RTLM 
created an atmosphere legitimating the elimination of Tutsi through interviews 
with government offi cials and eminent Rwandans who identifi ed all Tutsi as 
subversive supporters of  the RPF and its alleged plan to commit genocide 
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against the Hutu. And RTLM created a background of pervasive, overwhelming 
hatred toward the Tutsi, which discouraged ordinary Hutu from refusing orders 
to serve in well-organized patrols to hunt down and kill Tutsi. 
For many of the ordinary Hutu perpetrators interviewed by Aaron Karnell 
(2003), RTLM’s broadcasts made it appear as if all the authorities in the country 
urging the killing of  Tutsi spoke with one voice. And while Karnell found 
that direct contact with local authorities rather than listening to RTLM was 
what immediately precipitated anti-Tutsi killing, he concludes that ‘RTLM 
played a critical reinforcing role in the effort of authorities to mobilize Hutu 
for violence’.
After interviewing a very large sample of ordinary Hutu killers, Scott Strauss 
(2004) reached similar conclusions. 
The interviews I conducted suggest that the main effect of the radio broadcasts 
was to help establish killing Tutsis as the new order of the day – as the new 
‘law,’ as the new basis for authority – after Habyarimana’s assassination and 
after the civil war resumed. [Thus, he concludes,] The radio broadcasts did 
not create that experience of insecurity, but likely contributed to it. (Strauss 
2004: 281)
Most of the ordinary killers interviewed by Strauss cited face-to-face mobilization 
as ‘a greater factor in their decision to take part in the killing than were radio 
broadcasts’, but, he found, ‘the radio broadcasts shaped the overall atmosphere 
in which the mobilization occurred and empowered the most violent killers’ 
(Strauss, 2004: chapter 7 and 387). 
Current fi eld research in Rwanda makes it evident that broadcasts by RTLM 
facilitated and legitimated the Rwanda genocide of 1994. Preventing or stopping 
RTLM’s messages of hate would have seriously undermined the ability of its 
high-level planners to carry out the mass mobilization required for the systematic 
annihilation of Rwanda’s Tutsi.
Real confl icts over territorial boundaries and scarce resources are frequent 
occurrences in history, but they rarely require the intensive, sustained, elimi-
nationist propaganda that one finds in cases of  ideologically motivated 
genocide. When ethno-nationalist, utopian and racist goals become paramount, 
perpetrators work most intensively to persuade their subjects of the danger to 
their security and the need to eliminate whole groups of people portrayed as 
threatening their very survival. Propaganda and ideology interact synergisti-
cally to create panic – fear that allows ordinary people to believe that they are 
killing to preserve traditional rights imperiled by threatening groups. In such 
situations, the media’s role is to engender fear, hatred and violence, inciting and 
legitimating the destruction of cultures and groups of innocent human beings as 
the only possible solution to the threatened loss of life, rights and property. As 
William Schabas (2000) reminds us, ‘Genocide is prepared with propaganda, a 
bombardment of lies and hatred directed against the targeted group, and aimed 
at preparing the “willing executioners” for the atrocious tasks they will be asked 
to perform.’ And it is precisely this open mass mobilization of the population by 
INTERVENING TO PREVENT GENOCIDAL VIOLENCE 377
the media through public encouragement of the people to endorse and join in 
state-supported crimes against humanity and genocide that aids us in predicting 
and recognizing early warnings of ideologically motivated genocide.
The newspaper Kangura, edited by Hassan Ngeze, was a private publication. 
Radio station RTLM was a private media outlet. Yet both played major roles 
in inciting Rwandans to commit genocide. Kangura and RTLM were closely 
connected to the Hutu Power wing of  the Rwandan government and the 
Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR) political party through stock 
ownership, seats on the board of directors, cross consultation, and even the 
broadcasting of editorials from Kangura on radio programmes offered to the 
largely illiterate public by RTLM. While Kangura ceased publication before 
the genocide, throughout the genocide RTLM urged the killers on to greater 
zeal and effi ciency, even furnishing listeners with the names, addresses and 
automobile licence plate numbers of those who still needed to be killed.
Before rendering judgement in the Nahimana media case, the judges of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) had to examine once more 
the meaning of incitement as an element of the crime of genocide as defi ned 
in the United Nations genocide convention (UN 1951). And they had to do 
so in the context of an earlier case, the Akayesu case, in which the court had 
concluded, ‘The prosecution must prove a defi nite causation between the act 
characterized as incitement or provocation in this case, and a specifi c offence’ 
(ICTR 1998: para. 557). 
A number of important principles have emerged from the ICTR’s decision 
in the Nahimana media case. The judges set key boundaries defi ning legitimate 
expression and elaborated principles for interpreting their guidelines. In 
summary, the major points of the decision are:
• Incitement to commit genocide is a crime in its own right and the incitement 
need not have succeeded to be considered a crime.
• Because incitement is a crime in its own right, no causal relationship 
between the incitement and the acts of the perpetrators of genocide need 
be demonstrated to prove the accused is guilty of incitement.
• Incitement of ethnic hatred can be distinguished from the legitimate use of 
the media by focusing on three factors: the tone and not just the content 
of  a communication; the context in which a media statement is made; 
whether the media distanced itself  appropriately when reporting stories 
incorporating the messages of those who advocated ethnic hatred.
• The media play a legitimate role in a nation’s self-defence, but that role 
requires that the media characterize as threats those individuals who are 
armed and dangerous rather than entire ethnic groups.
• Ethnic expressions by the media should receive more rather than less 
scrutiny ‘to ensure that minorities without equal means of defence are 
not endangered’ (ICTR 2003: para. 1008).
• International law rather than domestic law should be the point of reference 
when making determinations of freedom from discrimination and freedom 
of expression.
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Recent history makes us aware that the effective use of the media in preventing 
genocide requires assessing the stage that the genocidal situation has reached 
and devising a response strategy appropriate to that stage. Poor, economically 
developing societies struggling to move from authoritarian, arbitrary rule 
to establish the democratic foundations of  civil society are particularly 
vulnerable to genocide. Such societies have few competing media outlets, 
possess no tradition of  independent media, lack deeply rooted professional 
standards for journalism and endure a violent media culture that exhibits no 
sense of responsibility to society as a whole. Journalists in such societies are 
frequently manipulated and bribed by the dominant political faction (‘envelope 
journalism’), are dependent on stereotyping and sensationalism for the themes 
of  their news stories and are oblivious to potential news stories that would 
diminish ethnic and political hatred. Good, highly trained journalists with 
professional standards are frequently subjected to threats and, in the wake of 
assassinations and beatings, may surrender to manipulation and intimidation 
by the purveyors of fear (Frohardt and Temin 2003).
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERVENTION
• Early-stage interventions – in confl ict situations where mass killing has not 
begun – include domestic and foreign monitoring of the media, training 
programmes and codes of  conduct to raise the skills and standards of 
local editors and journalists and strengthening of the local independent 
media. In such situations, local and foreign broadcasts of serial drama 
programmes addressed to children and soap operas for adults emphasizing 
the benefi ts of interethnic cooperation, the real benefi ts of compromise 
and peaceful solutions to problems are useful methods for lessening 
confl ict. Local, multi-ethnic production teams have proved to be especially 
effective and credible originators of  such productions (Frohardt and 
Temin 2003).
• Middle-stage intervention – in societies just beginning to suffer genocidal 
massacres – must be swift and aggressive. When government-sanctioned 
threats and intimidation make it impossible for local journalists, domestic 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and government ministers to 
intervene effectively against media promoters of  ethnic, religious and 
racial hatred, foreign governments and NGOs, regional associations of 
states and international organizations like the United Nations and the 
European Union must place the disseminators of  hate propaganda on 
notice that their threatening messages are being monitored, recorded and 
transcribed to enable the prosecution and punishment of culpable media 
owners, editors and journalists. Foreign broadcasters should broadcast 
accurate, targeted news in local languages to counter the disinformation 
and distortions of  domestic information providers and to supplement 
whatever material domestic anti-hate broadcasters are able to beam to their 
listeners. Electronic jamming of hate transmitters should be initiated.
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• Late-stage intervention – launched when genocide is underway – may 
require actually destroying the transmitters and printing presses of 
the hate mongers. Foreign broadcasters should supplement their news 
broadcasts with frequently repeated warnings that a genocide is underway, 
report credible threats designed to deter the perpetrators from further 
killing, provide accurate information to discourage potential victims 
from congregating in perpetrator-targeted locations, like the churches 
which became killing-grounds in Rwanda, and appeal to ordinary citizens 
to conceal and protect members of  the victim group. Future rewards 
should be promised for citizens who can document after the defeat of the 
genocidal regime that they hid potential victims and refused to participate 
in the killing. Whenever feasible, routes to safety and practical suggestions 
for survival should be announced.
Many of these recommendations have already been fi eld-tested in countries 
such as Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Kosovo, Liberia, 
Macedonia and Sierra Leone by international organizations, governments and 
NGOs including the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the BBC World Service, the 
BBC Trust, the British Department for International Development (Britain 
2000), the United States Agency for International Development’s Center for 
Democracy and Governance, the Internews Network, the Canadian Institute for 
Media, Policy and Civil Society, Search for Common Ground, the Hirondelle 
Foundation, the Open Media Research Institute, the Radio Partnership, the 
Center for War, Peace and the News Media and Lifeline Media. 
Still needed is an international code of conduct that recognizes the dual-use 
possibilities of  television and AM, FM, and satellite radio transmitters and 
subjects those countries already under international arms embargoes initiated by 
the United Nations Security Council, the OSCE and the European Union (EU 
1998) to the same or even tighter export control policies as those for military 
equipment. Following European Union and other international guidelines, the 
new code of conduct would prohibit exports of transmitters to countries:
• Not respecting sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council.
• Violating their human rights obligations, including the United Nations 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(UN 1951), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN 
1966) and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UN 1948).
• Likely to use the equipment to provoke or prolong armed confl icts or 
aggravate existing tensions in the country of fi nal destination.
• Endangering regional peace, security and stability.
• Threatening the national security of the states subscribing to the code of 
conduct and of territories whose security is a responsibility of member 
states, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.
• Demonstrating disrespect for international law, alliances and the need to 
contain terrorism.
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• Likely to divert the equipment within the buyer country or re-export it 
under undesirable conditions.
To refi ne and further develop measures to prevent the use of hate radio in 
inciting genocidal violence, the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human 
Rights Studies is organizing an international conference to be held in spring 
2007. Specialist scholars, representatives of NGOs, government agencies and 
manufacturers of radio transmission equipment will convene to discuss the next 
stage – bringing relevant mobile and stationary radio transmitters under the 
jurisdiction of the existing dual-use controls for arms exports. Once established, 
the new regime in radio export controls will ensure that hate-radio transmitters 
can be legitimately targeted for destruction if  and when their operators violate 
the terms of the revised code of conduct. In this respect, the new code will con-
structively embody the fateful encounter with hate radio in Rwanda and stand 
as one of the many memorials to the victims of the Rwanda genocide.
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Information in Crisis Areas as a Tool 
for Peace: the Hirondelle Experience
Philippe Dahinden
In an interview one day, an African musician said to me, ‘Words can save people 
just as they can kill people.’ The artist was Baaba Maal, the singer from Senegal. 
Why is it that words can save, and kill?
In May 1994, I spent two weeks in Rwanda as a reporter for Swiss Television, 
at the time the genocide was taking place. I already knew the country. I was also 
familiar with the media of hate. After the evacuation of most foreigners, my 
cameraman and I were among the fi rst members of the international media to 
go as far south as Butare. We saw many, many corpses. We also came to realize 
how information – or rather disinformation and propaganda – could actually 
kill. At every roadblock set up by the militia, the Interahamwe, I could hear the 
radio, RTLM, designating the targets to be hit. I could also see that hundreds 
of thousands of civilians were fl eeing or waiting for the violence to stop. But 
these civilians had no real information. All they heard were rumours or the 
slogans of the extremists.
When I returned to Europe, I thought that, as journalists, we couldn’t just 
remain impotent in this situation. We did our job as well as we could informing 
the rest of the world, but the victims of the events, who didn’t see our reports, also 
deserved information. Information is a right that is as vital as the right to food 
or medical care. People have a right to know. It’s a question of human dignity.
This fundamental right of  people to be informed is what justified our 
profession as journalists and the freedom of  the press that we advocate. In 
1994, the few Rwandan journalists who survived, such as Thomas Kamilindi, 
were themselves in the massacres; they couldn’t do their work. Therefore, we 
decided that journalists from Europe should go and help our colleagues in 
Rwanda to meet this urgent need for information by creating an independent 
media outlet. We decided to set up a radio station, the only medium that could 
become operational swiftly and reach a large number of people: that was Radio 
Agatashya.
This independent radio station was initially designed to counterbalance the 
infl uence of the media in Rwanda that were spreading hatred and also to address 
populations in distress, whether they had escaped the genocide, were deprived 
of all resources, were displaced inside the country or were fl eeing outside. In 
July 1994, as the ground situation rapidly changed, the station refocused its 
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priority on assisting survivors and the humanitarian organizations that were 
attempting to help them. 
It certainly helped save human lives. From its very fi rst broadcasts, however, 
Radio Agatashya’s mission was to provide ‘water and bread, but also trustworthy, 
independent and pluralist news’, to quote François Gross, then president of 
Reporters Sans Frontières, the organization that had launched the radio station. 
The goal remained to appease hatred by providing non-partisan information, to 
help reduce tension and to end the spiral of violence by broadcasting programmes 
carried out on the ground. The genocide had already taken place, but the entire 
region was afi re and antagonism remained as sharp as ever. Reconciliation was 
still a distant goal, but we had to take initial steps in that direction.
HIRONDELLE FOUNDATION
The Hirondelle Foundation, which grew out of the Rwanda experience, is an 
organization of journalists that sets up and operates media services in crisis 
areas. Since its foundation in 1995, Hirondelle has established and managed 
Radio Agatashya in the Great Lakes Region of Africa; Star Radio in Liberia; the 
Hirondelle News Agency at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda at 
Arusha, Tanzania; Radio Blue Sky in Kosovo; Radio Ndeke Luka in Bangui in 
the Central African Republic; Moris Hamutuk, a radio programme for refugees 
in Timor; Radio Okapi, a national network in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Radio Miraya, a national network in Sudan, as well as a support 
project with the Radio-Television of Timor-Leste (RTTL).
The Hirondelle Foundation, ‘Media for peace and human dignity’, took 
its name from the fi rst of its radio operations, ‘Agatashya’, which means little 
swallow in Kinyarwanda. The appeal of  the name is in its simplicity and 
universality.
An independent media outlet has a fundamental role to play in societies where 
authoritarian and non-democratic regimes are in power. In such situations, the 
traditional media fall silent because of insecurity, physical risks and because 
money invested in development projects could ultimately end up serving no 
useful purpose. But an independent radio station can play a crucial role in 
furthering peace by dissipating rumours, avoiding propaganda and focusing 
attention on hard facts. We feel that by providing a population that is deprived 
of impartial, professional, hard news with just that kind of information we are 
doing nothing more than recognizing a fundamental human right, the right 
to be informed. 
Whenever a political, military or economic power uses information as a 
propaganda instrument to condition the minds of  people, to incite hatred, 
to suppress, to create intolerance, to keep people in ignorance or generally to 
manipulate them, this violates the dignity of  men and women and degrades 
them. Whenever men and women of a particular national, ethnic or other group 
are deprived, for political or economic reasons, of information that concerns 
them directly, this too is a violation of their dignity. 
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RADIO AGATASHYA
Radio Agatashya acted as a pioneer in this realm. In late May 1994, I addressed 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in the name of Reporters 
sans Frontières (RSF (Reporters Without Borders)) and proposed the creation 
of  a ‘free radio station … that will allow Rwandans to receive honest and 
independent information’. RSF International gave its Swiss section the mandate 
to create a radio station that would serve humanitarian ends in fi ghting against 
the damaging effects of hate media. 
After an assessment mission in June and July 1994, we chose the Bukavu 
region in the south Kivu area of  what was then known as Zaire (now the 
Democratic Republic of Congo) as the fi rst broadcast site. This location was 
chosen primarily for security reasons and because we couldn’t get permission 
to operate in Rwanda. On 4 August 1994, Radio Agatashya broadcast for 
the fi rst time in Kinyarwanda and French. The station employed Rwandan, 
Zairean and Swiss journalists. A few months later, in March 1995, we created 
the Hirondelle Foundation in Geneva, to carry on the project and assume its 
management.
The station was launched with a small team, but millions of listeners were 
gradually able to pick up its broadcasts in a broad area of  the Great Lakes 
Region. The listening area covered part of eastern Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi. 
When it became a regional station in 1995, with some 40 journalists, it had 
studios and news correspondents in Kigali, Goma and Bujumbura. It opened 
a news correspondents’ desk at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), which had recently been set up at Arusha. This offi ce has survived to 
this day and has become the independent Hirondelle Press Agency (Agence de 
Presse Hirondelle), which covers ICTR sessions.
Once fully operational, Radio Agatashya had as many as 60 local 
collaborators plus three expatriates. Every day, the station broadcast eight 
hours of programming in fi ve languages: French; Kinyarwanda, the language 
of Rwanda; Kirundi, the language of Burundi; Swahili, the language of the 
region; and English (twice a week). This included two principal news broadcasts 
a day, two news summaries, plus hundreds of magazine and feature programmes 
on such topics as respect for human rights, justice, health conditions and HIV/
AIDS prevention.
In all, the station reached an estimated four million listeners. It contributed 
enormously to making the general public more aware of the activities of the 
major international agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
operating in the region. Radio Agatashya rapidly earned the nickname: ‘the 
radio that does not bend’ – the impartial radio. 
As a matter of  policy, only stringently checked facts could be broadcast. 
Commentary was not allowed. The station was able to pursue its mandate by 
attentively recruiting quality personnel and by abiding by a charter that sought 
to ensure complete editorial independence in the content of its broadcasts.
It is worth repeating the charter here in its entirety:
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Agatashya Radio Charter
Independent regional radio with a humanitarian vocation
1. Intention of the programme
Agatashya Radio intends to come to the help of civilian populations, victims 
of events in the Sub-Region of the African Great Lakes, without distinction 
or discrimination. It uses for this purpose, and for this purpose exclusively, 
the information it broadcasts.
Agatashya Radio offers the people, victims of the events in the sub-region of 
the Great Lakes, Rwanda, Burundi, Eastern Zaire and north-west Tanzania, 
the maximum of useful information, more especially about the situation in the 
sub-region. It places its reliance on the factual exactitude and neutrality of 
the information. Every time it is possible, Agatashya Radio will give priority 
to service information for the civilian population, victims of the events, in 
particular food and medical services, as well as the search for those who have 
disappeared and the uniting of separated families.
Agatashya Radio observes strict political neutrality and seeks to remain 
independent in the eyes of all in the execution of its programmes and the 
choice of  its collaborators. It avoids all useless controversies and gives 
particular care and attention to any rumour or information likely to arouse 
a movement of panic in the population. The responsibility for the use thereof 
can only be entrusted to Swiss reporters chosen by the HIRONDELLE 
Foundation.
No one, public or private, may demand the broadcasting of  information, 
opinions or works on Agatashya Radio. The management of  the Radio, 
alone, shall decide the contents of  its programmes, in particular the form 
and substance of the information it broadcasts, no matter who the authors 
or the sources of its information may be. 
2. Setting up and contents of programmes
Agatashya Radio is bound to no specifi c place for broadcasting. Its vocation 
is to be near those people who are the victims of the events and to request 
the authorization to broadcast for a limited period from the authorities 
of the appropriate territories, without any political distinction. Agatashya 
Radio will make sure, in particular, that the auditors can clearly identify the 
HIRONDELLE Foundation, its aims, and the donors of the operation.
Agatashya Radio’s basic programme is to give factual information on the 
situation in the sub-region for those people in particular who have escaped, 
have nothing left, have been dispersed, displaced or are refugees outside their 
own countries; on the activities of NGOs (non-governmental organizations) 
having relations with countries affected by the events; information on the 
defence and the promotion of human rights, the search for peace and action 
in favour of reconciliation.
The programme may at anytime be developed and include useful pin-point 
information for those persons victims of acts of war and violence or didactic 
programmes on human rights, the restoration of peace and reconciliation. 
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Agatashya Radio also works to make the situation of civilian populations, 
and victims of events, known outside the sub-region. 
3. Sources
Agatashya Radio sources are the international humanitarian assistance 
organizations and NGOs active in the field, as well as the other usual 
journalistic sources available. They are verifi ed and processed with the greatest 
regard to objectivity.
Agatashya Radio collaborates for this purpose with these humanitarian 
organizations, amongst others. It has, therefore, been agreed with the 
international organizations and NGO partners to this project that they will 
transmit to Agatashya Radio, at regular intervals, the information they think 
useful. This information may concern any geographical area in the sub-region, 
Rwanda, Burundi, eastern Zaire or north-west Tanzania.
The source shall specify on each occasion if  it wishes to be mentioned or not. 
Agatashya Radio may decide not to mention a source. 
4. Developments
Agatashya Radio is developing with the international organizations and NGO 
partners, specifi c didactic programmes useful for the victims of the events, 
the elaboration of which requires several weeks or months.
Agatashya Radio is studying with the international organizations and NGO 
partners which will be, at the time of  broadcasting, the most appropriate 
vehicle with due regard to the general environment at that time (document 
in possession of author).
At the end of  October 1996, Radio Agatashya was abruptly forced off  
the air. This followed the new confl ict launched by the Rwanda-backed rebel 
Banyamulenge and Laurent-Desire Kabila in eastern Zaire. A substantial part 
of  Radio Agatashya’s equipment was looted or confi scated. All employees 
managed to fl ee, but three were killed. In Rwanda, the editing studio had 
already been closed since the beginning of 1996 due to offi cial pressure from 
the government.
Radio Agatashya was launched to respond to an emergency situation. In 
October 1996, it also broadcast its last programmes in the midst of a serious 
crisis. In the interval, it had experienced events that persistently imposed 
emergency requirements, such as the Masisi confl ict in Kivu and the civil war in 
Burundi. But beyond these challenges, the project provided an unique experience 
concerning the potential role of a mass medium in a confl ict-stricken area.
During the two years on the air, we were able to discover in a zone of 
confl ict how important it was to disseminate information on the spot, to have 
media close by in local languages, offered by local journalists. Information is 
a weapon that can kill people when it’s manipulated. It’s a major issue in 
conflict, and totalitarian regimes, when the belligerents try to control 
information. We know that information can also be an instrument of peace 
to counter propaganda, to counter the incitement of violence and, therefore, 
to help resolve or prevent confl ict. 
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During the 1996 war, when Kabila and his allies reached Bukavu, where our 
radio station was located, we described as clearly as possible how the fi ghting was 
going. This information was a bulwark against rumour and panic, particularly 
when rebel propaganda falsely or inaccurately announced the presence of 
soldiers at the gates of the city. Appeals for calm were sent out by people who 
were respected, such as the Archbishop of Bukavu, and they contributed to 
reducing tension within the population and reducing hostility toward certain 
groups, who were considered scapegoats. This didn’t stop the confl ict, but the 
radio nevertheless did spare lives and prevented greater suffering.
Lack of offi cial authorization prevented the station from broadcasting from 
Kigali as was planned initially. We had to face criticism for maintaining our 
station in an area where extremists and genocide perpetrators were still present. 
Nonetheless, we think that our choice was correct. First, without our radio 
station, there would have been no independent information at all. Second, our 
programmes in Kinyarwanda reached listeners directly, without any risk of 
being manipulated by extremists and, thereby, helped fi ght the propaganda. 
Last, in spite of the closure of Radio Agatashya, the information on judiciary 
proceedings continued through the Hirondelle Agency at Arusha, in particular 
via international radio networks.
In terms of the genocide and its consequences, we took a clear editorial line on 
information. We focused on the need for justice, explaining, in local languages, 
the role of the international tribunal. We explained legal concepts. As a result, 
we were able to counter the propaganda of extremists in the camps, who wanted 
to deny that the genocide had taken place. We explained that if  somebody 
had been convicted of genocide, this did not mean that all of his descendents 
would also be banished for life from society. We explained in simple terms and 
in the local language that responsibility here was individual, not passed on to 
the descendants. We also allowed people who escaped the genocide to speak 
on the radio to describe their reality.
‘PEACE MEDIA’ 
Propaganda often feeds on real facts – skirmishes, imprisonment, incidents 
– but tends to exacerbate and amplify them, emphasizing their emotional 
load and rendering them intolerable for one of the involved parties. Rigorous 
information, on the other hand, respects facts and conveys them to listeners 
in a reliable way.
Such strict information also allows people, on both sides, to listen to each 
other, to talk through live accounts and reports. It re-establishes, without any 
pathos or judgement, a form of  communication and humanity in ravaged 
countries.
In areas of confl ict, the editorial boards of ‘peace media’ are most frequently 
mixed. They gather journalists from different and confl icting linguistic, national, 
ethnic and religious groups – to work together. This is a diffi cult challenge and 
the risks taken by our collaborators (as well as the threats they often receive) are 
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real. Such mixed editorial boards can engender respect with listeners – thanks 
to the quality of their work. 
Is a peace medium just another independent medium? Well, almost; however, 
its editorial line refl ects the mission entrusted to it. Radio Agatashya, for 
example, gave priority to information and programmes that were in the interests 
of its listeners. The return to peace, compliance with fundamental human rights, 
justice, tolerance, searching for grounds for agreement between antagonistic 
groups and reconciliation between opponents – all such issues were part of 
the priority news reports and programmes. Radio Agatashya could not be 
anyone’s spokesperson; it did not represent a government or an international 
organization or a political group.
Our various projects generally opened the way to local media. An independent 
media outlet enjoying international support can often provide information 
that local media cannot broadcast. However, once the news is on the air, local 
media may fi nd it less risky to speak up. In addition, in compliance with its 
written statutes, the Hirondelle Foundation is committed to leaving local media 
in place after its departure and ensuring that responsible broadcasting by local 
journalists continues.
This is how the Hirondelle Foundation came to see its role in crisis areas and 
the role that can be played by peace media. Media cannot stop a confl ict, but 
they can contribute to a better climate. There are two possible approaches. The 
fi rst consists of producing and broadcasting programmes with explicit pro-peace 
content. These can be, for example, radio dramas featuring families from hostile 
parties and revealing, through concrete neighbourhood communication, that 
differences are actually less signifi cant than similarities.
The other approach consists of offering listeners a non-specialized medium 
that refl ects reality as accurately and as faithfully as possible to counteract the 
impact of propaganda whatever its nature. This is the preferred approach of the 
Hirondelle Foundation, in spite of the diffi culties it involves. The objective is to 
manage in a crisis area according to the same rules and techniques as a media 
outlet in a stable area. Indeed these rules remain fully valid in crisis-stricken 
areas, all the more so as information fulfi ls a crucial function in such regions.
HUMAN DIGNITY
Populations who are victims of confl icts are deprived of their dignity and of 
their fundamental human rights. The attentiveness of  a radio station to its 
listeners – programming designed and implemented for them and broadcast in 
their language – will be perceived as a mark of respect. This restored dignity 
is one of  the fundamental objectives of  the Hirondelle Foundation (‘Media 
for peace and human dignity’). It is also one of  the reasons for the popular 
success of our projects.
To conclude, I would like to quote my colleague Jean-Marie Etter, president 
of the Hirondelle Foundation, who said, 
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Information really is a way of restoring responsibility and the dignity of our 
listeners. A radio of peace is also a radio which tries to give to people, who 
have been victims of war, or abuse of power, to give them some control over 
their own destiny.1
NOTE
1. Etter, J.-M. ‘L’information en zones de crises: construire la credibilite’, intervention during 
a colloquium organized by UNESCO and SIDA on information in zones of violent confl ict. 
Stockholm, May 2003.
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The Use and Abuse of Media in 
Vulnerable Societies
Mark Frohardt and Jonathan Temin
In the wake of  the deadly and destructive civil confl icts so prominent in the 
1990s, academics and practitioners have increasingly focused on predicting and 
preventing civil confl ict, rather than on responding to and recovering from it. 
Accordingly, various methods have been developed to identify societies in which 
violent confl ict is likely to occur, and signifi cant research has been conducted 
into the root causes of civil confl ict. That work has focused on identifying and 
understanding such causal factors as economic decline, long-standing grievances 
between groups and the ethnic and religious make-up of society. But insuffi cient 
attention has been devoted to the use of the media to promote violent confl ict.
In this paper, we focus on the role of  media in vulnerable societies, which 
are defi ned as societies highly susceptible to movement toward civil confl ict 
or repressive rule. This often describes societies in developing countries and 
countries in transition, almost always those struggling to make the transition 
from authoritarian to democratic government. It frequently describes multi-
ethnic societies as well, which, over the past decade, have proved more likely to 
fall victim to confl ict than societies with greater ethnic homogeneity.
Although media outlets can be actively used to promote confl ict, media can 
also contribute to confl ict involuntarily. Such passive incitement to violence most 
frequently occurs when journalists have poor professional skills, when the media 
culture is underdeveloped or when there is little or no history of independent 
media. Under such circumstances, journalists can infl ame grievances and 
promote stereotypes by virtue of the manner in which they report, even though 
their intentions are not necessarily malicious and they are not being manipulated 
by an outside entity.
Perhaps media have generally been overlooked in analyses of confl ict because, 
on their own, they are rarely a direct cause. Nonetheless, as part of  a larger 
matrix of factors, media can be extremely powerful tools for promoting violence, 
as witnessed in Rwanda, the former Republic of Yugoslavia, the former Soviet 
republic of Georgia and elsewhere. As Jamie Metzl (1997) observes, ‘mass media 
reach not only people’s homes, but also their minds, shaping their thoughts and 
sometimes their behavior.’
An earlier version of this article was published as special report 110 to the United States Institute 
of Peace (Frohardt and Temin 2003). 
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Media behaviour can also provide indicators of impending confl ict, as certain 
characteristics of media structure and media behaviour tend to precede confl ict; 
some are evident early enough that an intervention may be feasible. If preventing 
confl ict is the goal, then infl uential tools such as media must be closely examined, 
their pernicious effects mitigated and positive output magnifi ed. The various 
approaches to precluding or stopping the use of media as a tool to promote 
division and confl ict range from training journalists to advising legislators on 
drafting media legislation. But for such training or advising to be effective, the 
role of  media in moving societies toward or away from confl ict needs to be 
clearly understood.
CLUES TO CONFLICT
Using a series of indicators, it is possible to identify societies in which media 
outlets are especially susceptible to abuse or that may be in the early stages of 
manipulation. These indicators are divided between those dealing with media
structure (the way the media sector is set up) and those dealing with media 
content (the articles and programming that media outlets produce). None of 
these indicators constitutes either suffi cient or necessary conditions for media 
manipulation to occur, but when a signifi cant portion of them are evident media 
outlets are especially vulnerable to abuse.
Structural indicators
Structural indicators can be divided into three categories: indicators concerning 
the media outlets themselves; indicators concerning the professionals – 
journalists, editors, managers and owners – associated with the outlets; and 
indicators concerning the structure of  government institutions dealing with 
the media.
Media outlets
These indicators concern the confi guration of the media landscape in a particular 
country and the infl uence that media outlets exert over society. They include 
reach, accessibility and plurality.
The reach enjoyed by media outlets is critical for obvious reasons: if  the 
reach of an outlet is minimal, then its capacity to infl uence a society will also 
be limited. Factors affecting reach include the strength of radio and television 
signals and the breadth of newspaper distribution.
Media accessibility is equally important. Even if  media are widely available, 
people still need to have access if  they are to be infl uential (recognizing this fact, 
the Rwandan government handed out free radios before the 1994 genocide). 
For newspapers this means that people must be literate in the language of the 
newspaper and have the means to acquire a newspaper, whether that means 
purchasing one, borrowing one from a friend or other means. For radio and 
television, it means owning or having access to a radio or television and 
understanding the language of  the programming. In developed countries, 
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media access is taken for granted, but in many developing countries it is not 
easily achieved.
The degree of media plurality is critical because with greater competition, 
one or a small number of media outlets are less likely to have the capacity to 
dominate. Plurality applies not only to the number of outlets but also to the 
number of  divergent voices emanating from those outlets. In other words, a 
multitude of private stations all playing music, or all espousing similar messages, 
does not constitute plurality. The society in which media can exert the most 
infl uence, both positive and negative, is one in which media outlets enjoy wide 
exposure but have relatively few competitors.
An important variable here concerns whether the media scene is dominated 
by either state-owned or private outlets or if  there is a balanced mixture of the 
two. Particularly where the media scene is dominated by the state, there is often 
little or no check on media behaviour.
Another important variable is the receptivity of the population to diversifi ed 
independent media. This is often taken for granted in developed countries, but in 
many societies there is little or no history of media diversity and independence. 
Under these circumstances, when media diversifi cation does occurs, one of the 
consequences can be the type of situation that developed in the former Soviet 
republic of Georgia, where suddenly vacant media space was fi lled by outlets 
operating from distinctly nationalist and ethnic perspectives.
Media professionals
The second set of indicators concerns media professionals. This includes not 
only journalists, but also the people behind the scenes, such as editors, station 
managers and owners. The indicators are journalist capacity; journalist isolation; 
the political, ethnic, religious and regional composition of the media corps; 
and the degree of diversity in the ownership of media outlets.
Journalist capacity refers to journalists’ ability to carry out their charge with 
a reasonable degree of professional integrity and skill. More capable journalists 
tend to make media outlets less susceptible to abuse. Journalism training is an 
important variable. Questions that should be asked in any society that may be 
vulnerable to confl ict include: Is there a school of journalism or communications 
in which journalists are trained? Do journalists enter the profession with the 
skills needed to report responsibly? The degree of fact checking in place is also 
important: Do journalists write unsubstantiated stories fi lled with rumours? Or 
are the origins of most stories clear and are they attributed to credible sources? 
The answers to these questions go a long way toward determining the suscep-
tibility of journalists to abuse.
The second indicator is the degree to which journalists are isolated, physically 
and metaphorically, from their domestic and international colleagues. An 
awareness of international standards of professional journalism provides a basis 
from which journalists may feel justifi ed, beyond their own personal conviction, 
to resist manipulation, because they enjoy a network of support and feel part 
of a larger community of journalists who adhere to a common standard. Not 
only are they emboldened by that support, but they may also be able to use 
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the network to communicate with the outside world if  media freedom comes 
under attack. Consequently, those who intend to manipulate the media may be 
more hesitant if  every time they apply pressure behind the scenes their actions 
are made public by the local or international media.
Particularly in traditional societies where ethnic bonds are strong, simple 
peer pressure and an emphasis on the importance of responsibility to clan or 
group can facilitate media manipulation. In such societies, it may be relatively 
easy for individuals holding revered positions in their groups to manipulate 
members of the same group who work as journalists. They can sometimes do 
so using threats or bribes, without having to revert to overt coercion.
Along the same lines, diversity in the ownership of media outlets is critical 
because, ultimately, it is the owners who exert the most control over content. 
A society is especially vulnerable to media abuse when all or a signifi cant 
portion of  media outlets are owned by one or a small number of  people, 
particularly if  those people are of the same ethnicity or religion, support the 
same political party or are from the same region. Even a balanced mix of 
state-owned and independent media outlets may not be suffi cient to guard 
against abuse, because the ‘independent’ outlets may have strong ties to the 
government. It is also important to determine whether more subtle links exist 
between infl uential members of particular groups and media outlets, such as 
discrete fi nancial relationships.
Government institutions concerned with media
Perhaps as important as the structure of media outlets and the people involved 
in them are the independence and effectiveness of  government institutions 
concerned with the media, particularly the legislature and judiciary. The degree 
of  media independence and freedom established in a country’s laws and the 
degree to which those laws are enforced defi ne the space in which media are 
allowed to operate. The relevant indicators here are media’s legal environment 
and changes in media controls.
Two very different types of legislation are critical to maintaining a healthy 
legal environment for media: legislation protecting journalists and media outlets 
from abuse and guaranteeing their freedom to operate without government 
interference; and legislation, such as libel and slander laws, protecting private 
individuals from being the subject of unjustifi ed insult or falsehoods appearing in 
the media. The former allows journalists to operate without fear of government 
coercion, unwarranted prosecution or personal harm.
If  such legislation is in place and consistently enforced, then journalists 
and media outlets are not likely to be very susceptible to abuse. But if  such 
legislation is absent, journalists and media outlets are essentially ‘fair game’ for 
the government, meaning that the state is free to attempt to manipulate them 
however it chooses. Journalists, in turn, have few options for recourse.
If  private individuals have no effective avenue for registering complaints 
against the media, then few options are available to people or groups who 
may be unfairly criticized or demonized in the media. The absence of  the 
possibility of punishment emboldens those associated with hate media outlets 
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and may encourage the formation of such outlets, because the risks involved 
are reduced. To counteract this effect, mechanisms for punishment, such as 
libel or hate speech legislation that protects both individuals and groups, can 
be benefi cial.
Recent research into the causes of  civil confl ict suggests that societies in 
transition (those that are in the process of  liberalizing and moving toward 
a more open, democratic dispensation) are more vulnerable to confl ict than 
societies that have already gone through a transition or those awaiting one. 
In other words, it is societies ‘on the way up’ that tend to experience civil 
confl ict. A common characteristic of  liberalization is relaxation of  controls 
on the media and, although this is generally a positive development, dangers 
accompany it. Newly opened media space can quickly be fi lled by media outlets 
that mirror political or ethnic centrifugal forces promoting confl ict. Thus, a 
relaxation of media controls can sometimes actually lay the groundwork for 
future confl ict.
On the other hand, a tightening of media controls can also be a precursor 
to confl ict, as it can be indicative of a government’s intentions: for example, 
the Zimbabwean government-imposed tight restrictions on media toward the 
beginning of its violent land-seizure initiative and its effort to ensure Robert 
Mugabe’s victory in the 2002 presidential elections. By forcing these measures 
through parliament, Zimbabwean authorities telegraphed their intentions.
CONTENT INDICATORS
Content is critical to the overall analysis because media content helps shape 
an individual’s view of the world and helps form the lens through which all 
issues are viewed. The content indicators presented here can be evident early 
in the manipulation process, at a point where intervention may still be feasible. 
However, once media manipulation is widely apparent it may be too late, and 
interventions may yield little or no benefi t.
Content creating fear
The construction of fear is likely to be a component of any effort to use media 
to promote confl ict. In Rwanda before the genocide, a private radio station tried 
to instil fear of an imminent attack on Hutus by a Tutsi militia. These efforts 
were at least partly successful, as many people subscribed to the ‘imminent’ 
threat, although only fl imsy evidence was provided to support it. When such 
reporting creates widespread fear, people are more amenable to taking pre-
emptive action, which is how the actions taken in Rwanda were characterized. 
Media were used to make people believe that ‘we must strike fi rst in order 
to save ourselves.’ Creating fear laid the foundation for taking violent action 
through ‘self-defence’.
In assessing the construction of  fear, one must be circumspect, however, 
because there is an important distinction between content that criticizes a person 
or group in a manner that is simply degrading (as seen in many Western tabloids) 
and printing or broadcasting information that is clearly intended to create a 
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fearful reaction. Although the former can lay the groundwork for the latter, it 
is most often the latter that increases the likelihood of confl ict. Four strategies 
commonly used to create fear are: 
1. Focus on past confl icts and on a history of ethnic animosity. By highlighting 
the fact that violent confl ict has occurred in the past and that the same 
groups behind violent acts then are suspected of planning them now, the 
potential for future confl ict can appear much greater to media consumers 
than it actually is, and the means and capacity for carrying out such atrocities 
more attainable. Media can be used to make the point that ‘they did it before, 
they can do it again’.
2. Manipulation of myths, stereotypes and identities. This often occurs through 
the dehumanization of members of the ‘other’ group. Frequent references 
to Tutsis as ‘cockroaches’ in the Rwandan media are an example of  this 
phenomenon. As soon as people in the other group are perceived as ‘less 
than human’, engaging in confl ict with them and killing them becomes 
easier to justify. A related strategy is to portray members of  a particular 
group as ‘irrational’ or ‘unpredictable’, providing additional justifi cation 
for pre-emptive action.
3. Overemphasis on certain grievances, inequities, or atrocities. This tactic can 
create the impression that circumstances are worse than they really are 
and that a particular group is more victimized than it actually is. If  the 
overemphasized grievance or inequity is particularly sensitive, such as a 
religious issue or an issue concerning the use of natural resources, excessively 
negative reporting can be particularly infl ammatory. Overemphasis adds 
fuel to the fi re by creating the impression that a group is being intentionally 
discriminated against and that the situation is particularly dire, even though 
neither of these impressions may be accurate. Discrimination may be present, 
but the size and scope of the discrimination may be exaggerated in the media; 
thus, the ‘victimized’ group is given added incentive and justifi cation for 
reprisal, regardless of whether their grievances are actually legitimate.
4. Shift toward consistently negative reporting. The critical element here 
is change; if  the situation has been bad from the start and consistently 
negative reporting is the norm, then it is not likely to be infl ammatory. But a 
signifi cant shift in reporting toward a decidedly negative and pessimistic tone 
creates the impression that the country’s situation is worsening considerably 
and provides justifi cation for people or groups to stop and reverse that slide 
by taking decisive action, including violence.
Content creating inevitability and resignation
Just as media outlets have been used to create a pervasive sense of fear, they 
have also been used to convince people that confl ict is inevitable. This leaves 
media consumers resigned to the notion that confl ict will happen, and when 
such resignation is prevalent, efforts to prevent confl ict tend to be seen as futile, 
which makes them increasingly unlikely to succeed. 
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Portraying confl ict as part of an ‘eternal’ process is a strategy frequently used 
to create the impression that confl ict is inevitable. This often occurs when media 
promote ‘primordial identities’ that suggest that people of different ethnicities 
have, since the beginning of time, been in confl ict with one another, have never 
coexisted peacefully and are somehow preordained to be in perpetual confl ict. 
Rarely, if  ever, is this actually the case, as virtually every ethnic confl ict involves 
groups that have lived together peacefully at one stage or another.
A similar strategy for promoting the inevitability of confl ict is to use media 
to discredit alternatives to confl ict. For example, Alison Des Forges (2002: 241) 
observes that Rwandan radio ‘seized the opportunity to impress upon Hutu 
that Tutsi could never be trusted and that any form of power-sharing, such as 
that specifi ed in the Arusha Accords, could never work’.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTERVENTION
The term ‘intervention’, as it is used here, does not denote any sort of military or 
armed initiative (with one exception in the segment on ‘aggressive interventions’). 
Rather, the term refers to support for the development of diverse, pluralistic 
independent media outlets giving voice to a variety of  views and opinions. 
Such interventions are not carried out by soldiers or peacekeepers, but by 
journalists, professional media trainers and nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) workers.
Structural interventions
The most effective strategy for strengthening a professional media sector 
and protecting its content from biased infl uence is through reforms in media 
structure. Structural reforms have many advantages over interventions that 
target only content. If  carried out early enough they can prevent media abuse 
from taking place. Structural reforms can also go a long way toward obviating 
future attempts to manipulate the media during periods of social stress. Once 
in place, these reforms are no longer dependent on foreign assistance, so they 
tend to maintain legitimacy and build popular support. Eight types of structural 
interventions are detailed below.
1. Strengthening independent media. Enhancing the ability of  independent 
media outlets to resist unwanted infl uence from the government or elsewhere 
is critical to developing their ability to avoid abuse and manipulation. This 
strengthening is often a product of media plurality and longevity, both of 
which make using media to incite violence increasingly diffi cult. Plurality 
creates strength in numbers; with a variety of diverse independent media 
outlets in place, if  one or even several are co-opted the effect is mitigated. 
Through media expansion and diversifi cation, hate media can be marginalized; 
for example, in the United States, hate media exist but are virtually irrelevant. 
Longevity contributes to the strength of  independent media because the 
longer independent outlets are in place, the more ingrained in society they 
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become. Consequently, if  such ingrained outlets are abused, or shut down, 
the public outcry is likely to be substantial.
  One of the most prominent examples of independent media thwarting 
government attempts to manipulate information comes from Serbia under 
Slobodan Milosevic, where the independent radio station B92 is credited with 
playing an instrumental role in informing and mobilizing the population. 
2. Developing journalist competence. This intervention involves two basic 
objectives: enhancing the physical resources available to journalists (such 
as computers and vehicles) and enhancing human resources (such as 
writing ability, editing skills and contextual knowledge). If  journalists lack 
physical resources, they are likely to be more susceptible to co-optation 
and corruption. Human resource needs are more diffi cult to defi ne and 
to provide because they are not tangible goods. The principal method of 
enhancing human resources is through training, often through peer-to-peer 
training conducted by journalists. Although the results of  such training 
are often diffi cult to quantify, the benefi ts accrued by journalists can be 
substantial.
  Even with the latest technology, ultimately it is the quality of the journalist 
that determines the quality of the journalism. Improving the technical or 
material components of the medium does not, in itself, improve the message. 
Consequently, addressing human resource needs must be a top priority. An 
added benefi t of developing journalist competence is that more competent 
journalists are more likely to investigate and report on actors attempting to 
abuse the media and to expose their intentions, which can deter or thwart 
their efforts. Investigative journalism can be critical to blocking efforts 
to incite confl ict and can debunk some of  the infl ammatory myths and 
stereotypes propagated in the media.
3. Another type of structural intervention involves working with the legislature 
and judiciary, the government institutions responsible for protecting citizen’s 
rights, including the rights to free speech and independent media. Particular 
attention should be paid to the legislature because of its capacity to make 
and modify legislation. In many societies susceptible to media abuse, the 
legislation necessary to prosecute media abuse – including laws that protect 
the independence of  private media outlets and that address hateful and 
antagonistic media content, such as slander and libel laws – is absent, 
ineffective or poorly designed. Thus it is important for experts in comparative 
media to work with legislatures to aid them in crafting such legislation. 
  Once the necessary legislation is in place, it is equally important that 
the judiciary has the capacity to enforce the laws. If  it is effective and 
impervious to corruption, the judiciary can provide an important check 
on media abuse because it can punish actors attempting to use the media 
maliciously. But in so many of the societies recently succumbing to confl ict 
and in those vulnerable to doing so, rule of law is weak and the legal system 
is riddled with bribery and corruption. Among the recommendations by 
the NGO Article 19 following the Rwanda genocide was that government 
‘should seek to strengthen the judiciary to ensure that the necessary steps 
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can be taken within the domestic legal system to prevent the broadcasting 
of incitement to violence’ (Article 19 1996: 171). But often the government 
is poorly equipped to do this, and assistance from the NGO community 
can make a signifi cant difference. NGOs should focus on strengthening the 
mechanics of the judiciary and on reducing the susceptibility of judges to 
corruption.
4. Promoting diversity in the journalist corps and media ownership. If  there is 
little diversity among journalists and owners of media outlets, they are more 
vulnerable to abuse by members of the dominant group or groups in society. 
The way to combat this effect is clear – promote diversity – but strategies for 
doing so are not as obvious. One way to promote diversity among journalists 
is to impress on managers and owners of media outlets the importance of 
diversity and how they can benefi t from it, both commercially and through 
content improvements that result from employing more diverse personnel.
  Another strategy is to work with members of  certain political, ethnic, 
religious or regional groups to help them become involved with media 
(though this involves the risk of appearing to favour one group over another). 
A third strategy is to create incentives for outlets to promote diversity in their 
hiring, for example by having donor organizations provide more support, 
fi nancial or otherwise, to outlets that are more diverse. Promoting diversity 
in media ownership is even more complex, because in a market economy it 
would be diffi cult and ill-advised to set quotas concerning the demographics 
of media ownership. Worse yet, in a non-market society, the government 
controls the media outlets and is unlikely to be convinced of the merits of 
diversity in ownership. Nonetheless, there are ways both to aid individuals to 
create new private media outlets and to encourage governments to allow for 
such outlets. One route is through bilateral aid, particularly aid channelled 
from development banks through national fi nancial institutions via leasing 
and other fi nancial support, intended for developing small- and medium-
sized businesses.
5. Licensing and regulation of media outlets. A balance must be struck in the 
media regulatory environment so that starting a media outlet is not an overly 
complex, time-consuming, bureaucratic task, but regulation is not so lax 
that almost anybody can have a radio station or newspaper. Complete state 
control over media is not the solution, but neither is the total absence of 
regulation. Some type of government oversight of the licensing process is 
often in order, but one that is shielded, to the extent possible, from heavily 
political or corrupt infl uences. Again, it may be diffi cult for governments, 
particularly in developing countries still building and consolidating 
their democracies, to design and implement such regulations effectively. 
Assistance and encouragement from the domestic and international NGO 
communities can provide a strong impetus for establishing regulations, and 
international assistance can provide a blueprint for how to implement such 
regulation. Bilateral relations between donor and developing countries are 
also important, as they often involve assistance to government institutions 
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and advice on the overhaul of bureaucratic processes, which can strongly 
affect the domestic regulatory environment.
6. Strengthening domestic and international networks. Because journalists in 
vulnerable societies are often isolated from both domestic and international 
colleagues, establishing and strengthening journalist networks can be an 
effective way to combat media abuse. Domestically, this can be accomplished 
through journalist organizations or unions. When effective, they serve 
various purposes – providing journalists with information and ideas on how 
to report in a particular context (especially when there are personal safety 
issues involved), defending journalists’ rights and freedoms and providing 
journalists with legal counsel. All of these services are critical, particularly 
in a society where the state is wary of independent media and eager to crack 
down on independent journalists.
  International journalist networks can be just as important. Such networks 
can help journalists operating in diffi cult circumstances feel part of  a 
larger community of  colleagues around the world, which can strengthen 
their resolve. These networks can also inform journalists on what may be 
considered international standards of journalism.
  A more programmatic form of international networking involves making 
international media, such as CNN or the BBC, accessible to journalists in 
vulnerable societies. The benefi ts of this are twofold: sometimes journalists 
use the content verbatim, but even if  they do not, they are better informed 
and are exposed to a different perspective, which helps them in their own 
reporting.
7. ‘Demand-side’ intervention. Too often the ‘supply side’ of the media equation 
(meaning the news and information that is supplied by media outlets) is 
closely scrutinized at the expense of  attention to the ‘demand side’ (the 
demand by individuals for that news and information). A problem often 
found in societies in which media abuse occurs and in societies with under-
developed media in general is that media consumers – everyday citizens 
– rarely consider and question the source and credibility of  their news. 
Instead, they take for granted that what they hear on the radio and read in 
the newspapers is accurate and unbiased. For example, Des Forges (2002: 
246) observes that in Rwanda before and during the genocide, ‘most ordinary 
people saw no reason to call into question their practice of taking the radio 
as the voice of authority’.
  Part of the reason for the absence of critical analysis of the media was that, 
prior to the genocide, most Rwandans had never been exposed to alternatives 
to state-owned media, so they were conditioned to believe everything they 
heard from the few state-controlled outlets to which they had access. It was 
also due to the fact that most Rwandans had little understanding of the bias 
inherent in all media outlets.
  The prescription is increased public education and enhanced awareness 
of how media outlets operate. People need to understand that media outlets 
report from a particular perspective, one that may represent interests contrary 
to their own. B92 in Serbia tried to create such an understanding. ‘The idea 
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was to provoke the public to start thinking about the information that they 
were receiving,’ according to one of the station’s managers. ‘So don’t be just 
a passive recipient of this information, think about it and decide, do you 
believe it or not?’ (Glyn-Pickett 1999). 
8. Media monitoring. The fi nal structural intervention is quite broad: monitoring 
media behaviour in an effort to identify the indicators described above so that 
the interventions detailed here can occur. It is imperative that someone keep 
watch over the media and, just as critical, over forces infl uencing the media. 
Such oversight is accomplished most effectively through media monitoring 
initiatives, organized efforts to monitor for specifi c characteristics. Some 
monitoring of broadcasts in various countries already occurs – the United 
States government runs the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the 
BBC has a monitoring service – but it is not broad enough and does not 
cover media outlets in some of the most vulnerable societies.
Monitoring for the indicators presented above can inform policymakers 
about societies at risk of media manipulation. In doing such monitoring, it is 
important to work with local NGOs to develop a local monitoring capacity. 
Content-specifi c interventions
Content-specifi c interventions are often based on observations of the content 
indicators detailed above, which tend to appear at a relatively late stage. But 
content-specific interventions can also be pre-emptive. The interventions 
described here can occur before the appearance of  the indicators, to ensure 
that they do not appear. Content-specifi c interventions are most effective when 
media abuse is involuntary due to a lack of training and competence, rather 
than calculated.
If the media abuse is intentional, content-specifi c interventions are unlikely to 
succeed because journalists are fully aware of the consequences of their actions. 
But when media abuse is involuntary, such interventions offer alternatives to 
structural interventions; in circumstances where structural interventions are 
ineffective, content-specifi c interventions may be more successful. They may 
also serve as short-term remedies for some forms of  media abuse, allowing 
more time for structural interventions, which tend to take longer to implement 
and yield results.
1. ‘Repersonalization’. As described above, one of the strategies for using media 
to instigate confl ict involves the ‘dehumanization’ and ‘depersonalization’ 
of individuals. Through this process, people are portrayed in the media as 
members of a stigmatized group rather than as individuals.
  Training on how journalists can move beyond the political, ethnic, 
religious or regional factors to identify the true source of a grievance (be it 
an economic grievance or another concern) and how they can portray people 
fi rst and foremost as individuals can ease tensions and move a society away 
from confl ict. These strategies concern not only mitigating the negative 
effects of media abuse but also using media as a positive tool for reconcili-
ation and confl ict prevention.
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2. Issue-oriented training. Journalists can be trained in reporting issues that 
tend to be particularly sensitive and possibly explosive. Reports on economic 
issues and environmental resources, in particular, can be distorted and 
twisted into tales of  ethnic hatred and animosity because they are issues 
that affect people’s livelihood, as they can have a dramatic effect on both 
personal economic viability and general stability. Thus it is particularly 
important that they are reported on in a professional manner, and issue-
oriented training focusing on how journalists can frame these issues helps 
ensure that they are.
3. Entertainment-oriented programming. Entertainment-oriented programming 
offers another way to use media as positive tools for preventing and resolving 
confl ict. The work of the NGO Search for Common Ground provides several 
impressive examples of such programming. Among other projects, they have 
co-produced a dramatic television series for Macedonian children intended 
to facilitate cross-ethnic understanding; and they have established radio 
studios in Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone that produce, in addition 
to other programming, soap operas designed to encourage dialogue and 
discourage violence. Entertainment-oriented programming can have a direct 
effect and may be signifi cantly more infl uential than news programming. 
Aggressive interventions
Finally, the third group of strategies for combating media abuse and manipulation 
involves what may be considered ‘aggressive interventions’. Such interventions 
tend to be a last resort and usually occur after media abuse and manipulation is 
widely apparent, often after violent confl ict has begun. They are more reactive 
than proactive. They are also externally imposed and some forms are unlikely 
to be effective if  not accompanied by other forms of  intervention, such as 
military intervention. Such aggressive interventions do not usually change media 
structure or content, although some forms do disable physical infrastructure. 
Clearly, earlier intervention that stands a chance of  preventing media abuse 
and manipulation before it proliferates is preferable.
1. Alternative information. A prominent strategy for aggressive intervention 
is for foreign entities, including governments, NGOs and political parties 
to offer sources of  information other than those available domestically. 
In several instances, alternative information has played an important role 
in mobilizing a population and injecting new ideas into society. Among 
them are Democratic Voices of Burma, a station broadcasting into Burma 
out of Norway, and Radio Freedom and Capital Radio in South Africa. 
Radio Freedom was broadcast by the African National Congress into South 
Africa from several southern African states in the 1970s, and Capital Radio 
broadcast from the ‘homeland’ of  Transkei to the rest of  South Africa 
in the 1980s. Both served as valuable sources of  news about the realities 
of  apartheid, winning many converts among the white population along 
the way. 
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  More generally, in many countries major international radio networks, 
such as the BBC and Voice of America (VOA), are regularly heard on the 
airwaves and offer citizens reliable information that sometimes contradicts 
information broadcast by local media outlets. 
  Alternative information can be specifi cally designed to counter information 
broadcast by a single or small number of sources, such as government media 
or hate media outlets.
  A good example of the use of alternative information is the Ring Around 
Serbia, a multilateral project spearheaded by the United States in 1999. It 
involved assembling a ring of radio transmitters in countries neighbouring 
Serbia and broadcasting programming from the BBC, VOA, Deutsche Welle, 
Radio France International and Radio Free Europe into Serbia. Such an 
intervention is reactive and occurs late in the manipulation process. It is 
also expensive, diffi cult to organize and of questionable legality. Broadcasts 
prepared specially for transmission into ‘hostile territory’ are often perceived 
as propaganda and thus discounted by the intended audience. But if  all 
other opportunities for media intervention have been missed, broadcasting 
alternative information may merit consideration.
2. Radio and television jamming. Perhaps the most frequently discussed strategy 
for countering hate media is jamming radio and television signals. In looking 
back at Rwanda, several scholars and practitioners, foremost among them 
Roméo Dallaire, the UN commander in Rwanda during the genocide, have 
suggested that jamming Rwandan radio would have made carrying out the 
genocide signifi cantly more diffi cult and would have been worth the effort 
and cost (to his credit, Dallaire proposed radio jamming before the genocide 
as well). But jamming is a blunt instrument that comes with substantial legal 
concerns and would only be seriously considered once violence is already 
widespread. The more effective and less costly alternative to radio jamming 
is removing media from the ‘toolkit’ belonging to actors intent on inciting 
confl ict, which is what the structural and content-specifi c interventions 
detailed above are designed to do.
RECOMMENDATIONS
As this analysis demonstrates, media can be extremely powerful tools used by 
those intent on instigating confl ict. Media are multipliers: they amplify and 
disseminate messages and opinions. Media spread information and misinforma-
tion, shape individuals’ views of others and can heighten tensions or promote 
understanding. This makes controlling media and their messages an important 
goal for anyone intent on promoting confl ict. This analysis concludes with four 
recommendations to the international community for addressing the use and 
abuse of media in vulnerable societies:
1. Media in vulnerable societies should be monitored.
Media in vulnerable societies should be monitored for the ‘clues to confl ict’ 
detailed above. Special attention should be devoted to the structural indicators 
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– including, in particular, journalist competence, media variety and plurality 
and media’s legal environment – as they can reveal how vulnerable or resistant 
media are to manipulation and point to specifi c interventions that might 
prevent media co-optation and abuse before it occurs. Attention should 
also be given to content indicators, such as a focus on past atrocities and a 
history of ethnic hatred; manipulation of myths, stereotypes and identities to 
‘dehumanize’; and efforts to discredit alternatives to confl ict. The monitoring 
should be comprehensive; put in context with political, economic and social 
indicators; and conducted by experienced or trained monitors.
2. There should be greater collaboration between media organizations and confl ict 
resolution organizations.
The role of media in fomenting confl ict is seldom addressed comprehensively 
by either media or confl ict resolution NGOs. Media organizations tend to 
devote limited attention to the dynamics and causes of  violent confl ict, 
while confl ict resolution organizations often overlook the role of  media 
in fomenting or tempering the confl icts they scrutinize. However, working 
together, these organizations can pool their knowledge and address the role 
of media in confl ict from both sides of the issue. Particularly in efforts to 
develop early-warning instruments, media organizations should be consulted 
and media ‘indicators’ incorporated into the analysis, so that media are 
considered, along with other factors, when trying to identify societies highly 
susceptible to confl ict. Such collaboration can enhance understanding of 
the relevant issues and the design and implementation of  early-warning 
instruments and preventive interventions.
3. Media organizations need to build a better case for monitoring and early 
intervention and encourage appropriate donor support.
Early, preventive media intervention, such as the structural interventions 
described above, can be signifi cantly more effective and benefi cial than later, 
reactive interventions, such as radio jamming. Early interventions are more 
cost-effective and can lay the foundation for the long-term institutional 
development necessary to combat political or ethnic instability. Media 
organizations need to provide donors with reliable research and reports on 
signifi cant fi eld experience to justify supporting early interventions, even 
before traditional confl ict indicators are visible. Further collaboration and 
information-sharing between confl ict resolution and media organizations, 
particularly through common methods for identifying critical points for 
intervention, will contribute greatly to assuring donors that funding early 
intervention is worthwhile and cost-effective.
4. A systematic review of  media behaviour in vulnerable societies should be 
conducted.
An effective approach to gaining a better understanding of use and abuse 
of media in vulnerable societies would be to conduct a comprehensive study 
by monitoring the characteristics of media behaviour in several countries 
deemed close to confl ict. Such a review could provide the quantitative 
and qualitative data needed to focus the attention of  donors and media 
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organizations on the role of media in such societies and on the importance 
of early, preventive intervention. 
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Censorship and Propaganda 
in Post-Genocide Rwanda
Lars Waldorf
We used communication and information warfare better than anyone.
President Paul Kagame (Pottier 2002: 53) 
Rwandans realize perfectly well that there is a signifi cant discrepancy 
between what they see with their own eyes every day and what they hear 
through the official media or private newspapers, which support the 
government line. They can see they are not being told the truth. Once 
again, we have fallen into an era of suspicion and speculation, which is so 
favourable to dissemination of the worst kind of propaganda.
André Sibomana (1999: 144)
In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, in which Radio-Télévision Libre des 
Milles Collines (RTLM) and Kangura played a notoriously galvanizing role, 
Rwanda’s new government faced the task of ensuring that a resurrected press 
would not voice hate speech again.1 More than 12 years on, however, an 
increasingly authoritarian regime dominated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) continues to justify censorship and propaganda as a necessary safeguard 
against the recrudescence of genocide. As the minister of information explained, 
‘The specter of 1994 makes us a lot more vigilant ... The means of information 
must not become vectors for germs of  discord in the Rwandan population’ 
(Fontemaggi 2003). The RPF portrays RTLM and Kangura as cautionary tales 
about the dangers of  too much press freedom and private media. In reality, 
however, RTLM and Kangura testify to the dangers of government control and 
manipulation of the media.2
After taking power in 1994, the RPF retooled the previous regime’s 
information agency and the offi cial media to disseminate its own propaganda. 
As under the previous regime, the government has promoted private media 
outlets to create a facade of  media pluralism.3 At the same time, the RPF 
has successfully suppressed or co-opted independent journals and accused 
independent journalists of  inciting ethnic ‘divisionism’ and even genocidal 
ideology. As a result, there is less press freedom and media pluralism in Rwanda 
today than there was before the genocide. 
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Johan Pottier (2002: 202) has illuminated how the RPF attained a ‘monopoly 
on knowledge construction’ vis-à-vis the international media. The RPF’s prowess 
at propaganda should come as no surprise; after all, President Paul Kagame 
was head of military intelligence for Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance 
Movement army, which won the Ugandan civil war. While acknowledging 
the RPF’s propaganda skills, Pottier faults the ignorance of  many Western 
(especially Anglophone) journalists who were covering Rwanda for the fi rst time 
and who could not see past the RPF as saviour and the international community 
as guilty bystander. Yet, the RPF’s propaganda success with Western donors and 
media could not have been accomplished without its suppression of competing 
narratives, alternative voices and independent media within Rwanda. 
POST-GENOCIDE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
After the RPF defeated the genocidal forces militarily and installed a transitional 
government, there was some prospect that Rwanda might fi nally achieve a non-
ethnic and more democratic government. Such hope quickly evaporated as 
Anglophone Tutsi military elites took control, both within the RPF and the 
government, marginalizing Francophone Hutu as well as Francophone Tutsi 
survivors (Reyntjens 2004). The RPF’s authoritarianism stems from two main 
sources: a longstanding commitment to democratic centralism (shared by other 
well-disciplined guerrilla or vanguard movements) and its understandable fear 
of democracy in a country where Hutu comprise an overwhelming majority 
(HRW 2003: 4; ICG 2002: 2).4
Since 1995, more than 40 prominent fi gures – both Hutu and Tutsi – have fl ed 
into exile, while several others have been assassinated, imprisoned or disappeared 
(Human Rights Watch 2003: 8–9; ICG 2002: 28–9). In 1995, three Hutu political 
leaders resigned: Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu (from the Mouvement 
Démocratique Républicain (MDR)), Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga 
(from the RPF), and Justice Minister Alphonse Nkubito. Twagiramungu and 
Sendashonga went into exile, and Sendashonga was assassinated in Nairobi 
in 1998 after trying to create an opposition movement in exile. In early 2000, 
President Kagame linked Joseph Sebarenzi, the charismatic, Tutsi parliamentary 
leader, to monarchists and he fl ed into exile in the United States. After Assiel 
Kabera, an infl uential Tutsi genocide survivor and aide to Hutu President Pasteur 
Bizimungu, was assassinated, his two brothers fl ed the country: one was vice-
president of Ibuka, the main survivors’ association, while the other was head of 
the survivors’ assistance fund. The same year, the government also arrested Jean 
Mbanda, a Tutsi survivor and parliamentarian, on corruption charges after he 
publicly criticized the government.5 Prime Minister Celestin Rwigema, a Hutu 
MDR politician, fl ed to the United States in 2000, after which the Rwandan 
government accused him of genocide. President Bizimungu, a Hutu member of 
the RPF, resigned in 2000 and attempted to create a new political party, Parti
Démocratique pour le Renouveau-Ubuyanja, which was immediately banned. 
He was arrested in 2002 and, after a show trial in 2004, was sentenced to 15 
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years for inciting rebellion, plotting to overthrow the government and other 
crimes (ICG 2002: 30–1; USDS 2005). 
The RPF banned three opposition parties and co-opted the remaining parties 
in advance of the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections – the fi rst since 
the 1994 genocide. It levelled unsubstantiated accusations of divisionism against 
its political opponents – propaganda that the offi cial and pro-government 
media were only too happy to repeat (EU EOM 2003a: 45). As the European 
Union Electoral Observer Mission noted, ‘Accusations of  separatism and 
divisionism, which are grave in the Rwandan context, had a tendency to be 
used as arguments for limiting the freedom of speech of political opponents 
during the election campaigns’ (EU EOM 2003a: 10). The RPF accused the 
Liberal Party of promoting ethnic ‘divisionism’ by advocating on behalf of Tutsi 
genocide survivors. A parliamentary commission called for banning the MDR, 
the leading opposition party, and accused 46 individuals of collaborating with 
the MDR to promote genocidal ideology (HRW 2003). The former Minister of 
Defence and the army’s parliamentary representative fl ed the country. Shortly, 
thereafter, fi ve people disappeared, including the former vice-president of the 
Supreme Court and an MDR parliamentarian.6
President Kagame won 95 per cent of the vote and the RPF 76 per cent in 
the 2003 elections which marred by fraud, intimidation, a lack of transparency, 
and an ‘absence of pluralism of opinion’ (EU EOM 2004a: 4, 28–40; EU EOM 
2003b: 3). After the elections, the EU Mission concluded, ‘Political pluralism 
is more reduced than during the period of transition [July 1994 to July 2003]’ 
(EU EOM 2003a: 4). 
Following its electoral victories, the RPF further tightened control over the 
media and civil society. In early 2004, Parliament formed a commission to 
investigate the supposed persistence of  genocidal ideology in Rwanda. The 
commission construed any criticism of RPF policies as genocidal ideology. In 
its June 2004 report, it accused a wide range of media and civil society actors 
– including CARE International, the BBC, and Voice of America (VOA) – of 
promoting genocidal ideology. The report made similar accusations against 
La Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de l’Homme
(LIPRODHOR), a human rights NGO, and the staff  of  its two monthly 
journals, Umukindo and Le Verdict. Several of LIPRODHOR’s human rights 
defenders, including most of the top leadership, subsequently fl ed the country. 
The US Department of State observed: ‘After the release of the [parliamentary] 
report, independent human rights organizations were effectively dismantled, 
and all independent sources on the human rights conditions in the country 
disappeared in the second half  of the year [2004]’ (USDS 2005).
LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON PRESS FREEDOM
The RPF has imposed a legal regime that greatly restricts press freedom. A 2002 
criminal law punishes public incitement to discrimination or divisionism:
Any person who makes public any speech, writing, pictures or images or any 
symbols over radio airwaves, television, in a meeting or public place, with the 
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aim of discriminating [against] people or sowing sectarianism [divisionism] 
among them is sentenced to between one year and fi ve years of imprisonment 
and fi ned between fi ve hundred thousand (500,000) [US$ 1000] and two 
million (2,000,000) Rwandan francs [US$ 4,000] or only one of these two 
sanctions. (Rwanda 2002a: Article 8) 
The law defi nes divisionism in sweeping terms as ‘the use of  any speech, 
written statement, or action that divides people, that is likely to spark confl icts 
among people, or that causes an uprising which might degenerate into strife 
among people based on discrimination’ (Rwanda 2002a: Article 1). 
The July 2002 press law (Rwanda 2002b) imposes criminal sanctions on the 
media for a wide range of ill-defi ned offences.7 The law mandates maximum 
criminal sentences for publications that endanger law and order, threaten public 
decency, publish false news, hold the president in contempt and defame or 
abuse public authorities. Journalists can be taken into custody if  they excuse 
genocide, incite soldiers to disobedience or publish false information likely to 
undermine army morale. In addition, the law forbids journalists from making 
unfounded accusations and writing propaganda. Under the law, anyone involved 
in production and circulation is potentially liable for criminal sanctions: ‘The 
following persons ... shall be prosecuted as perpetrators for offences committed 
using the written press: the director of the publication or the publisher, failing 
that, the editor-in-chief, failing that, the authors, failing that the printers, and 
failing that, the sellers, distributors or bill posters’ (Rwanda 2002b: Article 
88). The law also requires journalists to reveal their sources on demand from 
the judicial organs (including, presumably, the judicial police). Finally, the law 
created the High Council of the Press, under the Offi ce of the President, which 
accredits journalists and advises the government on censorship.8
TARGETING INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS 
Shortly after coming to power, the RPF began to censor independent journals 
and persecute independent journalists. Andre Sibomana, the editor of  the 
Catholic newspaper, Kinyamateka, observed:
At fi rst the government allowed the press to resume its activities freely; then it 
continually restricted its freedom. It was quite understandable and desirable 
to limit the scope of the extremist press ... Yet, behind the offi cial objective 
of raising the moral standards of the press, a real censorship has gradually 
settled in. It started at the grassroots, within the editorial teams of public and 
private newspapers, and rose to the top: even the Minister of Information 
ended up fl eeing the country.... 
Persecution of journalists started again in the autumn of 1994. Arrests, 
disappearances, attacks and various forms of intimidation increased in early 
1995. One event marked the turning point: the attack on Edouard Mutsinzi, 
the director of the independent weekly Le Messager. Towards the ends of 
the day, in a café in the center of Kigali, a group of Tutsi extremists beat him 
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for a long time without anyone intervening ... the message got through: from 
then on, anyone criticizing the government knew what to expect. (Sibomana 
1999: 143–4)
Speaking in mid-1997, Sibomana (1999: 144) noted that ‘apart from 
Kinyamateka, there is virtually no opposition press.’ By September that year, 
the Catholic Church hierarchy had replaced him with a more pliant editor 
and, by March 1998, he was dead after the government denied him a passport 
in time to seek medical treatment in Europe (Sibomana 1999: 159–62). In the 
years since, Kinyamateka’s editorial line has been practically indistinguishable 
from that of the government-controlled press. 
Since 1994, three journalists have been assassinated or disappeared in 
apparent retaliation for their work. Manasse Mugabo, director of the United 
Nations radio station’s Kinyarwanda service, disappeared in August 1995 (RSF 
2001; Sibomana 1999: 143–4). Appolos Hakizimana, editor of Umuravumba,
was assassinated in April 1997, a week after the authorities seized the journal 
for describing RPF massacres (LDGL 2002: 62–3).9 In May 1998, Emmanuel 
Munyemanzi, former head of production at TV Rwanda, was killed, two months 
after the director of ORINFOR (Rwanda Information Offi ce) accused him of 
sabotaging a programme (CPJ 1998).
Over the years, the government has arrested several journalists on accusations 
of  having incited genocide in 1994. Despite international attention from 
Reporters Sans Frontières, most of  them have never been brought to trial 
(LDGL 2002: 62–3; RSF 2001: 1).10 One of them, Hélène Nyirabikali, former 
editor of  the government-owned Imvaho, died in detention even though she 
had been awarded a government prize for reconciliation in 1998 (Price 2000: 
43). A former Radio Rwanda journalist, Albert-Baudouin Twizeyimana, was 
released after three and a half  years in pretrial detention and a former TV 
Rwanda journalist, Gideon Mushimiyimana, after six years. Mushimiyimana 
had been accused of  genocide shortly after he gave information to a Radio 
France International (RFI) journalist (LDGL 2002: 62–3; RSF 2001). 
In a remarkable development, the Rwandan government arrested Father Guy 
Theunis, a Belgian priest, at Kigali airport in September 2005. At a preliminary 
hearing, several prominent RPF fi gures – including the vice-president of the 
High Council of  the Press – accused Theunis of  incitement to genocide for 
having translated and republished Kangura articles in Dialogue, a French 
journal, in the early 1990s. Defending himself, Theunis argued that Dialogue
had published extracts from a wide variety of  Rwandan journals as part of 
its review of the Kinyarwanda press (personal notes 2005). It is unclear how 
republication of Kangura excerpts in French (a language not understood by the 
great majority of Rwandans) could have constituted direct and public incitement 
to genocide. Nonetheless, the gacaca (community) court indicted Theunis for 
incitement to genocide, referred his case to the formal courts for trial and 
ordered him detained in Kigali’s central prison. In November 2005, Rwanda 
released Father Theunis on Belgium’s agreement to investigate the charges 
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against him. In a subsequent interview, President Kagame stated that Theunis 
‘was indeed involved’ in the genocide (Spiegel, 2006).
Several journalists have been forced into exile. The founder of  Tribun du 
Peuple, Jean-Pierre Mugabe, left in 1998. After Joseph Sebarenzi, the popular 
Tutsi speaker of Parliament, was forced to step down, Imboni revealed the RPF’s 
behind-the scenes role. The government then seized the journal and banned it. 
Following President Kagame’s attack on the paper, its two Tutsi journalists left 
the country: Deo Mushayidi (also president of  the Rwandan Association of 
Journalists) and Jason Muhayimana. Another Tutsi journalist, Jean-Claude 
Nkubito with Agence France Presse, followed them into exile (ICG 2002: 28–9). 
At the end of 2001, police briefl y detained Amiel Nkuliza, editor of Le Partisan,
after he published an interview with the MDR secretary general who had accused 
the RPF of fomenting divisions within the MDR.11 After reportedly receiving 
death threats from security forces, Nkuliza fl ed to Uganda in January 2002, and 
Le Partisan collapsed (Front Line 2005: 70–1; ICG 2002: 27).12
In mid-2002, the government expelled Asuman Bisiika, the Ugandan-born 
Tutsi editor of The Rwanda Herald, on immigration charges shortly after he 
published an editorial calling for the release of former President Bizimungu.13
With Bisiika ousted, the newspaper folded. At the time, the British Department 
for International Development (DFID), Rwanda’s largest bilateral donor, 
was funding the newspaper as part of its efforts to promote civil society. The 
government’s action and DFID’s lack of  public response sent a powerful 
message to journalists: international donors would not defend Rwanda’s 
independent media. 
In early 2002, the government arrested Laurien Ntezimana and Didace 
Muremangingo, editors of  Ubuntu, and charged them with attacking state 
security and inciting divisionism for using the word ‘ubuyanja’ (spiritual renewal) 
in their masthead.14 The same word fi gures in the name of the banned political 
party created by former President Bizimungu. Although an appeals court 
provisionally released them after a month in detention, Butare’s provincial 
government banned the publication and distribution of Ubuntu (HRW 2002; 
ICG 2002: 14). 
UMUSESO AND UMUCO: CASE STUDIES IN PRESS HARASSMENT
Umuseso was a lively, provocative, and occasionally partisan weekly that 
published critical articles about the government and broke stories on government 
corruption.15 The government repeatedly accused the newspaper of  inciting 
divisionism and genocide. In January 2002, the minister responsible for the 
press compared Umuseso to Kangura on Radio Rwanda (RSF 2002). In March 
2003, a parliamentary commission investigating the MDR labelled Umuseso 
journalists ‘propagandists of divisionism’ and charged them with disseminating 
genocidal ideology (Rwanda 2003a). The June 2004 parliamentary commission 
on genocidal ideology accused Umuseso of  having ‘incited the population to 
civil disobedience against the government in place’ (Rwanda 2004). The charges 
of  genocidal ideology seemed grotesque given that almost half  Umuseso’s 
410 AFTER THE GENOCIDE AND THE WAY FORWARD
journalists have been Tutsi and one, Kalisa McDowell, fought with the RPF 
in 1994 (Fontemaggi 2003). 
Government authorities have used both existing laws and extra-judicial 
methods to harass Umuseso, driving several of  the newspaper’s editors and 
journalists into exile. In May 2001, the founding editor, John Mugabi, sought 
asylum abroad after being threatened over his exposé of the Rwandan military’s 
resource exploitation in eastern Democratic Republic of  the Congo (LDGL 
2002: 65, 71; RSF 2001: 4).16 Around the same time, one of  his colleagues, 
Shyaka Kanuma, left the country after trying to garner an interview with former 
President Bizimungu (ICG 2002: 15).17
In January 2003, Ismail Mbonigabo, then editor, was jailed for a month on 
charges of  divisionism for an article correctly predicting that former prime 
minister Faustin Twagiramungu of the MDR would challenge President Kagame 
in the August presidential elections (and for an accompanying cartoon showing 
President Kagame cutting a baby, labelled MDR, in half).18 In November 2003, 
shortly after the RPF won the parliamentary elections, the authorities arrested 
the current editor, Robert Serufi fi ra, and four journalists for two days for inciting 
divisionism and defamation with an article about the planned demobilization of 
the former army chief of staff. Some of the journalists stated they were beaten 
while in detention. The authorities seized 4,000 copies of the journal to prevent 
its distribution (AFP 2003; CPJ 2003). 
In January 2004, police again seized issues of  Umuseso after it published 
several articles alleging corruption by Gerald Gahima, vice-president of the 
Supreme Court (and the former prosecutor general), and his brother, Théogène 
Rudasingwa, director of  the cabinet.19 The following month, security forces 
intimidated Serufifira and another Umuseso journalist and labelled them 
Interahamwe. Five days later, after being threatened by armed men, Serufi fi ra 
fl ed the country, along with the paper’s best known journalist, Kalisa McDowell, 
and a driver (CPJ 2004). More Umuseso journalists have since left Rwanda. 
Tharcisse Semana was threatened and fl ed in April 2004 after publishing articles 
critical of Bizimungu’s trial and the parliamentary commission on genocidal 
ideology (CPJ 2004). In January 2005, Didas Gasana and Rwango Kadafi  went 
into exile. Gasana claimed he had been detained by armed men and threatened 
with death the day before he left. Kadafi  and another Umuseso journalist had 
been attacked in mid-December by six men with knives (CPJ 2004). 
In August 2004, the new editor, Charles Kabonero, published an article 
alleging that Dennis Polisi, the vice-president of  Parliament’s lower house, 
had formed a clique of  Tutsi returnees from Burundi and was challenging 
President Kagame’s leadership of the RPF and the country. The article also 
accused Polisi of  nepotism and corruption. Polisi fi led suit against Umuseso
for criminal defamation and divisionism. After investigating Umuseso, the 
High Council of  the Press demanded that Kabonero reveal his sources and 
ask pardon. Kabonero refused, arguing that any apology would compromise 
his legal defence. In September 2005, the council recommended that Umuseso
be suspended for four months. The minister of information declined to suspend 
Umuseso, but expressed hope that the council’s action might serve as a lesson 
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to the paper and other journalists (personal communication 2004). A Rwandan 
court acquitted Kabonero of  divisionism in November 2004, but convicted 
him of criminal defamation and insulting the dignity of a public offi cial and 
fi ned him US$ 15 and 1 franc (US$ 0.001) in symbolic damages payable to 
Polisi (AFP 2004). On appeal, a higher court increased the sentence to a one-
year suspended prison term, a US$ 100 fi ne and a US$ 1,800 damage award 
to Polisi (CPJ 2005a).
By mid-2005, Umuco, a Kinyarwanda journal had replaced Umuseso as the 
main target of government harassment. In August 2005, police twice questioned 
the editor, Bonaventure Bizumuremyi, after he published an article on police 
corruption and another calling for the release of former President Bizimungu. 
Later that month, police seized copies of the newspaper and conducted a lengthy 
interrogation of the editor after he published several critical articles, one of which 
condemned the arrest of the Belgian priest, Father Theunis (CPJ 2005 b,c).
In August 2006, the government’s High Council of  the Press ruled that 
several articles in Umuco, which criticized the government, had violated 
the Constitution, the 2002 press law, and the code of professional ethics for 
journalists. That same month, Bizurnuremyi fl ed the country to avoid a police 
summons. Another Umuco journalist, Jean-Leonard Rugambage, spent 11 
months in prison on the orders of community genocide courts (gacaca) after 
writing an August 2005 article reporting corruption and false accusations by 
several of those courts.
LIMITING COMMERCIAL RADIO
Radio remains the most important means of communication in Rwanda given 
the 34 per cent illiteracy rate (Ministry of  Finance and Economic Planning 
2001: 44) and the limited circulation of  newspapers in Kigali and Butare.20
The 2002 press law had one positive feature: it authorized private radio and 
television stations for the fi rst time since the genocide. Yet, the government 
displayed little interest in issuing radio broadcast licences until after the 2003 
elections (EU EOM 2003b: 41). 
By late 2006, Rwanda had 14 radio stations but that has not led to real 
media pluralism. For a start, only four of the stations are private.21 Also, the 
minister of information has made it clear that the state will retain a monopoly 
on information broadcast over the airwaves: ‘The public radio and television 
are there for relaying the action of the government. The private media, rather, 
should be interested in other things, like music and entertainment’ (Fontemaggi 
2003). Indeed, the private commercial stations have mostly shied away from 
news and commentary. One independent Rwandan journalist criticized the 
new commercial stations, saying ‘They don’t take any risks to inform people’ 
(personal communication 2004).
RESTRICTING THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA
The government has not been content with harassing the independent Rwandan 
media; it has also retaliated against foreign journalists and foreign media that 
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portrayed the RPF in an unfl attering light. It expelled Christian Jennings 
(Reuters) in 1997, denied a visa to Stephen Smith (Libération) and refused 
visas to Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF 2001: 1). In June 2006, the Rwandan 
government ordered Sonia Rolley, Radio France International’s correspondent 
since October 2004, to leave the country within 48 hours after refusing to renew 
her visa – even though she had received her press accreditation from the Ministry 
of  Information a month earlier. The government offered no explanation for 
that expulsion.
In 2001, security forces pressured local correspondents for the BBC and VOA 
to turn over recordings of their interviews with former President Bizimungu 
(RSF 2001: 4). Police also confi scated recordings made by an international 
station’s local correspondent in mid-2004 (personal communication 2004). 
Government offi cials have repeatedly criticized the BBC, VOA and RFI 
for promoting divisionism.22 The 2004 parliamentary commission report on 
genocidal ideology recommended that the government 
see if  strong (or international) radio stations which have become a network 
of  genocidal ideology should be made to reveal their sources on what is 
happening in Rwanda and should help condemn the genocide and those who 
always want to perpetrate it. (Rwanda 2004)
The commission also expressed concern that residents in southwest Rwanda 
only receive information from Congolese radio stations that ‘propagate a 
genocidal ideology in the Great Lakes region’ (Rwanda 2004). One of  the 
named Congolese stations is Radio Okapi, a joint venture between the United 
Nations Observer Mission in Congo (MONUC) and the Swiss media NGO 
Hirondelle.23
At a January 2006 conference, the Minister of  Information and the head 
of the state information agency took turns criticizing Lucie Umukundwa, a 
VOA correspondent, and Jean-Claude Mwambutsa, a BBC correspondent, for 
biased reporting, as indicated by their on-air references to critical reports by 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The police spokesman also 
stated that police would investigate their ‘ideology’ a clear reference to a 2004 
parliamentary commission’s accusations of ‘genocidal ideology’ against VOA 
and the BBC. In July 2006, unidentifi ed men assaulted Umukundwa’s brother, 
reportedly saying the attack was in response to her VOA broadcasts.
International media NGOs working in Rwanda have been very careful 
not to antagonize the government or its international donors. For example, 
Internews regularly screened its documentary fi lms for government offi cials so 
they could suggest changes before the fi lms were shown throughout the country. 
In 2003, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
gave Internews US$ 250,000 to produce four fi lms on the national elections. 
The fi rst presented the four presidential candidates answering the same set of 
policy questions, while the second featured interviews with legislative candidates 
about their policy positions. The government refused to allow distribution of 
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the fi lms until after the elections and USAID abandoned the project (EU EOM 
2003b: 48).
CONCLUSION
Post-genocide Rwanda reveals just how easy it is to abuse hate speech laws in 
post-confl ict societies. The RPF justifi es its censorship and propaganda on 
the grounds that political pluralism and press freedom have led – and will lead 
– inexorably to hate media and incitement to genocide. By uncritically accepting 
that argument, international donors may be salving their guilty consciences 
in the short term, but they run the risk of ‘aiding violence’ (Uvin 1998) in the 
long term and setting a terrible precedent for other authoritarian regimes. The 
best way to prevent regimes from inciting hatred and violence through the 
mass media is to foster independent, pluralistic and professional media that 
can serve as a counterweight to government propaganda and manipulation. As 
an independent Rwandan journalist observed:
The government is the one that can put propaganda in the minds of  the 
people. The shareholders of RTLM were also members of the government 
... Kangura was trying to write the propaganda of  the government. If  a 
government goes wrong with its politics, [government-controlled media] will 
help to write the propaganda of a government that has already gone astray. 
(personal communication 2004, initially published in Front Line 2005: 67)
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NOTES
 1. Other vulnerable, post-confl ict societies have faced similar problems. See Price (2000) discussing 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia, and Rwanda; Palmer (2001) comparing the situation in post-war 
Kosovo to that of post-Nazi Germany. See also Frohardt and Temin (2003) discussing various 
interventions to assist independent media in vulnerable states.
 2. As a prominent Rwanda academic observed: ‘the [pre-genocide] government created media that 
looked independent to outsiders, but which was under its full control behind the scenes. These 
outlets conveyed messages of hatred and violence that could not have been published in the 
offi cial media. Thus, under the guise of promoting the freedom of expression, the government 
achieved its objective of controlling the press while spreading its propaganda.’ (Kamatali 2002: 
67) Indeed, it was Rwanda’s truly independent journalists – those who challenged government 
propaganda and the hate media – who were targeted during the genocide.
 3. Pro-government newspapers, like The New Times, subsist on advertising revenues from 
government agencies, parastatals and private monopolies. By contrast, newspapers critical 
of the government have had diffi culty in attracting and retaining their advertisers (ICG 2002: 
15; RSF 2001).
 4. To be fair, the early years of  RPF control could be partly understood as a response to an 
armed insurgency in northwest Rwanda led by remnants of the former genocidal army and 
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militias, as well as war with those elements in the Democratic Republic of  Congo (DRC). 
Some Hutu Power propagandists, like Kangura’s Hassan Ngeze, continued to publish from 
exile. Yet, even after the insurgency had been largely defeated in 2001 and a peace accord 
signed in the DRC in 2002, the RPF increased its persecution of political opponents, civil 
society and independent media.
 5. Mbanda was fi nally released from pretrial detention in early 2003 and later left Rwanda.
 6. The charges of divisionism against the MDR parliamentarian, Dr Leonard Hitimana, were 
particularly baseless: he was well known for having saved Tutsi during the 1994 genocide and 
for testifying as a prosecution witness at the ICTR (African Rights 2002).
 7. President Kagame refused to sign an earlier version of  the law that would have imposed 
sentences ranging from 20 years to death for incitement to genocide. He was reportedly swayed 
by arguments that such explicit criminal provisions belonged in the penal law.
 8. With funding from the British Department for International Development (DFID) and the 
Netherlands, Internews, an international NGO, prepared a strategic plan for the Ministry of 
Information, which, among other things, recommended liberalizing the 2002 press law and 
replacing criminal libel with civil libel (Ministry of Information 2004b: 30–4). In late 2006, the 
government was drafting a new press law, which represents a marginal improvement over the 
2002 press law (personal communications 2006). Though, as one journalist cynically noted, 
‘the press law is largely irrelevant in a country like Rwanda’ (personal communication 2006).
 9. In July 1996, the government had banned his prior journal, Intego, confi scated that month’s 
issue, arrested him for three weeks and labelled him an Interahamwe (a genocidal militia 
member) over an article criticizing a security campaign (CPJ 1996). 
10. As of late 2006, the government had still not tried Valérie Bemeriki, one of the most notorious 
RTLM broadcasters, even though she has been in custody since 1999.
11. The MDR secretary general, Pierre Gakwandi, was arrested for giving that interview in January 
2002. After lengthy pretrial detention, he was fi nally tried, convicted and sentenced to four 
years.
12. Nkuliza had already spent two years in detention (from 1997 to 1999) on a charge of attacking 
state security for having published photos of inmates in the overcrowded Kigali central prison 
(RSF 2001: 3).
13. Like many other Ugandan-born Tutsi, Bisiika returned to Rwanda after the genocide and 
began working without obtaining a work permit. Even though Bisiika started The Rwanda 
Herald in October 2000, his work status appears to have been investigated only after he 
published the editorial on former president Bizimungu. 
14. Ntezimana, a respected lay theologian and past recipient of the Pax Christi Award, worked 
for reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi before and after the genocide. Although a Tutsi 
survivor, Muremangingo was mixed with the general population at Butare’s central prison, 
most of whom are accused of genocide.
15. The newspaper also displays the lack of professionalism endemic among Rwandan journalists: 
most of the stories are unsourced and traffi c in rumour and innuendo.
16. Mugabi, who was originally close to the RPF, was detained for three months in 1999 on 
charges of defamation and false information for an article alleging that the secretary general 
of the defence ministry had received an illegal kickback on the purchase of helicopter parts. 
The prosecutor ordered Mugabi’s arrest after he refused to name his source.
17. Kanuma subsequently returned to Rwanda and, in 2005, he launched an English-language 
monthly Focus. The paper has offered some investigative reporting and modest criticism, while 
proclaiming ‘[t]oday in Rwanda we enjoy press freedoms on a par with any Western democracy.’ 
As editor, Kanuma has repeatedly published infl ammatory – and unproven – accusations 
against his main competitor, the editor of Umuseso, including accusations that he was plotting 
to overthrow the government with a series of bomb attacks.
18. Mbonigabo did not help the cause of independent journalism when he later became the press 
spokesman for Twagiramungu during the 2003 presidential elections. After Twagiramungu 
lost the elections, Mbonigabo fl ed to Uganda.
19. Gahima was forced to resign as Supreme Court judge. Rudasingwa was acquitted by a military 
court. Both are now in exile.
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20. The illiteracy rate is for 1999. In a country where approximately 90 per cent of the population 
are engaged in subsistence farming, and many earn less than a dollar a day, newspapers are 
an unaffordable luxury for most people. 
21. The remaining ten stations consist of  state-owned Radio Rwanda and its three affi liated 
community stations, four private religious stations and two private community stations. 
Television broadcasting remains a state monopoly.
22. Both the BBC and VOA present some of their programmes in Kinyarwanda and Swahili, 
thus reaching a broad audience.
23. After the genocide, the government rejected Hirondelle’s application to establish a radio station 
in Rwanda that would address human rights issues (LDGL 2002: 59).
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PG – Parental Guidance or Portrayal of 
Genocide: the Comparative Depiction of 
Mass Murder in Contemporary Cinema
Michael Dorland
In the hour of  brief  interviews with fi lm stars preceding the 2005 Oscars, 
Don Cheadle, nominated for best actor for his role as Paul Rusesabagina, the 
courageous hotel manager in Hotel Rwanda, stated that he was honoured to 
be associated with a fi lm that told the story of ‘a little known genocide’ (CTV 
2005). Cheadle’s remarks indicate a problem relating to the fi lmic, and often 
fi ctionalized, depiction of genocides generally. Whether in Rwanda in the 1990s, 
Cambodia in the 1970s or Nazi-occupied Poland of the 1940s, genocides are 
always seemingly, and remain often decades after the fact, ‘little known’. 
Genocides always take place off-screen, so to speak. There are no images from 
within the Nazi gas chambers to establish once and for all (if  such proof were 
still required) that the Holocaust happened.1 There are very few images of the 
mass slaughter with clubs and machetes of the approximately 800,000 Tutsis 
killed in Rwanda.2 There are, however, images of  numerous bodies after the 
slaughter and of cleaned skulls in rows and rows at memorial sites in Rwanda, 
as in Cambodia, that show that mass killings did occur. 
There are also the mental images imprinted in the minds of  those who 
witnessed or survived such events, in the form of  flashbacks or related 
associations reactivated by location, smell, etc. These internalized images are, 
of  course, impossible to show and so become the source of  acute personal 
suffering labelled ‘post-traumatic stress disorder’.3
Such dilemmas of representation leave the actual perpetration of genocide 
open to doubt, most notably in the case of Holocaust deniers (see, for example, 
Shermer and Grobman 2000). Curiously, regarding the genocide of  non-
Jewish populations (the Armenian case being something of  an exception), 
doubts about the actual occurrence of  the slaughter seldom arise, although 
generalized ignorance at the time, or worse impotent indifference, serve a 
somewhat equivalent function. This may have to do with the fact that we live 
in a post-Holocaust era, in the sense that the Holocaust set new standards for the 
acceptability of mass murder on a scale never previously known to humankind.4
Either way, the actual killings remain off-screen. This is both a problem and a 
challenge for fi lm-makers, as much for documentary fi lm-makers as for those 
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who have opted to deal fi ctionally with these issues. (It is equally a problem for 
historians, philosophers, theologians and the like, different again for novelists, 
although these will not concern us here.)
What will concern us is some of the problems encountered by certain fi lm-
makers who have attempted to represent genocide. For reasons of space, this 
will be a selective analysis, focusing on differences between ‘Holocaust fi lms’ 
and ‘genocide fi lms’, in which the victims are non-Jews. 
THE G WORD
A fi rst step must involve some defi nitional discussion of the problematic term 
‘genocide’.
One of the ‘diplomatic’ issues surrounding the lack of intervention in the 
Rwandan case was the Western powers’ inability to agree on when a genocide 
actually is one, as opposed to, for example, ‘an “acceptable” (if  tragic) round 
of  ethnic murder’ (Power 2002: 346). Coined by the refugee Polish lawyer 
Rafael Lemkin, ‘genocide’ – from the Greek geno (race or tribe) and the Latin 
caedere (killing) – meant ‘a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the 
destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the 
aim of annihilating the groups themselves’ (Lemkin 1944). 
He did not intend the term to capture or communicate the Nazi ‘Final 
Solution’; rather ‘genocide’ was meant as an ‘ideal–typical’ concept in 
international law, a standard by which ‘civilization’ could begin to come to 
grips with the novel twentieth century problem of unprecedented mass murder 
(Power 2002: 43). Through Lemkin’s own tireless personal efforts, combined 
with the legal problems posed by the (equally unprecedented) Nuremberg Trials, 
the term genocide rapidly did become not only widely accepted (if  in other ways 
unclear) but also entrenched in international law in the 1948 United Nations 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (as 
specifi ed acts ‘committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group’ (UN 1951)). 
If not intended to be confl ated with the Nazi Judeocide, in fact it was. Genocide 
and the Holocaust soon became equivalent ideas, if  not in international law, 
then in the broader post-Holocaust culture. Paradoxically, this confl ation 
would make it harder to reach agreement on genocides that did not involve the 
extermination of millions (by implication, of Jews; this being the standard). 
One of the diffi culties, then, in the case of the ‘diplomatic’ debate attempting 
to come to grips with what was going on in Rwanda in 1993, was the following, 
in Roméo Dallaire’s words:
I was self-conscious about saying the killings were ‘genocidal’ because to 
us in the West, genocide was the equivalent of the Holocaust or the killing 
fi elds of Cambodia – I mean millions of people. ‘Ethnic cleansing’ seemed 
to involve hundreds of thousands of people. ‘Genocide’ was the highest scale 
of crimes against humanity imaginable. It was so far up there, so far off  the 
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charts, that it was not easy to recognize that we could be in such a situation. 
(Power 2002: 358) 
Note that Dallaire’s reference to Cambodia indicates a shifting downward 
of the scale of ‘acceptable’ genocidal killing from the canonical fi gure of six 
million to a mere 1.7 million in Cambodia.5 If  the confl ation of genocide with 
the Holocaust compounded the diffi culty of rating a mass killing for diplomats 
and generals, how much more diffi cult would the issue be for the non-specialist, 
popular culture at large?
THE HOLOCAUST FILM6
As Barbie Zelizer (1998) remarked in her important study of Holocaust memory 
through the camera’s eye, Remembering to Forget, the initial dissemination of 
newsreels of British army bulldozers plowing thousands of emaciated cadavers 
into the lime pits of Bergen-Belsen raised some of the many problems relating 
to the depiction of  the Holocaust. The main one concerns the problematic 
status of ‘the image’ in mass media cultures. The paradox here is that for all 
the proliferation of  mediated images that we have lived with since the mass 
dissemination of  fi rst the movies and then television, we still do not fully 
understand, scientifi cally, philosophically and otherwise, how human beings 
respond to images individually and collectively. 
The naïve belief that ‘a picture is worth a thousand words’ is a highly dubious 
proposition, especially if  the picture depicts something never seen before; just 
consider modern art’s scandalous reception since the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Thus, the unleashing of images of the Nazi concentration camps, after 
their liberation by the allied armies in the spring of 1945, of mountains of dead 
or near-dead staggering survivors, a dissemination widely encouraged by the 
highest authorities of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, 
posed whole new problems. As Zelizer notes, these images had no ‘framing’ 
– they were just suddenly there. She notes as well that this was in a context of 
a rising professional rivalry between print journalists and photographers, as 
attested to by Life magazine, which, during World War II and the Pacifi c War 
in particular, had become increasingly ‘realistic’ in its photographs of  dead 
American soldiers.7
Similarly, it was the showing of  the same footage of  the bulldozing of 
murdered concentration camp inmates that caused the uproar at the Nuremberg 
Trials of the major Nazi war criminals, rather than the massive documentary, 
textual evidence assembled by the prosecution that journalists covering the trials 
found so ‘boring’ (Douglas 2001). In his feature fi lm Judgment At Nuremberg,
director Stanley Kramer (1961) recaptures precisely the shock of the showing 
of these same images within the fi lm’s depiction of one of  the smaller trials 
involving lesser fi gures of the Nazi leadership. It was all so shocking and incom-
prehensible that the most widespread collective response was to repress the 
whole business for several decades.8
420 AFTER THE GENOCIDE AND THE WAY FORWARD
‘HOLOCAUST’ TV SERIES
Hot on the heels of ABC’s enormously successful mini-series Roots in 1977, NBC 
responded the year after with the 9.5-hour mini-series Holocaust. As historian 
Peter Novick (1999: 209) writes, ‘more information about the Holocaust was 
imparted to more Americans over those four nights than over all the preceding 
thirty years.’ Nearly 100 million Americans watched all or part of  the mini-
series, written by screenwriter Gerald Green who also wrote the subsequent 
novelization (Green 1978). Although both teleplay and novelization have 
been criticized for their stereotypical characterizations, wooden dialogue and 
patronization of Holocaust victims (Schartz 1999: 162),9 the critical reception 
of Holocaust was ‘rhapsodic’ (Novick 1999: 211). Novick describes the millions 
of copies of special inserts, study guides and other promotional and educational 
materials about the Holocaust prepared around the mini-series by American 
Jewish organizations in an attempt to sensitize gentiles as well as a developing 
(American) Jewish identity. As for the lasting effects of this fi rst depiction of 
the Holocaust before a mass audience, Novick is less sanguine. His ‘guess is 
that it hasn’t mattered that much’ (Novick 1999: 212).
The notable exception concerns the showing of  the mini-series in West 
Germany in January 1979. Not only is Holocaust credited with helping persuade 
the Bundestag later that year to abolish the statute of limitations on war crimes, 
but as one German journalist wrote: ‘It is absolutely fantastic ... Holocaust has 
shaken up post-Hitler Germany in a way that German intellectuals have been 
unable to do. No other fi lm has ever made the Jews’ road to suffering leading to 
the gas chambers so vivid’ (Herf 1986: 214). If Holocaust incontestably acted as 
a turning point in the German popular culture’s reluctance to confront the Nazi 
Final Solution (in part perhaps because the mini-series was a major American 
production and so a perspective from outside), in America itself, the effect 
was less clear. Despite many subsequent attempts to bring the Holocaust to 
American television (Shandler 1999), none would turn out to have the fanfare 
and audience that Holocaust fi rst garnered until the release, 15 years later, of 
Steven Spielberg’s 197-minute feature fi lm Schindler’s List.
Thus, the representation of  the Holocaust by the mass media entailed a 
gamut of responses, from initial celebration of a medium’s ability to partly, if  
fi ctionally, depict events drawn from the historical record – technically speaking, 
what Barbara Foley (1982) terms the ‘pseudofactual’ in the sense that it replaces 
literary effects with some form of engagement with the historical – to the posing 
of such problems as the representability of the Holocaust itself. But these would 
be issues taken up, in the interim, by fi lm-maker intellectuals, most notably 
Claude Lanzmann.
LANZMANN’S SHOAH
The fact that the fi rst documentary images of the Holocaust appeared ‘out of 
the blue’ posed a range of problems, particularly concerning the place of the 
image not only in contemporary culture, but also in respect to the making of 
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collective memory. There is arguably a demand for understanding history and 
especially our human relation to it, but there are two contradictory responses 
to this. On the one hand, there is a popular demand for understanding history 
that is greater than the kind of  history produced by professional, academic 
historians; for example, the contemporary fascination with biography both in 
book form and television documentaries (indeed, entire television channels!). 
On the other hand, and precisely because of the surrounding proliferation of 
images, there is also an equivalent sense of fragmentation and of confl icting 
representations of the past, a problem that is only enhanced by the increased 
technical capacity to turn black-and-white images (formerly signifiers of 
‘pastness’) into colour as well as to redigitize images such that they no longer 
have any basis in any reality outside of their own.
Thus the debate over the representability of  the Holocaust – denounced 
by Elie Wiesel (1978) as a sacrilege at the time of  the airing of  Holocaust
– was the starting-point for Claude Lanzmann’s (1985a) nine and a half  hour 
‘documentary’ Shoah in which there is not a single shot of what we conven-
tionally understand as documentary archival footage. Indeed, Lanzmann has 
claimed repeatedly that no such images of the Holocaust exist – and even if  
he had found such images, he would have destroyed them. Arguably they do 
not exist, just as no document, blueprint or written order of any kind stating 
‘Now the Jews will be killed’ exists either (Lanzmann 1985b: 72). Shoah does 
include footage of present-day Sobibor, Chelmno, Treblinka and Auschwitz, 
or what remains of these major killings centres. As Simon Srebnik says, when 
taken back to the present-day site of Chelmno of which nothing remains except 
the forest, 
It’s hard to recognize, but it was here. They burned people here ... Yes, this 
is the place ... I can’t believe I’m here ... It was always this peaceful here. 
Always. When they burned two thousand people – Jews —every day, it was 
just as peaceful. (Lanzmann 1985b: 6)
The fi lm’s only access to the past is through the voices, expressions and 
memories of those speaking, the survivors of the Holocaust, the ‘technicians’ 
of  the Final Solution, the contemporary Polish bystanders. As Ilan Avisar 
(1997: 38–58) writes,
the principal channel to the past is ultimately memory. The avoidance of any 
archival footage further enhances the reliance on personal memories as the 
sources of  knowledge, while the camera documents the ongoing dramatic 
processes of  painful recollection ... Indeed, Lanzmann’s ‘Shoah’ conveys 
the painful recognition that memory is the only cognitive avenue to the 
unimaginable.
Seeing and hearing the tormented workings of memory in the testimonies of 
the survivors, compounded by the sheer length of the fi lm, its long takes and 
pauses, not to mention Lanzmann’s presence urging his witnesses to remember 
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no matter how painful it is to do so, makes Shoah a living (not re-living) present, 
in which the past is abolished because it is still here, 40 years later – thus the 
force of the fi lm and its justly celebrated status as the masterpiece of Holocaust 
fi lm. Not only did Shoah single-handedly entail the abandonment of the use of 
the word ‘Holocaust’ in France for the more accurate Hebrew term, but one of 
the reasons that motivated the making of the fi lm was a furious response to the 
kind of depictions that Holocaust, the mini-series, had evoked in Lanzmann as 
how not to make a fi lm about the Judeocide.10
Still, for all the controversy and debate that Shoah sparked – not least a 
colloquium at Oxford over Lanzmann’s unfl attering depiction of the Poles – it 
remained, like much of the extensive academic scholarship on the Shoah itself, 
confi ned within specialist fi lm or intellectual circles. The biggest Holocaust fi lm 
of them all was still to come.
‘SCHINDLER’S LIST’
Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List has been compared to both D.W. Griffi th’s 
Birth of a Nation and Orson Welles’ Citizen Kane, arguably the two greatest 
fi lms in the American cinema (Hansen 2001: 127–51). Released to a torrent of 
publicity preceded by the director’s not inconsiderable reputation for such fi lms 
as E.T. and Jurassic Park, it would sweep the Oscars, much as the Holocaust mini-
series had swept the Emmys in 1978. Because the fi lm’s release coincided with the 
opening of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC, 
publicists for the fi lm included no less a fi gure than the President of the United 
States (Novick 1999: 214). If  Time magazine would write that the fi lm showed 
‘the greatest sequences of chaos and mass terror ever fi lmed’ (Avisar 1997: 21), 
other critics such as J. Hoberman wondered whether it was ‘possible to make 
feel-good entertainment about the ultimate feel-bad experience of the twentieth 
century’ (Hansen 2001: 130). The issue, however, is less the critical response to 
what is certainly, on many levels, an extremely powerful attempt to come as 
close as possible to a fi lmed depiction of what aspects of the Holocaust may 
have been like. This is particularly the case with the sequences concerning the 
‘liquidation’ of the Kraków ghetto. As for Spielberg’s depiction of concentration 
camp ‘life’ as a state of relentless, unpredictable terror, he tends to personalize 
this, particularly through the evil character of Plazsow labour camp commander 
Amon Goeth (Ralph Fiennes), who enjoys pre-prandial random target shooting 
of prisoners. Italian writer Primo Levi (1960: 29) managed to better grasp the 
state of constant terror in four words spoken to him by a guard (‘Hier ist kein 
Warum’ [There is no why here]).
It is interesting that Spielberg declared his fi lm to be ‘a document’, a claim 
apparently supported by the fact that much of it was shot in Kraków where 
many of  the historical events depicted took place, and in black-and-white 
photography, which as we noted earlier serves to signify ‘the real past’.11 Such 
claims seem disingenuous, to the extent that Spielberg owes his reputation to 
his virtuosity in manipulating the codes of Hollywood cinema. 
PG – PARENTAL GUIDANCE OR PORTRAYAL OF GENOCIDE 423
Still, there is more involved than predictable arguments about trivializa-
tion or Americanization, as Miriam B. Hansen recognizes in elaborating the 
term ‘popular modernism’. This concept, which she compares to Fordism, 
for example, is the fusion of capitalist means of production with an aesthetic, 
in a modern vernacular of its own. Such an approach gives her the means of 
situating Schindler’s List as ‘more sophisticated, elliptical and self-conscious 
... than its critics acknowledge’ in its capacity for ‘refl ecting upon the shocks 
and scars infl icted by modernization on people’s lives in a generally accessible, 
public horizon’ (Hansen 2001: 135, emphasis added). 
Thus there is little question regarding the visual and aural sophistication 
of Schindler’s List (as Hansen demonstrates in a series of frame analyses). It’s 
certainly self-conscious, not only as Hansen argues by its references to Kane, 
but also by the homage it pays to Lanzmann’s Shoah. In the latter, as survivor 
Richard Glazer talks about the train trip to Treblinka: ‘[W]e’d been able to 
open a window – the old man in our compartment saw a boy ... cows were 
grazing ... and he asked the boy in signs, “Where are we?” And the kid made a 
funny gesture. This (draws fi nger across his throat).’ The same gesture is also 
made by a farmhand. ‘And he made that gesture. Like this. We didn’t really 
pay much attention to him. We couldn’t fi gure out what he meant’ (Lanzmann 
1985b: 34).
In Schindler’s List, during the train trip to Auschwitz in which a group of 
Schindler women is accidentally embarked, Spielberg recreates the scene – two 
shots – described by Glazer of a small boy in a snow-covered fi eld shown making 
‘that gesture’ at the passing boxcars. It’s a visual quote from Shoah, but we, of 
the after-Shoah, now know what it means.
Still, and because the idea of  popular modernism doesn’t exclude cheap 
tricks, Spielberg seemingly can’t resist not showing off, this time in a perverse 
homage to Hitchcock’s Psycho. Soon after their arrival at Auschwitz, among 
sweeping lights and snarling dogs, the Schindler women, their hair cut badly to 
the length of Janet Leigh’s, are sent naked to the Bad und Disinfektion rooms 
of what we fear – as do they – are the gas chambers, spewing out their greasy 
fl akes of  ashened fl esh that look like snow. After the door is bolted, we see 
them through the peephole, huddling together in dreaded anticipation. The 
camera tilts up to the ‘showerheads’; we – and they – wait for what seems the 
inevitable. And then real water begins to spurt down onto the naked bodies 
that burst into relieved laughter. There’s another shot of the showerheads, to 
remind us of their double function (life-giving water/death by Zyklon B gas). 
But we’ve been had, and are disgusted at our own relief. When the women, 
sprung by Schindler’s tractations, are leaving Auschwitz, they pass a long line 
of people going the other way who, as we all now know, are about to shortly 
feel the showerheads’ other function. Just to make the point crystal clear, this 
is followed by a shot of the smoking chimneys of the crematoria. Now that’s 
‘Shoah’ business, as the grim joke has it.12
A third point, made by the Israeli critic Ilan Avisar, concerns the two endings 
of  Schindler’s List. The fi rst is within the story when Oskar Schindler, after 
receiving the ring made for him by his Jews from their gold teeth fi llings, bursts 
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into tears and reproaches himself  for not having saved more Jews. He launches 
into a bizarre calculation: his car, had he sold it, would have been worth ten more 
Jews; the ring two more. The second ending, as a coda to the fi lm, which follows 
a dissolve as the former prisoners seem to march in a long line from Czechoslo-
vakia to Israel singing sabra songs, shows real Schindler Jews and the actors who 
played them placing stones in the commemorative ritual gesture on Schindler’s 
Jerusalem grave with its visible Christian cross. Avisar argues – not totally 
convincingly – that in the fi rst ending it is ‘the Christian “savior” who ends in 
the highest moral position.’ More important is what he writes about the second 
ending that links the Holocaust and the founding of the Jewish state. Avisar 
(1997: 52) writes that ‘in Spielberg’s fi lm, ideology combines with aesthetic 
effect as the linkage creates a narrative closure that deemphasizes the horrors 
of the genocide in the context of Jewish revival and independence in Israel.’13
Hansen (2001: 129) also notes with some ambivalence the fi lm’s ‘enormous 
success in Germany … and the discovery of local Schindlers everywhere’. If  
Holocaust inadvertently helped Germany begin to cope with its repression of 
the Final Solution, Spielberg, by the same token, de-emphasizes the long history 
of  Christian anti-Semitism by the good deeds of  one Christian opportunist 
and, to be doubly safe, redeems the Judeocide since it ‘caused’ the founding 
of the Jewish State.
THE GENOCIDE FILM
The genocide fi lm plunges us into a different set of problems, although with 
the occasional parallel to the Holocaust fi lm, but steering clear of the politico-
theological issues raised in the previous paragraph. As with the Holocaust fi lm, 
the genocide fi lm does not ‘show’ genocide, except metonymically. Instead, 
it deals more with questions of  racism and, more important, it raises once 
again, although not directly, the very problem that confronted what Dallaire 
terms ‘the failure of humanity’ with respect to Rwanda; namely, what makes 
a genocide a genocide?
The 1948 UN convention that came into force in 1951 is not terribly helpful 
in defi ning what constitutes a genocide. Article II defi nes genocide as:
a. Killing members of the [national, ethnical, racial or religious] group;
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
c. Deliberately infl icting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
e. Forcibly transferring children of  the group to another group. (UN 
1951)
Although such a defi nition might seem fairly encompassing, some critics have 
written that it is not broad enough in that it does not cover the killings of certain 
subgroups, for example, the Soviet killing of the Kulaks as a social class. Others 
have noted that it focuses on ‘physical’ extermination as opposed to ‘cultural’ 
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destruction, linguicide and so on (Kuper 1981; Stein 1996). As Stein, for example, 
observes, international law until recently was of  little help in clarifying the 
parameters of the 1948 convention, among other reasons because one state has 
to accuse another of genocide. As noted earlier, the confl ation of the Holocaust 
with a normative conception of genocide has made coming to grips with genocide 
harder, particularly once such acts occur outside of the European context. The 
case of Cambodia is a useful illustration of these problems.
CAMBODIA
Today, it is widely assumed that ‘(t)he Cambodian genocide of  1975–1979, 
in which approximately 1.7 million people lost their lives (21 per cent of the 
country’s population), was one of the worst human tragedies of the last century’ 
(Yale n.d.). However, it was not until March 2003 that the UN signed an 
agreement with Cambodia to try the surviving members of the Khmer Rouge 
leadership for crimes under Cambodian law, international law and custom 
and international conventions recognized by Cambodia. The latter include 
genocide, war crimes and breaches of the Geneva Convention. Thus, it took 
about a decade, since the 1993 elections that outlawed the Khmer Rouge, for 
the legal machinery to get itself  together. A key turning point was the United 
States Congress’ passage in 1994 of the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act. In 
other words, it is a complex process to try the leadership of a state for a range 
of crimes, of which genocide may be one.
The Cambodian case is further complicated by the fact that it is far from 
clear that what went on under the Khmer Rouge’s radical attempt at massive 
social engineering between 1975 and 1979 was actually a genocide. One of the 
leading Western historians on Cambodia, the Australian David P. Chandler, 
does not use the word in his numerous books on the period. The closest 
he comes to it, because the Khmer Rouge’s crimes were largely committed 
against other Khmers, is French author Jean Lacouture’s term ‘autogenocide’ 
(Chandler 1999: vii).14 For Chandler, what distinguishes the Cambodian case is 
the fusion of the (catastrophic) attempts of other Communist regimes to surpass 
Western economic development – the Soviet collectivization of agriculture in 
the 1930s, China’s Great Leap Forward in industrial production of the 1950s, 
the Chinese Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and the Vietnamese and North 
Korean equivalents – but, in the Cambodian instance, pushed to unprecedented 
heights of  Marxist and indigenous utopianism (such as in the Super Great 
Leap Forward of  1976). It is something of  an oversimplifi cation to lump 
all these processes together under the rubric ‘genocide’. In his book on the 
workings of the main Khmer Rouge torture centre, S-21, where some 14,000 
men, women and children were interrogated, tortured and killed (only seven 
people emerged alive), Chandler (1999) uses the term ‘crimes of obedience’15
to explain what went on there. These distinctions, while in no means meant to 
minimize the far-reaching effect of what Chandler (1991) terms ‘the Typhoon’, 
do, however, blur the picture somewhat when it comes to ‘genocide fi lms’ dealing 
with Cambodia.
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THE KILLING FIELDS
‘The Killing Fields’ (Joffé 1984) is probably the best-known fi lm in the West 
about the fall of  Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge armies in the spring of 
1975 and the almost instantaneous evacuation of the cities’ populations into 
forced rice-growing in the countryside. Despite its title, the fi lm is not really 
about the killing fi elds at all. Rather it is mainly about the friendship between 
The New York Times correspondent Sidney Schanberg and his Cambodian 
translator, coffee boy and apprentice journalist, Dith Pran. Second, it is about 
the hardships faced by the Western press corps attempting to cover civil wars in 
dangerous faraway places, with very strong parallels to the chaotic evacuation of 
Saigon by the panic-stricken Americans at the end of the Vietnam War. Third, 
much like Hotel Rwanda, The Killing Fields is at its most general level about the 
complex links between white foreigners and non-white locals and what happens 
to the locals once they are abandoned to a local fate. 
Ultimately, the fi lm is about the slippery notion of  identity in a world or 
region being globalized by war. Dith Pran survives his capture by the Khmer 
Rouge, escapes to the Cambodia–Thai border, is reunited with Schanberg and 
ends up working as a photographer for the Times in New York. Dr Haing S. 
Ngor, who plays Dith Pran, became the fi rst Southeast Asian – and Buddhist 
– to receive an academy award.
S-21: THE KHMER ROUGE KILLING MACHINE
Rithy Panh’s (2003) 101-minute documentary is, as critics have noted,16 more 
modestly the Cambodian Shoah, using similar strategies as the Lanzmann fi lm. 
Panh, who fl ed to France in 1979, returns to Cambodia and the infamous S-21 
former prison, now the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes, where some 
of the former guards serve as guides. Panh’s fi lm documents two of the surviving 
former prisoners, notably the painter Vann Nath who survived by drawing 
offi cial portraits of his guards and today reproduces on canvas scenes of the 
atrocities he witnessed. Unlike the Lanzmann fi lm, former guards, torturers 
and interrogators are confronted with survivors, Nath and Chum Mey. Like 
the Lanzmann fi lm, S-21 details the tortured workings of memory; guards and 
torturers ‘act out’ in minute detail the actions committed on the job. But the 
strength of Panh’s fi lm is as a study of the power of affect – how expressions 
and body language change according to the memory – and also of the human 
mind’s capacity for rationalizing awful deeds. Thus the guard ‘explains’ that 
they were victims too and just as terrorized as their victims. S-21 is an almost 
clinical analysis of the psychology of torture, and its effects 20 years later.
BACK TO RWANDA
Returning, then, to the case of Rwanda, we fi nd that some of the problems raised 
initially have gained in contextualization. As we saw in the case of Cambodia, 
the slow legal process of actually trying crimes of genocide would at last see fruit 
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in Rwanda with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) and the fi rst trial as of January 1997. The Akayesu case decided 
by the ICTR in 1998 was the fi rst in which an international tribunal was called 
upon to interpret the defi nition of genocide based on the 1948 convention. The 
subsequent conviction of former Prime Minister Jean Kambanda was the fi rst 
time that an accused acknowledged guilt for the crime of genocide before an 
international tribunal and the fi rst time that a head of government was convicted 
for the crime of genocide. As the legal process grinds on (it is expected to have 
completed all trials and appeals by 2010), fi lms about the Rwanda genocide are 
fi lling in the blanks in public memory. As of this writing, three fi lms have been 
released so far: Hotel Rwanda (George 2004), 100 Days (Hughes 2001) – two 
fi lms that in many ways could hardly be more different – and Shake Hands with 
the Devil (Raymont 2004). 
Several more features were released by summer 2005: the United Kingdom/
Germany co-production Shooting Dogs, starring British actor John Hurt as a 
Catholic priest, is described as focusing on ‘the human aspects of the story’, 
as it frankly admits ‘(i)t can’t ... say everything about the genocide’ (Caton-
Jones 2005). Sunday by the Pool, based on the novel A Sunday at the Pool in 
Kigali (Courtemanche 2004), was produced by Montreal company Equinox 
Productions. Sometimes in April (Peck 2005), another Rwanda genocide feature 
that was a success at the recent Berlin Film Festival, was aired on HBO in 
March 2005 and on PBS in April. A feature fi lm version of Dallaire’s memoir 
Shake Hands with the Devil, co-produced by Barna-Alper Productions and 
Halifax Film Company, was shot on location in Rwanda and will be in theatres 
in 2007.
HOTEL RWANDA: AFRICAN SCHINDLER?
As is by now well known, Hotel Rwanda tells the story of a good man caught 
in terrible times. It is the story of Mille Collines hotel’s ‘local’, that is, African, 
manager, Paul Rusesabagina, and how he saved some 1,200 people from the 
slaughter raging outside in Kigali. Earlier, I suggest a parallel with Oskar 
Schindler, although one that needs qualifying. Rwanda’s strategic unimportance 
– landlocked, no signifi cant minerals, or for that matter of  any compelling 
interest to any of the Western powers, except perhaps Belgium whose former 
colony it was17 – means that whereas Schindler was an industrialist (in enamel-
work at fi rst and then armaments), Rusesabagina is in the hospitality industry. 
Which doesn’t mean that he can’t grease local palms with Cuban cigars or 
Scotch in an attempt to gain the protection of high-ranking RGF offi cers. 
Rusesabagina’s adeptness is in keeping his customers happy, and his Belgian 
bosses in Brussels informed. His seeming servility is what allows him to be able 
to bend the rules and provide a refuge for threatened Rwandan Tutsis in what 
is, fi rst of all, a hotel for white tourists and prominent locals. Unlike Schindler, 
who despite his breakdown of remorse at the end of ‘Schindler’s List’ maintains 
a proprietorial relationship to ‘his’ Jews, Rusesabagina falls into his subversive 
role after French and Belgian troops, armed to the teeth, come to repatriate their 
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white fellow nationals. And when he also realizes that his ‘masters’ in Brussels, 
whom he has loyally served, can’t do very much for him at all. As he tells his 
wife in a powerful scene of his own coming to self-consciousness: ‘I am not 
even a nigger, I’m an African.’ Out of this realization of his own ‘nothingness’, 
however, comes altruism.
Unlike Dith Pran in The Killing Fields, who seems to bear no ill will at all 
to the whites who abandoned him, for Rusesabagina, the realization that no 
white can help him or his endangered fellow citizens is a crucial moment of 
utter loneliness. (The irony is that he will end up in exile in Belgium.) Similar 
to The Killing Fields, Hotel Rwanda is about ‘identity’: on the one hand, the 
Tutsi–Hutu identities that were a by-product of Belgian colonial anthropology 
mired in classical nineteenth century race science in the sense that the Tutsi 
were ‘whiter’ anthropomorphically; and the subsequent murderous frenzy of 
the Hutu attempt to reassert their ‘threatened’ identity. But on the other hand, 
the fi lm is also about the illusions of ‘identity’ – except, of course, for the ‘big 
other’ provided by skin colour and especially the difference between being white 
and being black. In this sense, it is racism, both in Hotel Rwanda and in The
Killing Fields that screens out the genocide; whereas in the Holocaust fi lm, it 
is the ‘racism’ that leads inexorably to the killings.
100 DAYS
Oddly for a ‘genocide’ fi lm, Nick Hughes’ (2001) 100 Days is an astonishingly 
gentle fi lm about a gentle people, some of whom are directed by state authority 
to suddenly begin to murder their long-time neighbours. The French word 
‘pudique’ (discreet but in a bodily sense) is perhaps better than gentle to describe 
what I’m getting at. The fi lm keeps its gaze turned away from the horrors – except 
for the sequence of the massacre at the Kibuye Church; and the suggestion of 
the rape by the priest of  Josette and the other Tutsi women (that echoes the 
tactical use of  rape in the former Yugoslavia as a means of  eliminating one 
ethnic group by forced insemination by members of the rival group). 100 Days
in its gentleness is the love story of Josette and Baptiste, and how the genocide 
comes to kill that love. With the exceptions mentioned, the genocide itself  is at 
times referred back to in time, after the fact, by the memorial markers that are 
set up at the Church’s mass grave site. Or conversely, that remains off-screen, 
in that for the fi lm’s Rwandan actors who had lived through the events and the 
fi lm’s investors and co-producers who had lost countless family members, the 
making of 100 Days becomes more an extra-diegetical act of ‘working through’ 
memory than what the fi lm itself  actually shows.
CONCLUSION: THE GENOCIDE COMMODITY18
Like the Marxist conception of the commodity, a fi lm is two-sided and full of 
metaphysical subtleties. It has use-values (aesthetics, narrative, psychology of 
characters, action, etc.). It also has exchange-value: a fi lm is capital-intensive 
and that capital must ideally be recouped through the rental of seats by ticket 
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sales, the selling of foreign and other distribution rights, and the like. However, 
these two sides of  a fi lm are hard to separate. On the contrary, they tend to 
blur into each other.
As various critics have remarked, conceptual entities referring to historical 
events such as the Holocaust or, more loosely, genocide, are themselves ‘word-
commodities’ whose value also changes over time. Largely going from neglect, 
indifference, and lack of knowledge, to varying degrees of approximation to 
what they refer to. Both the fi lm commodity and the word commodity are 
subject to fl uctuations. As historians like Peter Novick have shown, the meanings 
attributed to the Holocaust in the American case have followed such a pattern 
of  fl uctuation, from an initial shocked high, then to low, and subsequently 
increasingly higher again, tied as well to the United States’ changing relationship 
to Israel after the Six Day War, and other factors related to the American sense 
of Jewish identity. Norman Finkelstein’s (2000) really bad book, The Holocaust 
Industry,19 attempts to make something of  a similar point, if  ham-fi stedly: 
namely that ‘Holocaust’ is not only a word but also a veritable cultural industry. 
Yet words, like fi lms, rise and fall in currency. If  the Holocaust commodity, 
so to speak, has had a fairly good run, it would seem these days that it has 
been largely replaced by the genocide commodity, perhaps because the latter 
better satisfi es our contemporary obsession with victimhood as the signifi er of 
historical identity – to wit, the website of Yale University’s genocide studies 
programme: ‘As in the Ottoman Empire during the Armenian genocide, the 
Soviet Union under Stalin, Nazi Germany during the Holocaust, and more 
recently in East Timor, Guatemala, Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ (Yale n.d.). Or 
that of  Latrobe University in Australia on a 2003 conference on the topic 
of  colonialism and genocide. The latter is viewed as an integral part of  not 
only Australian history, but of  settler societies more generally (Canada and 
the United States, for instance), with their Indigenocides; or the nineteenth 
century German colonization of Namibia that foreshadowed the Holocaust; 
and the very barbarism of ‘civilization’ itself  with its many forms of cultural 
genocide (of languages and demographics) (Veracini 2003). World history, in a 
word, is one long series of genocides. As well it may be: the nineteenth century 
philosopher Hegel referred to world history as the butcher’s block of nations. So, 
if  the general idea is not exactly novel, having a word for it, thanks to Lemkin, 
seems to be. And where there is a word commodity, the fi lm commodity will 
surely follow.
This is not, to be sure, a state of  affairs to be lamented. On the contrary, 
the more we learn about the world we live in, the better, presumably. But to 
expect that words, or even less so, fi lms, will signifi cantly change the world any 
time soon is perhaps setting the bar too high. Because, in the words of another 
German philosopher (Martin Heidegger), the world ‘worlds’. For all else, there’s 
always the movies.
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NOTES
 1. I use the conventional term ‘Holocaust’ for the Nazi extermination of the Jews of Europe. 
The lengthy debate, particularly in France, over the existence of images of the Holocaust is 
discussed in detail in Didi-Huberman (2004).
 2. According to my colleague, Professor Allan Thompson, the images that did appear in the 
global media and were universally disseminated as ‘the Rwanda genocide’ consisted of a short 
sequence in long-shot from the top of a building showing members of the Interahamwe, the 
young Hutu militants deemed responsible for the killings, hacking away at prone bodies. The 
footage was shot by British journalist Nick Hughes, seemingly the only journalist to have 
fi lmed actual killings.
 3. In the Rwanda context, the subsequent breakdown of Canadian Brigadier General Roméo 
Dallaire, who was helplessly in charge of the UN military contingent there, is probably the 
best-known such case. See Dallaire (2004) as well as the documentary depicting Dallaire’s 
return to Rwanda a decade later (Raymont 2004).
 4. Some of the implications are drawn out in Dorland (2005).
 5. From the six million or eleven million on, if  one tries to come up with a total fi gure including 
Holocaust victims from all sources – a fi gure which Simon Wiesenthal claims to have invented, 
which is unlikely as it corresponds so closely to the Wannsee Conference estimates; the 
statistical evaluation of such data has been a problem ever since. For some perspective on 
establishing numbers that are often also rhetorical devices, see Marrus (1987). The Wiesenthal 
claim was purportedly made to Israeli historian Yehuda Bauer (Novick 1999: 215).
 6. Although Holocaust is the commonly used term for the extermination of the Jews, Roma and 
other nationalities, as well as political and military prisoners, by the Nazis, Jews nevertheless 
constituted over 50 per cent of those exterminated. What then to properly call this catastrophe 
has been a matter of debate since 1945; Jews in Israel and in France term it the Shoah, Hebrew 
for ‘the catastrophe’, as opposed to Holocaust which derives from the Greek and connotes a 
religious sacrifi ce by burning.
 7. See for example Zelizer’s reproduction George Strock’s photo for Life, ‘American Dead at 
Buna Beach, September 1943’ (Zelizer 1998: 37).
 8. For reasons of space, I’m only slightly exaggerating here. Alain Resnais’ ‘Nuit et brouillard’
(1955) and Gillo Pontecorvo’s ‘Kapo’ (1959) are distinguished precursors of the Holocaust 
fi lm. American fi lm generally since the 1940s has struggled with understanding Nazism in 
particular and the Holocaust subsequently. For a quick history of Hollywood’s ambivalence 
and clips from these fi lms, see Daniel Anker’s 2004 documentary fi lm, ‘Imaginary Witness: 
Hollywood and the Holocaust.’
 9. The most vocal critic of the mini-series was Elie Wiesel (1978), who wrote ‘This series treats 
the Holocaust as if  it were just another event ... Auschwitz cannot be explained nor can it be 
visualized.’
10. Lanzmann remarks somewhere that the mini-series’ depiction of Jews marching stoically into 
the gas chambers ‘like ancient Romans’ sickened him.
11. The colour red is used as a symbol for blood with the little girl’s coat during the ‘liquidation’ 
of the Kraków ghetto. It reappears as her body, still wearing its red coat, is wheelbarrowed 
onto the piles of bodies now being burned outside as the arrival of some 400,000 Hungarian 
Jews as of  1944 overtaxed the burn capacity of  the crematoria. And the fi nal sequence of 
Schindler Jews paying homage at the grave of their saviour is shot in full colour.
12. A fi lm that does make the attempt to depict the gassing process and the subsequent disentangle-
ment of twisted bodies for disposal to the crematoria is Tim Blake Nelson’s ‘The Grey Zone’
(2001a), directed from his play of the same title (Blake Nelson 2001b). The idea of ‘the grey 
zone’ is famously elaborated on by Primo Levi in his book The Drowned and the Saved (1989). 
The fi lm’s credits bizarrely attribute the story to Dr Miklos Nyisli’s Auschwitz: a Doctor’s 
Eyewitness Account (1960). Given that ‘The Grey Zone’ is the story of a failed Sonderkom-
mando revolt and that Nyisli, while he does describe the Sonderkommando process, is better 
known as Mengele’s (reluctant) assistant, the attribution here is curious.
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13. However, as ‘Schindler’s List’s’ closing over titles point out: there are less than 4,000 Jews still 
alive in Poland today, whereas the 1,100 Jews saved by Schindler have 6,000 descendants.
14. Note too, as we saw with the diffi culty of establishing the number of victims of the Holocaust, 
that in Chandler’s earlier, The Tragedy of Cambodian History (1991), the estimates of how 
many died in those four fatal years is half of what it would be in the later book. It is important 
to recall as well that those who died did so ‘from warfare, starvation, overwork, misdiagnosed 
diseases, and executions’ (Chandler 1991: 1).
15. A concept drawn from the experimental studies of Stanley Milgram (1974) and others.
16. Notably the ever-perceptive J. Hoberman in The Village Voice.
17. But, as Dallaire (2004) points out, not permitted by UN rules to intervene militarily as the 
former colonial power.
18. I’m drawing here on Thion (1993).
19. But tellingly translated into 17 languages.
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The Responsibility to Report: 
a New Journalistic Paradigm
Allan Thompson
Hands rose up from the grave to grasp each coffi n, as if the dead were welcoming 
the remains of the genocide victims. The simple wooden boxes contained bones 
recovered from mass graves and pit latrines so that they could be re-interred 
during ceremonies marking the tenth anniversary of  the Rwanda genocide. 
It was 7 April 2004 in Kigali, and a gaggle of television crews, reporters and 
photographers jostled for space around a concrete tomb where victims of the 
1994 genocide were fi nally being given a dignifi ed burial. Earlier, pall bearers 
had descended into the crypt, climbing down a ladder so they could be in place 
to receive the coffi ns. The boxes were gingerly passed one by one into their fi nal 
resting place at Rwanda’s national memorial to the 1994 slaughter.
Ten years after the genocide, Rwanda was still burying its dead and represent-
atives of the international media were there, watching. Heading the dignitaries 
assembled to take part in the ceremony was Paul Kagame, president of Rwanda 
and in 1994, leader of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front, which 
ended the genocide and took over the country. Retired Canadian General 
Roméo Dallaire, who led the ill-fated United Nations mission to Rwanda during 
the catastrophe, joined Kagame at the ceremony.
Both Kagame and Dallaire could have been forgiven for asking a pointed 
question as they regarded the international media throng gathered for the 
ceremonies: where were the world’s media a decade earlier when a campaign 
to exterminate the Tutsi minority and Hutu moderates resulted in the massacre 
of more than 800,000 innocents?
In hindsight, the media shorthand for the Rwanda genocide goes something 
like this: the world community failed to intervene and abandoned Rwanda while 
dead bodies clogged the rivers and piled up on roadsides. These events were 
reported by the news media, but not very prominently. When the media fi nally 
descended on the story, it was to cover the cholera epidemic in refugee camps 
across the border in Zaire, camps populated by Hutu who fl ed Rwanda at the 
tail end of the genocide.
Looking back, it is easy to see what the news media did wrong, both inside 
Rwanda and without. Many journalists within Rwanda were implicated in 
the killing. Hate media were instrumental in the extermination campaign. 
International news media misconstrued or downplayed the Rwanda story. 
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Political fi gures, such as US President Bill Clinton (1998), later claimed that 
they did not have enough information to fully grasp what was going on in 
Rwanda. More likely, because the public was not very engaged by the Rwanda 
story, there was little pressure for leaders to do anything.
This collection of papers set out to examine the role of the news media in 
the 1994 catastrophe, inside and outside Rwanda. More than a decade later, 
are we any wiser? What has changed and what have we learned from what went 
wrong? In part, the answer lies in Darfur, the region in western Sudan widely 
acknowledged in early 2006 to be a humanitarian and human rights tragedy 
of the fi rst order. By some accounts, as many as 5,000 people continued to die 
each month in a deteriorating situation of massive atrocities against civilians, 
blamed primarily on the government and its allied Janjaweed militias. 
In the face of  reliable accounts of  what is at best ethnic cleansing and at 
worst genocide – a situation that some have described as Rwanda in slow 
motion – the world community did little. By most accounts, North American 
media have drastically underplayed the situation in western Sudan, just as 
they did in Rwanda, despite evidence of massive violations of human rights 
and a government supporting forces wreaking havoc on innocent civilians. 
Perhaps, just perhaps, content analysis would demonstrate that Darfur has 
registered on the media radar screen to a greater degree than did Rwanda. But 
it has not become a mega-story, or a media sensation. It has not captured our 
imaginations. And that signals, once again, a media failure.
For what it’s worth, the international community has shown a measure of 
contrition with regard to the events of  1994. Rwanda is now a synonym for 
the world community’s failure to intervene in the face of gross violations of 
human rights, a genocide. Rwanda is invoked repeatedly, often in sentences 
that contain the phrase ‘never again.’ Key fi gures in the Rwandan drama have 
apologized, or at least expressed regret, for their failure to act to the best of their 
abilities.1 And in large part because of Rwanda, a new paradigm emerged and 
eventually won formal recognition on the world stage. The Canadian-inspired 
doctrine called The Responsibility to Protect (ICISS 2001) was formally adopted 
by the United Nations in September 2005. (Whether it is ever put into force is 
another matter.) The doctrine was set out in the December 2001 report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. It overturns 
the notion of absolute national sovereignty when it comes to massive violations 
of  human rights and genocide, marking the fi rst time that state sovereignty 
and non-interference in internal affairs have been qualifi ed. In effect, the UN 
declaration enshrines in international law the notion that the world community 
has a right to intervene – a responsibility to protect – to stop a government 
from massive violation of the human rights of its citizens. 
But the document is virtually silent on the role of the news media, and there is 
little discussion of the part journalists and news organizations could or should 
play in the face of the kind of atrocities witnessed in Rwanda. All these years 
later, we don’t yet seem to have fi gured out that part of the puzzle. Perhaps it is 
time to advance a new paradigm for journalists: the responsibility to report. If we 
cannot adequately address the kind of structural constraints that handicapped 
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the media in the case of  Rwanda, at least we can deal with the behavioural 
aspects of the media – the way individual journalists conduct themselves. 
In the years since 1994, Rwanda has become a case study in hate media, a 
textbook example of how journalism and particularly the broadcast media can 
be perverted in the name of hate. And, since Rwanda, considerable attention 
has been devoted to defi ning how monitoring the media in zones of actual or 
potential confl ict can help policymakers to grasp more accurately what is going 
on and to use that information to frame responses with the best chance of 
preventing or mitigating violence. In Britain, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Offi ce (FCO) and BBC Monitoring (BBCM) have established a specialized 
‘tension and hate speech monitoring’ project. BBCM aims to track the world’s 
media for its clients (four main stakeholders: the BBC World Service, the 
FCO, the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Offi ce). BBCM also has a 50-
year old partnership with the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in the 
United States. In August 2002, BBCM began intensively monitoring media 
in 15 countries of interest, then providing monthly transcripts. A small-scale 
project, begun in September 2003, involved a focus on media and hate speech 
and incitement in the former Soviet Union, Israel–Palestine, Kosovo, Albania 
and Côte d’Ivoire.2
Clearly, media monitoring for hate speech has taken on a high profi le because 
of Rwanda. As one observer quipped, we are all now well prepared to stop the 
Rwanda genocide – ten years too late.3 And yet, what are the chances of once 
again coming across such a textbook example of hate media and incitement 
as Rwanda? We should probably be focused on media interventions that come 
much earlier in the trajectory that culminates in hate media. In fact, rather than 
using monitoring reports to try and shut down media outlets, a more useful 
exercise would be to use the material to design programmes to improve media 
standards, conduct media training and develop codes of conduct for journalists 
– behavioural rather than structural solutions. 
More than a decade after the genocide, the media sector in Rwanda is still 
in need of this kind of assistance with training and development. There was 
no school of journalism in Rwanda until the late 1990s. Before the genocide, 
Rwanda’s journalists were either professionally trained outside the country or 
trained ‘on the job’, in some cases with seminars and workshops to improve 
their skills. The School of  Journalism and Communication was founded in 
1996 at the National University of Rwanda in Butare. In early 2006, Carleton 
University’s School of Journalism and Communication launched a collaborative 
effort with its counterpart in Butare to work together on staffi ng and curriculum 
development through a project called The Rwanda Initiative. 
But efforts to foster a more professional media sector in Rwanda come 
at a time when respect for human rights and press freedom in the country 
is a genuine cause for concern. Major human rights organizations, such as 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have been highly critical of 
the Kagame government’s treatment of  human rights organizations and the 
news media. The government has been accused of an intimidation campaign 
that prompted Rwanda’s primary human rights organization, LIPRODHOR, 
436 AFTER THE GENOCIDE AND THE WAY FORWARD
to close its doors in early 2005 (AI 2005). Amnesty International accused the 
Rwandan government of ‘inappropriately manipulating the concept of genocide 
to silence not only organizations and individuals critical of  the government 
but organizations who have a close relationship with the Rwandese people and 
whose loyalty the government questions’ (AI 2004a). And in November 2004, 
Amnesty International urged the government of Rwanda to do its utmost to 
foster the independence of the press and to refrain from using the law to repress 
journalistic activities (AI 2004b). Reporters Without Borders went so far as to 
label President Kagame an enemy of press freedom. More than a decade after 
a genocide that deeply implicated the news media, there are still lessons to be 
learned in Rwanda.
What lessons have the international media drawn from the debacle of Rwanda? 
Like other international actors, the news media have been slow to acknowledge 
their failures during the genocide. Journalists tend to look forward, not back. 
For that reason, it took nearly 60 years for The New York Times to come to terms 
with the impact of its coverage of the Nazi Holocaust. In a 14 November 2001 
feature headed ‘Turning Away From the Holocaust,’ former Times executive 
editor Max Frankel described the infl uential newspaper’s ‘staggering, stunning 
failure’ to properly depict Hitler’s methodical extermination of  the Jews of 
Europe. Frankel noted that only six times in nearly six years did the front page 
of the Times mention Jews as Hitler’s unique target for total annihilation. Sound 
familiar? The belated media mea culpa about coverage of the Holocaust has 
not been replicated when it comes to Rwanda, despite all the evidence of an 
abysmal media failure.
Instead, history continues to repeat itself. Stories like Rwanda continue to 
be downplayed. Year after year, the international news media devote less and 
less attention to foreign affairs, with the exception of  the ‘big’ stories, such 
as the war in Iraq, the war on terror or the disaster du jour. Claude Moisy, 
former chairman and general manager of Agence France-Presse, described an 
inescapable paradox that ‘the amazing increase in the capacity to produce and 
distribute news from distant lands has been met by an obvious decrease in its 
consumption’ (Moisy 1997). Writing in the late 1990s, Moisy described a clear 
pattern: with the exception of a surge of international coverage in 1990 and 1991 
due to the fi rst Gulf War, the number and length of foreign topics covered in 
the evening news had declined far below Cold War levels. In early 2006, chances 
are that a rigorous content analysis would show, pound for pound, a signifi cant 
up-tick in media coverage of foreign affairs. But factor out the overwhelming 
focus on Iraq and we are almost certainly looking at a continuation of the trend 
away from media coverage of international affairs. 
Once again, journalists and critics cite a number of  factors affecting the 
limited coverage of  Darfur: the diffi culty of  getting into the region, tight 
budgets, the news focus on the war in Iraq and the presumed lack of audience 
interest in Africa (Ricchiardi 2005). For example, one researcher calculated 
that the nightly newscasts of ABC, CBS and NBC devote a total of roughly 
24,900 minutes to news each year – an average of 20 minutes of news in each of 
these newscasts every night. In 2004, all three networks combined aired a total 
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of only 26 minutes on fi ghting in Sudan, which has been described by some 
as genocide. (ABC devoted 18 minutes to Darfur coverage, NBC 5 and CBS 
only 3.) By contrast, houseware maven Martha Stewart’s legal woes garnered 
130 minutes of nightly news coverage (Tyndall Report 2004). More recently, a 
quantitative monitoring of all news segments aired in June 2005 on ABC, CBS, 
NBC, CNN, FoxNews and MSNBC demonstrated that coverage of  Darfur 
was overshadowed by reporting on the so-called ‘runaway bride’ (the Georgia 
woman who drove across the country and concocted a fake kidnapping to escape 
her wedding in April 2005), the Michael Jackson trial and Tom Cruise’s new 
movie and relationship with actress Katie Holmes.4
The shocking thing about these fi ndings is that they no longer shock us. They 
haven’t shocked us for a long time. In fact, we now take this kind of  media 
coverage for granted. There is a vast academic literature on media coverage of 
international affairs and more specifi cally, coverage of Africa and the developing 
world. Some go at this empirically, with an eye to fi guring out what the news 
media are actually doing. Others take a normative approach, prescribing what 
the media and journalists should do. We need more of both lines of enquiry.
But the problem with media prescriptions is that they are often so general 
that they are beyond implementation. In essence, the prescriptions end up being 
variants on the symptoms: news organizations should devote more resources 
to coverage of Africa and the developing world; the media should train more 
professionals in coverage of  confl ict and development issues; news from the 
developing world should be given more prominence on news pages and in 
broadcasts; news organizations should deploy more full-time foreign corre-
spondents; rather than just covering wars, the media should pay more attention 
before a confl ict erupts and after the fact, examine efforts at confl ict resolution 
and ways the news media could actually support reconciliation and peace (for 
examples of this prescriptive approach, see Carnegie Commission 1997: 121–3 
and Manoff 1997).
All of these prescriptions are really just reworded descriptions of the problem. 
Clearly, we need more information and more fi rst-hand, eyewitness reporting 
from places like Darfur. We need to hear more and different voices. But how 
can we make that happen? Who moves the media? And what is ‘the media’ 
anyway? How can we talk coherently about such a disparate, diverse group of 
commercial and state enterprises that differ vastly across continents? Media 
organizations are populated by individual journalists, editors, media executives 
and others. More broadly speaking, ‘the media’ includes anyone who can apply 
some code of professional standards and disseminate news and information. 
So is it even realistic to look for discernible patterns of coverage in the media 
with an eye to recommending a different course of action?
And yet, some simple truths seem to be borne out by the evidence, and one 
of those truths is that media coverage does matter. There is a vast literature on 
how media coverage infl uences or is interwoven with foreign policy decisions: 
either directly through the provision of information that ignites public opinion 
(the so-called ‘CNN effect’) or indirectly through what Bernard Cohen (1963) 
described as the media’s remarkable agenda-setting power to instruct people 
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as to what they should be thinking about. Others have suggested that media 
infl uence is most likely to occur when policy is uncertain and media coverage is 
critically framed and empathizes with suffering people. But when policymakers 
have made up their minds and a policy track has been chosen, the news media 
can have much less infl uence (Robinson 2000: 614). We probably can’t resolve 
the debate over whether media reports prod decision-makers into action or 
simply manufacture consent, but there can be no disagreement about the fact 
that more coverage of  an issue or a region is more likely to generate policy 
action than less coverage (for more on this, consult Robinson 2002 and Wanta 
et al. 2004). 
Media coverage, or lack of it, also matters in the inverse. The media glare 
of  the big story casts a deep shadow on its fringes. Some argue that rather 
than seeking to measure the impact of media coverage, we should pay more 
attention to the ‘nether world of absence of news’ (Sonwalkar 2004: 207) and 
what happens when the news media methodically downplay or ignore a story.
The crux of the Rwanda piece is that more extensive media coverage might 
have made a difference, might have pushed international actors to do something 
in the spring of 1994. Roméo Dallaire argues that media coverage of Rwanda 
never gained momentum during the genocide, never reached the kind of critical 
mass needed to move leaders. That momentum only emerged in July 1994, when 
media descended in droves to cover the plight of  those living in the refugee 
camps in Goma and sparked an international response. 
We keep asking ourselves, why did the news media clamber to cover Biafra 
in 1968, Ethiopia in 1984, Somalia in 1992–93, but not the Rwanda genocide? 
And why have news media systematically downplayed events in Sudan for the 
past two decades and virtually ignored other locales (Livingston 1996)?
Could the answer be that ‘the media’, writ large, the ‘cyclops’ as some have 
called it (Bierbauer 1994), can only focus its gaze on one major story at a time? 
And in choosing such stories, are journalists more likely to seize on a simple, 
dramatic storyline, featuring good and evil, without the complexities of ethnicity 
and power politics to clutter the narrative?
According to analysis of 200 English-language newspapers worldwide, the 
2004 tsunami in South East Asia generated more column inches in six weeks 
than the world’s top ten ‘forgotten’ emergencies combined over the previous 
year (IFRC 2005). The media blitz prompted unprecedented generosity. By 
February 2005, the international community had donated US$ 500 for every 
person affected by the tsunami, compared with just 50 cents for each person 
affected by Uganda’s 18-year war (IFRC 2005). Why did the tsunami and 
the subsequent relief  efforts generate so many headlines? There was a simple 
storyline – a natural disaster. There were no complex political relationships to 
explain. And even though events were unfolding on the other side of the world, 
the tsunami met some ‘proximity’ criteria for Western news editors because 
many Western tourists were involved.
In World Disasters Report 2005, the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies put it bluntly: ‘Editors sort stories by death tolls. 
Disasters that are unusual yet explicable, and that cause considerable death or 
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destruction in accessible places which the audience is believed to care about, get 
covered. Baffl ing stories get less attention’ (IFRC 2005). Rwanda was a baffl ing 
story, as is Darfur. As the Red Cross points out, news can be driven by ratings 
and circulation. So TV news is part news and part entertainment. No surprise 
then that ‘sudden, dramatic disasters like volcanoes or tsunamis are intensely 
newsworthy, whereas long-drawn-out crises (diffi cult to describe, let alone fi lm) 
are not.’ By that score, the estimated 3.8 million deaths in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo since 1998 from war, disease and malnutrition have generated 
scant media coverage. But the dramatic eruption of the Nyiragongo volcano 
near Goma in early 2002 sparked an infl ux of journalists, even though it killed 
fewer than 100 people. 
But when the cyclops turns its ‘monocular gaze’, the news media can become 
a major humanitarian actor, particularly, as Piers Robinson (2000) points out, 
when decision-makers are uncertain how to proceed. But that media role is 
very ill-defi ned and hard to predict with any degree of certainty. That is in part 
because the media are no less complex as an institution than government or 
humanitarian organizations. And yet, most studies treat the news media as a 
monolithic actor (Minear et al. 1994: 31). As Minear and colleagues suggest, 
rather than seeing the media as an actor with a purpose, it is probably more 
instructive to see the media as an institution with a process. And that process is 
inclined toward gatekeeping principles regarding what is news and what is not, 
what warrants the cost of news coverage and is likely to garner the interest of the 
audience (Chang and Lee 1992). And often, media attention to one emergency 
comes at the expense of another. The devastating earthquake in Pakistan in 
the autumn of 2005 overshadowed coverage of the hurricane and mudslides in 
Guatemala, just as, in some ways, Michael Jackson overshadowed Darfur.
And ironically, the 24-hour news cycle, rather than leading to more in-depth, 
comprehensive reporting, has arguably driven coverage in the other direction 
– toward fl eeting, episodic encounters with events outside our daily lives. That 
makes the news media a bad early warning system. As journalists, we seem to 
be best at recording and reporting confl ict once it has reached a certain pitch, 
by acting as witnesses to genocide and other atrocities. The economics of the 
news business is a key factor here. Although it would seem to make sense to 
go where the news is about to happen, to get ahead of the story, we are more 
likely to go where the news is happening, where confl ict has broken out. It is a 
sure bet; you’re not going to buy a plane ticket and end up with no story. Not 
much preventive value there. Journalists react to the same impulses as political 
decision-makers, and confl icts often show up on journalists’ radar screen at 
about the same time as that of the decision-makers and diplomats – or more 
likely much later.
Not surprisingly, journalists largely refl ect the societies in which they live and 
share the same ambivalence toward what is going on outside their borders, the 
same focus on domestic issues and selected international issues that are deemed 
to be relevant. In my view, it is up to individual journalists to crawl outside 
their skin, to get beyond that domestic focus and to exercise their role fully. Just 
as nation states have begrudgingly acknowledged the Responsibility to Protect
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– driven by the simple realization that we have a responsibility to others – I 
think journalists, as individuals, must accept the responsibility to report.
I suppose my simple point is that we’ve been lamenting for three decades 
how ‘the media’ fail to cover stories like Rwanda and Darfur. I echo the lament, 
which is backed up by a stream of qualitative and quantitative research. But 
normative prescriptions for what ‘the media’ should be doing differently have 
little application. Could it be that everyone is going about it the wrong way, 
looking top-down at the media, which is an amorphous, disparate beast anyway, 
when they should be looking from the ground up, at individual journalists and 
the role they can play?
British journalist-cum-politician Martin Bell (1998) has spoken about 
the ‘journalism of  attachment’, a call for empathy with humanity among 
journalists, something that some regard as an affront to the classical notion of 
journalistic objectivity and neutrality. But surely journalists can talk about an 
ethic of responsibility, a responsibility to report on people, places and events 
that have been excluded from the agenda of news organizations for a myriad 
of reasons. Surely individual journalists can try to make a difference, even if  
news organizations and the media are unable or unwilling to fully exercise 
their role. 
Journalists such as Nicholas Kristof of The New York Times and Sudarsan 
Raghavan – now with the Washington Post and formerly Africa correspondent 
for Knight Ridder – have made it their mission to keep the Darfur story on the 
world’s radar screen. They have demonstrated that individual journalists can 
make a difference. Canadian journalist Stephanie Nolen, Africa correspondent 
for the Globe and Mail newspaper, has single-handedly kept the issue of HIV/
AIDS on the Canadian agenda through dogged, persistent reporting on a 
scourge that is decimating Africa in its own kind of  genocide. In my own 
way, during 17 years as a reporter with the Toronto Star – Canada’s largest 
circulation daily newspaper – I made every effort to use my position to interest 
the newspaper’s powerful editors in stories that were not immediately on their 
radar screen, stories that took me on assignment to such places as Rwanda, 
Somalia, Sierra Leone and Kazakhstan. My personal interest and sense of 
responsibility as a journalist were shaped by a seminal experience in the early 
1990s, when a development organization saw fi t to invest in me and fi nanced a 
media internship that took me to Africa for an extended period. 
Since then, at every opportunity I have urged development assistance 
agencies, government and nongovernmental organizations, and advocates 
interested in media coverage of  the developing world to invest in individual 
journalists – those new to the profession and also veterans – by endowing 
research grants, fellowships and awards that make it possible for journalists 
to visit the developing world or to explore areas that otherwise fall into that 
nether world of media absence. In my experience, journalists exposed to the 
developing world want to go back again and again. And their reporting can 
make a difference.5
In the carnage in Rwanda in 1994, individual journalists tried to fulfi l their 
mandate, even though they were constrained by the chaos and the world’s 
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indifference. Thomas Kamilindi, who quit his job at Radio Rwanda on the eve 
of the genocide, wrote in this collection of his attempts to reach the outside 
world from his hiding place in the Milles Collines Hotel. Kamilindi kept trying 
the phone lines until he could get on the air and describe what was happening 
on the streets of  Kigali. One of  the attempts on Kamilindi’s life came after 
he managed to get through to radio colleagues in France and describe the 
atrocities in Rwanda. Imagine the impact if  journalists of good conscience, like 
Kamilindi, had been able to publish blogs in 1994, to circumvent the media 
inertia of budgets, racism and competing news interests. 
Another Rwandan journalist, whose identity remains unknown, managed 
to capture on videotape some of  the atrocities in the streets of  Kigali. The 
journalist, believed to have been a camera operator with Rwandan television 
at the time, travelled with a group of Interahamwe through the streets of Kigali 
at some point in April 1994. According to one report, the camera operator 
had apparently befriended members of  the death squads, even though he 
was opposed to the killing. As a journalist, he took considerable risk to gain 
permission to ride with the death squads through the streets of Kigali, fi lming 
some of the scenes and capturing rare footage that has become the mainstay 
of later documentary accounts of the genocide and a key part of the historical 
record (Hughes 1998). The world needs more journalists like Kamilindi and 
the unknown Rwandan TV camera operator.
The concept of media intervention to foster a more highly professional cadre 
of journalists in the developing world fl ourished in the decade after the Rwanda 
genocide. In 2003, Ross Howard, an associate at the Vancouver-based Institute 
for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS) estimated that in the previous 
ten years, US$ 1 billion had been invested in media-related interventions in 
confl ict-stressed societies. Howard (2003) pointed to the emerging belief  that 
news media may well be the most effective means of preventing war and confl ict. 
Such media interventions abound. The Washington-based Search for Common 
Ground and its European counterpart operate radio studios in Burundi, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, producing news, features, drama, music and speciality soap 
operas for social change as well as television productions. The organization also 
supports media training workshops in Africa, the Middle East and the Aegean 
region. The Panos network of organizations works to stimulate debate around 
key development issues, in part through a media programme. The network 
includes offi ces in the Caribbean, Eastern Africa, London, Paris, South Asia, 
Southern Africa, Washington DC and West Africa, with a combined staff  of 
well over 100 people. Vancouver-based IMPACS supports programmes to foster 
free, responsible, independent media in emerging democracies by enhancing the 
contribution of the media to democratic development, good governance and 
public sector accountability. The Soros Foundation’s Open Society Institute, 
the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting and others are also 
active in vital media training. 
We need more voices, more fi rst-hand accounts of events from journalists in 
the North and the South. Technology makes the arguments about newsroom 
budgets increasingly less relevant. Simply put, it is much, much cheaper to travel 
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to the developing world and do journalism than it used to be. And why not use 
more locally based correspondents as well? Isn’t it about time that Western news 
organizations re-examined their assumption that visiting foreign correspondents 
are of more value than locally based journalists?
One need look no further than the body of work of journalists like Sorious 
Samura, the documentary fi lm-maker originally from Sierra Leone who has 
made it his mission to tell African stories. Samura’s very personal and engaged 
form of journalism has resulted in documentaries broadcast widely in North 
America and Europe on such topics as the atrocities of Sierra Leone’s civil war, 
the real stories of people living with hunger in Ethiopia, the plight of refugees 
in Darfur, the exodus of migrants through North Africa and the scourge of 
HIV/AIDS in a country like Zambia. Samura’s work is powerful and emotional 
stuff. But it also far exceeds the professional threshold for broadcast to an 
international audience. Surely he is not the only journalist in Africa capable 
of producing top-quality material for a Northern audience.
And Africans don’t just need to tell their stories to the outside world. They 
need to tell them to each other. For decades, London-based Gemini News 
Service pioneered the notion of  South–South journalism, maintaining a 
network of  journalists in the developing world. These local correspondents 
fi led their copy to Gemini’s London offi ce, where it was edited, packaged and 
transmitted through Gemini to be published elsewhere in the developing world. 
Gemini broke the cycle of dependence that previously forced many Southern 
news outlets to see themselves through stories written by reporters from the 
North. And in turn, Gemini News Service provided some news organizations 
in the developed world – such as The Toronto Star and Southam News Service 
in Canada – with a steady stream of quality news features written by authors 
based in the developing world. One of Gemini’s most innovative projects was a 
village reporting exercise that saw more than 15 reporters from such countries 
as India, Sri Lanka, Fiji and Lesotho head off  to spend two months living in 
a village to report on daily life.
Gemini was truly a pioneer in recruiting and cultivating homegrown 
journalists and using them as correspondents to report on matters of interest 
to developing countries. Gemini’s founder, former Daily Mail journalist Derek 
Ingram, always objected to the notion that he was running an alternative news 
agency. He wanted Gemini to be regarded as a mainstream source of  copy 
that would also appeal to newspapers in the developed world (for an excellent 
history of  Gemini News Service, see Bourne 1995). Along the way, Gemini 
served as a springboard for legions of promising young journalists from the 
developing world as well as a generation of young Canadians who worked at 
the news agency through fellowships funded by the International Development 
Research Centre.6 Sadly, Gemini struggled for years to be fi nancially viable and 
fi nally closed its doors in 2003 after nearly 30 years in operation. Perhaps it is 
time for an agency like Gemini News Service to be reborn.
Other individual journalists are joining forces to try to make innovative use of 
new technology and web-based information platforms to bring the stories of the 
developing world to a wider audience. Early in this century, news consumers were 
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introduced to the ‘blog’, short for weblog. These online journals by individual 
writers usually consist of frequently updated commentaries, posted to a World 
Wide Web address. Now, millions of bloggers are sharing their opinions with 
a global audience in postings that combine content drawn from mainstream 
media and the web. As Daniel Drezner and Henry Farrell (2004) suggest in a 
recent paper, ‘What began as a hobby is evolving into a new medium that is 
changing the landscape for journalists and policymakers alike.’
Drezner and Farrell argue that blogs are gaining more infl uence over the 
content of international media coverage, primarily through their agenda-setting 
function and by focusing on new or neglected issues. ‘Increasingly, journalists 
and pundits take their cues about “what matters” in the world from weblogs. For 
salient topics in global affairs, the blogosphere functions as a rare combination 
of  distributed expertise, real-time collective response to breaking news, and 
public-opinion barometer,’ they write. 
And television networks, with their notoriously top-heavy news operations, 
have begun to deploy ‘video journalists’, or VJs, individual journalists who 
carry small hand-held cameras and shoot and edit their own material. The work 
of some of these VJs is akin to a televised blog, with a mainstream connection. 
In Canada, the national broadcaster, CBC-Television, has deployed video 
journalist Saša Petricic in this way. Another such effort is the International 
Reporting Project at the Johns Hopkins University School of  Advanced 
International Studies (see the International Reporting Project website at 
<www.journalismfellowships.org/>). The group proposes a new programme 
concept for international news, an approach designed to bypass current 
distribution systems and build a new audience. The project aims to produce a 
new international news series using small teams of video journalists to explore 
an array of political, economic, health and cultural issues in a given country 
each month. The plan is to produce content for multiple platforms – including 
television, the Internet, DVDs, print and radio – and to promote it aggressively. 
For its part, Carleton University has expanded its Rwanda Initiative to include 
a media internship programme for Canadian journalism students who want to 
do work terms with a news organization in Africa. The initiative is also helping 
student journalists in Rwanda to produce freelance material for an outside 
audience.
It is diffi cult to fashion a strategy to deal with the structural fl aws in the news 
media that resulted in the failure to provide adequate coverage of the Rwanda 
genocide or the crisis in Darfur. But surely that diffi culty should not prevent 
us from trying to change the structure one small piece at a time, through the 
work of individual journalists. This is a rallying cry to those who call themselves 
journalists, who practise this profession. Rwandan journalist Thomas Kamilindi 
recounts an encounter he had in Côte d’Ivoire with a group of young reporters 
who wondered how to avoid being drawn into the hate media in their country. 
Kamilindi’s admonition was simple: stand up and be reporters, do your job. He 
is echoed by Roméo Dallaire, who reminds journalists that they can be powerful 
individually and collectively and must stay dynamic in the search for truth. As 
Maxwell McCombs notes in a recent review of the literature on media agenda-
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setting, the space on the media agenda and public attention to that agenda 
are both rare commodities. ‘Setting the agenda is an awesome responsibility,’ 
McCombs (2005: 556) concludes. ‘Arguably the most fundamental, overarching 
ethical question for journalists concerns their stewardship of these resources.’ 
This collection of papers ends on a simple note, a plea to journalists: do your 
job, use the power that this profession affords and take up your responsibilities, 
starting with the responsibility to report.
NOTES
1. United Nations Secretary General Kofi  Annan used remarks to a 26 March 2004 memorial 
conference on the genocide, held at the UN headquarters in New York, to declare that he 
personally should have done more to ‘sound the alarm and rally support’, for Rwanda; Bill 
Clinton used the 25 March 1998 speech in Kigali to acknowledge that the international 
community must bear its share of responsibility for the genocide, didn’t act quickly enough and 
did not call the crimes by their rightful name: genocide; Roméo Dallaire has stated on numerous 
occasions since 1994 that he feels he failed personally to fulfi l his mission in Rwanda.
2. The author took part in a 25 May 2004 roundtable discussion in London, conducted under 
Chatham House rules of  non-attribution, during which the BBCM tension and hate speech 
project was described in detail. The roundtable – Hate speech, incitement and confl ict: can 
media monitoring help prevent violence? – was organized by Oxford University’s Programme 
in Comparative Media Law and Policy.
3. The remark was made by one of the participants in the May 2004, London roundtable.
4. Research compiled by the American Progress Action Fund, which operates the BeAWitness.org 
website. Research for the June 2005 analysis was conducted using the TVEyes media tracking 
service <www.TVEyes.com>.
5. For example, the author made this argument in testimony before the Senate Standing Committee 
on Transport and Communications on 1 December 2004, in the context of  the committee’s 
examination of the current state of the news media in Canada (Senate 2004). 
6. The author took up one of IDRC’s Gemini internships in 1990–91 and worked as a copy-editor 
and writer at Gemini for eight months in addition to making a fi ve-month fi eld trip to North 
Africa to examine the fl edgling Arab Maghreb Union. The time at Gemini was a formative 
experience.
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